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
Standard English Compendium & Translation
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HISTORY OF THE WAR


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CHAPTER LXXX.

THE INTERVENTION OF ITALY.

ORIGIN AND HISTORY OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE—ITALY'S POSITION AND RELATIONS WITH OTHER POWERS—THE TRIPOLI AND BALKAN WARS—ITALIAN POLICY IN 1914—HER PROTESTS AGAINST AUSTRO-GERMAN ACTION—HISTORY OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH AUSTRIA—REASON OF THEIR FAILURE—END OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE—OPINION IN ITALY—THE GIOLITTI INTRIGUES—ITALY JOINS THE ALLIES—PUBLIC ENTHUSIASM.

FOR a dozen years at least before the Great War it had been one of the commonplaces of European politics that the Italian alliance with Germany and Austria was unnatural, and against the best interests of Italy. The old unforgotten enmity with Austria and the persistence of the Irredentist problem were alone enough to prevent anything more than a formal bond between Rome and Vienna. Italy, moreover, was a democratic State, in a sense perhaps even more democratic than republican France, while the Central Empires were politically unfree, still based essentially upon royal and aristocratic domination of the people. Ties of race and of culture suggested France as a natural ally. Great Britain, France, and Italy held, broadly, similar ideals of liberty and progress. Between Great Britain and Italy there existed a long tradition of sympathy and friendship, which was strengthened by the factor of common interests in the Mediterranean.

Such arguments were sound as far as they went, but they ignored the history of the Triple Alliance and the events which led up to it. They ignored, moreover, the dangers which threatened Italy if she should endeavour to resume liberty of action.

During the ten years which followed the occupation of Rome by the troops of united Italy, the foreign policy of Italy was directed

Vol. V.—Part 53.

rather to preserving good relations with all her neighbours than to cultivating special friendship with any one Power. The party of the Right, which fell in 1876, had always maintained its Francophil tradition, though the attitude of France under Thiers had put a severe strain upon the relations between the two countries. The accession to power of the Left, under Depretis, might have been expected to bring about a change in Italian foreign policy. For ten years the Left had advocated an alliance with Prussia, and Bismarck had on more than one occasion practised the policy of maintaining direct relations with the Italian opposition, which was to prove so disastrous to German influence when attempted in the hour of crisis that saw the final exit of Italy from the Triple Alliance.

The Left disappointed the expectations of Berlin and Vienna. Depretis adopted an extremely conciliatory attitude towards France, in spite of the provocation given by French Clericalism on the still living question of the Temporal Power. The idea of the Left seems to have been that Italy could rely upon the rivalry of her neighbours to secure her own interests. The results of the Berlin Congress might well have shattered the dream, for the Austrian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Anglo-Turkish agreement, which placed Cyprus in the hands of Great Britain, were both in clear opposition to Italian policy. But the



THE KING OF ITALY.

[Guigoni & Bossi.]

dream persisted for a few years more. Though Italy had long had her eyes fixed on the North African littoral, her rulers could not see that she was in danger of being anticipated. They went so far as to refuse the suggestion of Austria, Germany and Russia that Italy should occupy Tunis, and perhaps believed that this offer practically amounted to an Italian lien upon the Regency. They did not know their Bismarck. The suggestion was inspired by the idea of embroiling Italy and France, and when Italy declined to follow his advice, Bismarck turned round and made the same proposal to France. Before the Berlin Congress broke up, Tunis was lost to Italy. A verbal agreement had been made between Lord Salisbury and M. Waddington that France should be free to occupy Tunisia, "when convenient."

During the years immediately following Italy had fair warning of French intentions regarding Tunis, and it was even indicated to

the Italian Ambassador in Paris where she might look for compensation. In July, 1880, Freycinet spoke very clearly: "Why will you persist in thinking of Tunis, where your rivalry may one day cause a breach in our friendly relations? Why not turn your attention to Tripoli, where you would have neither ourselves nor anyone else to contend with?"

Cairoli and Depretis, who shared power between them during this period, failed to recognize the inevitable trend of events. In the spring of 1881 France sent an expedition to Tunis on the pretext of punishing the Krumir tribe for an attack upon a French force on the Algerian frontier, and on May 12 the signature of the treaty of Bardo established a French protectorate over Tunisia.

Italian resentment was naturally very keen. Tunis had long been regarded, by informed opinion in Italy, as a legitimate sphere of Italian influence. More than 50,000 Italians



THE QUEEN OF ITALY.


[Guigoni & Bossi.]

had settled in the Regency, and Italy's claim to eventual annexation, or to the declaration of a protectorate, was certainly stronger than that of France, which was founded upon the necessity of protecting the Algerian frontier from real or fancied disturbance.

The Cairoli Government fell immediately. The policy of isolation had proved a disastrous failure, and the conviction rapidly grew that the only way to safeguard Italian interests was to cultivate close relations with Germany and Austria. Depretis, who had succeeded Cairoli, perceived the necessity of a move in this direction, but he was loth to relinquish his belief that Italy could at the same time maintain cordial relations with France. The strongest line was taken by the centre, a small group led by Sidney Sonnino, who maintained that Italy's best course was to conclude a definite alliance with the Central Empires, and at the same time come to an understanding

with Great Britain regarding the Mediterranean. This policy was first put before the public on May 29, 1881, in the *Rassegna Settimanale*, in an article attributed to Sonnino himself.

Mancini, Foreign Minister in the Depretis Cabinet, was for a time unwilling to alienate France by a definite adhesion to the Austro-German alliance which had been formed in 1879. But the policy of isolation, of equal friendship with all the Powers, daily became more clearly untenable. The Tunis question seemed to make a *rapprochement* between France and Italy impossible, but Bismarck feared that Gambetta, who had succeeded Ferry, might take steps to conciliate Italy. He arranged for a German Press campaign in favour of reopening the Roman question, and though the Italian Government faced the threat with spirit, the conviction grew that an alliance with Germany and Austria was the only means of securing the position of Italy in



A REGIMENT OF BERSAGLIERI IN ROME.
The troops on the famous Garibaldi statue, cheering their King and Country.

Europe. Such an alliance would put an end to the possibility of attack from Austria; above all, it would prevent further aggression on the part of France.

Advances were first made to Germany, but Bismarck is reported to have said to Count de Lannay, the Italian Ambassador in Berlin, that the way to Berlin lay through Vienna. Early in 1882 conversations were opened in Vienna, at the instance of the Austrian Foreign Minister, but they did not progress favourably, owing to the unwillingness of Count Kálnoky to guarantee to Italy the possession of the Papal territories, and to an equal unwillingness on the part of Mancini to acquiesce formally in the Austrian tenure of Trieste and the Trentino. Mancini, moreover, desired the support of the Central Empires for Italian interests in the Mediterranean, a proposal which Kálnoky declined to consider. Bismarck finally interposed. The principle of reciprocal territorial guarantees was accepted, but Italy had to relinquish the idea of any pledge of support in the Mediterranean, though it was agreed that the contracting parties should act in friendly consultation with one another in all questions touching their special interests. The Treaty of Alliance was signed on May 20, 1882, but its existence was not made public till March, 1883.

It is often maintained that at first no new alliance was made, but that Italy simply adhered to the existing agreement between Germany and Austria, which was eventually published by Bismarck in 1888. Of late years it has been believed that the alliance was subsequently converted into three separate pacts, between Germany and Austria, Germany and Italy, and Italy and Austria, but the publication of various provisions of the alliance after Italy's declaration of war against Austria on May 23, 1915, shows that it eventually became a single treaty. It is said that the alliance consisted of three separate parts: a general treaty between the Governments for a definite period of years; a confirmatory pact between the Sovereigns, which required to be signed afresh by each successor to the throne; and a military convention.

The first term of the Triple Alliance brought little comfort to Italy. France remained resolutely hostile, while the new allies seemed far from friendly. Italy's value in the alliance was largely discounted by the Treaty of Skierniewice, signed on March 21, 1884, by which Bismarck secured the benevolent neu-

trality of Austria and Russia in the event of Germany being forced to make war upon a fourth Power. Italy was treated as a very junior partner, whose admittance into the firm had begun to be regretted by the seniors. She had undertaken certain obligations, but the real object of her entrance into the alliance was in no way assured to her. In Crispi's words, she "still stood alone in defence of her own interests."

The natural result was an attempt to come to an understanding with Great Britain in regard to the Mediterranean. By the autumn of 1886 Bismarck had convinced himself that the renewal of the Triple Alliance was desirable, but Count di Robilant, who had become Foreign Secretary a year earlier, declined to consider a renewal on the original terms. He is supposed to have secured a more satisfactory form of partnership in the treaty which was signed on March 17, 1887. His most important achievement was the negotiation of a parallel understanding with Great Britain, which is believed to have provided for common action by the British and Italian fleets in the Mediterranean in the event of war. In any case, from 1887 onwards the British and Italian Governments acted in perfect accord over Mediterranean questions. The policy advocated by Sonnino six years before had definitely triumphed.

Italy was now in a position to play an important part in Europe. The alliance with Germany and Austria and the understanding with England made her able to face France fairly, on an equal footing, and the knowledge of this fact on the part of both Powers was a necessary prelude to the establishment of satisfactory relations. Again, as the link between Great Britain and the Central Powers, Italy had a value for her allies that promised greater consideration for Italian interests at their hands. Crispi seized the opportunity, and under his guidance Italy began to realize her future. When Crispi fell, a Radical campaign was started against the renewal of the Triple Alliance, but in June, 1891, nearly a year before the expiry of the second term, it was renewed, on the initiative of Berlin, for a period of twelve years. On this occasion the Italian Prime Minister, Rudini, endeavoured to insert the proviso that if Great Britain should be one of the Powers whose declaration of hostilities against Austria or Germany meant involving Italy in war, Italy should be released



GENERAL COUNT LUIGI CADORNA,
Commander-in-Chief of the Italian Armies.

[M. Crano-Pisculli.]

from the obligations of the treaty. Germany declined to include this as a clause of the treaty, but the proposal was recorded and filed with the treaty as a protocol.

This period saw the gradual establishment of better relations with France. The Commercial Treaty signed in 1898 put an end to a tariff war that had lasted for ten years, and in 1900 Visconti Venosta succeeded in establishing a *détente* with France regarding the vexed question of the Tripolitan hinterland.

Two years later his successor, Prinetti, negotiated the agreement which gave Italy a free hand in Tripolitania in return for a recognition of French predominance in Morocco, an agreement which was followed shortly afterwards by a definite understanding with Great Britain regarding Tripolitania.

There were various rumours regarding the two years which preceded the third renewal of the Triple Alliance in 1902. The most interesting is that which asserts that for nearly two

years after his accession to the throne the present King of Italy declined to put his signature to the "dynastic agreement." Ultimately, however, the alliance was renewed at Venice in June, 1902, for a further period of twelve years, and the protocol regarding Great Britain was destroyed.

But circumstances were changing. Germany had no mind that Italy should claim an equal partnership in the Triple Alliance, and Italy, now firmer on her feet, was not content with a position in which her obligations seemed to outweigh her advantages. Her allies had shown little inclination to support her Mediterranean ambitions, and she had been forced to look elsewhere in order to safeguard her interests in this quarter. Nor had the alliance wrought any real improvement in her relations with Austria. The Italians in the "unredeemed" provinces were the object of continual petty persecutions on the part of the Austrian authorities, and the question was made more acute by Austrian encouragement of the Slavonic element to the detriment of the Italian. A further cause of friction lay in the Austrian attitude to the Vatican. French clericalism, and the danger it constituted to the Italian State, had died out. Austrian clericalism threatened to take its place. Austria had succeeded France as "Eldest Daughter of the Church," and though the relations between Vatican and Quirinal had greatly improved, there were still chances for mischief-makers. A third point at issue was the Balkan question. On this rock the leaking barque of the Triple Alliance was finally to split, but for a number of years it had been clear that Italian and Austrian interests in the Balkans were growing more and more divergent. It was known that there was an agreement, a self-denying ordinance, in regard to Albania, and it was afterwards revealed that there were definite engagements concerning the whole of the Balkan question. But Austria behaved as though these engagements did not exist. In Albania particularly, a diligent Austrian propaganda was carried on. In self-defence Italy followed suit, and the remarkable spectacle presented itself of two allied Powers, bound both by general and by special engagements conducting rival campaigns of "peaceful penetration" in territory which both had agreed that neither should occupy.

The Mürzsteg agreement of 1903 was a blow to Italian interests in the Balkans, for the

establishment of Austrian and Russian financial agents in Macedonia was a definite "score" for Austria, though the appointment of General de Giorgis as Commandant of the international Macedonian gendarmerie was recognized as affording some compensation to Italy. But the light in which the question was regarded and discussed showed clearly that Italy and Austria looked upon one another more as rivals than as allies.

The Morocco crisis of 1905-6 showed another divergence of view between Italy and her allies. While Austria played the part of a "brilliant second" to Germany, Italy's refusal to support German policy gave rise to the famous phrase about "extra dances." At the Algeiras Conference, where the veteran Visconti Venosta was a prominent figure, it was seen that Italy's Mediterranean agreements outweighed the claims of the Triple Alliance. Her allies had no grounds for complaint. They had declined to have anything to do with Italy's Mediterranean interests, and it was Bismarck himself who had suggested to Italy where she should look for support. He had not, of course, foreseen that the understanding with Great Britain would lead to an agreement with France, and the lesser men who followed him had failed to take any steps to divert the trend of Italian policy.

Italy was now on bad terms with both her allies, and the rift was further widened by the Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The announcement of the annexation was made without any previous notice to the Italian public, though a meeting had just taken place between Baron Aehrenthal and Signor Tittoni, the Italian Foreign Minister. Signor Tittoni's position was made the more difficult from the fact that he had subsequently made a speech in which he declared that "Italy might await events with serenity, and that these would find her neither unprepared nor isolated." The keenest indignation was aroused throughout the country. There was talk of an expedition to Tripoli, where Italian intervention was expected. Indirect compensation, however, was provided by the withdrawal of Austria from the Sanjak of Novibazar, and by her renunciation of the right to police the Montenegrin coast and prevent Montenegro from owning warships.

The withdrawal from the Sanjak was a renunciation only in seeming. Austrian military opinion had decided that the corridor of the Sanjak was not a convenient way of approach to European Turkey. It was too narrow and



BERSAGLIERI ON THE MARCH.

too easily commanded from either side. The opinion was openly expressed that the only possible route to Salonika lay through the Serbian plain, and the withdrawal from the Sanjak meant simply that the plans of the Austrian General Staff for an eastern advance were definitely based upon war against Serbia.

Germany held that the only way of securing her hegemony in the alliance was to prevent the establishment of a real accord between Italy and Austria-Hungary. Count Goluchowski, who, during his last years of office, had striven to establish better relations between Rome and Vienna, was driven from office by German intrigue. Germany was always on the watch against too close a *rapprochement* between her two allies, and not the least gain to Germany arising out of Aehrenthal's action during the crisis of 1908 lay in the fact that it widened the gulf between Austria-Hungary and Italy.

There were to be other efforts, during the few years that remained before the final break, to improve Austro-Italian relations. It would seem that Aehrenthal had begun to realize, before his death in 1912, that a better understanding with Italy was necessary to the success of his ambition to secure for Austria-Hungary a greater independence of Germany. Perhaps

if he had lived, a different spirit might have animated the alliance. But it is hardly likely. German interests seemed to lie the other way, and German influence at Vienna was too strong to be resisted. And the history of subsequent events shows that Austrian opinion was in no way ready for the *rapprochement* with Italy that policy should have dictated.

From 1908 to 1911 the unpopularity of the Triple Alliance increased among Italians. It gave no support to Italian aims in the Mediterranean; it had failed to hold the balance between Italy and Austria in the Balkans; it seemed to promise nothing for the future save a doubtful immunity from Austrian attack—a doubtful immunity, for the military party in Austria talked openly of "a promenade to Milan." Italians began to ask more frequently whether Italian interests might not be better safeguarded by a different partnership, and when the war with Turkey broke out the renewal of the Triple Alliance in 1914 seemed far from being a certainty.


When Italy made her descent upon Tripoli in the autumn of 1911, Italians were ready for hostile criticism on the part of their allies. It was widely reported that Germany actually brought forward the question of Tripoli during the Moroccan negotiations, and made the

suggestion that as "compensation" for her recognition of the French position in Morocco she should be granted a free hand in the territories which had long been regarded as an Italian sphere of influence. What is beyond doubt is that Germany was beginning to develop commercial interests in the Tripolitaine at a time when Italian interests were being consistently thwarted by Turkey. The example of Morocco had shown the world how the assertion of commercial interests was the immediate prelude to political claims, and the Italian occupation of Tripoli cut short what was no doubt regarded in Berlin as a promising development of policy.

There was a further reason why Italy's action was unwelcome to Germany. It threatened seriously to compromise her position at Constantinople. German diplomacy had assured the Turk that his interests were best secured by German protection, and that he could count upon German support against the aggression of other Powers. Now for the second time in three years an ally of Germany showed that German protection did not extend very far. Germany was naturally irritated by events which threatened to spoil the German game.

From Austria nothing but hostility was expected. A lack of sympathy for Italian interests was the normal attitude at Vienna; and in this case there was some reason for the cold eye turned upon Italian enterprise. War between Italy and Turkey threatened to hasten, and did actually hasten, events for which Austria was not adequately prepared.

The northern members of the Triple Alliance soon showed their displeasure. The withdrawal of the Duke of the Abruzzi's squadron from the coast of Epirus, after the successful little action at Prevesa, was due to the direct veto of Germany and Austria upon any further operations in those waters. Aehrenthal complained of "the embarrassing situation in which Austria had been placed," and the German Ambassador in London told the Italian Ambassador, Marquis Imperiali, that if Italy continued the operations she would have to deal with Austria. The veto was more widely extended. On November 5, 1911, Aehrenthal declared that "Italian action on the Ottoman coasts of European Turkey or the Ægean islands could not be permitted either by Austria or Germany, as being contrary to the Treaty of Alliance." This prohibition followed



A GROUP OF ITALIAN OFFICERS.

General Cadorna, Commander-in-Chief of the Italian Armies, is the third figure from the left; and General Porro, Sub-Chief of General Staff, is on the Commander-in-Chief's left.



[Guigoni & Bossi.]

GENERAL COUNT PORRO,

Sub-Chief of General Staff of the Italian Army.

upon a report that Italian warships had been using searchlights near Salonika. Two days later, on November 7, Aehrenthal informed the Italian Ambassador at Vienna that he "considered the bombardment of ports in European Turkey, such as Salonika, Kavalla, etc., contrary to Article VII. of the Alliance." A further protest was made by Count Berchtold some months later (April, 1912). He complained that an Italian squadron, when fired on by the forts at the entrance to the Dardanelles, had returned the fire and done some damage. He suggested that if the Italian Government "wished to resume its liberty of action" the Austro-Hungarian Government could do so equally. He declined to admit the right of Italy to make any attack upon Turkey in Europe, and gave an explicit warning that further action might have "serious consequences."

During the first months of the war the expectations that France also would make difficulties were happily disappointed. French opinion showed itself more friendly to Italy than that of any other country. When the greater part of the European Press was publishing grossly distorted versions of events in the Tripolitania, and particularly of the


repression which followed the Arab revolt in the oasis of Tripoli, French newspapers, taken as a whole, printed fair and unbiased accounts of the action of the Italian troops. There was some little friction between French and Italians in Tunis, where the old feud had never died out. Some Italians did not fully appreciate the difficulties which beset the French authorities owing to the effects of the invasion upon the Arabs of Tunisia, and after a time there were murmurs against the trade in "contraband" which was alleged to go on between Tunis and Tripoli. But on the whole it may be said that during the last months of 1911 Italo-French relations were actually improved.

The situation changed with startling suddenness. On January 15, 1912, the French mail steamer *Carthage* was stopped on her way from Marseilles to Tunis and escorted to Cagliari in Sardinia, on the ground that there was included in her cargo an aeroplane destined for the Turkish Army. Considerable excitement was aroused in France, and three days later the capture of a second steamer, the *Manouba*, greatly increased the tension. This case was more serious than the first. Signor Tittoni, now Italian Ambassador in Paris, had informed the French Government that a Red Crescent Mission, which was to travel by the *Manouba*, was believed to include several Turkish officers. It was agreed that Italy should not interfere, but that an investigation should be held by the French authorities in Tunis. Unfortunately, the telegram announcing this agreement arrived too late. Italian cruisers had been under orders to stop the *Manouba*, and as no countermanding telegram arrived, these orders were carried out. The *Manouba* incident assumed serious proportions.

After a period of tension and discussion the disputes were finally referred for settlement to the Hague, where it was decided that Italy had been justified in exercising the right of inspection in the case of both vessels. But Franco-Italian relations had been seriously prejudiced. French action in Tunis was regarded henceforward with extreme suspicion. The old distrust between the two countries was revived, and it seemed as though the patient work of various far-seeing statesmen had been undone. Resentment against Germany and Austria was largely forgotten in the supposed realization that France was still an enemy. The tendency to drift away from the Triple Alliance was abruptly arrested.

This change of feeling was greatly assisted by the fact that for the first time since the unification of Italy Italians were struck with a doubt as to the reality of British friendship. When Italy declared war upon Turkey, and proceeded to the occupation of Tripoli, British comment was generally unfavourable; in the case of some newspapers it was very markedly hostile. The nerves of Great Britain, like those of other countries, were suffering from the strain of the Morocco crisis. War had come very near to Europe in the summer of 1911, and the newspapers, occupied with graver matters, had not followed the development of the Tripoli question. War of any kind was resented by people who had just emerged from the shadow cast by the threat of a European struggle. And British relations with Islam furnished another reason for the marked coolness displayed by British opinion towards the Tripoli enterprise.

British criticism caused disappointment and resentment in Italy, but a better understanding would have been quickly re-established by a fuller consideration of each nation's point of view if the situation had not been prejudiced by the disgraceful calumnies levelled at the Italian Army by a large section of the British Press. Official relations between Great Britain and Italy were happily undisturbed by any friction, but the special value of the friend-



DUKE OF GENOA, [Rossi.
Uncle of the King of Italy. Appointed "Lieutenant-General" for the King during His Majesty's absence at the Front.

ship between the two countries had always lain in the fact that it was based on the sympathy of public opinion. This sympathy seemed suddenly broken. Italians felt they had suffered disillusionment. They had expected other treatment at the hands of their traditional friends, though they had counted on neither support nor sympathy from their allies.

Germany was quick to take advantage of the situation. Nor is it likely that Italy showed any reluctance to meet her allies half-way. The rising tide of feeling against the Triple Alliance had not greatly affected the convictions of Italy's political leaders, who still saw in the alliance the best means of preserving peace in Europe and at the same time insuring that Italy's particular interests should not be disregarded. The alliance inspired no enthusiasm. Its drawbacks for Italy were manifest. But it still seemed to serve the interests of peace.

The Triple Alliance was renewed for the fourth time on December 7, 1912, eighteen months before the date of expiry, and owing to the alteration in public opinion the renewal was not greatly criticized in Italy.* For a time it seemed as though the alliance was actually more solid than it had been for a decade. Yet recent revelations have made it clear that during the twenty months which elapsed between the renewal of the alliance and the outbreak of the European War Italy

* Although Austro-German diplomacy thus scored a success, its need for haste involved the abandonment of the German intention to amend the terms of the alliance by requiring Italy to assume definite *naval* as well as military obligations.



MARQUIS IMPERIALI,

The Italian Ambassador to Great Britain, and his wife on the balcony of the Embassy in London.



AT THE BASE HOSPITAL.

Princess Di Bango, assisting with the Red Cross work, with Count Delle Schaglia, President of the Italian Red Cross Society.

was almost unbrokenly engaged in combating the policy of Austria-Hungary. For Austria-Hungary was determined to alter, as Italy was determined to maintain, the balance of power in the Balkans. Italy worked for peace; Austria-Hungary seemed bent on war.

Certain provisions of the Triple Alliance were disclosed in 1915 for the first time. The contents of the first article of the alliance were disclosed in a Note sent by Baron Sonnino to Italian representatives abroad, on May 24, 1915, for communication to the Powers. According to this Note Article I pledged the contracting parties to an exchange of ideas regarding all general political and economic questions which might present themselves. "From this it followed," the Note proceeds, "that none of the high contracting parties was free to undertake without previous accord any action whose consequences might give rise, in the case of the others, to any obligation contemplated by the alliance, or touch their most important interests."

Articles III., IV., and VII. were published in an Austro-Hungarian Red Book towards the end of May, 1915. They were as follows:

CLAUSE III.—In case one or two of the high contracting parties, without direct provocation on their part, should be attacked by one or more Great Powers not signatory

of the present Treaty and should become involved in a war with them, the *casus foederis* would arise simultaneously for all the high contracting parties.

CLAUSE IV.—In case a Great Power not signatory of the present Treaty should threaten the State security of one of the high contracting parties, and in case the threatened party should thereby be compelled to declare war against that Great Power, the two other contracting parties engage themselves to maintain benevolent neutrality towards their ally. Each of them reserves its right, in this case, to take part in the war if it thinks fit in order to make common cause with its ally.

CLAUSE VII.—Austria-Hungary and Italy, who have solely in view the maintenance, as far as possible, of the territorial *status quo* in the East, engage themselves to use their influence to prevent all territorial changes which might be disadvantageous to the one or the other of the Powers signatory of the present Treaty. To this end they will give reciprocally all information calculated to enlighten each other concerning their own intentions and those of other Powers. Should, however, the case arise that, in the course of events, the maintenance of the *status quo* in the territory of the Balkans or of the Ottoman coasts and islands in the Adriatic or the Ægean Seas becomes impossible, and that, either in consequence of the action of a third Power or for any other reason, Austria-Hungary or Italy should be obliged to change the *status quo* for their part by a temporary or permanent occupation, such occupation would only take place after previous agreement between the two Powers, which would have to be based upon the principle of a reciprocal compensation for all territorial or other advantages that either of them might acquire over and above the existing *status quo*, and would have to satisfy the interests and rightful claims of both parties.

The success of the Balkan allies in the war against Turkey was a heavy blow to Austria-Hungary, and through her to Germany. The way to the East was blocked by young and vigorous States bent upon progress, and Serbian aggrandizement threatened to complicate the Slav problem within the Hapsburg dominions. As soon as it became evident that the war would result in an accession of strength and territory to Serbia, Austria-Hungary began to move. In November, 1912, she approached Italy with a plan for hampering Serbian development. The fact was revealed by Signor Tittoni in the following words:

Austria-Hungary turned to Italy and requested her adhesion to the Austro-Hungarian programme, which consisted in permitting Serbia her extension of territory on the condition that she should give Austria-Hungary certain guarantees. Italy, in giving her adhesion, declared expressly that she subordinated it to the condition that such guarantees should not constitute a monopoly, to the exclusive profit of Austria-Hungary, and that they should not diminish the independence of Serbia. Austria-Hungary expressed the intention of studying these guarantees and communicating them to us, but she made no subsequent communication, perhaps because she was gradually preparing and substituting for this pacific plan the plan of aggression.*

When the terms of peace between the Balkan Powers and Turkey began to be discussed, Austria-Hungary opposed a direct negative to the Serbian desire for access to the sea.

* Speech at the Trocadéro, Paris, June 24, 1914.

Italy supported her ally in the ill-starred design of an independent Albania, though public opinion was almost certainly against the action of the Government. For public opinion in Italy recognized the justice of the Serbian claim for a port on the Adriatic, and realized that such an outlet would bring great commercial benefit to Italy.

But while the Italian Government was ready to support Austro-Hungarian policy up to a certain point, a very definite limit was drawn beyond which they would not go. They were willing to help in thwarting Serbian ambitions by the establishment of a puppet principality in Albania. They were willing to back up their ally in demanding that the Montenegrins should be deprived of Scutari, though this action was very unpopular in Italy. But Austria-Hungary pressed her programme too far. In April, 1913, when the fate of Scutari had not yet been decided on by the Powers. Austria-Hungary threatened an occupation of Montenegro. On April 30 the Italian Foreign Minister, the late Marquis di San Giuliano, telegraphed to Signor Tittoni asking his views on the question, suggesting that if Austrian troops attacked Montenegro Italy should disembark an expedition on the Albanian coast, and expressing the opinion that if this

solution did not meet with Austrian approval Italy would be compelled to follow an opposite policy to that of her ally. Signor Tittoni's reply deserves to be quoted in full :

If Austria wishes to occupy Montenegro, wholly or in part, we must go to Durazzo and Vallona, even if she does not consent. In fact, if Austria were to occupy Montenegro she would perform an action which is not necessary to the carrying out of the decisions of the Powers regarding Scutari, and would therefore put herself first of all outside the decisions of the Powers, acting on her own account without sufficient cause, and disturbing the balance in the Adriatic to our disadvantage; for even a temporary occupation disturbs this balance. There is no force in the quibbles to which the Austro-Hungarian and German Ambassadors have recourse regarding the letter of Article VII. in the Treaty of the Triple Alliance. The spirit of that article is clear, and for the rest, any disturbance of equilibrium between Italy and Austria would strike not only at Article VII., but at the whole Treaty of Alliance. The day on which Austria should claim to upset, in any way or to any extent, the equilibrium in the Adriatic, the Triple Alliance would have ceased to exist.

Austria-Hungary refrained from action, but her threats, together with the knowledge that Germany stood behind her, induced the other Powers to acquiesce in the programme which refused to Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro the rewards of their efforts in the west. But the second Balkan War ran a different course from that expected by the Central Empires. In a month Serbia and Greece established their superiority. The result was gall to



FUTURIST ARTISTS FOR THE FRONT.
They volunteered as cyclists in the Italian Army.



A BATTERY OF ITALIAN FIELD ARTILLERY.

Austria-Hungary, and on August 9, the day before the Treaty of Bukarest was signed, she made the shameful proposal that Italy should consent to her attacking Serbia. Italy declined flatly to countenance any such action. The incident was not disclosed till December 5, 1914, when Signor Giolitti related to an astonished Chamber of Deputies the story of the Austrian suggestion and Italy's refusal.

It was now evident to Italy that the Triple Alliance stood on a very uncertain foundation, for Austria-Hungary was plainly bent upon attacking Serbia when opportunity offered. Within a year the chance was provided and the opportunity was seized.

When Austria-Hungary sent her ultimatum to Serbia, Italy took action at once. Besides warmly supporting the British proposal for a conference, and pressing upon Germany the necessity of employing every means to preserve peace, the Marquis di San Giuliano made the Italian position very clear to the two allies of Italy. On July 5 a meeting took place between Signor Salandra, the Marquis di San Giuliano and Herr von Flotow, the German Ambassador, and on the same day the Foreign Minister telegraphed the substance of the conversation to the Duke d'Avarna, the Italian Ambassador in Vienna, in these words :

Salandra and I called the special attention of the Ambassador to the fact that Austria had no right, according to the spirit of the Triple Alliance Treaty, to make such a move as she has made at Belgrade without previous agreement with her allies. Austria, in fact, from the tone in which the Note is conceived and from the demands she makes, demands which are of little effect against the pan-Serb danger, but are profoundly

offensive to Serbia, and indirectly to Russia, has shown clearly that she wishes to provoke a war. We therefore told Flotow that, in consideration of Austria's method of procedure and of the defensive and conservative nature of the Triple Alliance. Italy is under no obligation to help Austria if as a result of this move of hers she should find herself at war with Russia. For in this case any European war whatever will be consequent upon an act of aggression and provocation on the part of Austria.

These were plain words, and when Austria-Hungary persisted in her action against Serbia, and proceeded to a declaration of war, the Italian Government definitely took up the position which it maintained throughout the long months of intrigue and uncertainty which followed. Notes were dispatched to Berlin and Vienna, on July 27 and 28 respectively, which raised the question of the cession of Austria's Italian provinces and declared that if Italy did not receive adequate compensation for Austria's disturbance of the Balkan equilibrium, "the Triple Alliance would be irreparably broken."

When the fire lighted on the banks of the Danube leapt east and north and west, Italy was able to hold back from the flames. She had already made her position perfectly clear to the other members of the Triple Alliance. To the world at large it was not possible to be so explicit. The Italian Government made an open declaration of neutrality on August 4, pointing out that the *casus foederis*, which would have placed her in the field with Germany and Austria-Hungary, had not arisen. No further step could well be taken, and no further announcement made, until it was known whether her allies would recognize the claim for compensation due under the terms of the alliance. The situation was complicated

by the fact that the Giolitti Government had left the Army in a deplorable condition as regards munitions and equipment. Italy was in no position to take the field, or to back her legitimate demands by the force which, she knew well, was the only argument her allies would recognize. She was forced to wait and prepare.

It has been seen that very early in the crisis Italy raised the question of the Italian provinces of Austria-Hungary, and indicated that it was here she looked for compensation. From that position the Italian Government never receded. There may have been moments of uncertainty as to how far it was possible to go, and by what means it was feasible to assure the "redemption" of the Italian provinces outside the kingdom of Italy, but the aim was fixed. At a private conversation in September, 1914, Signor Salandra declared himself convinced that now was the time to solve the Irredentist problem. In all probability negotiations with Austria-Hungary would have been opened sooner than they actually were if it had not been for the illness and death (October 16) of San Giuliano. San Giuliano had in preparation a Note which was to state the Italian case in detail, and Signor Salandra has told how his sole regret, as he faced death, was that he had not seen the day of Italy's entrance into complete national unity.*

Baron Sonnino came to the Foreign Office in November, and on December 9 he addressed a Note to the Duke d'Avarna for communica-

tion to Count Berchtold, the then Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs. The opening sentences of the Note give the broad foundation of the Italian case:

The actual military advance of Austria-Hungary in Serbia constitutes a fact which must be an object of examination by the Italian and Austro-Hungarian Governments on the basis of the stipulations contained in Article VII. of the Triple Alliance. From this article derives the obligation of the Austro-Hungarian Government, even in the case of temporary occupations, to come to a previous agreement with Italy and to arrange for compensations. The Imperial and Royal Government ought, therefore, to have approached us and come to an agreement with us before sending its troops across the Serbian frontier.


The Note goes on to recall the Austro-Hungarian resort to the stipulations of Article VII. during the Libyan War, and points out the prime importance to Italy "of the full integrity and of the political and economic independence of Serbia." No "stable pledge" had been given that Austria-Hungary would not acquire Serbian territory, but apart from this point Article VII. provided for compensation in the event of the Balkan equilibrium being upset otherwise than by territorial acquisitions. Baron Sonnino pressed for an immediate exchange of views and for an early entrance upon definite negotiations. He pointed out that public opinion was increasingly occupied with "Italian national aspirations," and suggested that the moment was propitious for coming to an agreement which would remove long-standing causes of friction and ill-feeling.

Count Berchtold replied that the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Serbian territory was "neither permanent nor temporary, but

* Speech at the Capitol, June 2, 1915.



ITALIAN INFANTRY MARCHING THROUGH THE STREETS OF ROME.



SIGNOR TITTONI,
Italian Ambassador in Paris.



BARON VON MACCHIO,
Austrian Ambassador in Rome.



DUKE D'AVARNA,
Italian Ambassador in Vienna.

momentary." This was only the most startling of various quibbles. He refused to admit the precedent of the Libyan War on the ground that Italian operations against European Turkey would have threatened the *status quo* in the East, whereas Austro-Hungarian action against Serbia was undertaken for purely defensive reasons, to secure the integrity of the Monarchy. Baron Sonnino brushed aside these arguments. He declared that Italy must press the rights assured to her under Article VII., and insisted upon the danger of further delay in accepting the principle of discussion on the basis of the Article. His insistence bore fruit, for Count Berchtold agreed to exchange views on the question of compensation, and accepted the general Italian argument.


At this stage Prince Bülow appears upon the scene. Since his dismissal from office in 1909 the late Imperial Chancellor had lived in Rome. As a last hope the Kaiser now put him in charge of the German Embassy, in place of Herr von Flotow, who took "sick leave." His first interview with Baron Sonnino took place upon December 19, and in the course of conversation he said that the object of his mission was to explain the Italian point of view to Berlin and the German point of view to Rome. He said that he was aware of the Italian proposal to Vienna, and had already expressed the opinion that the Italian contention was justified. He believed that this would have its effect in Vienna.

But Hungary here intervened. The masterful Count Tisza obtained the dismissal of the Austrian Foreign Secretary, Count Berchtold, and the appointment of his own nominee, Baron Burian. Baron Burian adopted a much more intransigent position, and though a former Ambassador, Prince Wedel, was sent from Berlin on a special mission to Vienna, with the object of inducing Austria-Hungary to surrender the Trentino, all the old objections were raised by the new Minister of Foreign Affairs. Meanwhile Prince Bülow was trying to clear the ground at Rome. He began by assuming that the cession of the Trentino would satisfy Italian claims, but Baron Sonnino at once replied that he "did not consider that Italian popular sentiment would be contented with the Trentino alone; that a stable condition of accord between Austria and Italy could not be effected except by the complete elimination of the Irredentist formula 'Trent and Trieste.'" Prince Bülow seemed to be taken aback. He said that Austria would certainly prefer war to the cession of Trieste (he might have added that Germany shared Austria's preference), and gave it as his opinion that he "could succeed with the Trentino, but not with anything more."

Baron Burian continued to vary his line of argument between a disinclination to accept the Italian point of view at all and the suggestion that Italy should be content

with compensation in Albania. Speaking on behalf of Vienna, Prince Bülow urged that Italy should formulate her demands, but Baron Sonnino declined to make any proposals until Austria-Hungary should definitely accept the basis of discussion and cease to oppose "objections of principle." The only basis of discussion which Italy would agree to was "the cession of territories actually in possession of the Monarchy." Until Austria-Hungary accepted this demand Baron Sonnino would neither define nor exclude anything—"neither the Trentino, nor Trieste, nor Istria, nor anything else." He had already explained that, in his opinion, discussion regarding territories belonging to other belligerents would compromise Italy's neutral position, as such discussion "would be equivalent to taking part in the contest." He now pressed for an early decision, pointing out that delays might render an agreement more difficult.

Baron Burian continued to fence, bringing up the question of the Italian occupation of the Dodecanesus, which had apparently been settled with Count Berchtold, in May, 1912, and on February 12 Baron Sonnino withdrew the Italian proposal for discussion, and addressed a grave warning to Austria-Hungary. He declared that any military action undertaken by Austria-Hungary in the Balkans against



[Elliott & Fry.]

SIR RENNELL RODD,
British Ambassador in Rome.

either Serbia or Montenegro, without previous agreement with Italy, would be considered an open infringement of Article VII. of the Triple Alliance. He added that a disregard of this declaration would lead to grave consequences, for which the Italian Government henceforward declined all responsibility. Five days later he repeated the warning, and said that his previous communication had "the precise significance of a veto opposed by us on any military action by Austria-Hungary in the Balkans until the conclusion of the agreement for compensation in accordance with Article VII. It is necessary to state very clearly that any other procedure on the part of the Austro-Hungarian Government could only be interpreted by us as an open violation of the terms of the treaty, and as clear evidence of its intention to resume its liberty of action; in which case we should have to regard ourselves as being fully justified in resuming our own liberty of action for the safeguarding of our interests."

This dispatch had a certain special importance apart from its effect upon the course of the long discussion regarding the interpretation of Article VII. Italy's veto assured for Serbia a temporary immunity from attack at a time when there was much talk of a fresh invasion with German assistance.



[Lafayette.]

THE LATE MARQUIS DI SAN GIULIANO,
Former Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs.



SIGNOR ANTONIO SALANDRA,
President of the Council and Minister of the
Interior in Italy.

The strong position taken up by Italy spurred Germany to fresh effort at Vienna. For a considerable time Baron Burian held firmly to his contention that it was impossible to settle the question of compensation until it had become clear how Austria-Hungary's enterprise in Serbia would fare. The fact that the Treaty of Alliance provided for *previous* agreement as to compensation did not appear to trouble him at all. He argued that it would be most inconvenient for Austria to let military action wait upon diplomatic discussion, and that Baron Sonnino must surely see how awkward it was. The terms of a signed treaty meant no more to Austria-Hungary than they did to Germany. Baron Burian twisted and turned and brought up one new argument after another to show why Austria-Hungary should avoid the obligations of Article VII. Each argument was based upon the plea of expediency; each argument attempted to show cause why a pledged word should not be kept. Baron Sonnino never swerved an inch. He met every argument by a patient but firm reiteration of Italy's rights under the treaty, and by a refusal to be led away from the text of Article VII.

On March 10 Baron Sonnino put forward


three conditions which he considered essential as preliminaries to any negotiation.

First: that absolute secrecy should be preserved. "Any indiscretion regarding the existence and progress of the negotiations would force the Italian Government to withdraw their proposals and break off negotiations."

Second: that the terms of the agreement should immediately be carried into effect.

Third: that the agreement should cover the whole period of the war in so far as any possible invocation of Article VII. was concerned.

Baron Sonnino suggested further that a



DUKE OF THE ABRUZZI,
Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Italian Navy.

period of two weeks should be set aside for discussion, and that if no agreement were arrived at within that time all proposals should be withdrawn.

Difficulties were promptly raised at Vienna. Baron Burian went back to several of his previous arguments, but the chief obstacle lay in Baron Sonnino's second condition, that the cession of territory should follow immediately upon the conclusion of the agreement. Baron Burian flatly refused to accept this condition, and for a few days it looked as though negotiations would not take place at all.

Prince Bülow stepped once more into the breach, and sought to persuade Baron Sonnino that his insistence upon the immediate carrying out of any eventual agreement was not reasonable. He feared that Austria-Hungary would never accept such a condition, and hinted at "the terrible consequences of a rupture between Germany and Italy." Baron Sonnino

was immovable, and replied that he would take no further initiative and make no proposals. Prince Bülow offered the guarantee of Germany. Baron Sonnino reaffirmed the essential condition, and when pressed on the point of Germany's guarantee he recorded his opinion, in an identical Note to the Italian Ambassadors in Berlin and Vienna, that at the end of the war Germany might not be in a position to carry her guarantee into effect.

It was not until March 27 that actual negotiations were begun by a rather vague offer made by Baron Burian to the Duke d'Avarna. This offer spoke of the cession of "territories in South Tyrol, including the city of Trent." Various suggestions were made regarding payments to be made by Italy as part of the

strip of territory in the Trentino" would not satisfy any of Italy's requirements.

On April 2 Baron Burian became more explicit. He said that Austria-Hungary was willing to cede the districts (*Politische Bezirke*) of Trento, Rovereto, Riva, Tione (except Madonna di Campiglio and the neighbourhood) and Borgo. The frontier line would cut the valley of the Adige just north of Lavis. Baron Burian explained that these districts were far from being only "a strip of territory," and hoped that Baron Sonnino would change his opinion about the importance of the cession offered. Four days later, no reply having been received from Rome, Baron Burian asked for counter-proposals. These were sent to the Duke d'Avarna on April 8.

Italy's demands were as follows :

I. The Trentino, with the boundaries fixed for the kingdom of Italy in 1811. (This boundary line would leave the existing frontier at Monte Cevedale (*Zufallspitze*); run along the mountain ridge between Val Venosta and the valley of the Noce down to Gargazzone in the Upper Adige Valley; thence in a straight line to Chiusa (*Klausen*) across the mountains and the Val Sarentina; thence to join the existing frontier between Monte Cristallo and the Tre Cime di Lavaredo (*Dreizeinnen*), including the Ampezza valley, but leaving out the Gadera and Badia valleys (*Gaderthal* and *Abteithal*).)

II. A new eastern frontier, to include Gradisca and Gorizia. The line to run from Troglkofel eastwards to Osteruig; thence *via* Saifritz between the valley of the Seisera and the Schlitzato to the Wischberg; thence along the existing frontier to the Nevea Saddle, whence



ADMIRAL VIALE,
Commander of the Italian Fleet.


Austrian public debt and as indemnification for public works, railways, etc. Baron Burian hoped that the offer might be regarded as a basis for negotiation, but Baron Sonnino's reply was disconcerting. Putting aside for the moment the question of immediate cession, he found the proposals both too vague and too meagre. They did not settle the Irredentist problem; they did not make any appreciable improvement in Italy's military frontier; and they did not represent adequate compensation for the freedom of action which Austria-Hungary would enjoy in the Balkans. "A



REAR-ADMIRAL ENRICO MILLO,
Italian Minister of Marine.







SIGNOR GIOLITTI,
Former Italian Premier.

it would drop to the Isonzo east of Plezzo (Flitsch); thence along the Isonzo to Tolmino, whence it would run via Chiaporano and Comen to the sea, which it would reach near Nabresina.

III. Trieste and its neighbourhood, including Nabresina and the judicial districts of Capo d'Istria and Pirano, to be formed into an autonomous State, with complete independence from Austro-Hungarian rule. Trieste to be a free port.

IV. The cession by Austria-Hungary of the Curzolari Islands off the coast of Dalmatia.

V. The immediate occupation by Italy of the ceded territories and the immediate evacuation by Austria-Hungary of Trieste and the neighbourhood.

VI. The recognition by Austria-Hungary of Italian sovereignty over Vallona and district.

VII. The renunciation by Austria-Hungary of any claims in Albania.

VIII. A complete amnesty for all political or military prisoners belonging to the territories mentioned in I.-IV.

The next three articles provided:—

1 (Art. IX.) that Italy should pay to Austria-Hungary as indemnification for loss of government property, as a share of the public debt, and against all money claims, the sum of two hundred million lire.

2 (Art. X.) that Italy should pledge herself to maintain neutrality throughout the war. This applied both to Germany and Austria-Hungary.

3 (Art. XI.) that Italy should renounce any further claims under Article VII. of the Triple Alliance, for the whole duration of the war; and that Austria-Hungary should renounce any claim to compensation for Italy's occupation of the Dodecanessus.

At this time there were persistent rumours of a separate peace between Austria-Hungary and Russia. Baron Sonnino pressed for an early answer to his proposals and Baron

Burian's reply arrived on April 17. It was wholly unsatisfactory. Articles II., III., and IV. were entirely rejected. Article V., which provided for the immediate transference of the ceded territories, was met by the old objections. Articles VI. and VII. were practically refused. Article VIII. was accepted. As regards Article IX., Baron Burian declared that the sum offered was totally insufficient, but suggested that the question of "pecuniary indemnity" should be referred to The Hague. He claimed that the pledge of neutrality offered in Article X. should be extended to Turkey, as the Ally of Austria and Germany, and requested the insertion of an extra clause in Article XI., providing that Italy's renunciation of further claims under Article VII. of the Triple Alliance should cover all such advantages, territorial or otherwise, as Austria-Hungary might gain from the treaty of peace which should terminate the war.

On only a single cardinal point did Baron Burian offer any concession. The frontier he proposed for the Trentino followed a more reasonable course than that of his original



GENERAL VITTORIA ZUPELLI,
Italian Minister of War.

offer. Leaving the existing frontier near Monte Cevedale it followed the watershed between the Upper Adige and Noce valleys as far as the Flenenspitze and reached the Noce valley by way of the Pescara. From there it followed the boundary of the district of Mezzolombardo to the Adige valley, which it crossed south of Salorno (Salurn). Thence it followed, roughly, the watershed between the Adige and Avisio valleys as far as the Latemar. Descending from the Col Canon it reached the valley of the Avisio between Moena and Forno, and thence followed the ridge between the San Pellegrino and Travignolo valleys to the existing frontier at Cima di Bocche.

Baron Sonnino's reply, sent from Rome on April 21, pointed out that the increased concessions in the Trentino, the only advance on Austria-Hungary's original proposals, did not "repair the chief inconveniences of the present situation, either from the linguistic



BARON BURIAN

(On left) Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

and ethnological or the military point of view." As Signor Salandra was to point out later, "the doors of the house remained open." Austria-Hungary was determined to keep the positions that were a perpetual threat to Italy. But the main stumbling-block lay in Baron Burian's refusal to admit the principle of immediate cession.

There were three more conversations between Baron Burian and the Duke d'Avarna before negotiations were broken off. The Duke d'Avarna told his Government that he saw no prospect of an accord. Baron Burian's sole concession in regard to Article V. was the suggestion that the immediate appointment of a mixed Boundary Commission would be sufficient guarantee that the territorial transfer would eventually be carried out. On April 29 the Duke d'Avarna telegraphed that Baron Burian practically opposed a negative to all the Italian demands, especially to those contained in the first five Articles.

On May 3 Baron Sonnino sent to Vienna a formal denunciation of the Italo-Austrian Alliance.

In Italy the disclosures of the Government laid many doubts to rest. The provisions of the Triple Alliance were secret. There was no clear idea of the obligations upon




PRINCE BÜLOW

(On left) Acting German Ambassador in Rome.

either side. The declaration of neutrality made it evident that Italy was not required to join her Allies, but between holding aloof and entering the field against them seemed a long step. Public opinion was very uncertain during the early period of the war. A number of Italians had originally been in favour of joining the Central Empires, influenced partly by the feeling that it was only fair to assist the Allies of thirty years' standing, partly by a genuine admiration for Germany which counteracted the old enmity against Austria-Hungary, and partly by the conviction that Italian interests could only be secured by intervention. This tendency was not much

ment. It must be remembered that Signor Salandra had not yet proved himself. He had held office and shown himself a capable administrator. He had been in close association with Baron Sonnino for thirty years. He had never taken part in the intrigues which had disfigured Italian politics for so long. There was no question of his ability and dexterity, and his character commanded trust. But he was largely untried and his position was very difficult. He had accepted the task of forming a Government when Signor Giolitti retired, but the followers of Signor Giolitti constituted the majority of the Chamber, and the experience of those who had taken office in similar cir-



ITALY'S NEW ARMY.
Recruits on their way to be equipped.

in evidence after the declaration of neutrality, but a strong pro-German current continued to oppose itself to the rising tide of feeling in favour of intervention on the other side. All through the winter the greatest uncertainty prevailed. At one time, early in the autumn, the popular feeling in favour of intervention on the side of the Entente Powers rose very high, and threatened to embarrass the Government. It is not unjust to the memory of San Giuliano to say that his death, and the arrival of Baron Sonnino at the *Consulta*, had something to do with stemming this tide. His Austrophil record was known to all; it was not yet known that he had taken up a firm stand on behalf of Italy's full rights. With Baron Sonnino in charge of the Foreign Office the country had fuller confidence in the Govern-

cumstances on other occasions was not encouraging. Part of his Cabinet was "Giolittian," and the situation called for unusual skill and strength of purpose. Though the country had confidence in Signor Salandra, there was still the feeling that he was untried, and that the circumstances might conceivably be too much for him. The arrival of Baron Sonnino greatly strengthened Signor Salandra's position. He had now at his right hand the close friend and political ally of thirty years. More than that, he had now as Foreign Secretary the man whom all Italy recognized as an example of unswerving rectitude and commanding ability. Baron Sonnino's intellectual endowments had been fully proved, his character not less so. Bluntly straightforward, uncompromising to a fault, he had

failed as a parliamentarian. But his very failures had shown him to his countrymen, and to all who knew him, as a man to be trusted. Now was no day for mere parliamentarians; the hour for statesmen had struck. At last Baron Sonnino was to come to his own, and Signor Salandra was to show that all the hopes which had been formed of him were less than the reality.

Before Parliament rose in December, 1914, Signor Salandra pronounced a phrase that deserves to be remembered. There was a certain uneasiness in the country at the prospect of great issues being decided and great changes effected without any profit to Italy, and a senator made the suggestion that Italy should have asked a price for her neutrality. Signor Salandra's reply was striking: "If we had bartered our neutrality, we should also have dishonoured it" (*Se la neutralità noi l'avessimo negoziata, l'avremmo anche disonorata*).

But for many months the position of Italy was liable to misinterpretation. The necessity of preserving secrecy regarding the line of action taken by the Government made this inevitable. The necessity of secrecy bore hard upon the people, and it is a tribute both to Government and governed that the long months of anxiety passed in such relative quiet. Two strong currents of opinion were noticeable. There were those who maintained that the interests of Italy and of civilization alike demanded intervention against Austria and Germany. These grew steadily in number. There were others, a numerous and powerful body, who were very strongly against war. There were many who were oppressed by the thought of Germany's immense military strength,



BARON SONNINO,
Italian Foreign Minister.

and held that Italy ought at all costs to refrain from opposing the Colossus. There were others who argued that Italy was unable to stand the strain of modern war "on the grand scale," that even victory would be too dearly bought. They spoke of the cost at which Italy had maintained her hard-won place among the Great Powers. They said that for more than forty years she had been attempting a stride that was almost beyond her compass, and that the vast efforts intervention demanded would break her down. Some of them went so far as to contend that it was better for Italy to content herself with first position among the lesser nations than to struggle to preserve her place as a Great Power. They talked of revolution and ruin. They feared the temper of the people and did not guess its greatness.



ITALIAN INFANTRY ON THE MARCH.



SIGNOR MARCONI,

The inventor of wireless telegraphy, serving as Lieutenant in the Italian Army.

Between the interventionists and the neutralists there stood the great mass of Italian opinion, which had not been able to make up its mind on the question of peace or war, and was content to leave the matter in the hands of the men whom it trusted. It was widely felt that public opinion did not possess the material to form a reasoned judgment on the very difficult problem with which Italy was faced. There was much discussion in the Press, and the argument of the interventionists that Italy's place in Europe depended upon her taking sides with the Entente Powers, that neutrality meant isolation, slowly gained ground. The neutralists were encouraged in their efforts by a letter from Signor Giolitti to one of his chief henchmen, Signor Peano, a letter which was to become historic. In this letter, which was written on February 2, Signor Giolitti expressed himself as being unfavourable to intervention, and declared his belief that Italy might secure "a good deal" (*parecchio*) by diplomatic means.

As the spring wore on opinion hardened, and a new feeling arose—a feeling against Germany. The terrible story of Belgium came slowly home to Italians; very slowly, for Italians had good reason to be sceptical

regarding atrocity stories. For long the reports of German "frightfulness," in so far as they applied to savagery, and not merely to destructiveness, were simply disbelieved. But in the end the evidence proved too strong for most Italians. The eloquent words of the Belgian Socialist Deputy, M. Jules Destrée, who told the story of his country's martyrdom in all the chief towns of Italy from Piedmont to Sicily, did much to make the truth sink into the minds of the people. And German propaganda helped to blacken the German name. For, as the prospect of war seemed to increase, German agents went about threatening that German soldiers would work a greater horror upon Italy than Belgium ever saw. They gave the items of their programme: destruction, murder, rape. They thought to terrorize Italians; they only made them set their teeth.

All through April the tension was great. Parliament had risen on March 22, and a vote of confidence in the Government had twice been recorded, only the Official Socialists recording their dissent from the motions which carried with them the request for the vote. On March 28 the rumour ran through Rome that an agreement between Italy and Austria-Hungary was practically concluded, and that only a few finishing touches were required before agreement would be complete. This rumour was circulated from the Embassies of Austria and Germany, and it is interesting to note that it was put about just at the moment when Baron Burian made his first offer of concessions in the Trentino. The incident shows how much the Austrian pledge of secrecy was worth. The rumour fell flat, and within a fortnight the expressions of confident hope were replaced by ill-concealed uneasiness. Once again the leak was from the Austrian side. Baron Sonnino telegraphed his counter-proposals on April 8. They were presented to Baron Burian on April 10, and two days later they were the subject of comment in Rome, in certain circles at least. Austrians and Germans expressed resentment at what they considered the excessive nature of the demands and showed the greatest anxiety. The neutralists fought hard, though there were some signs of weakening. An attempt was made to emphasize the existence of "a Slav Peril," an attempt which was greatly aided by some articles in the Russian Press which pushed Slav claims in the Adriatic very far north. The *Novoe Vremya* went so far as to


say that "if Russia permitted Italy to have Trieste it would be a scandal. Trieste is absolutely Slav." But it was too late to talk of a Slav peril. Italy was waking to a knowledge of the German peril, a knowledge which her wisest statesmen already possessed.

By the end of April the Italian people was braced for war. During the first days of May hearts were stirred by the preparations for the unveiling of a monument to Garibaldi and The Thousand, on the rock of Quarto, whence the expedition had started. The King and the Premier were to be present, and Signor Gabriele D'Annunzio was to deliver an oration. Moreover, there was a general feeling that before May 5, the date of the ceremony, the fate of the negotiations with Austria-Hungary would be decided. So it turned out, though at the time it was not known that negotiations had been broken off. On May 3, the day that Baron Sonnino instructed the Duke d'Avarna to denounce the alliance with Austria-Hungary, the news was published that the King and his Ministers would not leave Rome "in view of the political situation." It is a matter of history now that the Alliance had ceased to exist, and that Italy had already, to all intent, thrown in her lot with Great Britain, France, and Russia; but at the time no explanation was given of the sudden crisis that kept the King from going to Quarto.

On May 8 the news came that the *Lusitania* had been sunk. The effect upon the populace was quite extraordinary. For the first time a note of real anger was heard in the streets and the shops, along the by-ways and in little taverns. The tragedy of Belgium had been told to the people, and its horror had begun to sink in. But all Belgium was enveloped in the fog of war, and there was still a feeling that the worst stories might be exaggerations, that German ruthlessness might have had some provocation, and that in many cases there was the excuse of the anger born of battle and danger. Here was a crime committed in the sight of all the world, upon the peaceful seas, against a helpless multitude in which were included many women and children. The feeling against Germany, which had been slowly growing, came out in a blaze.

Then followed quickly the unforgettable days of what d'Annunzio called "The Week of Passion." As it appears from the Austrian

Red Book, Baron Sonnino's denunciation of the alliance caused a rapid change in the attitude of Baron de Burian. Prince Bülow and the Austrian Ambassador, Baron von Macchio, were given full authority to conclude a new treaty on the basis of further concessions. Baron Sonnino was immovable, and Prince Bülow and Baron von Macchio decided on a last desperate throw. Baron von Macchio has explained exactly what was done. His words are enshrined in



GARIBALDI THE LIBERATOR.

the Austrian Red Book. He telegraphed to Vienna on May 10, accusing Baron Sonnino of having kept back information regarding the Austrian concessions, both from the King and the majority of the Cabinet. He explained that on these grounds "it seemed opportune to make known a list of the Austro-Hungarian concessions, authenticated by Prince Bülow and myself. By this means there was a chance of countermining the game of Salandra, Sonnino and Martini."

A list of the Austrian concessions was printed and circulated among people who were thought likely to be influenced against



GABRIELE D'ANNUNZIO

(In the car and on left of inset), the Italian Poet, in the uniform of cavalry lieutenant.

the Government. The German Catholic deputy, Herr Erzberger, was assiduous in spreading the new offers, but there were various channels of distribution. Signor Salandra has stated definitely that the concessions were made known to various "politicians and journalists" before they reached the hands of himself or the Foreign Minister. Unfortunately there were Italians who were ready to lend themselves to the German-Austrian game. Signor Giolitti had been at his country home in Piedmont all through the parliamentary vacation, but he arrived in Rome on May 9, summoned, it is said, by Prince Bülow, but more probably by an urgent call from his party henchmen, at the instance of

Prince Bülow. On passing through Turin, the stronghold of neutralism, he was hissed. On arriving in Rome he was the object of a very hostile demonstration. It was suspected by this time that Prince Bülow and Baron von Macchio had gone behind the backs of the Government and had appealed to the party of the man who had for so long been almost dictator in Italy. There were four days of rumour and tension. Some of Signor Giolitti's chief supporters said that he would do nothing to embarrass the Government, but others took a very different line. They hailed him as the coming saviour from a ruinous war. The supporters of Signor Giolitti were in a majority both in the Chamber of Deputies and in the Senate, and it was clear that if he chose he could overthrow the Government. Parliament was to meet on May 20, and it was altogether uncertain how the Salandra Ministry would fare. The excitement and anxiety were already intense when late in the evening of May 13 the announcement was made that Signor Salandra had resigned.

The news was the signal for a great burst of anger throughout the whole of Italy. Rome is not easily stirred, but Rome, already moved by the eloquence of D'Annunzio, who arrived the evening before Signor Salandra's resignation, became a burning protest. It was only

for a day that the situation seemed really uncertain. The King summoned various politicians to his residence, and it was reported that Signor Marcora, the venerable President of the Chamber, was asked to form a Cabinet. On May 14 it was announced by the *Corriere della Sera* that the Triple Alliance had been denounced early in May, and the report spread that about the same time Italy had entered into engagements with the Triple Entente. It was clear that the die had been cast, and that Signor Salandra's foreign policy was bound to be continued, whatever the fate of himself and his Cabinet. But it was not this fact that roused the whole country to demand the recall

take part, either in the mile-long procession that marched from the Piazza del Popolo to the Quirinal, or in the vast crowds that lined the whole route.

Signor Giolitti had not been able to stir from his house during the three days of crisis, and on Monday, May 17, he left Rome. He could not face Parliament. It is said that he was ready to do so, but that the police authorities declined to guarantee his safety. What rôle Signor Giolitti had played or intended to play is not quite clear. It is maintained on the one hand that he meant to accept the Austrian offers and preserve Italian neutrality. On the other hand it is suggested that his aim,




GARIBALDIAN MARINE VOLUNTEERS
Marching to their quarters.

Inset: Peppina, Ezio and Ricciotti Garibaldi about to start for the Front.



of Signor Salandra. It was the knowledge that the representatives of foreign Powers had dared to go behind the Government of Italy and treat with others, and that there were Italians who had lent themselves to such an intrigue. The demonstrations were extraordinary. Italy was aflame from north to south. By Saturday, May 15, it was evident that no Government could exist except that of Signor Salandra. When the announcement was made on the following afternoon that the King had declined to accept Signor Salandra's resignation, there was a great outburst of joy and triumph. In Rome an immense gathering which had been called to protest against the Bülow-Giolitti intrigues and demand the recall of Signor Salandra was turned into a demonstration of rejoicing. All Rome seemed to

and those of his adherents, was simply power and place; that he would have assumed the reins of government only to find, after further negotiation, that war was inevitable, and then bow to the demands of that "historical necessity" which he had invoked as a reason for the Libyan expedition. Nor is it clear how far Signor Giolitti was responsible for the intrigues that ended so disastrously for himself and his followers. There is some reason to think that



SIGNOR MARCORA,
President of the Italian Chamber.

he was only brought in as the name to conjure with, that the conspiracy against the Government was not his doing so much as that of a small group near the throne of the ex-Dictator. Signor Giolitti's remarkable position in Italian politics had been won, to a very considerable extent, by his faculty of yielding to the desires of his supporters. The so-called Dictator had preserved his dictatorship by keeping an ear ever open to suggestion from those upon whom he relied. Perhaps it is true that on this fatal occasion he was manœuvred into a position which his own judgment would have refused.

On May 18 Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg disclosed to the Reichstag the offers which

Austria-Hungary had finally made. These differed materially from the list of concessions circulated by Herr Erzberger and others, but they attracted little notice in Italy, which thought no more of concessions. The Giolittian party had crumpled. When Parliament met on May 20 Signor Salandra secured overwhelming majorities (367 to 54 and 407 to 74) on a Bill conferring extraordinary powers upon the Government in the event of war. General mobilization was ordered on May 22. On May 23 the Duke d'Avarna delivered the formal declaration of war against Austria-Hungary.

No one who lived through the days of crisis, when for a moment at least it seemed as though the intrigues of the foreigner might succeed, will ever forget the marvellous uprising of the Italian people. Never in history has a nation so strikingly proclaimed its will. Gabriele D'Annunzio spoke for the soul of Italy in the burning words with which he addressed a great crowd on the night of his arrival in Rome. "Could he, Garibaldi the Liberator, descend from the Faticulum, would he not brand as cowards and traitors, would he not set the seal of infamy, on all those who to-day in secret or openly work to disarm our Italy, to debauch the country, to thrust her again into servitude? . . . Can we allow aliens, those in our midst and those without, enemies of our own race or intruders, to impose this kind of death on the nation?" The spirit of the Garibaldian hymn awoke again throughout all Italy. "*Va fuori d'Italia, va fuori stranier.*"



IN THE COURTYARD OF THE STATION AT MILAN.

Workmen engaged in linking up the City tramway with the railway lines in order that trains conveying the wounded may go direct to the hospitals.

CHAPTER LXXXI.

THE ITALIAN ARMY AND ITS TASK.

THE AUSTRO-ITALIAN FRONTIER—MAIN FACTORS OF THE STRATEGICAL PROBLEM—THE TRENTINO, CADORE AND CARNIA FRONTS—ITALIAN PREPARATIONS, 1914-1915—ITALIAN MILITARY SYSTEM AND CONSCRIPTION—THE PERMANENT ARMY AND ITS DISTRIBUTION—THE ARTILLERY—UNIFORM—ITALY'S RECORD IN RECENT WARS—BERSAGLIERI AND ALPINI—SPIRIT OF THE ARMY.

ONE glance at a map shows the great inferiority of Italy's strategical position in relation to Austria-Hungary. The Trentino runs down like a wedge into Italian territory, a wedge that holds a wide gate open to attack. From the Lombardo-Venetian plain Italy looks up to Italian mountains that are held by another Power. An Austrian fortress frowns upon her richest provinces, and its outermost bastion, Monte Baldo, is plainly visible from Verona itself. Along the whole frontier, except for the short stretch in Friuli between Cividale and the sea, Italy has to fight uphill.

The eastern border from Pontebba to the Adriatic is the only sector of the front where an Italian offensive on a large scale is in any way feasible, but such an offensive is impossible unless the open gates on the north are closed. The detachment of large forces is necessary to secure the base of operations and the left of the attacking army. The Trentino presents the most serious problem, but the mountain valleys that converge from the Carnic Alps upon the valley of the Tagliamento give good opportunity for a flank attack, and this route is supposed to have been a main feature of the offensive planned against Italy some years before the war by General Conrad von Hötzendorf. In Cadore, between the Trentino and Carnia, the masses of the Dolomites are a protection to Italy as well as to Austria, and

no important offensive is possible for either side. Except for this limited tract, Austria holds the advantage all along the line, for even if the Italian base and flank be secured, the country to the east is very unfavourable to an Italian offensive. The plain of the Veneto continues eastwards through Frinti nearly as far as the lower Isonzo. But the upper and middle reaches of the Isonzo flow through mountainous and difficult country, and all along the left bank of the river the advantage is with the defending armies. North of Tolmino there are few gaps in the barrier of the Italian Alps, and nearer the sea the rough and broken plateau of the Carso presents great difficulties to an attacking force. In a general order issued to the Austro-Hungarian troops on the Isonzo line they were told that they were in the position of men in a six-story building whom the enemy had to attack from the level. Securely posted on their heights, they were to "decimate and destroy" the advancing Italians.

Reduced to its simplest terms Italy's strategical plan, imposed upon her by geographical conditions, must be to hold on the north, and push towards the east. This does not in any sense imply a passive defensive on the Trentino, Cadore and Carnia fronts. In each case a tempting objective presented itself for a limited offensive, though in the Trentino and Cadore the aim of such movement would primarily

be to strengthen the defensive position. In the Trentino particularly a quick though limited offensive would make all the difference to the Italian position. Although the Trentino threatens Italy, it is itself threatened from Italian soil. It has the weaknesses of a salient as well as its advantages. The Italians could do more than merely close the gates. They could make it dangerous for an enemy to come too near the gateway. It seemed unlikely that any offensive on a large scale would be undertaken against the Trentino, though the temptation to occupy the "unredeemed" lands must be very strong. The conquest of the Trentino would lead no further, for Northern Tyrol must be regarded as inexpugnable. But the Austrian position in the Trentino might quite well be rendered untenable by steady pressure on both sides of the salient, in the valleys that branch out from the Adige—the valleys that were to have been the routes for an Austrian offensive. The whole situation was changed by the fact that Austria-Hungary could not dispose of enough troops to receive full benefit from the overwhelming natural advantages of the ground. The forts that were to cover an Austrian advance could only be used to check the Italians. From Cadore also the Italians could threaten, indirectly, the Austrians in the Trentino. The Trentino depends upon the two railway lines that meet at Franzensfeste. The northern line from Innsbruck is safe from direct interference, but the Pusterthal line passes close to the Italian frontier, and a successful Italian offensive here would not only close one entrance, or exit, of the Trentino, but would threaten the other line from the east. From Carnia, again, or rather from the passes which cross the Carnic Alps to the Gailthal, though the main object of the troops must be to defend the valleys that run down to the Tagliamento, the Italians looked towards Hermagor and the strategic railway which connects it with Villach. The railway was built for an Austrian offensive. Now it could hardly serve this purpose, but the Gailthal was all-important to the defence of the Malborghetto - Tarvis - Villach line. Movement in the Alpine regions is difficult in the extreme, and operations on a large scale could not be expected. Communications were difficult for the Italians and easy for the Austrians, who could bring troops readily from the neighbouring valley of the Upper Drave, as well as by the Hermagor line, but the region was so important, and the

number of Austrian troops available was relatively so small, that the Carnia front must give grave cause for anxiety to the Austrian General Staff.

It was clear that the Italian armies had a difficult task before them. The advantages that naturally lay with the Austrians were to a great extent nullified by the fact that Austria was short of troops. The position was changed to this extent that the Austrian General Staff was in no position to take the offensive. But the defensive lines upon which they must rely were very strong. The enormous difficulties that face the attack in modern warfare had been amply proved in Flanders and elsewhere, and these difficulties were of necessity greatly increased when the natural lie of the ground favoured the defending forces. The Austrians had had many months to prepare the lines they had chosen, and they had made good use of their time. Their trenches were constructed of metal and concrete. Their elaborate systems of wire entanglements were connected with electric power stations, and there was the further complication of mines. All along the eastern front there were rails on which to move their heavy guns, and the nature of the ground made it easy to conceal their artillery positions.

Italy had a hard task before her, but Italy had had time to prepare, and opportunity to learn from the lessons of the war. During the nine months that elapsed between the outbreak of war and the denunciation of the alliance with Austria, General Cadorna had practically re-made the Italian Army. It was necessary. In August, 1914, Italy had men and rifles and good field-guns, but she did not possess a modern army. There was a shortage in every kind of munitions, stores and equipment. The late Government had neglected to make good the expenditure in *matériel* caused by the Libyan War, and a great quantity of equipment had gone rotten in store. General Porro, at the outbreak of war sub-chief of the General Staff, had been offered the portfolio of War Minister in the spring, but he made his acceptance conditional upon the adoption of a programme of re-equipment which demanded large sums of money. This was refused, and the European War found Italy unprepared to an alarming degree. The situation was complicated by the fact that the field artillery was being re-armed with the Deport gun, a process which had little more than begun in August. There were a certain number of good medium-calibre guns, but there was no modern heavy artillery ready




GENERAL GARIONI.



GENERAL RUELLE



GENERAL MAMBRETTI.



GENERAL DRUETTI.



GENERAL DI
ROBILANT.



GENERAL ZOPPI.



GENERAL BRICCOLA.



GENERAL LEQUIO.



GENERAL CAMERANA.



GENERAL FRUGONI

ITALIAN ARMY CORPS COMMANDERS.

to take the field. And Italy had a lower proportion of machine-guns than any of the Great Powers. All these deficiencies had been realized and pointed out. To make them good cost too much money.

Between August, 1914, and Italy's intervention all the gaps had been filled, and every additional weapon or item of equipment that experience had shown to be necessary had been supplied. In addition, there were a great number of new formations—the strength of the first line must have been increased by nearly 50 per cent. Details of the remarkable work that had been done cannot be given here. Only a few items of the completed programme could be made known, and it was laid down by the Italian Government that no further details were to be published. In what follows, therefore, we confine ourselves in the main to the information about the Italian Army that was available before the war, noting certain alterations and additions that had become public property.

Every Italian citizen fit to bear arms was liable to military service. Liability began in the year in which the recruits completed their twentieth year, when the levy of each class was held, but service began on the first of January of the following year. In the event of an emergency recruits could be called earlier, and a case in point occurred towards the end of 1914, when the 1895 class (of recruits born in that year) was called to the colours more than a year before its time. Volunteers were accepted who had completed their eighteenth, or exceptionally, their seventeenth year.

The annual contingent was divided into three categories. The first category consisted of the number of men required each year to fill the peace establishment of the Army. The second category consisted of those over and above this number who could claim no exemption from service. The third category consisted of those who were exempt by law from military service, such as only sons of widows. Various family reasons still allowed exemption, but the law had been narrowed of late years, and if the levy of 1911 were compared with that of 1900, it would be seen that the third category of the later year numbered only a little over 26 per cent. of that in the earlier levy.

The terms of service in the three categories were as follows :

First Category.—Two years with the colours ; six with the reserve ; four in the Mobile Militia ; seven in the Territorial Militia.

Second Category.—A period of training not to exceed six months with the colours ; seven and a half years or more with the reserve ; the rest as above.

Third Category.—Nineteen years in the Territorial Militia. Third category men as a rule receive no training, but are inscribed as belonging to the Territorial Militia, and are liable to service if required.

Men with a certain educational qualification were permitted to serve in the first category as "one-year volunteers," on payment of £64 in the cavalry and £48 in the other arms.

The 1911 census gave the population of Italy as 34,686,683 persons, and the levy lists for the year gave a total "class" of 487,570. Of these only 433,670 came up for medical inspection. A number were struck out for various reasons, and the others failed to present themselves, most of them, probably, having emigrated. Those who were examined were assigned as follows :

Put back to the next levy	118,073
Unfit for service (<i>riformati</i>)	98,138
First category	158,927
Second category	35,102
Third category	23,430
	<hr/>
	433,670

The actual number of men joining the colours was considerably less than that assigned. A good number failed to present themselves, others were already in the Army or the Customs Guards, others obtained leave to put off their service. In all 122,852 men were actually posted to one or another branch of the Service.

Officers of the first line were recruited from the Military School at Modena (for infantry and cavalry), the Military Academy at Turin (for artillery and engineers), and from complement officers (*ufficiali di complemento*). Twenty-five per cent. of the commissions vacant each year were reserved for under-officers (sergeants and upwards) who had had at least four years' service, and had completed a prescribed course at the Military School.

Complement (or reserve) officers were recruited from under-officers, qualified one-year volunteers, and officers of the active army who had retired before the age of 40. Classes of instruction were formed for under-officers and one-year volunteers who wished to qualify for commissions.

Auxiliary officers were those who were unfit for active service, but were considered able to undertake certain special duties.

The permanent army of Italy was organized in 12 army corps, 25 divisions and 3 cavalry



TYPE OF ITALIAN ALPINE REGIMENT WITH FULL SERVICE KIT.

divisions, with a peace strength of some 14,000 officers and 250,000 men. The details were as follows:

- 12 legions of Carabinieri or Military Police;
- 2 regiments of Grenadiers (24 companies and 2 dépôts);
- 94 regiments of the line (1,225 companies, 94 dépôts, and 85 "nuclei" of Mobile Militia);
- 12 regiments Bersaglieri (153 companies and 12 dépôts);
- 8 regiments Alpini (78 companies, 8 dépôts, and 25 "nuclei" of Mobile Militia);
- 88 recruiting districts (6 of them double);
- 29 regiments of cavalry (150 squadrons and 29 dépôts);
- 36 regiments of field artillery (289 batteries, 36 companies of train and 36 dépôts);
- 2 regiments of heavy field artillery (20 batteries, 2 dépôts);
- 1 regiment of horse artillery (8 batteries, 4 train companies and 1 dépôt);
- 3 regiments of mountain artillery (39 batteries and 3 dépôts);
- 10 regiments of fortress artillery (110 companies and 10 dépôts);
- 6 regiments of engineers (75 companies and 6 dépôts);
- 10 companies of train troops;
- 2 aviation "commands" (1 airship battalion, 1 aeroplane battalion, an unknown number of air squadrons, and an aviation school);
- 12 companies medical corps;
- 12 companies commissariat;
- Various special services.

The army corps and divisions had their headquarters as follows:

- 1st Army Corps, Turin.—1st Div., Turin; 2nd, Novara.
- 2nd Army Corps, Alessandria.—3rd Div., Alessandria; 4th, Coni.
- 3rd Army Corps, Milan.—5th Div., Milan; 6th, Brescia.
- 4th Army Corps, Genoa.—7th Div., Piacenza; 8th, Genoa.
- 5th Army Corps, Verona.—9th Div., Verona; 10th, Padua.
- 6th Army Corps, Bologna.—11th Div., Bologna; 12th, Ravenna.
- 7th Army Corps, Ancona.—13th Div., Ancona; 14th, Chieti.
- 8th Army Corps, Florence.—15th Div., Florence; 16th, Leghorn.
- 9th Army Corps, Rome.—17th Div., Rome; 18th, Perugia.
- 10th Army Corps, Naples.—19th Div., Naples; 20th, Salerno.
- 11th Army Corps, Bari.—21st Div., Bari; 22nd, Catanzaro.
- 12th Army Corps, Palermo.—23rd Div., Palermo; 24th, Messina.

The 25th Division, stationed at Cagliari, Sardinia, formerly attached to the Rome Army Corps, had been attached to the 12th (Palermo) corps.

The army corps consisted of:

- 2 divisions of infantry (division = 2 brigades of 2 regiments, 6 battalions);



THE CHARGE OF THE FAMOUS BERSAGLIERI TROOPS.

1 regiment of Bersaglieri (3 battalions and a cyclist battalion);
 1 regiment of cavalry;
 1 section of carabinieri;
 36 field guns (1 regiment of 8 batteries);
 2 to 3 heavy howitzer batteries.

with ammunition column, telegraph and engineer parks, ambulance section, supply section, supply column, reserve supply park, reserve store, section of army cattle park, section of field bakery.

The division consisted of 12 battalions of infantry, 24 to 36 field guns, pontoon section, engineer company, divisional ammunition column, ambulance and supply sections, reserve store, section of carabinieri.

Comparing these figures with the totals given earlier, it will be seen that there was a considerable surplus of first line troops outside the corps organization. In 1912, in order to garrison Libya without weakening the permanent army at home, 24 line regiments were given a fourth battalion and 3 Bersaglieri regiments a fifth. There were in addition the Alpine troops and the mountain artillery, which were not within the organization of the 12 permanent army corps.

The Alpini consisted of 8 regiments in first line (26 battalions, 78 companies). Each Alpine battalion had a "nucleus" of Mobile Militia attached to serve as a centre of formation on mobilization. There were three regiments of mountain artillery, each containing four "groups" of three batteries. A thirteenth group of mountain artillery was attached to the Messina division, in lieu of a similar unit of field artillery.

Behind the formations of the active army and their reserves came the organized Mobile Militia, consisting of about 320,000 men. These were made up of four classes of 1st and 2nd category men—from 29 to 32 years of age. The Mobile Militia formations were as follows:

51 regiments of the line, of 3 battalions each. Three of these were detailed for service in Sardinia. The other 48 were attached to the 48 brigades of the first line army.

20 battalions of Bersaglieri, and
 38 companies of Alpini.

These were attached to the Bersaglieri and Alpini depôts.

31 squadrons of cavalry. These were not properly Mobile Militia, but were used to make new formations in time of war.

63 batteries of field artillery.

15 mountain batteries.

78 companies of coast and fortress artillery.

24 companies of artillery train.


These were attached to the artillery regimental depôts.

54 companies of engineers and 4 companies of train, who were similarly attached to their depôts.

Commanding officers and squadron and company commanders were supplied from regimental officers on the active list. The rest came from reserve officers or officers on the auxiliary list.

The Alpini were used to swell the battalions or regiments of the first line. The rest of the Mobile Militia was organized for war in brigades or divisions. Certain army corps took in a division of Mobile Militia on mobilization. The brigades were attached to first line divisions in other cases.

Behind the Mobile Militia came the Territorial Militia, consisting of seven classes each of



AN ITALIAN SOLDIER

Wearing a respirator as a protection against poisonous gas.

1st and 2nd category men, and all the 19 classes of the 3rd category. The organization for war was as follows:

324 battalions of infantry of the line.

26 battalions of Alpini.

100 companies of fortress artillery.

30 companies of engineers.

The Territorial Militia was primarily designed for garrison duty, guarding railways, bridges, etc., but it was liable for any service. It was embodied in time of war, and new formations were made for training purposes. There was a certain proportion of active officers, but the greater number were reserve officers or new appointments.



ON THE WAY TO THE FRONT.

An Italian Artillery column takes a brief rest by the roadside.

Another military force was the Customs Guards. These consisted of some 400 officers and 17,000 men. They were employed with effect in the Libyan campaign, and four regiments of three battalions each had been organized for the present war. A large proportion of them were accustomed to work on the mountain frontiers, and they were expected to be very useful.

The normal war strength of Italian infantry units, with the exception of the Bersaglieri and Alpini, was as follows :

		Officers.	N.C.O.'s & Men.
Company	...	5	250
Battalion	...	24	1,019
Regiment	...	78	3,116

The organization of the Alpine regiments was rather different. Some battalions had three companies and some four, while the regiments had either three or four battalions. On mobilization each battalion was reinforced by one or more companies of Mobile Militia. On a war footing the company, the only constant unit, had 6 officers and 250 men. The battalion staff consisted of 2 officers and 10 men, and the regimental staff of 3 officers and 12 men.

The Bersaglieri numbers were practically the same as those of a line regiment, but a Ber-

saglieri regiment consisted of four 3-company battalions (one cyclist) instead of three 4-company battalions.

In war time each infantry regiment had 103 pioneers. They carried 48 spades, 18 saws, 12 sets of gimlets, 24 picks, 24 axes, 36 choppers, 6 metre measures, rope, etc. An entrenching tool was also carried by the soldiers.

The Italian cavalry regiment used to have six squadrons, but when the number of regiments was increased the strength was reduced to five squadrons. In 1912 a sixth squadron was added to five regiments in order to provide for the Libyan garrison.

The war strength of a squadron was 5 officers and 137 men. In each regiment there were 55 pioneers, who carried saws, axes, choppers, pickaxes, spades, metre measures, etc., while the regimental transport carried explosives and special instruments for the destruction of railways, etc.

The service weapon of the Italian infantry was a magazine rifle on the Mänlicher system (Mänlicher-Carcano), known as the 1891 pattern. It is of very small calibre—·253 in. ; the magazine holds six rounds and is loaded with a clip. The length without bayonet is


4 ft. 2 $\frac{3}{4}$ in., with bayonet 5 ft. 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ in. It weighs without bayonet 8 lbs. 6 ozs. The muzzle velocity is 2,296 f.s., and it is sighted up to 2,200 yards. The cavalry carbine, which is also used by cyclists, is similar in construction, taking the same cartridge, but it is just under 3 ft. in length without bayonet and weighs a little under 7 lbs. The length with bayonet fixed is 4 ft. 2 in. It is sighted to 1,640 yards.

Active army and Mobile Militia were both armed with the 1891 pattern rifle, but the Territorial Militia, for the most part at least, had the old Vetterli-Vitali pattern, 1870-1887, which carries four rounds in a fixed magazine. This rifle has a calibre of .407 in., and is sighted to 2,000 yards. It weighs 9 $\frac{1}{2}$ lbs. The sword-bayonet is over 2 ft. in length.

It is difficult at present to write with any sort of accuracy about the Italian artillery. The outbreak of the Great War found a process of re-armament going on, but this process had come on the top of a previous process that had never been completed. Thirteen or fourteen years earlier it was decided to replace the old 7 cm. field-gun by an improved Krupp Q.F. 75 mm. gun, but 1914 saw this re-arma-

ment unfinished (there were only about 100 batteries armed with the quick-firer), and a new re-armament begun. The 75 mm. Deport gun, 1911 pattern, had been adopted. It is impossible to say how many batteries of this gun had been completed, but it was a very large number, and the artillery had been accustoming themselves to its use for many months.

The same may be said of heavy artillery, which the experience of the war had shown to



THE ITALIAN ARTILLERY.

A commander giving orders to his men by hand-signals. Inset: a heavy gun.

be so important. When the war broke out Italy had no adequate siege train (*parco d'assedio*). Her heaviest mobile weapons were 210 mm. howitzers (8.2 in.), and 149 mm. guns. All that can be said here is that the deficiencies were fully repaired, and that Italy was not likely to suffer from lack of medium or large calibre guns.

A word should be said about the mountain artillery, of which there were 39 batteries. The gun was an efficient weapon, but the men and the mules were remarkable. An Italian mountain battery could go anywhere.

All information regarding the latest types of aeroplane and dirigible being used or constructed for military purposes had been suppressed by the authorities. Airships (type P, gas capacity 4,500 m.c., speed 50 km. an hour) had been used by the Italian Army for a number of years. This type did good service in Tripoli. A larger model of similar design (type M, gas capacity 12,000 m.c., motors 400 h.p., speed over 70 km. an hour) had been employed with success in time of peace. The aeroplane service had already been well tested. Italy was the first country to use aeroplanes in war, and the experience gained in Tripoli gave a great impulse to military aviation. Unfortunately, lack of money prevented many of the developments that were studied and put forward by experts, but the winter of 1914 saw a great increase in the Italian Flying Corps. And Italians are notably quick and skilful at flying.

The uniform of the whole army was of a serviceable grey colour. The headgear formed the readiest means of distinction. Infantry of the line, artillery and engineers wore a soft *kepi*. The shiny black hat of the Bersaglieri, with its drooping cocks' feathers, is well known, but in war time the hat is covered with grey cloth. The Alpini wore a grey felt hat with a high crown, a small brim turned up at the back and down at the front, and a black eagle's feather at the side. The Customs Guards wore a similar hat. Of the cavalry, the first four regiments wore a helmet, the others a busby. In war time both helmet and busby were covered with grey cloth.

Not very much was known in England of the Italian Army. The picturesque figure of the Bersaglieri was familiar, and the illustrated

papers soon made known the appearance of the Alpini. Italian cavalry officers had done great things at Olympia, and some people knew that the Italian cavalryman is very good across country. But the Army as a whole had been handicapped in people's estimation by the fatal memory of Adowa, where the Italian forces met with real disaster, and by the slowness of the Tripoli campaign, where the soldiers, for political reasons, were not allowed to do what they were able and anxious to do.

The Bersaglieri were known for their cocks' feathers. Their wonderful marching capacity was less familiar even to military men. They were all picked men, of splendid physique, though not big. Their ordinary marching rate is four miles an hour, with a pace of 34 in. They double at a rate which works out at about nine minutes to the mile, and they practise the double relentlessly. On manoeuvres they sometimes cover 40 miles in a day, and in Tripolitania the 11th Bersaglieri accomplished two wonderful desert marches of 50 miles in 26 hours and 33 miles in 19 hours. The first march was made necessary owing to a well being found dry. The second was carried out, for the greater part of the distance, in a sandstorm.

The Alpini are perhaps the finest mountain troops in the world. Their physique is magnificent, and their skill and endurance in mountainous country marvellous.

These were picked troops, and in the end one must always come back to the infantry of the line. First it should be said that the physique of the Italian nation had improved out of all knowledge in the last twenty years. Perhaps military training had had a good deal to do with bringing about the change, though it was not the only factor. Increased national prosperity had meant more and better food and improved conditions all round. The material was far better than it used to be. As a result the Italian Army showed a very high level of physique. The Italian soldier is not big, but he is tough and sound and a hard worker. He is not smart, sometimes he seems even slack. But he is keen and cheerful and obedient to command. The officers do not seem to insist upon a rigid discipline, but they get out of their men what they want, and the relations between officers and men are excellent.

CHAPTER LXXXII.

HILL 60 AND SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES.

THE LULL AFTER NEUVE CHAPELLE—GERMAN AND BRITISH OBJECTIVES—THE WAR IN THE AIR—GERMANS PREPARE TO USE ASPHYXIATING GAS—BRITISH ATTACK ON HILL 60—DESCRIPTION OF THE ASSAULT—THE GREAT GAS ATTACK ON APRIL 22—GERMAN ETHICS OF WAR—RESULTS ACHIEVED—THE GALLANT CANADIANS—YPRES ABANDONED BY CIVILIANS—END OF THE SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES—THE NEW BRITISH LINE—LOSS OF HILL 60—GERMAN FAILURE TO TAKE YPRES.

AFTER the offensive of the British at Neuve Chapelle and the counter-offensive of the Germans at St. Eloi a time of comparative inaction ensued. But it was only a preliminary period of preparation for a renewal of the gigantic struggle for supremacy between La Bassée and the sea which had commenced in the second half of October and the first half of November 1914, and which has already been described. As before, the aim of the German commanders was, operating north of the Lys, to cross the Comines-Ypres, Yperlee and Yser Canals, take Ypres, seize the whole of the ridge of the Mont-des-Cats, south of that battered city, and, advancing across the plains to the west, capture Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne.

While the Germans were bent on a rapid offensive north of the Lys, the Allies, who since the first Battle of Ypres had been heavily reinforced both in men and material, proposed on their part to advance south of the Lys on Lille from two sides. Sir John French was to storm the Aubers ridge and turn from the north the German salient at La Bassée, while the French between the western environs of this village and the town of Arras were to endeavour to recover the region of Lens and to threaten La Bassée from the west and south. So long as the salient formed by the latter was occupied by the Germans, they could strike

at the point where the British Army joined the main French Army, and if from La Bassée they broke through to Boulogne, they would cut off the whole of the British forces, and the French and Belgian Armies between Ypres and the sea about Nieuport. On the other hand, the isolation of La Bassée and the capture of the Aubers ridge would render the German hold on Lille precarious, and, if the Kaiser lost Lille, the Allies might begin the task of driving the Germans out of Belgium.

In this chapter will be described the operations north of the Lys to the sea between March 16 and May 17. By the latter date the repeated attacks made by the Germans had reduced them to temporary impotence, and the second battle of Ypres may be said to have ended. The Germans at a frightful cost had gained some ground, but they had failed to achieve their object. Ypres still remained in the possession of the Allies and, to all intents and purposes, the Germans were as far from Calais, Dunkirk and Boulogne as they were on the days of Neuve Chapelle and St. Eloi.

It was on March 14 that the British retook St. Eloi and parried the German blow at Ypres from the south. The remainder of the month and the first half of April were spent by the opposing armies in comparative inactivity. The aircraft on both sides executed raids and reconnaissances. On March 18 a Zeppelin



A RIFLE WITH PERISCOPE ATTACHED,
So that it can be aimed without exposing the firer.

flew over Calais and dropped twenty bombs on the town, killing seven workmen at the railway station. The day after a German aeroplane crossed the Straits of Dover. On March 21 the same or another Zeppelin paid a second visit to Calais, but this time was driven off. The important railway junction of St. Omer, and also Estaires, one of the points of crossing on the Lys, were bombed from Taubes on the 23rd. Estaires was again attacked by the same means on the 27th, three children being killed. On the same day some damage was done by German aviators to Dunkirk, Calais and Saily. On March 28 Calais was once more visited by a Taube, and Estaires and Hazebrouck had bombs dropped on them. On the last day of the month a Zeppelin appeared over Bailleul, and a German aviator was brought down at Poperinghe.

The honours of the fighting in the air, however, still fell to the Allies. On Tuesday, March 16, an aerial squadron flew along the coast and attacked military posts at Ostend and Knocke, at which latter place German coast batteries had been previously located. The approach of the squadron was perceived by the

Germans from an observation balloon at Zeebrugge, and a flock of Taubes rose to meet it. They were outmanœuvred and forced to escape inland. A big yellow observation balloon, it may be mentioned, hung over Lille to give warning of the approach of British airmen.

On March 24 five British aviators attacked the German submarine base at Hoboken, southwest of Antwerp, destroyed one and damaged two other submarines and, with the loss of an aeroplane, which had to descend on Dutch territory, returned safe and sound. Belgian, British and French aviators flew constantly above Ostend, Zeebrugge, Roulers and Aubers and other places where German troops and munitions were congregated, and caused great damage. On March 27 Belgian aviators bombed the aviation field of Ghistelles, and a Zeppelin hangar at Berchem-Sainte-Agathe, near Brussels, was destroyed the next day. Ten British and some French aviators on the 30th swept along the coast from Nieuport to Zeebrugge, dropping bombs on magazines and submarine depôts. On the 31st the German captive balloon at Zeebrugge was destroyed and the two observers in it killed, while Belgian

aviators bombed the aviation field of Handzaeme and the railway junction of Cortemarck, and the celebrated Garros fought a successful aerial duel south of Dixmude.

The 1st of April was signalized by a joke played by an Allied aviator on the Germans. He flew over the Lille aerodrome and dropped a football. The Germans imagined it to be a bomb and scuttled to cover. The ball, striking the ground, bounced to a great height. Still the Germans remained hidden. Perhaps they thought that this projectile was fitted with a "delayed action" fuse. Only when the ball had rested for some time on the ground did they emerge from their holes, to read the inscription on it—"April Fool—*Gott strafe England.*"

The mental attitude of the officers and men at this moment is well reflected in the following extract from the letter of an officer in the Royal Artillery:

A spring in Flanders really deserves a letter all to itself, especially after one has spent a winter in the

trenches. Not that it is not bitterly cold at times still, for it freezes most nights; but there is that indefinable feeling of spring in the air that makes the blood course through the veins and makes one glad to be alive—so different from the gloom that would settle over us at times after weeks of bad weather and those deep trenches. We stand to arms in the grey hours of the morning and watch the sun rising blood red over the German trenches, while we stamp our feet on the frozen ground to try to get warm after being up working half the night and spending the other half in a chilly dug-out, wondering whether our feet were made of us or of lead. Gradually the sun rises higher in the sky and slowly warms us. Overhead the sky turns from indigo through grey to a perfect blue, till one can realize where the old Flemish potters drew their inspiration for their marvellous delft.

Up above one can hear a lark carolling, and everything else is still, for the sniper has now retired behind his lines. The night long, firing has died down and the desultory artillery bombardment of the day has not yet begun. Suddenly the stillness is broken by a droning sound, and after craning our heads in all directions we see an aeroplane hovering like a hawk and glistening silver as the sun strikes it. It passes on over the German lines, and as we watch two little fleecy clouds burst into whiteness near it and a moment later we hear a whirr and a bang. The German aeroplane gun, familiarly known as "Archibald," is in action. The aeroplane swerves to alter the range and elevation, and then sails serenely on. Reports follow each other



A BRITISH SNIPER.

His rifle has a telescopic sight, which enables him to shoot more accurately.



A BRAVE BRITISH AVIATOR.

Although severely wounded, he brought back his machine.

in quick succession, till the whole sky is flecked with a double line of white shrapnel bursts slowly dissipating. A regular fusillade of rifle fire breaks out and a stammering machine gun joins in, but the aeroplane disappears in the distance apparently unhurt, while we wonder vaguely whether it is engaged on a strategical reconnaissance or on a bomb-dropping expedition against some railway centre.

The sun grows warmer and the ground grows softer under foot till it resembles a newly-laid asphalt pavement. The men have all got their braziers alight now, and are busy cooking breakfast, and a discreet glance through a periscope shows that the Germans, only a hundred yards away, are likewise engaged, for a blue wreath of wood smoke arises from the line of trenches too against the dark line of trees. One feels that the wood should be bursting into green by now, but these trees will never show leaf again, for they have been harried by shot and scarred by shell until the sap and the promise of the new year has died in them.

If only the croakers at home could pass down our front-line trenches on such a bright spring morning and see the spirits of the men! Their language may be at times far from choice, but their fund of humour seems limitless, if occasionally bloodthirsty. Every dug-out seems to have its name and notice. "All passers-by please look into ye old funk-hole and see the bhoys cleaning German bloodstains off their bayonets. By order Von Kluk"; "B Subsection (the Sunshine Troop)"; "Potsdam Lodge," and fifty other cheery placards. Even a dangerous corner must be labelled with due solemnity: "Please carry your head under your arm when passing here." Every kind of gun opposite has its own particular name—"Jack Johnsons," "Black Marias," and "Coal-boxes" are common-places since our days on the Aisne, but lately "Pip," "Squeak," and "Fizzbang" have earned notoriety. They are so called because shell and sound arrive almost simultaneously, and most unpleasant customers they are. Anyhow, they start the ball rolling quite early in the morning, and our artillery reply. This is no bombardment or battle, but each side wants to show the other that they are still alive and provided with ammunition.

Suddenly there is a long-drawn singing shriek—for so only can I describe it—and a "Jack Johnson" passes overhead, to fall half a mile behind with a "kirrump" that shakes the earth. So the day wears on, with shell passing overhead one way or the other, an occasional

aeroplane and almost continual rifle fire. The C.O. passes down the line and directs this parapet to be heightened or that breastwork to be strengthened. Perhaps the Brigadier or some Staff officer comes up to have a look round, or maybe a gunner strolls along to gather the latest news. By noon the keen wind has died down and we discard our coats and fairly revel in the sun. But sad to say, it nearly always clouds over in the afternoon, and the wind blows keener than ever, sometimes even ending in a flurry of snow. But as the sun goes down the sky always clears again and one gets a brilliant frosty moon.

We came out to rest yesterday, and I took a walk round, glad to assume once more the erect posture natural to the *genus homo*. There is no doubt that height is a decided disadvantage when the trenches were dug by Gurkhas! The fruit trees are bursting into blossom, and the gardens of the ruined cottages are becoming little patches of colour with daffodils and primulas and pincushions growing up through the rubble. Very strong and bright they grow, and I could not but think of Omar:

"I sometime think that never grows so red
The Rose as where some buried Cæsar bled."

As I walked home again I saw a long line of poplars silhouetted against the sunset sky of blue green and orange pink, with a pointed square church tower standing grim and squat. It might have been a Hobbema straight from its frame.

I am afraid that the local children are becoming confirmed cadgers through the kindness of T.A. I passed two rosy-cheeked, plump urchins standing at the roadside holding out their hands and saying with a cherubic grin, "Vairy hungree." They also show considerable aptitude for pitch and toss, calling "Heads" and "Tails" in English, while they are perfect enthusiasts at football, waiting patiently round a group of men at "punt about" in the hopes of a kick at the ball. Every urchin seems to wear khaki puttees, Balacava helmet and a woollen muffler. It has become a regular uniform with them. They all or nearly all gravely salute all officers, and beam with delight when it is returned, which I always make a point of doing. They usually accompany the salute with "Good night"—at 8 a.m. for preference.

If the German anti-aircraft guns were of little use, the Allied "Archibalds" were not much

more effective, though they often, indeed, forced hostile aeroplanes to keep at a height which rendered it difficult for the observers in them to see clearly objects beneath them.* Occasionally, however, as on April 8, when a Taube was brought down at Pervyse and another one damaged near Ypres, an anti-aircraft gun brought down its quarry, but on

* Archibald was the name given by our soldiers to the anti-aircraft guns used both by the Germans and the Allies.

April 12 a German airship visited the Allied lines, inflicted some loss, and escaped without being hit. The next day German aeroplanes were active, especially east of Ypres. Flares and smoke-balls were thrown from them over the trenches. The result was that the British were subjected to a heavy bombardment by guns and rifles firing grenades.

The command of the air on the whole unmistakably belonged to the Allies; their command of the sea was never a matter of



AN ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUN.

doubt. As they had done for some time past, the British and French men-of-war continued to guard the extreme left of the Allied line and to rake German troops advancing from Ostend on Nieuport. On March 17 they bombarded the enemy's position at Westende, east of Nieuport. Against that town, which, it will be remembered, contained the locks and sluices regulating the inundation of the Yser region, the Germans had brought up one of their monster howitzers. Short of laying their hands on the inundation machinery the best thing would be to destroy it.

Meanwhile the Belgians, with their left wing protected by the Allied Fleet and by the French troops in and around Nieuport, who on March 11 had captured a small fort east of Lombartzyde, took the offensive. Fighting took place at Schoorbakke, to the north of the loop of the Yser, the French artillery shelling the German trenches on the eastern edge of the inundated district. On Wednesday, March 17, a convoy between Dixmude and Eessen was maltreated by the French gunners, who had previously destroyed the enemy's front in the Dixmude graveyard. By the 23rd a Belgian division was on the east bank of the Yser. From the sea to Dixmude the Allies were advancing.

It was south of Dixmude that the Germans next made a forward movement. In the first days of April they heavily bombarded the villages (e.g., Oostvleteren) and farms west of the Yser and Yperlee Canals, and captured the farm of Driegrachten. South of it a detachment with three machine guns crossed the canal. The idea was to push forward along the edge of the inundations to Furnes. The French artillery, however, destroyed the farm, and on April 6 the Belgians drove the enemy back on Mercken. During the same period—March 15 to April 17—Ypres continued to be bombarded. The Cloth Hall and most of the public buildings were by now completely ruined, and a medical student writing about this time notes that "the cathedral clock was lying in the middle of the market square."

On the purely British front serious fighting had not recommenced. The British were amply provided with shrapnel, and in face of the British and French artillery, machine guns and rifles the Germans could not hope successfully to take the offensive until they had completed their preparations for dislodging the enemy by the use of new destructive agencies. On the other hand, Sir John French required

still larger munition supplies than he had hitherto had to allow his troops to undertake any prolonged forward movement.

The remainder of the month of March and the first half of April were undistinguished by events of any great note. On April 1 British guns shelled with effect a German headquarters. The next day trench mortars did some execution near the Wood of Ploegsteert. On the 3rd a hundred yards of trench facing Cuinchy, a village a little south of Givenchy, was blown up by a mine, pieces of timber and steel loophole plates being hurled up by the force of the explosion, and in reply the Germans heavily bombarded the British lines at this point. By then rumours of a German advance, to be preceded by clouds of asphyxiating gas, were current. Close to Neuve Chapelle the Germans had posted the following notice:

"HINDENBURG IS COMING !

WELCOME TO OUR BROTHER AND 500,000 MEN.

WELCOME, BROTHER !"

Prisoners reported that poisonous gas was to be employed against us, and that the gas, which was contained under pressure in steel cylinders, was of a heavy nature and would spread along the ground without being quickly dissipated. So far as the barbarity of the idea was concerned there was nothing improbable in the story. In Alsace on March 26 the Germans had again resorted to the use of burning liquids, and in the Argonne they had pumped blazing oil or pitch on the French.

In the next few days the British and German guns were active. Fleurbaix (three miles south-west of Armentières) was shelled by the enemy on the 5th. The same day the British artillery put out of action a new trench mortar which had been located to the south of this point. North and south of the Lys the German artillery showed some activity on the 6th, while the British guns effectually bombarded the railway triangle near Cuinchy. A mine was fired at Le Touquet, on the north bank of the Lys, and several Germans were killed and wounded. About the same time (April 9) near Cuinchy a German ammunition store was exploded, and our mortars opposite Givenchy drove the enemy from their front trenches.

On April 14 there appeared in a German *communiqué* the significant falsehood that "yesterday week north-west of Verdun the French employed mines emitting yellow asphyxiating gases."




THE BISHOP OF LONDON AT THE FRONT.
Addressing the men.

During the lull in the fighting the Bishop of London visited the British lines. His impressions were recorded in the following communication to *The Times* :

I have held fifty or sixty short services all along the front of the battle-line and at all the bases, and have visited, ward by ward, twenty-two of the hospitals in France, and have therefore had a unique opportunity of seeing that side of the British soldier's character which is often left out in people's estimate of him. We hear a great deal of his wit and humour, his grit, and his splendid courage and endurance; but little is said of that simple faith which he has imbibed in some quiet home or learnt in his Sunday school, and which, to a large extent, is the spring and source of his other qualities. As one of the leading Generals said to me, "People often ignore the sentimental side of the British soldier's character."

It is to this spiritual side, of course, to which I went out principally to appeal; and I chose Holy Week and Easter as the most appropriate time at which to do so. What has encouraged me so much has been the overwhelming response of the whole Army. A few of the services were of the nature of Church parades, but the great majority were purely voluntary. On no occasion did we have less than 1,000 men and often 4,000; about half the services were in the open air, others in cinema theatres, large baths, and (at the bases), the huge warehouses where goods are stacked for the front.

The most touching service to myself was early on Easter Day, when, after giving the Holy Communion to 200 officers and men within a mile of the German lines in a schoolroom, the roof of which had been taken off by a shell, I was told at the end that 150 more men and officers were outside from other regiments asking for their Easter Communion; and, of course, I held at once another service for them. Before each service I gave a message from all at home, saying that they must



THE RAILWAY CUTTING NEAR HILL 60.

imagine that their wives and mothers and children, or sweethearts, had sent them all their love through me, and that the whole nation was thinking and praying for them day and night. When the service began the religious note was struck at once, and the point I want to emphasize is the immediate response to the deeper spiritual note. Few things will live in my memory so vividly as the sight, from the wagon or extemporized platform which was always arranged for me, of these thousands of upturned faces singing "When I Survey the Wondrous Cross," with a depth and earnestness about which there could be no mistake. At the services just before and on Good Friday I took the Words from the Cross; and as the Generals and officers who attended in large numbers with the men often remarked, "the men seemed to drink in every word."

The guns booming hard by, and the British aeroplanes circling like guardian angels over the service to guard the attractive target of 4,000 men and officers with a Bishop in the middle, made the scene very impressive. Time being always strictly limited, we had sometimes three, but more often two, hymns, some prayers translated from the Russian Liturgy of a simple character, of which I had taken out 2,000 copies, and which were greatly appreciated, and an address of about a quarter of an hour, the whole lasting half an hour.

At the end of each service my chaplains, among whom I must specially mention Mr. Macpherson, senior chaplain of the Church of England chaplains, who gave up a whole fortnight to arrange my tour, gave out what the soldiers called "The Bishop's Souvenir," souvenir being one of the French words which the British soldier has enthusiastically adopted. Everything is a "souvenir," from a German helmet to a button off a Bishop's cassock. These particular souvenirs were pictures of our Lord on the Cross and of His Resurrection on Easter Day, with some meditations and prayers I had written myself. I had only room to take 10,000, and these made two enormous packages, and they were almost fought for, as they began to run short towards the end.

Every one spoke of the splendid work of the chaplains of all denominations. I shall take another opportunity

of saying what I saw of them; but the point which bears upon the subject in hand is that officers and men seem to look upon them "as guides, philosophers, and friends."

The truth of the matter is that the realities of war have melted away the surface shyness of men about religion; they feel they are "up against" questions of life and death; and I have heard of more than one censor who has for the first time realized the part religion bears in a soldier's life, while censoring the innumerable letters home in which the writers ask for the prayers of their relations or express their trust in God.

The visit of a Bishop was more than justified by the one fact alone that, although such short notice had been given of my visit, 200 were waiting to be confirmed, some with the mud of the trenches still wet on their putties.

It was, however, perhaps most of all in the hospitals that the religious character of the British soldier came out. The lines and lines of wounded men and boys in those twenty-two hospitals, admirably looked after by a devoted band of doctors and nurses, form the most pathetic note of war, while the patience and courage with which those terrible wounds are borne is its highest inspiration. I only hoped that instead of the brief word which was all that was possible to each I had had time for the long and confidential talk for which I could see by their faces they would have been ready.

Sometimes it was possible to do more. One young man, little more than a boy, just carried in from the trenches, shot through the shoulder, at a clearing hospital at the Front, held out his arms towards me with a radiant smile. I thought for the moment he was in delirium, but he was an East-end lad, a communicant at an East-end church, who saw the Bishop he knew so well passing his bed. I need not say that I tried my best to help him in that hour of pain and trial. But the incident was in itself a parable; in his hour of need the soldier turns instinctively to the religion of his childhood; and in the men and boys who are fighting our country's battles we have more than brave heroes—we have potential saints.




HILL 60.

On April 17 Sir John French, as if anticipating the coming German attack, resumed the offensive. Between the villages of Zwartelen and Klein Zillebeke the Comines-Ypres railway, skirting on the east the Comines-Ypres Canal, cut through the Klein Zillebeke ridge, the highest point of which was the so-called Hill 60, distant three miles from Ypres. Hill is, perhaps, rather an exaggerated term for what was really only a slight eminence about 60 feet above the surrounding country, forming a small open space of ploughed land surrounded on all sides by woods, but the heroic deeds which took place on it justify the retention of the name, and as Hill 60 it will be known in future. The Germans held the upper slopes and the summit, and their observers could watch what was going on in the lower ground, where were the British trenches, and also the country to the south-east of Ypres, and could signal to their heavy guns at the hill of Zandpoudre, farther east on the Menin-Ypres road, where to direct their fire. The German trenches were only some 50 yards away from the British. The hill of Zandpoudre was one of the keys in the German line east of Ypres and, if Hill 60 could be taken, it might be possible to dislodge the enemy from it.

Accordingly, Major-General Bulfin and, after

he and his troops were replaced, Sir Charles Ferguson directed that Hill 60 should be mined preparatory to an assault, which was to be made on April 17, and five galleries had been driven into and under the hillock. Neither the operations of our engineers nor the concentration of troops for the attack were perceived by the enemy. As at Neuve Chapelle, it was thanks to the Allied airmen—among others Garros, who unfortunately after bringing down a Taube was, the day after, forced through a defect in his plane to descend near Courtrai and was captured—that nothing unusual at this spot had been observed from the German lines. To the 13th Brigade was allotted the task of carrying the position after the mines had blown the defences to pieces. This brigade comprised the 2/ King's Own Scottish Borderers, the 2/ Duke of Wellington's (West Riding Regiment), the 1/ Queen's Own Royal West Kent Regiment, 2/ King's Own (Yorkshire Light Infantry). Of these, the first and third named were to lead the assault, and to Major Joslin of the West Kents was given the command of these two battalions, and they waited in the trenches till the mines went off. At 7 p.m. the mines were fired simultaneously. Then the 250 yards of German trenches seemed to be struck by an earthquake. Parapets dis-



A BELGIAN BRIDGE OVER THE YSER CANAL.

appeared, sandbags, barbed wire, and the bodies of those holding the trenches were hurtled up into the air. The trenches had ceased to exist, and where they had been huge craters appeared, while the *débris* falling down again to earth formed new hillocks, and the air was filled with dense columns of smoke and dust. Into these storm clouds every available gun poured shrapnel and high explosive shell. In the midst of this inferno could be seen German soldiers, some in their shirt-sleeves, and without weapons, falling over one another in their struggle to escape into the communication trenches, others in their terror forcing their way through their comrades at the bayonet's point.

Now Major Joslin gave the signal, and against this disordered mass were promptly launched the West Kents in first line, followed by the Scottish Borderers. Forward went the West Kents down into the craters and up out of them into what was left of the first line of the enemy's trenches. Few there were to stop their progress; many Germans had been blown to bits, and most of those left were too terror-stricken to resist. Two German officers and fifteen privates were thus captured. Pursuing the flying Germans, the front communication trenches were soon gained. Then a severe struggle between man and man commenced. Across the communication trenches were barricades defended by bomb throwers. The Germans rallied, and in the narrow room available many bloody encounters took place, and in one of them the gallant leader Major Joslin was killed. The British were cooped up in a narrow salient deluged from three sides by the shells of the German guns. Up the com-

munication trenches rushed the enemy's bombers, flinging hand grenades at or over the barricades and parapets which were being hastily erected, and into the craters to whose crumbling sides our men were clinging. The scene on Hill 60 was wreathed in the smoke of bursting shells, through which were seen flashes from rifles and exploding grenades, where British and Germans (mostly Saxons) bayoneted and shot one another in the darkness of falling night.

Meanwhile, the Scottish Borderers had entrenched the edge of the craters and held a supporting position for the West Kents. It had only taken 20 minutes to capture the position, and up to this time the casualties had been small.

The West Kents had made themselves a position in the communication trenches they had captured, and here from the repeated attacks of the rallied Germans they suffered heavily during the night. In the early morning they were relieved by the Scottish Borderers. These in their turn had heavy losses from the heavy artillery fire and from bombs, and were compelled to fall back to the near side of the craters, to which they obstinately clung.

Through the eyes of an officer of the Territorial Royal Field Artillery, who was in the background, we catch some vivid glimpses of the fight between 5 p.m. and 11 p.m. :


The waiting and standing by of the last three nights finished up with an attack by our own troops on our left. At 5 p.m. we got a 'phone message to say there would be heavy firing to the north of us. We were ordered to make a demonstration on our own front. We got our lamps that we use for laying by by night and made every possible preparation. The telephone wires buzzed with messages from all directions as the operators spoke on

and tested them to see that communication was as perfect as possible. We were in continued touch with our trenches in front of us and with the Infantry Headquarters. They told us exactly where they wanted our fire and the guns were laid accordingly. Then followed perhaps half an hour of waiting. It was rapidly getting dusk. As we stood behind our guns, dug in and well covered by earthworks and sandbags, we could see the infantry reserves collecting at different points in little groups.

The flash of a heavy gun to our north was followed in a few seconds by a rumbling report. Immediately other guns took it up and a most terrific cannonade was opened. Flashes from guns and shells flickered in the sky like summer lightning. Slowly, but collectively, the noise began to travel down the line towards us. Every minute it got clearer, until it was possible to distinguish the rattle of machine-guns and rifles crackling in the trenches like a wood fire in a puff of wind. Nearer and nearer it came. Suddenly the fusillade was opened in the trenches in front of us. It was immediately backed up by the guns behind. The hour had arrived and we all let fly together. For twenty minutes the night was just one shriek of bullets and shrapnel. None came our way, but we could hear and imagine. Then all at once it died down, and in the silence that followed a message came through on the 'phone that a mine under the enemy's trenches had been successfully exploded and that the infantry attack was launched. It was impressive. We sat still for ten minutes waiting for news. Each of us, I think, had more than a vivid picture in his mind of those poor infantry fellows who had been lying covered by our fire while we prepared the ground for them, and were now making the final rush across the open. Then the 'phone again, and good news, "The attack has been successful," "Stand easy." So these attacks and counter-attacks are conducted. Organized, timed, and run by 'phone. News of what's happening, even in the fire trenches themselves, flashes up and down the wire almost too quickly to take it in. At 11 o'clock

I turned in and listened to the windows rattling from guns that were still firing. What was accomplished exactly I don't know. We never do until we see it in the papers from home. England always gets the news before us.

Meanwhile machine guns had been rushed up on motor-cars to the British trenches. They were needed. About 7 a.m. the next morning (Sunday, April 18) two massed attacks were delivered by the Germans. The advancing enemy were mown down by machine guns and beaten back by a continuous rain of shrapnel, but time after time the Germans renewed their assaults. By 6 p.m. the Germans had succeeded in recovering part of the southern edge of the hill, and the West Kents and Scottish Borderers, after a desperate resistance, had been pushed back to the British side of the crest. They were relieved by the Duke of Wellington's and the Yorkshire Light Infantry. These regiments, supported by heavy artillery fire, darted forward and drove out the enemy at the point of the bayonet, fifty-three prisoners (including four officers) being captured. They were supported by the Victoria Rifles, the second oldest Volunteer corps in the Kingdom, now the 9/ London Regiment, who fought with great gallantry. The British position was thus consolidated, but the troops were weary and so were their opponents, and the engage-



BRITISH SOLDIERS WASHING IN A CANAL.

ments for a time became mere artillery duels.

The next day (April 19) the fighting continued, and the 13th Brigade again had many casualties from the incessant artillery fire and the constant showers of bombs. Towards evening they were relieved by another brigade, and marched to the rear for a rest. But hardly had it settled down when it was moved up again to the front line to support the troops at Ypres.



On the 20th the Germans concentrated more guns in the area and Ypres was bombarded by pieces of 42 cm. and 35 cm. calibre. Among the casualties they inflicted were fifteen children playing in one of the streets of Ypres. At 6.30 p.m. and 8 p.m. other assaults were made on Hill 60. Owing chiefly to the machine guns, they were repulsed with heavy loss. Nevertheless, the stubborn foe did not admit himself beaten, and throughout the night the British were bombarded by artillery and by the hand grenades of infantry.

At dawn (April 21) it was discovered that the Germans had once more established themselves in a corner of the tiny field of combat. A counter-attack was delivered against them, and by 3 p.m. only a few bomb-throwers were left on the north-eastern edge of the ridge. Though all day common shell and shrapnel and shells with asphyxiating gases rained on the British, still they hung on to the position which they had bought at so heavy a cost.

But all this was merely the prelude to the second Battle of Ypres. Tons of metal and high explosives had been poured on this tiny table-top of land. It had partly been blown away by mines, and what was left had been



YPRES AFTER THE BOMBARDMENT.

Devastation caused by a 42 cm. shell



YPRES.

Set on fire by German shells.

enveloped in poisonous gas; but once more the British infantry had, in Sir John French's words, "behaved with their customary courage, endurance and tenacity and had held what they had captured against the gigantic efforts of their opponents."

While this fight was taking place there had been some minor incidents along the British front which are worthy of notice. Between the 15th and the 20th five German aeroplanes had been destroyed, and on April 19 an Allied aviator with three bombs and some hand grenades attacked the German airship shed near Ghent. It was protected by a captive balloon with armed observers and by anti-aircraft guns. From a height of 6,000 feet our aviator loosed his first bomb at the shed. Discovering that he was being fired at from the car of the balloon, he descended in a spiral towards it and attempted to destroy it with one of his remaining bombs and with hand grenades. Passing the balloon, he planed under it towards the shed. The troops below and the gunners of the "Archibalds" did not dare to fire for fear of hitting the balloon. Finally, when he was only 200 feet above the

shed, he unloosed his third bomb, which exploded, and he then flew back untouched. The planes of his machine had been perforated with bullet holes.

The same day the British guns caused explosions in the railway triangle at Cuinchy, near which on the 21st the Germans fired four mines, though these did little damage. On the 19th they had unsuccessfully attempted to blow up trenches close to Givenchy, and there had been some hand-to-hand fighting in mine galleries on the 20th near this place.

Thursday, April 22, will be memorable in the history of the Art of War. That day the Germans first used an apparatus intended to destroy their opponents by a cruel and crude form of suffocation; that their dastardly conduct was not so successful as they hoped was very largely owing to the coolness and valour of the Canadian forces fighting at the point where the British joined on to the French Army.

The War Book issued before the Great War by the German General Staff for the instruction of German officers stated, when discussing the means of conducting war, that "what is

permissible includes every means of war without which the object of the war cannot be obtained," and that "what is reprehensible on the other hand includes every act of violence and destruction which is not demanded by the object of war." In applying these principles, it was pointed out that wide limits were set to the subjective freedom and arbitrary judgment of the commanding officer. All means of destruction, it was observed, "including the fullest, most dangerous, and most massive means of destruction, may be utilized." Nevertheless, "the usages of war recognize the *desirability*"—the italics are ours—"of not

food supplies), the propagation of infectious disease."

It is noticeable that the examples of reprehensible actions given by the War Book did not include the use of asphyxiating gases, and that no clear distinction was made between the methods which were to be excluded and those which should not be employed if and when the object of the war could be attained by "milder means." Germany, however, was a signatory to the Declaration at the Hague Conference of 1899, and an article in that Declaration ran as follows:

The contracting Powers agree to abstain from the use of projectiles the sole object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases.

The draftsmen of the Declaration had unfortunately overlooked the possibility of asphyxiating gases being distributed by pipes or cylinders, and the compilers of the War Book had frankly warned Germans and foreigners that the Declarations of the Hague Conference would not be binding on Germany.

In the modern usages of war [they said] one can no longer regard merely the traditional inheritance of the ancient etiquette of the profession of arms, and the professional outlook accompanying it, but there is also the deposit of the currents of thought which agitate our time. But since the tendency of thought of the last century was dominated essentially by humanitarian considerations which not infrequently degenerated into sentimentality and flabby emotion, there have not been wanting attempts to influence the development of the usages of war in a way which was in fundamental contradiction with the nature of war and its object. Attempts of this kind will also not be wanting in the future, the more so as these agitations have found a kind of moral recognition in some portions of the Geneva Convention and the Brussels and Hague Conferences.

The above extracts show that the German military authorities had before the Great War meditated on the employment of every means, however diabolical, for attaining their objects. As a German Jurist, Professor Lüder, expressed it—"The ugly and inherently immoral aspect of such methods cannot affect the recognition of their lawfulness. The necessary aim of war gives the belligerent the right and imposes upon him, according to circumstances, the duty not to let slip the important, it may be the decisive, advantages to be gained by such means."

In this frame of mind the Germans as a whole, and their rulers, had entered on the struggle for world-power. That they intended to stick at nothing had been speedily apparent. They had revived malpractices condemned by the most civilized thinkers of Greece and Rome, by Christian teachers and by almost all International Lawyers since Grotius. For example,



KEY MAP TO ILLUSTRATE SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES.

employing severer forms of violence if and when the object of the war may be attained by milder means, and furthermore that certain means of war which lead to unnecessary suffering are to be excluded."

The War Book proceeded to give illustrations of the "severer forms of violence" which it was not "desirable" to employ, or which ought to be excluded. Among them were "the use of poison, both individually and collectively (such as poisoning of streams and



TAKING FORWARD SANDBAGS TO FORTIFY CAPTURED TRENCHES.

in October, 1914, the headquarters of the Second German Army at St. Quentin had issued an Order regulating the use of fire-squirts ejecting inflammable liquid. A special Corps of Pioneers, attachable to any unit which might need them, had been organized to handle this novel weapon. The Order explained that the instrument could squirt a flame which would cause mortal injury and which, owing to the heat generated, would drive the enemy to a considerable distance. It was recommended particularly for street fighting.

At first the German authorities, after falsely accusing the Allies of asphyxiating Germans, carefully concealed from their people the fact that, so far as success had been achieved in the Second Battle of Ypres, it was obtained by a

wicked disregard of conventions hitherto accepted. Later on, however, they gloried in this fresh exhibition of German *kultur*, and professors and journalists were ordered to expatiate on the meritorious actions of the governing classes. At the end of April German newspapers admitted and defended the use of asphyxiating bombs. Thus the *Kreuz Zeitung* wrote :

When the French report says that we used a large number of asphyxiating bombs, our enemies may infer from this that they always are making a mistake when by their behaviour they cause us to have recourse to new technical weapons.

On the same date the *Frankfurter Zeitung* in a leading article said :

It is quite possible that our bombs and shells made it impossible for the enemy to remain in his trenches



A French soldier standing by a bell which he rings to warn the troops when a gas cloud is coming.

and artillery positions, and it is even probable that missiles which emit poisonous gases have actually been used by us, since the German leaders have made it plain that, as an answer to the treacherous missiles which have been used by the English and the French for many weeks past, we too shall employ gas bombs or whatever they are called. The German leaders pointed out that considerably more effective materials were to be expected from German chemistry, and they were right.

But, however destructive these bombs and shells may have been, do the English and the other people think that it makes a serious difference whether hundreds of guns and howitzers throw hundreds of thousands of shells on a single tiny spot in order to destroy and break to atoms everything living there, and to make the German trenches into a terrible hell as was the case at Neuve Chapelle, or whether we throw a few shells which spread death in the air? These shells are not more deadly than the poison of English explosives, but they take effect over a wider area, produce a rapid end, and spare the torn bodies the tortures and pains of death.

Finally, the whole truth was imparted to the Germans, and we find Professor Wegener at the beginning of June in the *Cologne Gazette* gloating over his countrymen's iniquitous conduct:

It was along the same road that we walked that the stupefying gases crept on the evening of April 22. What can compare for mysterious terror with this uncanny, greenish wall, which looked as if the very soil itself were walking, and as if the trenches, which for so many months had remained unmoved, were now suddenly set in motion! Airmen who followed events from above have told how extraordinary it looked when the clouds came up to the enemy trenches, then rose, and, after as it were peeping curiously for a moment over the edge of the trenches, sank down into them like some living thing. Until then the enemy had shown only blank

astonishment. Suddenly there was a wild shriek of terror and then tumultuous flight. With a cheer our men were after them, and in irresistible German assault left the enemy no possibility of pulling himself together, but overran his second and third positions.

I am not going into the silly chatter about the unlawfulness of our new weapon of attack. Why should a stupefying gas, which one sees openly and slowly approaching, and before which one can retire, be less humane than the invisible and unavoidable gas which burst shells and with their splinters tears bodies into bloody shreds? Or the gas which flames up under one's feet from a secretly exploded mine and hurls thee and dozens of thy comrades in atoms towards the firmament?

What if it were "poisonous" and killed? I do not go into this chatter in dealing with a band of enemies who since the beginning of the war have been misusing human speech, in order, as regards us, to turn into their opposite the most simple moral conceptions and values. What is "law" any longer in this most unmoral—with the exception of some English Colonial wars—of all wars of modern times, in which Italy's intervention, out of a greed that is no longer cloaked, shows even the biggest fool what is the spirit of the coalition against us that has been made "in England"? So you want to get at our throats. Very well then, you shall feel our claws and teeth. And now more thoroughly than ever.

Holding the views they did, it was natural that the German rulers should select chlorine, the action of which set up acute bronchitis and caused its victims to die in horrible agony,* and for some time past vast quantities of chlorine had been manufactured to asphyxiate and destroy the Allied soldiers. The gas had been pumped into huge shells such as those discharged on Hill 60; reservoirs of it had been placed behind the German lines. From the reservoirs ran pipes to the front trenches for its distribution, and special respirators had been served out to the troops detailed to take advantage of the foul blow thus to be struck.

To utilize their gas, it was necessary for the Germans that a breeze should be blowing towards that part of the Allied line to be attacked. The British, in accordance with General Joffre's wishes, had taken over some of the French trenches. Owing to the irregularities of the line, which faced east, north-east, and in places even west, a simultaneous gassing at all points was impracticable. The section chosen by the Germans for the first of their diabolical experiments was the northern portion of the salient round Ypres defended by coloured troops, supported on their right by Canadian troops. Coloured soldiers, it was conceived by the German Commanders, would be more liable to panic from such methods; probably also they supposed that the soldiers of the Canadian Contingent were inferior in training


* Irritant substances, probably amorphous phosphorus, by the way, had already been used on the bullets of the German shrapnel shells with a view to poisoning wounds.

to their British comrades and would, therefore, at once retreat if their flank was turned.

The northern section of the salient from the crossing of the Yperlee Canal at Steenstraate (west of Bixschoote) round the north of Lange-marck to the Ypres-Poelcappelle road was now held by the French Colonial Division under General Putz. Poelcappelle was in the possession of the enemy. Where the French trenches ended, the Canadian trenches began. Their Division occupied a line of some 5,000 yards extending from the Ypres-Poelcappelle road along the Grafenstafel ridge to the Ypres-Roulers railway in the region of Zonnebeke. The Division consisted of three infantry brigades with a numerous artillery. Of these brigades, the third was in touch with the French, and the

second was on its right. South of the Ypres-Roulers railway a British division was strung out from Broodseinde to the western outskirts of Becelaere, whence our line curved through the woods to Hill 60, and beyond it to the Comines-Ypres Canal.

Thus the Allied forces formed an arc-like figure, the chord of which was the canal from Steenstraate through Ypres to a point a mile or so south-east of Hill 60 and a mile west of St. Eloi. The aim of the Germans was to destroy the French Colonial troops defending the northern section of the arc and to cross the canal north and south of Steenstraate and at this village. If they succeeded in these operations they would turn the left flank of the Canadians, who would have to



MEN UNDER GAS.

retreat or fight an enemy in front and behind them. If they retreated to the Yperlee Canal, the bulk of the British troops from Broodseinde to the Ypres-Comines Canal near St. Eloi would either be cut off or have to make their escape, under the fire of the German artillery, through the encumbered streets of Ypres. That city would fall into the hands of the Germans, and the Kaiser would then be able to proclaim the annexation of Belgium.

The plan was ingenious, but it left out of account certain important factors. The Canadians were mostly recruited from a class of men forced by their occupations to develop individual daring and resourcefulness. Feeling that the eyes of the inhabitants of Canada and the United States were on them, they were determined to show that they were the equals of any troops in the world. Belonging to a race of sportsmen, they would be certain to be roused to fury by the dastardly trick about to be played on both them and the French troops to their left. They might, therefore, be depended on to hold out to the last extremity.

Nor were they or the French without supports. For both General Foch and Sir John French had assembled sufficient forces in or behind the salient to engage in counter-attacks. Two miles or so behind the right of Putz's Division, in a small wood to the west of St. Julien, was the 2nd London Battery of Heavy Artillery with 4.7 in. guns. Four battalions of the V. Corps were round Ypres. The 13th Infantry Brigade, which, as we have seen, had suffered severely on Hill 60, was resting three miles west of Ypres, at Vlamertinghe. The 1st Canadian Brigade was in general reserve, but with one battalion close to the trenches. Unless the line from Broodseinde to St. Eloi was simultaneously threatened at all points, the reserves of the British troops defending it could safely be employed to beat off the Germans descending on Ypres from the north. The Cavalry Corps, now, as ever, ready to replace infantry, was in general reserve, and if necessary the Lahore Division of the Indian Corps and a portion of the III. Corps could be sent to reinforce the British Second Army, on which and Putz's Division the storm was about to burst. Foch, too, had ample reserves. With the motor transport at his disposal, he could quickly concentrate fresh men and guns round Ypres.

The gassing was to have begun on the 20th—

at the height of the combat for Hill 60—but the wind on that and the succeeding day was unfavourable. Thursday, the 22nd, dawned. The wind shifted and blew from the north. The weather was warm and sunny. During the forenoon and early afternoon nothing unusual was reported to the Allied Headquarters.

It was nearly 5 p.m. Suddenly an aviator reported that yellow smoke had been seen on the German position between Bixschoote and Langemarck. From their trenches the Turcos perceived a white smoke rising some three feet from the ground. In front of it appeared a greenish yellowish cloud, higher than a man, which drifted towards them. At every 50 feet or so along the German front there was a battery of 20 retorts, and the Germans had at last turned on the chlorine gas.

"Very probably," wrote one of them on the 26th, "we are going to settle the hash of the wicked English. We are making use of a new means of fighting, against which they are simply defenceless."

If they had no compunction in asphyxiating the British, they had still less in murdering Turcos. Unable themselves to employ coloured troops, for their brown subjects in South Africa would never have fought for their cruel masters, they hypocritically objected to the presence of Africans or Asiatics on European battlefields.

In a few seconds the Turcos began to experience intolerable irritation and smarting in the throat, nose and eyes. They began to cough and vomit blood; they felt frightful pains in the chest; they seemed to be suffocating.

Dimly they discerned detachments of the enemy advancing through the wall of vapour. Some of the Germans had their heads enveloped in huge masks, which made them look like divers; the majority wore indiarubber respirators pierced with holes and shaped, not inappropriately, like a snout. These respirators, which had been issued in sealed covers, were attached by means of elastic bands passing behind the neck. The wearer breathed through a plug saturated with bicarbonate of soda or some other solution neutralizing the evil effects of the gas.

The surprise was complete. Hundreds of the Turcos were thrown into a comatose or dying condition, others were shot or bayoneted by their opponents. The survivors retired from the gas area, leaving 50 guns in the Germans' hands.



FRENCH INFANTRY WEARING STEEL HELMETS.

A light helmet of steel used in the field to protect the soldier's head against projectiles.

No discredit whatever attached to the French Colonials. "It is my firm conviction," said Sir John French, "that if any troops in the world had been able to hold their trenches in the face of such a tremendous and altogether unexpected onslaught, the French Division would have stood firm." As it was, those who were not killed outright were dazed and reeling in the green smoke. Their blanched and contorted faces betrayed the nature of the hideous ordeal through which they had passed, as they reeled backwards pursued by the Germans, part of whom halted and entrenched themselves on a line parallel to the road to Poelcappelle. In addition to the losses suf-

fered by the Turcos in the trenches, a large proportion of the French troops billeted behind the front line were taken by surprise.

Ypres seemed within the enemy's grasp. Storms of high-explosive shell, of shrapnel, and bombs filled with asphyxiating gases were bursting over or on all the tactical points north of the city, which was itself once more heavily bombarded. Onward came the Germans, leaving the wall of gas, which was now beginning to break up into patches, behind them. At a distance they looked like a huge mob bearing down on the town. The battery of 4.7 in. guns in the wood, west of St. Julien, was captured, and the left of the German mass advanced on



A GERMAN LOOK-OUT POST.

several field batteries farther to the rear and in a more easterly direction. Before the guns could be brought into action the Germans were within a few hundred yards of them. One battery swung round, fired on the enemy at point-blank range and stopped the rush. The guns of another were attacked from three sides, but not a gun was taken.

Barely two miles of open country lay between Ypres and the Germans. The right wing of the two corps launched to the attack was marching on the Yperlee Canal to seize the crossing at Steenstraate and that at Het Sast, three-quarters of a mile south of it. Between Steenstraate and Dixmude the Germans were renewing their attacks on the Belgians at Driegrachten and, north of Dixmude, at the Château de Vicogne—a small country house, the centre of a group of cottages. Still more serious, the Canadian Division was turned and a line of trenches formed by the enemy at right angles to its left flank. Advancing from these, the enemy might cut the Canadians off from Ypres.

Never had the position in Flanders been more critical. The French Colonial Division was almost wiped out as a fighting unit, and, apart from the Canadians, only the four battalions of the V. Corps round Ypres and the sorely tried brigade resting after its efforts on Hill 60 at Vlamertinghe were at hand to save the situation. "The self-governing Colonies in the British Empire," Bernhardt had written in 1911, "have at their disposal a militia, which is sometimes only in process of formation. They can be completely ignored so far as concerns any European theatre of war." The Canadian "militia" was about to prove on a European theatre of war that it possessed a courage and tenacity equal to those of regular troops.

The soldiers in reserve in and near Ypres, startled by the cannonade and by the sight of the retiring Turcos, were gathering in groups. Here and there a Turco who could speak English was gesticulating and trying to explain what had happened, while Englishmen who could speak French were calmly asking questions. Out of the houses were rushing the thousands of civilians—men, women and children—who still remained in the city. They frantically endeavoured to make their way into the fields.

Suddenly a Staff officer galloped up and shouted: "Stand to Arms." The soldiers, some of whom had been bathing, quietly pushed their way through the panic-stricken civilians to their alarm posts. The officers, without waiting for orders, led them forward, and then the German host, attacked with the bayonet, was brought to a standstill on the ground which they had secured by their treacherous conduct.

The fate of the battle turned on the fortunes of the 3rd Canadian Brigade, commanded by Brigadier-General Turner. At the Canadians the Germans had also discharged a cloud of chlorine gas, behind which four divisions were massed for an attack. Fortunately, however, the direction of the wind saved the Canadians from the worst effects, and, though many soldiers were placed *hors de combat*, two assaults of the Germans were beaten off. As these combats proceeded, General Turner parried the blow aimed at his left and rear. The French Colonial Division had collapsed. The wood west of St. Julien with the 4.7-inch guns in it had been captured by the enemy; the French field artillery behind General Putz's force had been lost; our own field guns were in imminent danger of capture.

It was one of those moments which test the quality of leaders.

General Turner and his Staff rose to the occasion. The left of the brigade was promptly swung back from in front of Poelcappelle until it was west of the Poelcappelle-Ypres road. It was its duty at all costs to hold the new line while the Turcos were being rallied and reinforcements rushed through Ypres to fill the gaps between the environs of that city and St. Julien, and all the available reserves of the Canadian and the other divisions east and south of it were brought up. This most difficult operation, ordered and carried out in an atmosphere loaded with poisonous fumes, under bursting shells, amid jets of lead from machine-guns and in the teeth of a sleet of bullets from the German infantry entrenched between the wood west of St. Julien and Poelcappelle, was successful. Night fell. By the light of blazing farmhouses and cottages, their work from time to time illuminated by the moon, the Canadians dug themselves in.

But a passive defence was not sufficient. The Germans were crossing the canal at Steenstraete and Het Sast, and up both its sides they were descending on Ypres. Between St. Julien and the canal there were only the four battalions of the V. Corps under Colonel Geddes, of the Buffs, another battalion, some half-dazed Turcos and a few handfuls of soldiers who had been flung into the battle by enterprising subordinate officers. Ypres, the junction of nearly all the roads supplying the British forces from the region of Poelcappelle, through Zonnebeke to Hill 60, was in imminent danger of being stormed.

To relieve the pressure on the French, who had retired west of the canal, and on Geddes' scanty force, the 16th Battalion of the 3rd Canadian Brigade, under Lieut.-Colonel Leckie, and the 10th Battalion of the 2nd Canadian Brigade were prepared for a counter-attack. Two battalions of the 1st Canadian Brigade, which, it will be remembered, had been in Army Reserve, had arrived in the fighting line and were at hand as supports. They were the 2nd Battalion, under Colonel Watson, and the 3rd Battalion (Toronto Regiment), under Lieut.-Colonel Rennie, which latter battalion, known as "The Queen's Own," consisted of a company of the Governor-General of Canada's bodyguard, two companies of the Queen's Own Rifles and a company of the 10th Grenadiers.

Their immediate objective was the recovery of the wood west of St. Julien, and of the heavy guns lost there. This charge of the Canadian Scottish will live in history. It has been graphically described by one who took part in it:

The night had now become very dark. The moon, of which we had only had a few glimpses during our march, had disappeared behind dense black clouds, but farm buildings were ablaze all around us, and at a distance of, as near as I could judge, about two miles and a half, in nearly a straight line from our new front, there was a large wood.

The sound of firing had now entirely ceased and was succeeded by a silence which, to those of us who had been months at the front, was uncanny. After a further halt, which seemed interminable, but was really only one of minutes, we were ordered to move off in the direction of the wood. Scarcely had we done so when the intervening plain was again treated to shrapnel, but at intervals only, and we arrived within three-quarters of a mile of the outskirts of the wood without any casualties in our lot.

Here a further halt was called, and the officers were then told that the Germans were occupying the wood, that they had been in possession since 4 o'clock, and, in all probability, were entrenched therein. It was pointed out that the enemy were occupying a strong position in the rear of the British lines and that they must be driven out of it at all costs. It was whispered also that some British guns had been taken during the afternoon, and that it would be our "bit" to retake them. It was well understood by all that we were in for bayonet work and that we should not be supported by artillery.

We again moved on, in column of companies, forming fours to pass through a narrow gateway. This passed, we deployed in long lines of half companies, the second half of each company keeping about 30 yards in the rear of the first. All the battalions marched in this formation and each first half company knew that its "pals" in the second would not fail to support it when it came to the "Charge." The 10th Battalion had the post of honour in the van—its gallant Colonel, Russell Boyle, fell leading it.

It wanted but a few minutes to midnight when we got to a hollow which was at most 300 yards from the wood. The moon now reappeared at intervals and we could have done without her. The shrapnel fire had completely ceased and we had a second spell of a silence which could be felt.


Whispered orders were given to fix bayonets, which were obeyed in a flash. Overcoats, packs, and even the officers' equipments were dropped, and we immediately advanced in light order.

Scarcely had we reached a low ridge, in full view of the wood, when a perfect hell of fire was loosed on us from rifles and machine-guns, which the Germans had placed in position behind the undergrowth skirting the wood.

Instantly the word was given to charge, and on we rushed cheering, yelling, shouting, and swearing, straight for the foe. At first the Germans fired a little too high, and our losses until we came within fifty yards of them were comparatively small. Then some of our chaps began to drop, then the whole front line seemed to melt away, only to be instantly closed up again.

Cheering and yelling all the time, we jumped over the bodies of the wounded and tore on. Of the Germans with the machine-guns not one escaped, but those inside the wood stood up to us in most dogged style. We were so quickly at work that those at the edge of the wood could not have got away in any case. Many threw up their hands, and we did not refuse quarter.

Pressing on into the wood itself, the struggle became a dreadful hand-to-hand conflict; we fought in clumps and batches, and the living struggled over the bodies



THE COUNTRY ROUND YPRES.

of the dead and dying. At the height of the conflict, while we were steadily driving the Germans before us, the moon burst out. The clashing bayonets flashed like quicksilver, and faces were lit up as by limelight.

Sweeping on, we came upon lines of trenches which had been hastily thrown up and could not be stubbornly defended. Here all who resisted were bayoneted: those who yielded were sent to the rear. The trench fighting presented a spectacle which it is not pleasant to recall.

The 4.7 in. guns, according to one account, had been blown up by the enemy; according to another, were retaken and afterwards destroyed by the Canadians. The wood was won, but it could not be held. On it was concentrated the fire of innumerable German guns, which, as Sir Max Aitken wrote, "swept the wood as a tropical storm sweeps the leaves from a forest."

Meanwhile, the 2nd Canadian Brigade, under Brigadier-General Curry, whose right rested on the railway line from Ypres to Roulers in the region of Zonnebeke, and the British troops east of Zonnebeke, in the horn of the salient, had been vigorously attacked and shelled. At about 1.30 a.m. the Germans twice charged the trenches round Broodseinde, the tip of the horn, but were repulsed with heavy loss. The troops at this point fought with the utmost gallantry. News of the collapse of the French Colonials, of the retirement of the 3rd Canadian Brigade, and of the departure of most of their own local reserves to defend General Turner's new line had reached them. A portion of Ypres through which, if a disaster occurred, they would have to retreat was in flames. Though Sir John French was directing the Cavalry Corps and the Northumbrian Division to the west of Ypres and ordering other reserve troops from the III. Corps and the First Army to prepare to assist the Second Army, the situation was most precarious.

At 4 a.m. on Friday, the 23rd, the Germans gassed the 2nd Canadian Brigade, still in its old position, 2,500 yards or so long, on the Grafenstafel ridge. Men lay about struggling for breath and blue in the face, but General Curry's battalions did not flinch. Away south from the spot where their trenches touched those of the 3rd Canadian Brigade, their comrades were also choking from the poisonous fumes. The 13th Battalion (Royal Highlanders of Montreal) and the 15th Battalion (48th Highlanders) had been especially affected by the discharge of chlorine. The 48th Canadian Highlanders were to lose in the second Battle of Ypres 691 officers and men out of 896. The great-grandfather of their adjutant had

been with Wolfe when he stormed the Heights of Abraham.

Suffocated by the chlorine gas, the battalion abandoned for a moment its trenches. "The effect of the gas is," says a Canadian who suffered from it, "that you cannot get air. The sensation is horrible. In the trenches I saw men collapsing around me."

While the gassing went on, the Germans attempted to pierce the Allied line south of the wood west of St. Julien. At 6 a.m. the Ontario 1st and 4th Battalions of the 1st Canadian Brigade, which was under Brigadier-General Mercer, were ordered to charge. Colonel Geddes's force, which had been repeatedly counter-attacking with the bayonet, prolonged the charge on the left. The German guns poured shrapnel upon the devoted Canadians and Geddes's men. Machine guns and rifles thinned their ranks. The 4th



A FRENCH CAPTIVE BALLOON.

Canadian Battalion wavered. Its commander, Lieut.-Colonel Burchall, a light cane in his hand, coolly rallied it. He fell and his death decided the charge. With a yell of rage the Canadians rushed forward shooting and bayoneting the enemy.

By 11 a.m. the Allied line ran from St. Julien almost due west for about a mile, then curved south-westwards, and, turning north, reached the Yperlee Canal near Boesinghe. Across the canal the Germans from Steenstraate were attacking the village of Lizerne, at the junction of the Lizerne-Ypres and Lizerne-Vlamertinghe roads, and were bridging the canal at various spots. In the background of this battle General Foch and Sir John French had been consulting.



[Elliott & Fry.]

LT.-COLONEL RUSSELL LAMBERT
BOYLE,

10th Alberta Battalion, Canadians.

They had met early on Friday morning and General Foch had repeated to Sir John the report of the astounding events of Thursday, which had been furnished him by General Putz. It was Foch's intention to drive the enemy from the trenches he had managed to capture thanks only to his dastardly device. Large reinforcements from the north and west were on their way to Putz's aid, but, as an additional precaution, the Cavalry Corps were ordered by Sir John to assist the French west of the Yperlee Canal, while to reinforce his Second Army he sent for two Brigades of the III. Corps and the Lahore Division of the Indian Expeditionary Force. The loss of the French field guns behind Putz's Division and of the 4.7 in. guns had given the enemy, who had brought down several heavy pieces from the coast near Ostend, a great superiority in gun power, and no counter to the gas had yet been devised.

To civilians on the spot the prospect seemed even blacker than it had been on October 31, 1914. Ypres itself was being abandoned by what remained of its inhabitants. The latest exhibitions of German *kultur* had shaken the nerves of men and women who had lived indifferent to high-explosive shells and shrapnel.

On the road to Poperinghe thousands of refugees trudged along. These old men, women and children, with their few possessions and their carts drawn by horses, oxen and cows, somewhat delayed the advance of the reinforcements. All through the day, during the next night and on Saturday the exodus from Ypres proceeded. The ruins of the Cloth Hall and the Cathedral, of the beautiful private houses, the broken-hearted, pauperised fugitives on their way to Poperinghe and, from Poperinghe, to France or England admirably illustrated a text in the German War Book, "A war," said that work, "conducted with energy cannot be directed merely against the combatants of the Enemy State and the positions they occupy, but it will and must in like manner seek to destroy the total intellectual (*geistig*) and material resources of the latter. Humanitarian claims such as the protection of men and their goods can only be taken into consideration in so far as the nature and object of the war permit."

Throughout the remainder of Friday the battle raged with violence. In the afternoon, south of Pilkem, the troops of Colonel Geddes made some progress, and along the Yperlee Canal the French gained ground. Foch's reinforcements did not, however, arrive in time to save Lizerne, which was captured that night by the Germans, and the 3rd Canadian Brigade was pushed back, and a company of the Buffs sent by Colonel Geddes to help it met with terrible punishment.

The Canadians had had little to eat, and their trenches had been smashed in by the German shells, but still they maintained their heroic resistance. Gradually General Turner withdrew his troops from the north-east on St. Julien. During the retirement many wounded officers and men had to be left behind. Among them Captain McCuaig chose of his own accord to stay rather than to encumber his retreating countrymen. He asked that two loaded Colt revolvers should be placed by the side of his own. Thus armed he waited in an abandoned trench to sell his life to the miscreants who had gassed his battalion.

As the spring night drew to its close—about 3 a.m.—the German cannonade, which had dwindled away, was violently renewed. Shortly afterwards the gas was again turned on, this time east of St. Julien. The Canadians, wrapping wet handkerchiefs round their faces, resisted as best they could, but General Turner's Brigade was obliged to retire still further.

Just before dawn an airship appeared in the sky and dropped four red stars over the British trenches. Immediately afterwards a wall of greenish-yellow vapour bore down on them. Through the wall came streams of bullets, but for some reason, probably because the Germans themselves were affected by their gas, no bayonet charge followed. This was fortunate. The withdrawal of General Turner's Brigade had exposed the left flank of the 2nd Canadian Brigade on the Grafenstafel ridge, and General Curry was busy moving his battalions so that their left joined hands with Turner's right, east of St. Julien. Pivoting on the 8th Battalion, commanded by Colonel Lipsett, which remained where it was till Sunday afternoon, this perilous manoeuvre was safely accomplished. Towards midday large bodies of the enemy were perceived marching from the direction of Poelcappelle on St. Julien. The enemy's aim was to pierce the centre of the Allied line. Under the pressure of numbers the troops right and left of St. Julien were thus thrust back, and the village was assaulted. The detachment of the Royal Highlanders of Montreal (Canadian 13th Battalion) and of the Royal Montreal Regiment (14th Battalion), with a handful of Buffs, Turcos and French, which held it, defended themselves to the last. In vain Major-General Snow and Brigadier-General Hull sought to save them. The counter-attack organized in the afternoon by the latter, acting under the orders of Lieut.-General Alderson, the commander of the Canadian Contingent, with parts of battalions from six separate Divisions, though they checked the enemy's further advance, failed to retake the village. But hours after the Germans were beyond its southern line the sound of rifle shots in the interior of St. Julien showed that the heroic garrison were dying at their posts.)

The result of the action round St. Julien was that by nightfall the remnants of the Canadian Contingent were defending the Passchendaele-Ypres road between Fortuin and Grafenstafel. To reinforce Colonel Lipsett's 8th Canadian Battalion at Grafenstafel the 8th Battalion of the Durham Light Infantry and the 1st Hampshires had been sent up. They filled the gap between Grafenstafel and Broodseinde. The Allied line from Fortuin to Boesinghe had been reinforced by two Brigades, one composed of Territorials who but four days before had been in England; a third Brigade was coming up to replace the



[Elliott & Fry.]

BRIG.-GENERAL R. E. TURNER, V.C.

Canadians round Fortuin, and the Lahore Division and several battalions of another Division were fast approaching. On the Yperlee Canal the Germans held strongly the crossings at Het Sast and Steenstraate, and the village of Lizerne had been taken by them. But in the afternoon the French counter-attacked from Boesinghe and almost recovered Pilkem, the Belgian artillery smashed the bridge at Steenstraate, and General Foch concentrated fresh troops between Woesten and Crombeke with a view to driving the Germans west of the canal into or east of it. On both sides it was a race against time. An officer in the Lahore Division writes: "On Saturday, April 24, they marched us off at 1 p.m. on ten minutes' notice, and marched us hard—thirty-three miles—which we did by 10.30 a.m. Sunday."

That day—Sunday, the 25th—Allies and Germans again flung themselves on one another in the grapple for Ypres. About 4.30 a.m. General Hull threw his Brigade and two Territorial Battalions at St. Julien and the wood west of it. The men reached the cottages at the end of the village and got within a few hundred yards of the wood, but the German machine guns brought the charge to a standstill. During the rest of



GERMAN PRISONERS GOING TO THE REAR THROUGH FRENCH TRENCHES.

the day Hull—at one time with no less than fifteen battalions and the Canadian Artillery under him—clung to the blood and gas-stained position. At Grafenstafel the Durham Light Infantry, bombarded by asphyxiating shells, was attacked by the Germans from 2 p.m. onwards. At nightfall it fell back, and about midnight the line ran for some distance along the south bank of the little Haanabeek stream. From daybreak to the small hours of Sunday night the salient at Broodseinde was shelled with asphyxiating and other bombs and repeatedly attacked. The British at this point held their own and inflicted heavy losses (including many prisoners) on the enemy. Away on the left, beyond the Yperlee Canal, the French, debouching from the woods between Crombeke and Woesten, prevented the German advance. Still more to the left the Belgians south of Dixmude on Sunday night repelled three attacks supported by asphyxiating gases.

On the wings the Allies had held their own, but in the centre the fate of the battle was so doubtful that on Monday the 2nd Canadian Brigade, now less than 1,000 strong, which had been relieved, was again called up. The soldiers obeyed cheerfully. By nightfall the whole Canadian Contingent was brought

back into reserve. It had undoubtedly saved Ypres, but it left behind it three commanders of battalions, great numbers of junior officers, and thousands of men who had died for the cause of the Empire. In good sooth the men of the great colony had proved themselves the equals of their British companions in arms.

It was now the turn of the Indian troops of the Imperial Army to be gassed. On Monday (April 26) the Lahore Division, under Major-General H. D. Keary, was brought north of Ypres, a Cavalry Division at the same time being sent to support the V. Corps.* The crisis of the battle, as it turned out, had arrived. During the day the horn of the salient at Broodseinde was temporarily pierced, and north of the Roulers-Ypres railway the brigade round Grafenstafel was heavily attacked, while at dawn the Durham Light Infantry was driven from Fortuin behind the Haanabeek stream, and, as mentioned, General Curry, with what was left of the 2nd Canadian Brigade, had had to be moved up to its assistance. From St. Julien and its environs the Germans launched several attacks between the southern outskirts of that village and the Yperlee Canal, and

* The Lahore Division had three brigades—viz, those from Jullundur, Sirhind, and Ferozepore, commanded by Brig.-Generals Strickland, Walker, and Egerton.

Colonel Geddes's force, like Curry's Canadians, was in the last stages of exhaustion. It was broken up and the battalions and companies composing it were returned to their divisions and regiments. With the Canadians, this body had borne the brunt of the first part of the battle, and no praise can be sufficient for its commander, who was mortally wounded as he left the field. He had had to manœuvre troops most of whom he had never led before. If he or his men had lost their heads or flinched, the Canadian Contingent and Ypres would probably have been captured.

With the salient narrowing and the troops in it as it narrowed becoming more and more exposed to the enemy's fire from three sides, a counter-attack was imperatively needed. At 10.15 a.m. General Riddell's Brigade moved to Fortuin. It, and the Lahore Division on its left, were ordered to retake St. Julien and the woods west of it. The attack was delivered in the afternoon. There had been no time to reconnoitre the German position. Far off on the left, beyond the Yperlee Canal, boomed the Belgian artillery supporting the French assault on Lizerne, and the rolling thunder of the *soixante-quinze* guns indicated that General Foch was engaged with the Germans who had crossed the Canal. From the region of Boesinghe the French Colonial troops poured on Pilkem. To their right were the Connaught Rangers, then the celebrated 57th Wilde's

Rifles, forming the centre battalion of the Ferozepore Brigade. Further east were the 129th Baluchis, the Jullundur Brigade, and General Riddell's battalions. The Sirhind Brigade was in reserve. Let us follow the fortunes of Wilde's Rifles, commanded by Major T. J. Willans, D.S.O. From what they experienced the reader may gather a dim idea of this terrible combat.

The ground in front of Willans' men was bare of cover. It rose slightly for the first five hundred yards; there was then a dip, and, on the other side of the dip, the ground gradually sloped upwards for about 600 yards. Somewhere on the second slope were the German trenches, which could not be located. Every point was under the fire of the German gunners, who knew the distances accurately, and both slopes and the dip were swept by machine guns and rifles.

By short, rapid rushes the heroic Indians, led by their no less heroic British officers, reached the edge of the dip. Shrapnel and rifle bullets had thinned their ranks. Descending from the ridge they encountered every description of missile, including shells filled with asphyxiating gas. Lieutenant Bainbridge was suffocated, Major Willans, Captain Radford and Captain Mahon wounded.

The battalion lost its formation. The Baluchis and the Jullundur Brigade were shouldering it off to the left.



THE MOUTH ORGAN AT THE FRONT.



A GERMAN ATTACK.

Nevertheless the survivors had covered another 400 yards and were at the bottom of the dip. Up the second slope they ran, walked, or crept forward. Captain Mahon refused to go back. Bhan Singh, a Sikh, severely wounded in the face, stuck to Captain Banks of the Guides, whose orderly he was, until the latter was killed; he had that day been attached to Wilde's Rifles. The orderly, weak from loss of blood, lifted his corpse, and staggered rearward with it. Too exhausted to carry the weight he was compelled to abandon the body; but still succeeded in bringing in his officer's accoutrements. For this gallant act Bhan Singh received the Indian Distinguished Service Medal. Other officers fell—Major Duhan, Captain Mackie, Subadar Fateh Jang Bahadur, Jemadars Ugajir Singh, Hayat Khan, and Kala Khan. A gas-shell half stupified Lieutenant Deedes, but, though suffering intensely, he endeavoured with his machine guns to open fire from an adjacent farm on the left. The wounded Captain Mahon took command, and led on the remnants of the regiment to a point about eighty yards from the German trenches.

At this moment the Germans again resorted to their use of gas. Big nozzles, like the nozzles of fire hoses, appeared on the outer edge of the parapets of their trenches, emitting clouds of white smoke which rapidly changed to dense greenish-yellow clouds. A wall of poisonous vapour six feet or so deep obscured the German position, and descended on the advancing Allies. The French Colonial troops away on the left beyond the Connaught Rangers, who were, it will be recollected, between Wilde's Rifles and the French, received the full force of the gas; but the Connaught Rangers, Wilde's Rifles and other troops did not escape unscathed. The faces of asphyxiated men, as an eye-witness relates, "turned a sort of saffron-yellow, which after a time changed to a purplish blue colour." The victims spluttered, coughed and vomited, and, when they recovered consciousness, struggled and fought with their friends. Through this deadly atmosphere, amid bursting shells, and under the fire of machine-guns and rifles, the Indians, with Captain Mahon and Lieutenants Bainbridge, Deedes, and Mein, sullenly withdrew down the slope, entered the dip, ascended to the ridge beyond and reached their former trenches.

Of the Indian officers only three were left, and these were slightly wounded or gassed.

Of the latter, Havildar Mangal Singh, subsequently under heavy fire, brought in wounded and was awarded the Indian Order of Merit, 2nd Class. In this magnificent charge Jemadar Mir Dast, of the 58th Coke's Rifles (F.F.), who already held the Indian Order of Merit for services on the north-west frontier of India, gained the Victoria Cross. He was the fourth Indian to receive it, and richly had he earned that coveted distinction. Behaving with the utmost gallantry in the attack, he had remained behind to collect and rally his gassed compatriots, and, though slightly wounded, had come in after nightfall.




AN INDIAN CAVALRYMAN.

with eight wounded British and Indian officers and several privates.

The experiences of the other troops who took part in the charge on the afternoon of Monday, April 26, were very similar to those of Wilde's Rifles. The 40th Pathans lost their Colonel and almost all their British officers, among them Captain J. F. Dalmahoy, who, after being six times hit, continued to lead his men until he was killed. General Riddell's Brigade, attacking St. Julien, was held up by wire, and, at 3.30 p.m. General Riddell himself fell. The outskirts of St. Julien were taken, but had to be abandoned, but in places the British line had been moved forward some 600 or 700 yards. The woods west of St. Julien, however, remained in the enemy's possession.

That night the Allied line of battle extended from the north of Zonnebeke to the eastern edge of the Grafenstafel ridge, then south-west along the southern side of the Haanabeek stream to a spot half a mile east of St. Julien, whence curving round that village it proceeded to Vamhuele ("shell-trap") farm on the Ypres-Poelcappelle road. From that point it ran to Boesinghe and crossed the Yperlee Canal, going northward past Lizerne, beyond which the French joined hands with the Belgians.

Before closing the account of the battle of the 26th, the Allied air-raids on that day must not be forgotten. The stations of Staden, Thielt, Roubaix and Courtrai were



A GERMAN BOMB THROWER.

bombed; an armoured train near Langemarck which was located by an airman was shelled and forced to retire; and a German airman obliged to descend at Roulers. The bombing of Courtrai cost the life of Lieutenant W. B. R. Rhodes-Moorhouse. Severely wounded in the thigh, instead of descending, he flew towards the British lines. While 100 ft. above the ground he was again wounded—this time mortally. Still he went on. He reached his own base, made his report, and died shortly afterwards. It was one of the most heroic episodes of the war.

The next day (April 27) the Lahore Division, with the French on their left, attacked about 1 p.m. Owing to the clouds of chlorine gas

emitted by the Germans little progress was made. As Lord Kitchener that night remarked to the House of Lords, Germany had "stooped to acts which will surely stain indelibly her military history, and which would vie with the barbarous savagery of the Dervishes of the Sudan"; but those acts were locally efficacious. Until the Allied troops were furnished with the respirators, which were being hastily made, they were at a heavy disadvantage. By good fortune, however, the Germans had suffered enormous losses and were exhausted. On Wednesday, the 28th, the opposing forces east of the Yperlee Canal rested, and two German aeroplanes were destroyed. West of the Canal the French retook Lizerne and laid hands on Het Sast.

These successes were not sufficient to warrant Sir John French continuing to keep the Second Army so far east of Ypres. The advance of the Germans from Poelcappelle to St. Julien threatened its communications. The British Generalissimo, therefore, ordered Sir Herbert Plumer, who was now commanding the Second Army, to prepare to retire to the new line which had been fixed upon. But this movement was postponed for a few days. On April 29, in the morning, General Foch had an interview with Sir John French. Strong reinforcements were on the point of reaching General Putz, and General Foch asked that the Second Army should stay where it was until the result of the action of the next day should be known. The 29th passed almost uneventfully; there was a lively artillery duel north of Ypres, and south of the city, near Wytschaete, the British engineers with a mine destroyed a house and some trenches.

On Friday, the 30th, as General Foch had warned his British colleague, General Putz made a vigorous attack on the Germans. They were thrust back some distance in the region of Pilkem. Two hundred prisoners and seven machine guns were taken, and the 214th, 215th, and 216th German regiments lost over a thousand men. Further east the London Rifle Brigade, with machine gun fire, beat off a German advance from St. Julien. But west of the Yperlee Canal the enemy were by now too strongly installed to be quickly shifted. They had thrown numerous footbridges across the canal, and had established several lines of defence furnished with sandbags, iron *chevaux-de-frise*, pointed wooden stakes, and defended by machine guns.



A GERMAN TRENCH.

The flat ground was intersected by hedges, watercourses, and marshes. As it was clear that much time would be required to capture such a position, and also that until it was captured the Second Army's communications were in danger, Sir John French on May 1, at one o'clock, ordered Sir Herbert Plumer to begin his retrograde movement. At Hill 60 and also at Neuve Chapelle the Germans that day used asphyxiating gas. But the wind proved unfavourable and they probably suffered more from it than the British, most of whom were now supplied with respirators, though not of a very efficacious pattern.

That Sir John French was justified in contracting the southern portion of the salient the events of the next two days showed conclusively. The Germans, well aware that their gassing tactics would speedily be countered by the supply to the Allied troops of appropriate respirators, made on Sunday May 2, another attempt to poison their way through the Allied line between Boesinghe, on the Yperlee Canal, and Zonnebeke, on the Ypres-Roulers railway. Although respirators of sorts had been served out to the British and French, it is apparent from the following description furnished by a British officer that the Germans had still reason to hope that their devilish devices might be successful:

It was on a beautiful Sunday evening, May 2, at about 5.30 p.m., that an officer looked into my "dug-out" and said, "The Germans are putting smoke up from their trenches." I was into the fire trench almost before he had finished speaking, my fear and horror of gas having been most vividly in my imagination ever since the enemy had caused the French to retire by overwhelming them with its fumes a little more than a week previously.

The first things to be seen were three or four jets of smoke rising from the enemy's trenches some 400



MAKING SOUVENIRS TO SEND TO THEIR FRIENDS

From bullets and fragments of shells.

yards away. These jets soon joined forces until they formed a solid wall of vapour some 8 ft. high, white on top, the remainder being of a greenish-yellow colour. This wall, although the breeze was of the lightest description, advanced with great rapidity, and was on us in less than three minutes. And now I fear it will be impossible for me to give you a real idea of the terror, of the awful horror, that this loathsome, noiseless wall of filthiness spread among us all.

I have seen men afraid, I have seen brave men nervous and apprehensive, I have never before seen brave men become suddenly panic-stricken, look round like frightened animals, forget their manhood and their duty, and run away. Thank God! those that did so only went a short distance before remembering they were soldiers and returning to their places.

Of course, directly we smelt the gas we put on respirators, such as we had—just bits of flannel dipped in water. When the fumes were full on us breathing became most difficult, and we had to resist the temptation to tear aside our respirators in our struggles for air. The trenches presented a weird spectacle—men were coughing, spitting, cursing, and trying to be sick. I do not suppose the worst part of it lasted for more than 10 minutes, but we could not have stood it much longer. And then we had our reward—the Germans advanced to within 200 yards' range, and delivered themselves to the fire of two of our Maxims. The men fired dreadfully badly with their rifles, but, poor chaps, they were almost too weak to stand. The attack was too easily beaten off; we wanted to kill and go on killing.

The first sensations, after the above excitement was over, were coldness in the hands and feet and great weakness; many men lay down at once and went into a deep sleep. Throughout the night the line was held in the most precarious way—only a few men were fit for sentry, and the men on the whole got worse instead of better. The next day they were still very bad, and it was pitiable to hear the coughing; several died. The next night we got about 200 of the worst cases away to hospital, but they continued going sick all the week, and when I left, feeling utterly ill and with a temperature, we had lost 300 men from gas alone.

The incidents recorded by this officer were typical. At many points the trenches were temporarily abandoned, but the Germans failed to secure any permanent advantage. The moment it appeared the wall of vapour,



IN THE FRONT TRENCHES.

Taking a rest.

this time looking from a distance like a great reddish cloud, was made the target of every gun.* The result was that the Germans advancing through it were mowed down in heaps by the *soixante-quinze* and the British artillery. The gas approached, sinking into the inequalities of the ground and rolling slowly towards the Allied trenches. Machine guns and rifles spoke out and, on the extreme left of the British position, the supports dashed forward and bayoneted the enemy. At other places our troops moved out of the affected area and charged the Germans in flank. The 2nd Seaforths and the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders particularly distinguished themselves in this stern struggle. South of St. Julien and between Fortuin and Zonnebeke the line gave way, but the supporting battalions with two cavalry brigades moved up from Potijze, a mile and a half from Ypres on the Zonnebeke road, and recovered the trenches.

At nightfall the enemy retired, leaving behind them heaps of dead and wounded. In the hand-to-hand fighting many Germans had lost their respirators and had been asphyxiated. When it came to close quarters they had little chance of escaping. The British, almost always their superiors in bayonet work, had been maddened by their enemy's treachery. From April 22 onward they had

* It is possible this may have been due to the use of bromine.

begun to regard the Germans with the bitter hatred felt towards the latter by the Belgians, French, and Russians.

In the morning of Monday, May 3, the Germans seemed about to renew the contest. On the British left, west of the Bois des Cuise-nirs, between St. Julien and Pilkem, they were observed cutting entanglements, leaving their trenches, and lying down in front as if about to advance. But the Allied artillery which opened on them and inflicted severe losses prevented an attack from this quarter. Instead the Germans assaulted the northern side of the now very narrow salient. During the afternoon large bombs thrown by a *minenwerfer* blew in a considerable length of trenches and the garrison fell back behind a wood a little to the north-west of the village of Grafenstafel. There a successful stand was made and the further progress of the enemy checked. South of Dixmude, beyond the French lines, the Belgians were bombarded with asphyxiating bombs. Imagining that these had stupified the foe, the Germans delivered an assault, but were mowed down by machine guns. During the night the attack threatened in the morning against the British left materialized, but again the artillery brought it to a standstill.

Meanwhile, since the evening of May 2, Sir H. Plumer had been evacuating the eastern fringe of the salient. His new line was three miles shorter than the old. It touched the French trenches west of the Ypres-Lange-



SORTING OUT A POST.

[Photo Service of the French Armies.]



WATCHING THE BURST OF A BIG SHELL.

marck road and ran through "Shell-trap" farm to the Haanabeek stream and the eastern face of the Frezenberg ridge, which was a slight elevation among the flat meadows. From this ridge it turned south, and covering Bellewaarde Lake and Hooze, curved round to Hill 60. Fortuin, with Zonnebeke, and the Polygon, Bosche and Veldhoek Woods—the scenes of the desperate struggles in October and November, 1914—were abandoned, but all the roads to Ypres were covered, while fewer troops were required for the defence of the line, and those troops would not be exposed to fire from three sides.

This very difficult operation of a withdrawal in face of an enemy whose trenches were in places only ten yards away was during the night of May 3 completed. Like the withdrawal of the British Expeditionary Force from the north bank of the Aisne, it had been carried out with a celerity and secrecy redounding to the credit of all concerned. From the eight-mile long front, in pitch darkness and absolute silence, the units marched off to their places in the new line. The Royal Army Medical Corps, under the guidance of Colonel Ferguson, assisted by Major Waggett (the London specialist on throat diseases), brought away 780 wounded men out of cellars and dug-outs. Crack shots were left behind in the trenches to cover the retirement, but so skilfully was it concealed that all the next day, long after the last British soldier had left, the Germans continued to shell many of the abandoned trenches. Sir Herbert Plumer and his Staff well deserved the congratulations bestowed on them by Sir John French.

May 4 was an uneventful day. Fog, machine

guns, and asphyxiating gas stopped General Putz's attempt to drive back the Germans across the Yperlee Canal, and for the next ten days the French between Lizerne and Boesinghe were engaged in methodically sapping their way to Steenstraate and the banks of the canal. Along the British Front the Germans under cover of the mist and a heavy bombardment, advanced cautiously, but they did not attack till the next day.

By then they had discovered that the British line had been readjusted. Trenches were dug opposite to it; the guns advanced to new positions. About 9 a.m. clouds of poisonous gas were projected against the British trenches on Hill 60. Our men fell back and the Germans pursued. In spite of heavy losses occasioned among them by the British artillery, they took some trenches north of the hill and even forced their way in the direction of Zillebeke as far as the supporting line. All day the combat raged, and by nightfall the Germans were still on the crest of the hill and also in some trenches north-east of it. At midnight the British dislodged them from the hill, but owing to another discharge of gas had to retire. On the morning of May 6 Hill 60 and some trenches north of it were in the hands of the enemy.

On the north and south sides of the Ypres-Roulers railway, and away on the left, they had also endeavoured with the aid of gas to pierce the British line. The Germans had been repulsed, but the knowledge that a great French offensive in the Arras region, supported by a British offensive south of the Lys, was in preparation stimulated them to fresh exertions. To oblige General Foch and Sir John French to keep large forces north of the Lys

was sound, and they had very good grounds for hoping to take Ypres. How precarious was the hold of the Allies on the ruined city may be surmised from a statement of Sir John French:

Throughout the whole period since the first break of the line on the night of April 22 all the troops in this area had been constantly subjected to violent artillery bombardment from a large mass of guns with an unlimited supply of ammunition. It proved impossible whilst under so vastly superior fire of artillery to dig efficient trenches, or to properly reorganize the line, after the confusion and demoralization caused by the first great gas surprise and the subsequent, almost daily, gas attacks. Nor was it until after this date (May 8) that effective preventatives had been devised and provided.

On Saturday, May 8, another of the innumerable struggles for Ypres began. At 7 a.m. the German artillery concentrated their fire on the British line north and south of Frezenberg. Trenches were obliterated and huge losses sustained. Three hours later the enemy advanced against our front between the Ypres-Poelcappelle and the Ypres-Menin roads, his main efforts being directed on both sides of the Ypres-Roulers railway. The right of one Brigade broke at 10.15, its centre and the left of another Brigade south of it retired. The Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, however, stuck to their posts. On the left of the line the 2nd Essex Regiment, about 11.30 a.m., destroyed a small force of advancing Germans, but a few minutes after noon the centre of another Brigade broke and the 1st Suffolks, on its right, were surrounded and overwhelmed.

The enemy had smashed their way through at Frezenberg, and at 3.30 p.m. Sir Herbert Plumer counter-attacked. Early in the day he had placed two battalions astride the Ypres-

Menin road as a reserve. Five more battalions were under his hand, and an infantry brigade had come up to the grounds of Vlamertinghe Château behind Ypres. The 1st York and Lancaster Regiment, the 3rd Middlesex Regiment, the 2nd East Surrey Regiment, the 2nd Royal Dublin Fusiliers, and the 1st Royal Warwickshire Regiment were thrown into the gap and Frezenberg was recovered. But the enemy's machine-guns were too potent for the British, and they had to withdraw to a line running north and south through Velorenhoek. On their left the 12th London Regiment losing heavily, reached the original trench line.

At 4.15 p.m. the position was threatened from the east and north. Masses of Germans issued from the woods south of the Menin road, while other masses descended the Poelcappelle road and captured Wieltje, two miles or so from Ypres. On Wieltje the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders and the 1st East Lancashire Regiment were directed.


The sun went down, but still the battle raged. At 1 a.m. the British by a bayonet charge carried Wieltje, and regained most of the ground to the north of it.

Two Cavalry Divisions and a Territorial Division were during the night placed at Sir Herbert Plumer's disposal. They were needed.

In the early morning, about 5 a.m., everyone had been startled by the sound of a terrific cannonade beyond the Lys. From the south of Armentières, through Neuve Chapelle and Givenchy to the Arras region, the Allies were advancing. The unsuccessful attempt by Sir Douglas Haig to storm the Aubers ridge and



GERMAN DRAGOONS CROSSING A STREAM.



CHARGE OF THE 4th CANADIAN BATTALION AT YPRES.

Lieutenant-Colonel Burchall killed while leading his men.

the victory of the French in the Carency region will be described in a subsequent chapter. Here it is sufficient to mention that on Carency, north of Arras, from over a thousand guns, a large number of shells were discharged, and that, as the day wore on, the German troops at this point and in the neighbourhood were routed. To counterbalance the French victory, the Germans, who were elated by their repulse of Sir Douglas Haig's attacks south of Armentières, after bombarding the British trenches, made wild rushes for Ypres in the afternoon. North of the town a body of five hundred dashed from the woods and were killed almost to a man. On the north-east there was a ding-dong fight and five separate assaults were delivered on the eastern side of the salient. The centre of this battle was south of the Ypres-Menin road, but at 6.30 p.m. the enemy north of it attempted to storm the grounds of the Château de Hooze. Under the concentrated fire of guns, maxims, and rifles the German masses on every occasion melted away, the ground being literally heaped with dead and wounded. They had gained 150 yards of trenches at a fearful cost and the British losses had been comparatively insignificant. In the course of the fighting the 2nd Gloucestershire Regiment and 2nd Cameron Highlanders had distinguished themselves, the Gloucesters suffering heavy casualties.

Thus on Sunday, May 9, the German attacks north and the British attacks south of the Lys, had failed, while the French had won a considerable victory south of La Bassée. On Monday the enemy spent the morning shelling our trenches north and south of the Menin-Ypres road. They then discharged a cloud of gas. After waiting, as they thought, long enough for the poisonous vapour to do its work, they streamed out from the woods and through the clearings. Many were dressed in British uniforms. All expected an easy triumph. But by now effective respirators had been supplied to our soldiers. Suddenly these lined the parapets and poured in rapid fire from rifles and machine guns. The Germans who were not hit threw themselves flat on the ground, and the bullets passed over their bodies. A few seconds later shrapnel descended on them from our guns in the background, and in front of the parapets there was a shambles. Out of the smoke and dust a German dressed as a Highlander dashed forward, shouting, "Don't shoot, don't shoot!" The

trick failed and he was promptly killed. The 2nd Cameron Highlanders, 9th Royal Scots, and the 3rd and 4th King's Royal Rifles had read the enemy a severe lesson.

Between the Ypres-Comines Canal and the Menin-Ypres road for half an hour two batteries of gas cylinders discharged their contents. So dense was the gas that a man could not see his hand when held before his face. The grass was bleached; the sandbags turned a bright yellow. Under the circumstances it was thought prudent to withdraw our men from the influence of this pestilential vapour, but the rifles of the troops to right and left prevented the enemy entering the lost trenches, which, when the gas cleared away, were reoccupied.

It was only north of the Menin road that the Germans had any success. Their shells destroyed the trenches of the 3rd King's Royal Rifles and 4th Rifle Brigade. Many soldiers were buried alive. The survivors retired to another line of trenches immediately west of Bellewaarde Wood, the trees in front of which had been pounded by the shells into an impassable entanglement.

While these events were proceeding on the ground, in the air there had been numerous incidents. The day before, above the Wytschaete region, a British airman with a machine gun had put out of action a Taube, which fell, nose downward, several thousand feet. The canal bridge at Don had been bombed, and a British airman hit by an aircraft gun had had to descend at Lille. On Monday one of our airmen looped the loop. In a single-seater aeroplane he was 8,000 ft. or so up hunting a Taube. Reloading his machine gun, he lost control of the steering gear. The aeroplane turned upside down. It happened that the belt round his waist, which kept him in his seat, was loose. The belt slipped down round his legs and he was left clutching the rear centre strut and desperately endeavouring to free his legs and reach the control lever with his feet. It was not till the machine was 2,500 ft. or so off the ground that he succeeded. Then slowly the plane looped the loop and he slid back into his seat. It was a cool and daring action.

Exasperated by their failures, the Germans on Tuesday, May 11, threw hundreds of incendiary shells into the ruins of Ypres, over the blazing buildings of which a dense pall of smoke speedily settled. All round the salient

their artillery deluged the British trenches with high-explosive shells. Our own guns replied and the 31st Heavy Battery put a German piece out of action and the North Midland Heavy Battery damaged several howitzers. The enemy's fire was particularly devastating on the portion of the line astride the Ypres-St. Julien road. South of the Menin road three separate attacks were delivered and repulsed. The Germans temporarily gained a footing in part of the trenches held by the 2nd Cameron Highlanders and the 1st Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, only, however, to be ejected by a supporting company of the 9th Royal Scots. Yet, despite the ghastly toll paid by them, the rank and file of the Germans had not lost heart. An extract from a letter written the next day from St. Julien by a soldier of the 22nd Reserve Jäger Battalion illustrates the spirit which animated many of them:

Now that we have had three days' rest, we are going back to the trenches this evening. To-day or to-morrow will decide the fate of Ypres, and we riflemen will all do our best to carry it through. From our trenches one sees the whole country as far as Ypres, and we had to-day a magnificent spectacle. Our artillery, which is located here in tremendous numbers, was going strong. Wherever we looked, one saw smoke and striking shells from the small 7.6 cm. to the 21 cm.

Wednesday, May 12, was spent by the enemy in bombarding the British trenches, especially



A BRITISH SNIPER
With his telescopic sight rifle.



A FRENCH INTERPRETER WITH THE
BRITISH.

Watching at a loophole.

those north and south of the Menin road. Sir Herbert Plumer, expecting that this was a preparation for a final attack, withdrew his depleted centre division during the night and substituted for it two cavalry divisions, which henceforth with the artillery and engineers of the retired division were known as the "Cavalry Force." The division which had been brought back into reserve had been fighting continuously since April 22. It had lost very heavily and most of its battalions were now being led by captains. The Cavalry Force under General de Lisle had to defend the line from the north-east of Velorenhoek to the Bellewaarde Lake.

"To-day or to-morrow," had said the Jäger just quoted, "will decide the fate of Ypres." On Thursday, May 13, at 4.30 a.m. a bombardment which is described by Sir Herbert Plumer as "the heaviest bombardment yet experienced" opened. It was raining in torrents and a bitter wind blew from the north. At about 7.45 a.m. the Cavalry Brigade astride the Ypres-Roulers railway, where its trenches had been blown in, fell back about 800 yards. Many men of the 3rd Dragoon Guards had been buried alive. To the right of the brigade the North Somerset Yeomanry under Lieutenant-Colonel Geoffrey Glyn proved that the Yeomanry of England had not deteriorated. Not only did they hold their trenches, but they advanced and charged the enemy with the bayonet. The Royals, 10th Hussars, and the Blues were brought up, and at 2.30 p.m. a counter-attack, assisted by the Duke of Westminster's armoured cars, was delivered

by the two brigades. In the face of very heavy shrapnel and rifle fire, the dismounted cavalry crept forward. Suddenly a party of Germans bolted to the rear. The cry of "They're off!" was raised, and the whole British force darted forward. The enemy, including those in the support and reserve trenches, broke and ran; they were terribly punished by shrapnel and machine-guns. In this charge the 10th Hussars under Major Crichton and the Essex Yeomanry, were conspicuous for their gallantry.

The original position was regained. On it the Germans once more turned their heavy artillery. As the trenches had disappeared, it was considered advisable to withdraw the men to an irregular line behind. There in the craters formed by shells they opposed to the Germans an unbreakable resistance.


On the left, north of Wieltje, there were, also, savage encounters between the opposing forces. "Shell-trap" Farm was momentarily lost, but it was soon afterwards recovered by the 1/ Rifle Brigade. The 1/ East Lancashire Regiment were shelled out of their trenches, which were retaken by their support company and by the 2/ Essex Regiment acting on its own initiative. The 1/ Hampshire Regiment killed or wounded every German who approached them, and the 5/ London Regiment maintained its position. By nightfall the enemy, apart from pressing back the cavalry a few hundred yards, had completely failed. The plain was covered and

the woods choked up with German dead and dying.

Two days later—on May 15—General Putz attacked Steenstraate and Het Sast. The Zouaves and Algerian sharpshooters captured a trench before Steenstraate, entered the village, and by the end of the day reached the canal. More than 600 German corpses were counted. Simultaneously the Zouaves occupied Het Sast. The artillery bombardment had paralysed its defenders. "We entered the village with our hands in our pockets," said a Zouave recounting the scene.

During the night the Germans counter-attacked, bombarding Het Sast with asphyxiating shells. The Zouaves donned their masks and met them with rifle fire and hand-grenades. Both at Steenstraate and Het Sast the assaults were repulsed with awful carnage. By May 17 not a German who was not killed, wounded, or a prisoner remained on the left bank of the Yperlee Canal. Three villages, four fortified lines, and three redoubts had been captured, and at least three regiments had been destroyed by the French. They had amply avenged the gassing of their comrades on April 22.

Such was the inglorious termination of the Germans' first effort to win a battle by using asphyxiants. They had not taken Ypres; they had lost very many thousands of men; they had infuriated the usually tolerant British soldiers and public; and they had rendered indignant every civilized neutral by their



THE SHIELD OF A "75" FRENCH GUN DAMAGED BY GERMAN FIRE.

dastardly methods. By resorting to asphyxiating gases the Kaiser tacitly admitted that he could no longer hope for success by clean fighting and that to overcome the Allied troops he must have recourse to means which the most ferocious savage would have scorned to employ. That the superiority of their opponents was beginning to sink into the minds of the German soldiers is shown by two incidents. On May 15,

according to a French report, the German Marine Fusiliers defending the Yperlee Canal wished to surrender and were promptly decimated by their countrymen behind them. Forty-eight hours later, south of Neuve Chapelle a battalion of Saxons raised their hands and hoisted the white flag. Ere they reached the British lines, they were massacred by the Prussian artillery and rifles.



THE BIBLE HIS SHIELD.

The life of Private A. G. Perkins, of the 1st
Lincolns, was saved by the Bible he was
carrying in his breast pocket.
A shrapnel bullet went right through it.

CHAPTER LXXXIII.

THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE BALTIC PROVINCES.

THE GERMAN ADVANCE INTO THE BALTIC PROVINCES—ITS AIMS—THE SETTLEMENT OF THE GERMAN
ON THE BALTIC SHORE—THE BALTIC GERMANS AND RUSSIA—THE PAST MUTUAL RELATIONS OF
THE GERMANS AND THE LETTS—THE MILITARY OPERATIONS IN SAMOGITIA AND COURLAND UP TO
MAY 18.

ON April 30 official *communiqués* brought the news of the German raid in the direction of Libau and Shavle. By May 2 the Germanic offensive in the district of Gorlice in Western Galicia had developed into an action of almost unprecedented magnitude.

It was evident from the very beginning that the advance against Libau and Shavle was devoid of independent strategic importance. Even after having penetrated for about a hundred miles into Russian territory, the German forces were still further away from any point of immediate strategic importance than they were in any other part of the entire Eastern front. Naturally, therefore, much speculation arose concerning the real aim of that new enterprise.

Very few human actions in ordinary everyday life can be traced back to one single exclusive motive; both life and the human mind are too complex to admit of singleness of purpose. The same is true about strategies; different possibilities, some of them belonging to a distant future, are usually present in the thoughts of the directing mind. Such a multiplicity and variety of purposes is of positive advantage; should the wider hopes and expectations never be realized, it is desirable

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that immediate advantages should be reaped, such as would justify the undertaking.

The explanation which seemed most natural was at first given for Hindenburg's new undertaking. It was said that he had chosen the line of least resistance, and had found in addition employment for his cavalry, which could not be used along the other parts of the front, where fighting had assumed the character of trench-warfare. Raids are naturally directed against unguarded points, and there is no reason to colour with a touch of reproach and contempt the statement that the enemy was moving along the line of least resistance. If the Germans found that the district between Libau, Shavle, and the Prussian frontier was left practically unguarded, it was sound generalship on their part to take advantage of that fact. The Russians had done the same in the case of Memel, towards the end of March. The lesson learned from that raid of our Allies constituted probably one of the motives for the German advance against Shavle. By pushing the front line away from their own territory the Germans secured its safety against hostile inroads; and it must be admitted that when economic attrition had come to play a prominent part in warfare, the German policy of attaching supreme



SOLDIERS OF THE TSAR.

importance to the security of their own territory found justification.

There are, however, two limitations to the usefulness of raids or advances such as are devoid of immediate strategic importance. First, care must be taken that the raiding force should not be exposed to dangers out of proportion to the results which may be obtained by means of the raid. In this respect the Germans were fairly well guarded. In view of their naval strength in the Baltic they could always retire to the shore, should a Russian advance from Kovno seriously threaten their right flank. The second restriction on the usefulness of raids is this, that they should not withdraw forces which might be of greater use in the decisive theatre of war. It would be difficult to estimate the effects which Hindenburg's advance on Shavle had on the general situation, and particularly on the offensive in West Galicia. Cavalry was, during April, of small use in other parts of the front, and most of the raiding force, as is shown by the very speed of its advance, consisted of cavalry. But the first week in May saw the Russians in full retreat in West Galicia. It is an open question whether the Germanic armies disposed anyhow of sufficient cavalry in Western Galicia, and could spare the divisions which the Baltic raid had withdrawn to the front in Lithuania and Courland, or whether the speed of the advance which followed on the breakdown

of the Russian line on the Dunajec and Biala came as a surprise to the German commanders themselves. On the other hand, the view has been put forward that the advance along the Baltic shore aimed at diverting the attention of our Allies from the Dunajec-Biala front. On careful consideration it seems, however, very doubtful whether the Baltic raid could, did, or was ever meant to affect the operations which a week later were opened in Western Galicia.

Another aim ascribed to the Baltic raid was that of foraging. Riga and Libau have been for centuries two of the great granaries of Eastern Europe; moreover a rich potato crop, preserved from the autumn, and plenty of cattle, were to be found in Lithuania and Courland. The German raid, says the Russian official *communiqué* of May 1, "may be explained as an attempt to include for foraging purposes, within the sphere of operations, a section of frontier territory which had not yet been ruined by the war."

When the great French Revolution was losing its cosmopolitan ideals, and substituting for them, in so far as international affairs were concerned, that doubtful worldly wisdom which is now generally known by the name of *Realpolitik*, Danton, the incarnation of much that was best and of some that was worst in the Revolution, made the remark that "*Vaincre l'ennemi, et vivre à ses dépens, c'est le vaincre deux fois.*" During the Great War the Germans

faithfully kept to that maxim. We know it for a fact that the Germans requisitioned great quantities of wheat at Libau, and robbed the peasant population throughout most parts of Courland and Lithuania of grain, potatoes, cattle, poultry, in short of anything they could lay hands on. Similarly they immediately requisitioned all metals which they could find in the invaded districts.

We shall not quote any of the many letters from Polish and Lithuanian peasants to relatives in America, which appeared in the

American Polish and Lithuanian newspapers, and which tell the story of the depredations committed by "the cursed Swabians." We shall limit ourselves to one example coming from a German source and concerning Poland, which had suffered even more severely by the war than Belgium. The shortage of food in Poland was recognized by an official Austrian *communiqué* of April 8, which begins with the following phrase: "Considering that the question of food forms at present the most important and most urgent problem for the population of



GERMAN TRANSPORTS ON THE RIVER NIEMEN.

Schooners to convey barges of troops and ammunition about to start for Russian territory.

the occupied parts of Russian Poland. . . .” This, however, seems to have in no way concerned the Germans. The *Deutsche Tageszeitung* of March 27 announces to its readers the joyful news that the German military authorities had requisitioned in Poland 60 million hundredweight of potatoes, and that the Silesian Chamber of Agriculture had “succeeded” in buying in Poland 8,000 hundredweight of bran at 24 marks the hundred-weight. We are not told whether, and in what way, the German military authorities helped them in making that splendid bargain. If such methods were adopted in the devastated regions of Poland, little mercy could the peasant population of Lithuania, and least of all that of Courland, expect from the German invaders. For a hatred, which all the waters of the Baltic Sea could never extinguish, burns in the heart of every Lettish peasant against the Germans, and the Germans have always answered it with a hatred equally strong, and with persecutions and oppressions such as hardly any other nation in Europe has ever had to suffer.


Seven centuries ago the first German conquerors set foot on the coast of the Baltic Sea, in the land inhabited by different Letto-Lithuanian and Finnish tribes; less than ten years before the war, during the revolution of 1906, Letts and Germans were once more hunting one another in the Baltic Provinces, as

the White men and the Redskins had done in the virgin forests of America. What the German “Baltic Barons,” the *Herrenvolk* of Courland, would do when their kinsmen from across the Prussian border had come to their aid, anyone could guess who knew those distant districts stretching along the quiet backwaters of the Baltic Sea. There is a sinister political aspect to Hindenburg’s raid.* In order to understand its full meaning it is necessary to review, if only briefly, the political condition and problems of those districts.

It ought to be marked first of all that we are dealing, in the case of the Baltic raid, with two different countries, with Samogitia,† which forms the western half of the government of Kovno, and with Courland. These two districts, although they had originally been parts of the same nation and political system, came subsequently to differ widely owing to their different historical developments. The entire Baltic shore, from the Finnish Gulf to the Lower Vistula, and its hinterland up to the Vilia and Dubissa, were inhabited in the twelfth century by different Lithuanian and Finnish tribes; the border zone between them ran

* The Hindenburgs themselves were a family settled also in the Russian Baltic Provinces, and Hindenburg as a good *Junker* was certain to view the concerns of the German Baltic Barons as his own family affairs.

† “Samogitia” means in Lithuanian the “Lowlands”; its language differs slightly from the Lithuanian as spoken round Kovno and Vilna.



A RUSSIAN PATROL BOAT,
Fitted with machine guns.



RUSSIAN ARTILLERY IN ACTION.

Inset: Guns disguised by fir branches.

more or less through the middle of Livland. The Lithuanian tribes were known in various parts of the country by different names, and their dialects varied to some extent. Still, all of them were merely subdivisions of the same group: the Lithuanians proper, the Samogitians, the Letts, and finally the Prussians, who are now practically extinct in their nobler Lithuanian form; there are only about two hundred Lithuanian Prussians left in East Prussia. The languages of these Letto-Lithuanian tribes were more closely allied to the Slav languages than to any other European speech, though it is a mistake to describe them as Slav. In the thirteenth century two German Knightly Orders settled on the shores of the Baltic, one at the mouth of the Vistula, the other round Riga. They pursued identical aims; they were waging a war of extermination on the Letto-Lithuanian tribes. For the sake of strength and efficiency these two Orders amalgamated about the year 1225. Besides fighting the Letto-Lithuanians, the Northern branch, centring round Riga, had to carry on war against the Finnish Esthonians, the Danes, and the Russian town-republic of Novgorod; the Southern branch of the Teutonic Knightly Order, which had its chief seat at Marienburg in West Prussia, was waging wars also against the Polish kingdoms of the Vistula basin. These were the first stages of the gigantic,



continually renewed struggle for the dominion over the Baltic Sea and its shores. In this struggle the two great warrior-kings of Sweden, Gustavus Adolphus and Charles XII., achieved world fame. This struggle formed the chief preoccupation of Peter the Great, during whose reign the Baltic Provinces passed under Russian rule; it was in the wars for the dominion of the Baltic that Prussia achieved her silent rise,

and Poland received her first crushing blow. The Great War witnessed only a further stage of the old contest for the Mediterranean of the North.

The foundation of the new Russian capital by Peter the Great on the eastern shore of the Baltic marked its final annexation by Russia, but the name of St. Petersburg gave expression to the accomplished fact of another conquest, which was to prove of even greater importance in the history of the world—namely, to the conquest of the Russian Government by the Baltic Germans and by other German immigrants, who now became the teachers and the tyrants of Russia.

Having passed through a longer period of political development, and having stood nearer to the centres of West-European culture, the Germans were naturally better fitted to be the servants of the modern State in Russia than were the native Russian boyars. They were especially well fitted for servants of an autocratic system; devoid of any feeling for the country and its people, hated by it, they developed the art of government for government's sake. The offices of State became the fourth German province in Russia. "The highest posts in the Russian Army and the diplomatic service," wrote Count Vitzthum in 1853,* "were filled by Germans, and the numerous sons of the nobility of Courland and Livonia regarded the Russian Empire as an inexhaustible mine of offices and riches." Still, such was the hatred against them among the true

Russian people that at that time a Courlander occupying one of the highest posts in the Russian Foreign Office thought it necessary to warn the Emperor "of the arrogance of the Russian party."† "If your Majesty does not check this mischief," said he, "we shall live to see in your reign a St. Bartholomew's Night of all German officials." "The mischief" was "checked," and with the blood and tears of the best Russians and of the other nationalities inhabiting the Russian Empire, the Baltic Germans continued to write, throughout the nineteenth century, the blackest pages of Russia's internal history. The destruction which they wrought surpassed a hundredfold any good which they may have done. They never felt with the Russian people; at the best they served the Government. But in most cases they worked only for the interests of their own tribe, and the spiritual home of that tribe was at Königsberg and Berlin.

It was but natural that the Baltic Germans should have used their power in the Russian Government for strengthening their own position in the home-provinces of Courland, Livonia, and Esthonia, and for maintaining their dominion over their Lettish and Esthonian peasant population. As a matter of fact, the Germans formed and form to the present day in those provinces merely a ludicrously small minority. Esthonia had in 1897 a population of 412,716 inhabitants; of these 365,959 spoke the Esthonian language,‡

* *Memoirs*, Vol. I. Count Vitzthum was a German himself; he was Saxon Minister to St. Petersburg.

† *Ibid.*

‡ Esthonian is a Finnish language, and in no way

allied to Lettish. The binding link between the Esthonians and the Letts is not language but common sufferings and a common hatred against the Germans.



RUSSIAN TROOPS DRAWN UP FOR INSPECTION.



THE BALTIC PROVINCES.

16,037 German. The population of Livland was 1,299,365 inhabitants, including 510,523 Letts, 518,594 Esthonians, and 98,513 Germans. In Courland, of 674,034 inhabitants the Letts count 524,042, the Germans 51,017. Thus the total population of the three Baltic Provinces amounted in 1897 to 2,386,115; of these 165,627 were Germans, 884,553 Esthonians, and 1,094,565 Letts. But still the Germans own the greater part of the land, they were, and endeavour to remain, the "masterfolk" (*das Herrenvolk*) of these provinces, whilst the Letts and Esthonians are mostly farmers and labourers, the descendants of their serfs.

Towards the end of the eighteenth century Catherine II. tried to improve the condition of the peasantry in the Baltic Provinces, but failed. "The nobility . . . consisting largely of retired officers, in whom camp-life had developed that contempt for other men *which the difference of nationality had by itself implanted in them* . . . resented the demands of the Empress as an unjustified and ruinous intrusion into their private affairs." *

At last, in the course of the nineteenth century, under pressure from the Russian Government, the German masters consented to the abolition of serfdom in the Baltic Provinces; the emancipation of their peasants was, however, carried through in such a manner that the property of practically all the land was vested in the German aristocracy, and the economic condition of the peasantry changed for the worse rather than for the better. In Courland, even at the present day, although hundreds of thousands of acres have been redeemed by the Letts, a few hundred big landowners, almost all Germans, own more land than half a million Lettish peasants.

The war was likely also to settle the fate of the Lettish and Esthonian peasantry for generations to come. An able summary of their views and position was given in a letter written by a Lettish national revolutionary to the famous French writer, M. Romain Rolland.† The Letts had lived under the German yoke for centuries before the coming of the Russians, writes M. Rolland's correspondent. "Compared with the Germans the Russians appeared

to us as liberators. For centuries the Germans kept us by brute force in a state comparable to slavery. Only 50 years ago the Russian Government gave us our freedom (from serfdom), but at the same time committed the grave injustice of leaving all our land in the hands of German proprietors. In spite of all, we have managed in 20 or 30 years to redeem from the Germans a portion of our soil, and to attain a certain level of culture, thanks to which we are regarded, with the Finns and the Esthonians, as the most advanced nation of the Russian Empire." Germans call the Letts ungrateful, he goes on to say, but they have no right to do so. "We acquired our culture in spite of them, against their will."

In 1906 the Lettish revolution was directed mainly against the Germans. After it had broken down, "at the head of the majority of the military detachments sent to chastise the country were officers of German nationality who had asked for this employment." Having received the command, they displayed a simply uncanny zeal "in shooting down men and burning houses." The nation of masters carried out its vendetta.

Now, says M. Rolland's Lettish correspondent, "our soldiers have left for the front filled with enthusiasm . . . because the war is against Germany, and we are capable of any sacrifice to prevent the annexation of the Baltic Provinces." The German landowners and merchants in the Baltic Provinces, says he, though Russian subjects, will welcome the German armies with open arms. Not so the Letts or the Esthonians; in fact, these were, in August 1915, forming legions of volunteers for the defence of the Baltic Provinces against the Germans.

The delegate of the Estho-Lettish group had declared in the Duma on August 8, 1914: "We have many accounts to settle with the Germans of the Baltic Provinces, but we shall not choose this moment for settling them." Not so the Germans; in the last days of April the armies of Hindenburg were crossing Samogitia on their way to Courland, the land of blood and tears and German barons.

"German troops have again occupied an important part of the late Duchy of Courland," announced the semi-official *Berliner Lokal Anzeiger* on the occupation of Libau on May 8 1915. "Seven centuries ago German knights and merchants had entered that country in order to subdue it to German dominion

* This description of the relation of German masters and Lettish peasants does not come from the pen of a Lett. It is taken from Dr. Seraphim's *Baltische Geschichte* (1908). Dr. Seraphim is an ardent German patriot.

† This letter was published in the *Journal de Genève* on October 12, 1914. We quote the translation from Mr. Alexinsky's book on "Russia and the Great War."

and in order to lay in it the foundations of German culture, which rules there unchanged to the present day. German warriors under Knight Hindenburg follow now in their footsteps. May this be a lucky omen for the future. . . ."

Fighting on a small scale had been proceeding on the confines of East Prussia and Samogitia, round the town of Taurogen, ever since the time of the Russian raid on Memel (towards the end of March). During these battles Taurogen had to suffer severe German bombardments; very little was left of that ancient seat of the Princes Radziwill. By some irony of fate, one of the few things which survived the German bombardment was the monument of the Russian General Dybitch, who concluded with the Prussian general York at Taurogen, in 1813, the famous convention against Napoleon which marked the beginning of the so-called Wars of Liberation.

In the last week of April the Germans concentrated considerable forces between Tilsit and Jurburg. Their strength was at first estimated at three brigades of cavalry and one brigade of infantry, and they were said to have

been commanded by General von Lauenstein, who in March had been in command of the 39th German Reserve Corps. Subsequent estimates put the strength of the German forces in the Baltic Provinces at one and a half corps of infantry, and about the same number of cavalry. It is probable that the former figure renders more accurately the numbers engaged in the first advance, whilst the latter includes reinforcements which were sent during the following week to the support of the advanced bodies. Only small numbers of infantry could have taken part in the first raid. Almost a hundred miles seem to have been covered in two days. German military writers ascribe that fact to what they call the marvellous endurance of the German infantry. The truth of the matter is in all probability that the infantry made use for its advance of motor-transport, at least for part of the way. A first-class high road leads from Tilsit by Taurogen and Shavle to Mitau and Riga; that road, being about 50 feet wide, provides sufficient space for three cars moving in one line. It was used by the infantry, artillery, and transport, while smaller side roads were probably followed by the main bodies of cavalry.





RUSSIAN CAVALRY ON THE MARCH.

The invading forces seem to have started on April 27, and moved in three columns. The main body moved along the Taurogen-Shavle road. On its left a considerable body of cavalry advanced by Telshe towards Muravievo, where the Riga-Mitau-Libau railway meets that coming from the direction of Shavle; thus Libau was cut off straight away from all

communication with Riga or with Kovno. A third body, also consisting chiefly of cavalry, crossed the Niemen over a bridge constructed by German engineers near Jurburg. These forces had a double task before them. They had to screen the lines of communication of the central column from possible Russian flank attacks from the south-east, from the direction of Kovno, whilst advancing further by Rossienie towards Radzivilishki, they had for their objective the junction of the railways from Vilna and from Ponieviez. By seizing the railway junction of Radzivilishki, and establishing themselves on the line Shadoff-Beissagola, they prevented a quick concentration of Russian troops on the flank of the main German group which was moving by Shavle against Mitau and Riga.

The first more serious encounter between the German and the Russian troops took place near Shavle,* on April 29. The Russians, being outnumbered by the Germans, withdrew

* Shavle is a picturesque old town of about 15,000 inhabitants. The upper classes are mainly Poles, the officials Russians, the peasants Lithuanians, the small shopkeepers and artisans are Jews. Shavle has acquired



RUSSIAN RETREAT FROM GALICIA.

Galician peasants watching the departing Cavalry. Inset: A Russian priest on the field.



ON THE ROAD TO WARSAW.
German infantry passing through a village.


in the direction of Mitau.* On April 30 the Germans reached the railway stations of Muravievo and Radzivilishki. On May 1 German patrols appeared near Libau; on the same day a few German torpedo-boats visited the Gulf of Riga. Libau and Riga were their main strategic objectives. Their calculation was that should the Russians concentrate

recently a peculiar connexion with the British Empire. In the decade preceding the outbreak of the Boer War some 60,000 Jews emigrated to South Africa from Shavle and a dozen other small surrounding towns. It is difficult to explain the reasons of that emigration, but by far the greater part of the Jewish population of South Africa hails from that one small district. There are at present more Jews from Shavle in South Africa than in Shavle itself, and South Africa plays the same part in the life of its Jewish population as America does in that of most other towns of Poland, Lithuania, and the Ukraina.

* Louis XVIII. of France spent at Mitau many years of his exile. That small Courland town became at that time the centre of the French aristocratic *émigrés*.

considerable forces in the Baltic Provinces, Libau and Riga, if once occupied, could still be held under the protection of the fleet; a base would thus be gained on the Baltic shore for future operations.

Under date of May 3 we hear of fighting on the flanks, round Muravievo and Rossienie. On the 5th the Germans attempted an advance against Mitau, but were repulsed with considerable losses. On May 7 the Germans were compelled to retreat still further; on that day they had to evacuate their strongly fortified positions near Janishki, about thirty miles south of Mitau; they withdrew, leaving behind a great quantity of booty. Meantime further operations were developing on both flanks. A German column, which had not hitherto taken part in the advance, moved from Memel, along the sea, towards Libau; it was accompanied by



RAILS ON ROLLING STOCK.
Russian soldiers placing guns on trucks on the railway.

a flotilla composed of two cruisers, four torpedo boats, and several destroyers. On May 8 the Germans entered Libau, which the Russians had almost completely evacuated. One German destroyer, having struck a Russian mine, sank outside Libau.


About the same time a much more serious movement was undertaken by the Germans from the direction of Rossienie. Whilst one body of troops was detaining the Russians on the Beissagola-Shadoff front, to the east of Radzivilishki, a Bavarian cavalry division, supported by a regiment of Prussian Guards, was advancing along the northern bank of the Vilia. On May 8 the Bavarians reached the station Zejny on the Vilna-Shavle railway line. They thus threatened to outflank the Russian troops which were operating between Beissagola and Keidany, and, which was still by far more important, they threatened to attack from the north the railway between the important fortress of Kovno and the main Petrograd-Vilna-Warsaw railway line.

Our Allies were, of course, fully aware of the significance of the German move against Zejny; on the same day—i.e., on May 8—the Bavarians were attacked in the vicinity of the station of Zejny by Russian cavalry and completely routed. The pursuit was continued throughout the night, and on the fol-

lowing morning a second battle was fought, about thirty miles north of Zejny, near the river crossing of Krakinov. Its result was equally disastrous for the Germans as had been that of the previous engagement.

During the following day the German retreat extended to the entire line. On May 14 the Russian railway service was resumed between Riga, Mitau, and Muravievo. All the territory east of the rivers Vindava and Dubissa was free of the enemy. An official *communiqué* from Russian Main Headquarters on May 18 says: "In spite of the concentration in the Shavle district of large enemy forces of all arms, the German armies, after the complete repulse of the attacks delivered by two of their divisions on May 14, passed to purely defensive tactics."

Thus about the middle of May the first stage of the German invasion of the Baltic Provinces can be considered as closed. Their advance against Mitau and Riga and their attempt against Kovno had failed, but Libau and most of the territory to the west of the Vindava and the Dubissa remained in their possession. This advance brought them nearer to the Vilna-Petrograd line; from here they were going to threaten two months later a gigantic turning movement against the entire Niemen-Vistula line.



RUSSIAN TRANSPORTS.

Machines broken down from the wear and tear of the war.

CHAPTER LXXXIV.

THE AUSTRO-GERMAN VICTORY ON THE DUNAJEC.

THE DUNAJEC-BIALA-ROPA LINE—THE COMPOSITION AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE AUSTRO-GERMAN AND THE RUSSIAN FORCES IN THE GALICIAN THEATRE OF WAR AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE AUSTRO-GERMAN OFFENSIVE—THE CONCENTRATION OF AUSTRO-GERMAN ARTILLERY—THE BATTLE OF GORLICE—THE FIGHT FOR HILL 419—THE CROSSING OF THE DUNAJEC NEAR OTFINOW—THE FURTHER ADVANCE OF THE AUSTRO-GERMAN FORCES ON MAY 3-4—FIGHTING IN THE EASTERN CARPATHIANS.

THE Germanic offensive against the Dunajec line must rank as an operation surpassing in magnitude almost anything which had hitherto been experienced in the war.

The Germans once more showed their incomparable powers of organization. In matters which can be foreseen, calculated and prepared, hardly anyone can equal, and no one can surpass, the Germans. The human machine which they have created is as mighty in its strength as it is ghastly in its spirit. It marks the highest triumph of the reasoning mind and the closest welding of the modern mass-individuality. When watching the Germans at their destructive work, one's thoughts wander back to the tales of the eccentric, coldly calculating imagination of Jules Verne, especially to the story about the "Millions of the Begum." A German and a Frenchman inherit between them an immense fortune. The German uses his share for the construction of an enormous—shall we say—howitzer? The Frenchman builds a garden city. One shell fired from the giant gun is to wipe out the throbbing life of the Latin city. But the usual happy unravelling of the plot saves

its existence. The deadly shell rises too high, it leaves the spheres of life, and joins the dead stars in their regular, fantastic courses.

Against the German hurricane of steel and fire stood the patiently enduring nature of the Russian peasant. The artillery which was to equalize the conditions of battle, though splendidly staffed and managed, was unable to cope with the superiority in number, weight, and ammunition possessed by its Germanic opponents. The Russian peasant-soldier had to meet the storm in his own way. He stood at his post and perished. It is the resistance offered by the Russian infantry which imparts the heroic, tragic touch to the fighting on the Dunajec line. Some German military writers cannot abstain from expressing their admiration for that silent, unassuming heroism; they recall the words spoken by Frederick II. after the battle of Zorndorf in 1758, that if a Russian soldier is hit by three bullets one has still to push him before he falls. Other German writers simply foam with fury and annoyance; according to the ordinary calculations a wild panic ought to have gripped the Russians. Nothing but stupidity and total absence of nerves can, according to them, explain such



RUSSIA'S RULER AT THE FRONT.

The Tsar talking to Count Brobinsky, Governor of Galicia; the Grand Duke Nicholas, and the Chief-of-Staff.

resistance; paraphrasing Schiller, they suggest that "against stupidity, gods and howitzers thunder in vain." Was it stupidity? Let those Germans answer the question who shrink with fear before the mighty, suffering spirit of a Dostojewski. The Russian Slav faith and the Russian religious feeling have arisen from the depths of the peasant heart and have grown up amidst the misery and endless pain of peasant life. It was not primarily against the upper classes of Petrograd, then St. Petersburg, but against the spirit of the Russian peasant nation that the Germanic States opened this war. With the peasant nation they had also to fight it out. The fight on the Dunajec was only the opening of a gigantic struggle between the souls of two nations.

In previous chapters we have referred to the western front in Galicia as the Dunajec-Biala-Ropa line. Up to the beginning of May 1915 it was, on the whole, of only secondary importance, and we therefore abstained from entering into detailed descriptions of that line, along which the Russian and the Austro-Hungarian armies had been facing one another since about the middle of December. The description of the front by the names of those three rivers was naturally never meant to imply that their course marked the actual dividing line between the

two armies. In a war for positions—and the fighting in West Galicia had assumed that character—rivers even bigger than the Dunajec hardly ever remain a barrier between the contending forces.

Several times previous to May 1915 offensive movements had been undertaken by one side or the other. Practically each movement left its mark on the configuration of the line. On some occasions the defending side was unable to recover all the ground from which it had been compelled to recede before the first impact of the attack; at other times and places the attempts ended in failures so serious that the aggressors were finally unable to stop their retreat along the previous lines. Thus almost each offensive movement left its salients. It would be both tiresome and futile to attempt a detailed description of the history and the gradual evolution of the West Galician front. We shall limit ourselves to a brief consideration of the main geographical features of the theatre of war in which the Germanic offensive started in the first days of May 1915, and of the relative positions which the two armies were then holding in that district.

In its upper reaches the Dunajec cuts its way between high, steep rocks. Along a considerable part of its course, from close to Novy Sacz to Zakliczyn, the main roads avoid the neighbourhood of the river. Several miles

above the confluence of the Dunajec and the Biala their valleys widen out considerably, and numerous islands facilitate the crossing or bridging of the rivers. From the village of Biala, which lies near the confluence of the Dunajec and the River Biala, to the confluence of the Dunajec and the Vistula, on a stretch of almost twenty miles, the Dunajec can be forded at only very few places. Its valley is about five miles wide. On both sides of it hills rise to a height of between 200 and 300 feet above the level of the river. Both these ranges dominate the river valley; during April the Austrian positions followed, in the main, the western range of heights, the lines of our Allies stretched along the eastern hills. Further protection was derived by both sides from the woods which cover the slopes and tops of the hills. On the western side these woods form a belt between two and three miles deep. Little strategic interest attaches to the river valley itself. The dams which on both sides encompass the river are its main feature. At several points our Allies were holding practically the entire valley; at others the river formed the dividing line between the armies. Of all the Russian salients on the western bank of the Dunajec the most marked was that near Radlow. This entire village remained up to the beginning of May in the hands of our Allies.

Between the villages of Biala and Gromnik, for a distance of about fourteen miles, the two armies were facing one another on the western side of the river Biala; this sector of the front lay almost entirely within the triangle, of which the Dunajec and the Biala are the sides, their confluence the apex, and of which the Zakliczyn-Gromnik road is the basis. About two miles to the south of the river junction, between Bogumilovice and Tarnow, the double-tracked railway Cracow-Lwow crosses the Dunajec and the Biala. The big railway bridge across the Dunajec had been blown up by the Austrians during their second retreat in November 1914; the Russians replaced it by a wooden structure, but this in turn was destroyed by our Allies during their retreat from before Cracow about the middle of December. Since then the Dunajec had become at this point the unbridgable borderline between the armies, which slowly settled down to the routine of trench warfare. But as surprise attacks were in most parts impossible on account of the intervening river, sniping became the chief occupation of the troops in that sector. Behind the big eastern pillar of the broken bridge was the post of a Russian sniper, who by his exploits earned for himself among the enemy local fame and the nickname of "Ivan the Terrible"; he finished by becoming in turn the victim of a sniper.



THE RAILWAY BRIDGE ACROSS THE DUNAJEC.

There was only one period of "close season" observed by both sides in that sector; during a certain hour either side was allowed to fetch water from the river without being molested by the enemy. The Russian trenches near the bridge had been dug in a field covered by beautiful winter rye. "The Russian moujiks," says the correspondent of a Viennese paper, who visited this locality after the retreat of our Allies, "in their superstitious reverence for crops, characteristic of peasants, have carefully respected the sown field and followed, in walking through it, only a few narrow paths." The civilized German correspondent, however, does not seem to feel the same respect for that reverence and love which, according to his own statement, the so-called barbarians were showing for the labour of another poor peasant and for the bread of his children.

Even here, where the broad river formed a fairly serious obstacle to communication between the two sides, it did not constitute an absolute barrier. At one place, to the north of the railway bridge, near the village of Ostrow, the Russians had gained a foothold on the western bank of the Dunajec, and the Austrians, notwithstanding the most desperate efforts, were unable to dislodge them. During the

night a small ferry used to carry food and munitions to the outpost beyond the river.


The main battle in that region consisted, however, of the artillery duel which Austrian batteries, from west of Bogumilovice, were carrying on with the Russian batteries posted above Tarnow. The first Austrian 42-cm. howitzer had been got into position as early as January 15, and was, from a distance of almost eight miles, directing its fire against the town of Tarnow. The Russians in return were bombarding most effectively the Austrian positions near the left bank of the Dunajec from 28 cm. howitzers.

South of the railway line two first-class high roads cross the Dunajec, one near Vojnicz, the other near Zakliczyn. About a mile to the east of the bridge by which the Vojnicz road crosses the river, lies the village of Zglobice; the bridge and the village are both dominated by Hill 269,* which rises to the south of the road. The other road, having crossed the Dunajec near Zakliczyn, runs in a northerly direction past the western edge of the Mount Val, which is the highest point within the

* If a figure stands for the name of a height or mountain, that figure expresses its height in metres. A metre is equal to about 3·28 feet.



A MESSENGER OF THE AUSTRIAN GENERAL STAFF
Carrying dispatches across a river in Galicia.



THE AUSTRIANS IN GALICIA.

Officers of the Headquarters Staff studying a plan of campaign.

triangle (526 metres—*i.e.*, 1,725 ft.); on Height 402 the Zakliczyn road is met by a secondary road descending from that mountain.* The two roads meet opposite Tarnow, close to the western bank of the Biala.

To the north-west of the Val lies the second highest hill of the district, Hill 419; Hill 402 forms a bridge between them. Together these three heights encircle a valley traversed by a small, nameless stream. The heights are covered by fine dense forests of elms and beeches, and offer excellent strategic ground; given an approximately equal strength of artillery they form practically impregnable positions. At the time when the great Germanic offensive opened in West Galicia Hills 269, 419, and 402 were held by the Russians, Mount Val by the Austrians.

On a front of about ten miles, between Gromnik and Bobova, the positions of the two armies extended close to the banks of the Biala. Further south the Austrian line crossed over to the eastern side of the river. The sector between Cieszkowice, Gorlice, and Malastow was the decisive district of the entire West Galician front. There are only two possible lines for an advance through Galicia, and they are marked by the two railway lines running east and west; on the Dunajec-Biala-Ropa line the gate to the "Transversal

Valley" lies between Cieszkowice and Gorlice. Apart from tactical reasons, which it would take too long to discuss, on purely strategic grounds it paid the Germans better to direct their main attack along the southern line than to press it along the Tarnow-Rzeszow railway. The "Transversal Valley" runs along the northern slopes of the Carpathians; just beyond the main crest, on the Hungarian side, stood Russian troops. A successful piercing of the Gorlice front carried the Germans at once on to the basic lines of communication of that army. Further, the Russians had better means for a quick concentration of forces along the northern than along the southern line. The former is a first-class double-tracked railway, the latter a rather poor single-track line. Moreover, the Russians had used the winter and spring for the construction of new lines, linking up from north to south their own railway system with that of Galicia. At the outbreak of the war not a single link existed between the two systems from Granica at the extreme western end of Galicia, to Brody in the furthest north-eastern corner of the country. By May 1915 our Allies had constructed two links between the Vistula and the Bug, connecting the Cholm-Lublin-Warsaw railway with the Lwow-Rzeszow-Tarnow-Cracow line. One line had been built from Cholm by Zamosc and Tomaszow to Belzec, where it joins the Lwow-Rawa Ruska-Belzec railway.

* Val (in Polish spelling Wal) means "a rampart," the root of the word is the same as of our word "wall."



HEAVY AUSTRIAN ARTILLERY ON THE GALICIAN ROADS.

The other, which was of much greater importance for the Dunajec front, ran from Lublin to Rozvadow (south-east of Sandomierz). Moreover, the Austrian circular railway Dembica-Rozvadow-Przeworsk had been enlarged down to Dembica to the Russian broad gauge, so that Russian trains could run straight through from Lublin up to the main Cracow-Lwow line. Neither of these new railways could be of much immediate use in a quick concentration of troops in the southern gate round Gorlice.

In the most important district round Gorlice the Russians had failed to secure a decisive superiority of position. It is by no means certain, we might perhaps venture to say that it is improbable, whether even a marked advantage in positions could have counterbalanced the superiority in artillery of the Germanic armies. Be that as it may, it is still of importance to mark that even in that respect our Allies possessed no advantage over the enemy.

The Maslana Gora (it is 747 metres—i.e., 2,450 feet high—and lies between the Grybow-Biecz railway and the Grybow-Ropa-Gorlice-Biecz road), together with the Magora of Malastow, form the key-stone between the Biala line and the Carpathian Mountains. The Maslana Gora was held, towards the end of April, by the Germanic forces, whilst the Russians' hold on the Magora was, as we shall see below, by no means complete or secure. The front between Bobova and Gorlice had the shape of a capital S, drawn from west-north-west to east-south-east. Near Bobova and

Vola Luzanska were its furthest northerly points; Luzna lay in the "no man's land" between the lines. Beyond Vola Luzanska the positions again extended almost due north and south, crossing the Grybow-Gorlice road between Szymbark* and Gorlice. South of it, near Senkova, the Germanic positions approached very close to the Gorlice-Malastow-Konieczna-Zboro-Bartfeld road. The Austrians had gained ground at that place during an earlier attempt which they had made at crushing the Russian lines in the Carpathians by a flank attack from the west. They had tried it as a desperate means for the relief of Przemyśl. On March 8 they reached the hills east of the Gorlice-Malastow road, facing Senkova. Although the attempt at piercing the western Russian line failed, they remained in possession of that salient.

The Gorlice-Konieczna-Zboro road was of considerable importance to the Russian troops which had advanced into Hungary. It will be remembered from Chapter LXXVI. that on April 2 our Allies had reached the Hungarian village of Cigielka, which lies, as the crow flies, six miles west of the road. In order to secure completely their hold of that road, the Russians would have needed to occupy in strength the entire line of the Ropa to the south of the village bearing the same name;

* In the region of Gorlice a considerable number of place-names can be found which are corruptions of German names; these are mostly townships which had been founded by German colonists in the fourteenth century. Thus Szymbark (pronounce: Shymbark) is a corruption of Schoenberg; Rozenbark of Rosenberg; Rychwald of Reichwald; Szymwald for Schoenwald, etc.

that village was, however, entirely within the Austrian lines. What the exact position of the two armies was towards the end of April in the region south of the Grybow-Szymbark-Gorlice road cannot as yet be ascertained with certainty. So much, however, appears from subsequent events, that the important secondary road from Uscie Ruskie to Gladyszow which, following a tributary of the Ropa, connects the valley of the Ropa with the Gorlice-Zboro high road, was neither held in force, nor even properly guarded by the Russians.

Thus in the decisive sector of the Dunajec-Biala-Ropa front, to the south of Ciezkevice, where the gate opens into the "Transversal Valley," and along the flank of the Russian armies which were facing Hungary, the position of our Allies was by no means one of strategic superiority. It may be that the failure of the offensive undertaken at that point by the Austrians in the beginning of March misled them concerning the degree of danger which they had to expect from a frontal attack from the west. Anyhow, even the number of troops concentrated in that district failed in any way to counterbalance the other disadvantages of their position.

We have previously spoken of the great length and the complexity of the Eastern front. One of their military effects was the development of "group command" to an even greater extent than it was known in the West.

One commander cannot possibly direct the operations on the entire Eastern front, not even to that limited extent to which it is still possible to do it in the West. Therefore a system which one might call the group system of armies grew up. It was very marked in the case of the Austro-German drive in Galicia, though the apparent distinction between the Austro-Hungarian and the German Armies was apt to obscure to the superficial observer the real reason for the separate grouping of the northern and of the southern Germanic armies on the Russian front.

Nominally the chief Commander of the Austro-Hungarian Army, the Archduke Frederick, stood at the head of the forces operating on the Galician front. The real leader was undoubtedly the Prussian General von Mackensen, who had been Hindenburg's chief assistant during the second invasion of Poland in November 1914. The offensive and the necessary preparations were worked out by the general staffs of the two allied armies. Mackensen, who was sent to Galicia as Commander of the Eleventh German Army, directed the execution of the plan.

Since about the middle of December the region of the Pilica was the zone in which the Austrian and the German Armies met. During the following four and a half months German reinforcements were continually poured into the Austrian lines. At the end of April there was hardly an Austro-Hungarian Army com-



NAPHTHA MINES FIRED BY SHELLS.



A CONFERENCE OF AUSTRO-GERMAN COMMANDERS.

General von Emmich (x). Inset: The General with his staff at a railway station in Galicia.

posed exclusively of Austro-Hungarian troops. Each of them included at least some auxiliary German forces. Two armies standing on Austro-Hungarian soil were predominantly German.

In front of Warsaw, from the confluence of the Bzura and the Vistula, down to the middle course of the Pilica stood the Ninth German Army, the extreme left wing of Hindenburg's armies. A group of Transylvanian regiments under General von Kövess formed the connecting link between these troops and the Army of General Woyrsch, which was facing the dis-

trict of Ivangorod. General Woyrsch's Army consisted mainly of Silesian troops; the Hungarian troops on his left flank were included in General Woyrsch's command. In the course of the spring his Army seems to have been depleted by drafts for other parts of the front, and we can hardly suppose that it included about that time much more than two army corps. South of it, along the Nida down to the Vistula, stood the First Austrian Army under General Dankl. This army also was probably under strength at the time when the Germanic offensive opened in Galicia. The average estimate puts it at about two army corps.

With the southern bank of the Vistula begins the immediate theatre of the Germanic drive of May 1915. The region between the Vistula and the Carpathians was, towards the end of April, that where the greatest concentration of forces took place. This concentration was, however, effected without any forces being withdrawn from the Carpathians. In other words, the concentration effected in North

Hungary during the four preceding months remained undisturbed, but additional troops were moved from the interior and from other fronts into the district from which the drive was to begin. From the confluence of the Dunajec and the Vistula down to the Zakliczyn-Gromnik road stood the Fourth Austro-Hungarian Army under Archduke Joseph Ferdinand. Its strength was estimated at about five army corps; it included also a German Cavalry Division under General von Besser. On its right wing, to the south of Tarnow, stood the Ninth Army Corps, consisting mainly of Hungarians and the Fourteenth Austrian Army Corps. The hilly region of the Val was occupied by Tyrolese regiments. A considerable proportion of the Archduke's Army had only come to the Dunajec front during the great concentration towards the end of April. The entire district from the Vistula to the Carpathians had formerly been held by the Fourth Army, which then consisted of only three Austro-Hungarian army corps (those of Generals Arz, Roth and Kralicek) and the Prussian Division of General Besser. On its right wing round Grybow stood then the Sixth Austro-Hungarian Army Corps under General Arz von Straussenburg. This corps included the Galician 12th Division and the Hungarian 39th Division, besides Moravian and Silesian troops.

During the great concentration in the second half of April the Austro-Hungarian corps of General Arz von Straussenburg got embedded, and consequently included, in the Eleventh German Army, which remained under the direct command of Mackensen. On the left of the Sixth Austrian Army Corps now stood the *élite* of the Prussian Army, the Guards; on its right, Bavarian troops under General von Emmich, the commander who, in August 1914, had opened the Western campaign by his costly attacks against Liège.

In the corner, south-west of the Magora of Malastow, the Eleventh German Army was joined up by the Third Austro-Hungarian Army under General Borojevic von Bojna.* On its extreme left wing near the Magora stood the 10th Army Corps under General Martiny. The 10th Army Corps is the "home force" of Przemyśl, for it draws its recruits from the districts of Przemyśl and Jaroslav.


The important district of the Laborcza was held by the 7th Army Corps under Archduke Joseph, consisting almost entirely of Hungarians, and commanded by a member of what is considered to be the Hungarian branch of the Hapsburgs. On the extreme right wing of the Third Austrian Army stood the German corps under General von der Marwitz, generally known in Germany as "das deutsche Beskidencorps."* It was explained in Chapter LXXVI. that this Army was brought up to the Carpathian front during the last days of March when the Russian pressure in the district round the Lupkow Pass was threatening to break the Austro-Hungarian defences in the north of

* "The German Corps of the Beskid Mountains." "Beskid Mountains" is the name given to the western sectors of the Carpathians.



FIELD-MARSHAL VON HINDENBURG.

* In Chapter LXXVI. General Borojevic was described as commander of the Second Austro-Hungarian Army, and General von Boehm-Ermolli as that of the Third. It ought to have been the other way round.



MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE BATTLE OF GORLICE.

the Hungarian Plain. Between the 7th Hungarian Army Corps in the Laborca Valley and the 10th Army Corps, north of Bartfeld, stood some additional Austrian forces, forming at least one army corps.

The region between the Lupkow and the Uzsok was held by the Second Austro-Hungarian Army under General von Boehm-Ermolli. It had taken up that position towards the end of February; from here the last desperate attempt at the direct relief of the fortress of Przemyśl was undertaken in the first weeks of March. The army of General von Boehm-Ermolli had remained in this region ever since. It consisted almost entirely of Austro-Hungarian troops, and included among others, the *élite* of the Viennese regiments. On its extreme right wing stood the 5th Austro-Hungarian Army Corps under Field-Marshal-Lieutenant* von Goglia. The Uzsok Pass itself was held by the army-group of F.M.L. von Szurmay; the troops under his command were almost all Hungarians. This corps formed now, towards the end of April, the extreme left wing of the so-called German "Südarmee" (Army of the South). Its chief commander was General von Linsingen.

In the entire theatre of war which was occupied by the mixed armies of Austro-Hungarian and German troops this was certainly the most composite of them all. There was hardly a corps in it which did not bear traces of a long and eventful development. East of F.M.L. von Szurmay's troops stood a Prussian corps, composed of a division of the Prussian Guard, and of Pomeranian and East Prussian regiments, under a Bavarian General, Count Bothmer. This corps included moreover the 38th Hungarian Honvéd division under F.M.L. Bartheldy. It was the corps of Count Bothmer which had been delivering desperate and unsuccessful attacks against the heights of Koziowa ever since the Army of General von Linsingen had arrived at the Carpathian front, in the last days of January 1915. Next to it, in the region of the Ostry, the Makowka, and the Tatarowka mountains, stood the corps of General Hofmann, composed mainly of Austro-Hungarian troops. To his corps belonged the division under General Fleischman. There is


hardly an Austrian nationality which was not represented in that division; it had a most varied history, and had come into existence during the fighting which took place in the Bukovina in the autumn of 1914. It included all kinds of irregular formations. Its history reminds one to some extent of the ethnical history of countries like the Caucasus or the Bukovina itself. Huge waves of stronger nations swept the



FIELD-MARSHAL VON MACKENSEN.

plains, and the remainders of the smaller nationalities were driven under the shelter of the forests and mountains. Thus also now, in the valleys intervening between the highest massifs of the Carpathians different regiments had found shelter; they were formed into a division and were now, entrenched in the mountain valleys, offering resistance to the further advance of the Russians. On the right of the corps of General Hofmann round the Wyszkw Pass, almost down to the valleys

* A Field-Marshal-Lieutenant is, in the Austro-Hungarian Army, a much lower rank than the name would imply to the mind of the English reader. Practically every Austrian corps commander is a Field-Marshal-Lieutenant. In future we shall denote this rank by the initials "F.M.L."



GERMAN TRANSPORT CROSSING A RIVER IN GALICIA.

of the Bystrzyca, the ground was held again by German troops.

Along the northern edge of the Pruth Valley stood the army group of General von Pflanzer-Baltin. We do not know its exact strength, but judging from indications which can be gathered occasionally from German reports, it must have included something between two and three army corps; one of them was the Hungarian corps of the F.M.L. Czibulka, consisting very largely of Croats and Hungarians. F.M.L. Czibulka himself had taken part in the disastrous Austrian expedition into Serbia. He is said to have been more successful than most of his colleagues at extricating his own division (he then commanded only a division) from the catastrophe which befell his Army, and was transferred in January 1915, with some of his troops to the Bukovina front.

To sum up: At the end of April more than four Germanic army corps were holding the district between the middle Pilica and the confluence of the Nida and the Vistula—that is, the sector intervening between the Ninth German Army in front of Warsaw and the Galician border.

On the West Galician front, down to the south-western corner round the Magora of Malastrow, stood at least ten army corps, consisting of almost equal numbers of Austro-Hungarian and German troops. The Carpathian front was held by three distinct armies, each of which included about four army corps; of these altogether not more than four were German. Finally, the district between the Carpathians, the Dniester and the Russian frontier was held by two or three Austro-Hungarian army corps. Thus towards the end of April, on the Galician front alone, at least twenty-four army corps were concentrated, to say nothing about the reinforcements which continued to pour in later on, whilst these armies were advancing and suffering heavily during that advance.

What were the forces with which our Allies were opposing that extraordinary and unprecedented concentration?

We cannot speak about the Russian forces with the same freedom with which we were able to enumerate and name the Austro-Hungarian German corps and their commanders. We must limit ourselves to that which by now is common property among our enemies.

The Russian forces in Galicia, from the Vistula down to the farthest eastern corner between the Dniester and the Austro-Russian frontier, formed the group of armies commanded by General Ivanoff. The West Galician front, from the Vistula to the region of the Dukla, was held by the Third Russian Army under General Radko Dmitrieff. The Carpathian front was held by two armies; one of them was the Eighth Russian Army under General Brusiloff; the other, the Ninth Army, included large bodies of troops which had previously been in the siege army of Przemyśl. On the extreme left wing, north of the Pruth Valley were concentrated about two corps of Russian cavalry. Among them were several famous "native divisions" and also the 12th Russian Division, which included some of the best



THE SOLDIERS' DINNER.

A Russian officer tasting a sample of the food before the men take away their supply.

Cossack regiments under General Mishtshenko; his name is well known to any student of the Russo-Japanese War.

Thus we find that our Allies, at the end of April, were facing a concentration of at least twenty-four Germanic corps with certainly not more than fourteen Russian corps. The disparity of forces was worst in the West, where the five army corps of General Radko Dmitrieff (according to German statements, these were the 9th, 10th, 12th and 24th Russian and the 3rd Caucasian Army Corps) had to face at least twelve Germanic corps of the armies of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, of General von Mackensen, and, on the extreme left wing, part of the army of General Borojevic von Bojna, forces equipped with an infinitely

stronger force of artillery and provided with an infinitely larger supply of ammunition.


Even more remarkable than the Austro-German concentration of men was, in the battle of Gorlice, the concentration of artillery, especially of heavy guns. Their exact numbers are not known as yet, but the best estimates put their total number at about 4,000, half of which are said to have been equal or exceeding the 8-inch types. They further state that the two Russian corps in the district of Gorlice were faced by a concentration of 1,500 guns, 500 of which are said to have been of heavy calibre. In four hours, on the morning of May 2, they fired about 700,000 shells against the Russian trenches. It has been calculated that 1,500 guns with their train would occupy a length of road amounting to over one hundred miles; 700,000 shells are approximately equivalent to one thousand car-loads. A similar number of shells must have been, moreover, kept in reserve. Calculating on the basis of only one line, we find that against every Russian soldier in the firing line—*i.e.*, against every one and a half step of front—10 shells were fired of the weight of about 14 pounds. These few figures give an approximate idea of

the enormous task of preparation which preceded the opening of the Germanic offensive in West Galicia.


For months Austrian aviators had been at work taking photographs of the Russian positions until they had completed an exact bird's-eye view survey of their lines. Then all the ranges were exactly calculated and the disposition of their own artillery mapped out and emplacements prepared. The broken, hilly character of the country is very well suited to a strong and masked concentration of howitzers within a comparatively narrow area. As howitzers, which formed the main strength of the Germanic artillery, admit of very considerable variations in the angle of firing, the possibilities for concentration are very great. The actual moving of troops to the front does not seem to have started on any large scale until in the second half of April. A glance at the map of railways and roads in West Galicia will explain how that enormous task could have been performed in such comparatively short time.*

In the net of communications along the

* Readers should refer to the map published in Vol. IV., chapter 76, p. 410.



AN AUSTRIAN BIG GUN.
The Skoda 30.5 cm. gun about to be fired.



AUSTRIA'S GIANT ARTILLERY IN GALICIA.

The Skoda 30.5 cm. guns in action.

Dunajec-Biala-Ropa line itself there is hardly any difference between the eastern and the western side. The area of exceptionally favourable conditions for quick concentration in West Galicia lies 40 miles to the west of the Dunajec, on the Cracow-Chabowka line. No less than five first-class railways reach that line from the north-west, the west, and the south-west, on a front of about thirty-five miles. In the north-west the Cracow-Chabowka area is connected with the railway system of Russian Poland; the Thorn-Kutno-Skierniewice-Piotrkow-Czestochova railways and the western sector of the Kielce-Miechów line had been in the hands of the Germanic armies ever since the beginning of December. Over these railways they could transfer reinforcements from the Vistula front to West Galicia. From the west the highly developed Silesian and West-Austrian railway net reaches the Cracow-Chabowka front by three main branches. From the south-west, a Hungarian railway leads by Nowy Targ to Chabowka. Besides these lines, another important Hungarian railway runs from Kaschau by Eperies to Nowy Sacz, and thus enters the "Transversal Valley" about twenty miles to the west of the battle front of Gorlice, whilst two other Hungarian railways approach the Carpathians from the south within what then was the Austrian area, though they do not cross the mountain range. From the Cracow-Chabowka-Nowy Targ area two railways and four first-class high roads lead up to the Dunajec-Biala-Ropa front, besides two Hungarian high roads running from the south-west to Nowy Sacz. It must further be remembered that towards the end of April (and also later on in May) the weather in West Galicia

was quite exceptionally fine and dry, so that also secondary roads could be used by the armies. Nevertheless the concentration accomplished by the German armies in West Galicia in the second half of April remains one of the most extraordinary feats of army organization which had been achieved in this war.

The Russian official *communiqué* of May 2 contains the following statement: "During the night of April 30-May 1 strong Austrian forces opened an offensive in the region of Cieszkowice. Our fire forced the enemy to entrench 600 paces in front of our trenches." Moreover, during the last few days of April and on May 1 artillery fire, sometimes followed by infantry attacks, was opened by the Germanic forces at different points on the Rawa, Pilica, Nida and the Dunajec. These were movements really aiming at diversion, they were meant to mask the intentions of the Germanic armies and to mislead the Russians concerning the sector which had been chosen for the main attack.

During the last few nights preceding that of May 1-2 the Germanic forces in the district between Cieszkowice and Senkova had moved closer to the battle line. On the opposite slopes of the hills, to the east, the Russians were holding carefully constructed lines. The Russian front line extended from Cieszkowice in a south-eastern direction; between Staszkovka and Zagorzany the heights of the Viatrovka and Pustki (1,475 feet) and the Kamieniec (1,384 feet) formed the main Russian *points d'appui*. Near the town of Gorlice itself their strongest strategic point was the mountain



AN ABANDONED RUSSIAN TRENCH.
German Red Cross workers searching for the wounded.

rising to the east of the town between the River Ropa and the Gorlice-Sokol-Zmigrod road (about 1,200 feet high). On its western end is the cemetery of Gorlice; farther east extended a beautiful grove of oaks, almost a thousand years old. The square between the roads connecting Gorlice, Malastow, Bartne and Bednarka is filled by a mountain group which consists of about a dozen hills, varying in height from 1,500 to 2,200 feet. The most important among them, from the strategical point of view, was the Zameczysko height, after which the whole group is sometimes named. The strategic importance of this group can be easily seen on the map. An advance to Bednarka will carry the German troops on to the flank of the Jaslo line, the *third Russian line* of defence, and will also bring them dangerously near to the Jaslo-Zmigrod-Krempna road, which, after the loss of the Gorlice-Malastow-Zbow road, remained the only line of retreat for the Russian troops that were holding the Zboro district. South-west of the Zameczysko and south of Malastow the two mountains, of the Magora (2,778 feet), east of the Malastow-Gladyszow-Zboro road, and the Ostra Gora (about 2,400 feet), to the west of it, formed the chief Russian *points d'appui*.

Towards the evening of May 1 the Germanic batteries started "practice shooting" against the Russian positions. The fire was continued throughout the night with intervals during which the engineers attempted to destroy the first line of Russian wire-entanglements. The Austrians claim to have brought up during the same night several batteries of heavy

howitzers, across the serpentine road from Gladyszow to Malastow, without the Russians noticing it. To Gladyszow they evidently must have been brought by the road from Uscie Ruskie. It is not easy to understand how all that could have been done without the Russians knowing about it, and it is hardly credible that this really occurred. The Austrian report which contains this account claims that the Austrian artillery after having passed between the Magora and the Ostra Gora during the night started in the morning the bombardment of the Russian positions on those heights from the direction of Malastow.

On May 2, between 6 and 7 a.m., an artillery fire was opened against the entire Russian line such as had never been witnessed before. In the following four hours 700,000 shells were fired. The first lines of Russian trenches were practically wiped out. As Prof. Pares, who was present in that battle, says about one part of line, "the whole area was covered with shells till trenches and men were levelled out of existence." The German and Austrian artillery continued that hurricane of shells for about four hours. After that they passed to the *tire de barrage*: a curtain of fire is thereby placed *behind* the front line of the enemy trenches, thus isolating the area which had been previously bombarded; the shells now pass over the heads of that front line, but establish behind it an area which no living being can pass. The men in the front trenches who have survived the previous shelling cannot receive any reinforcements from behind and the infantry of the attacking side advances

against them. This stage was reached along the greater part of the Cieszkowice-Malastow line on May 2, about 10 a.m. "In this part of the front," says a German military writer, "infantry fighting has given place for the time being to the action of our heavy artillery, which is subjecting to a terrific fire the positions of the enemy. These positions had been carefully reconnoitred during the lull in the fighting which prevailed during the last few months. Only after all cover is destroyed, the enemy's infantry killed or forced to retire, we take up the attack against the positions; the *élan* of our first attack now usually leads to a favourable result." One would not expect much *élan* to be required on the part of the infantry after the condition described above had once been reached; but nowadays *élan* or "bravery" has become with German writers the necessary *epitheton ornans* due to the Germans, and like the classical *epitheta* it is used in season and out of season. As a matter of fact, the statement that the first attack *usually* sufficed for the conquest of the Russian trenches is incorrect; even German and Austrian writers frequently mention attacks that failed, though the ground had been previously prepared by the most terrific bombardment; we shall have to say more of that farther on.

At the extreme northern end of the sector which had been chosen for the main onslaught round Cieszkowice and Staszkovka the Prussian Guard and other Prussian troops under


General von François attacked the Russian positions. Our Allies had to retire by the end of the day to positions about half-way between the previous positions and the Olpiny-Biecz line. On the whole, Mackensen seems to have chosen for his Prussians the less difficult work, and comparatively least seems to have been achieved in that district; the most arduous task was left to the Austro-Hungarian and the Bavarian troops. The Russian positions on Mount Viatrovka were attacked by the 39th Hungarian Division, those on Mount Pustki by the 12th Galician Division, both belonging to the 6th Austro-Hungarian Army Corps under F.M.L. Arz von Straussberg. The ground had been prepared for them by heavy artillery, consisting of the 21-cm. Krupp howitzers and the terrific Austrian 30.5-cm. howitzers manufactured by the Skoda-Works at Pilsen. These guns, surpassing in mobility most of the German artillery of similar calibre, had been adopted by the Austro-Hungarian Army in 1912. Their shell weighs about sixty stone and has proved almost as effective as that of the 42-cm. giants. Its shot is said to throw up the earth about 100 ft. high.

Farther south the town of Gorlice was subjected to a merciless bombardment. Whatever had remained of that unfortunate town was now destroyed; about 300 of its remaining civilian population of about 1,300 perished whilst the Austrian and German batteries were throwing "from the south and the west



TRENCHES IN A GRAVEYARD.

Scene in the cemetery at Gorlice after the battle.



GERMAN ARTILLERY PASSING THROUGH A TOWN IN GALICIA.

fire and death into the town" (we quote that cheerful description from a German source). The horror of the situation was heightened by the conflagration of the oil-wells and oil-refineries. Gorlice is the centre of an important oil district. In the building of the town hall of Gorlice, some sixty years ago, the chemist Lukasiewicz conducted his researches which resulted in the discovery of the first process whereby lamp-oil was gained from raw petroleum; it was he who constructed the first oil-lamp. Of that old town hall nothing survived the German bombardment. The fire spread also to the Gorlice factory of sulphuric acid and to the oil-wells which extend between Gorlice and Glinik. Yet our Allies were still hanging on to the town, which had been changed by noon into a living inferno. Step by step in hand-to-hand fighting the Silesian divisions had to conquer the town. In the afternoon the struggle was continued on the cemetery mountain and in the oak-grove of Sokol. A hail of shells soon changed the fine old oaks into matchwood. The position became untenable. By the end of the day our Allies had to withdraw to the Biecz-Lipinki-Bednarka front, their second line in that district. Of that line the heights of Kobylanka, Tatarowka, Lysa Gora and Rekaw were the most important supports.

South of Senkova, in the district of the Zameczysko, Bavarian regiments under General von Emmich had replaced the Austrian troops of General von Arz about April 26. At that time our Allies had still been in possession of the intervening valley through which flows the small river Senkova. These positions, to which little importance was attached at that time, were conquered by the Bavarians in the last days of April, in order to obtain a better starting point for the grand offensive. During the night of May 1-2 everything was prepared for the attack. At 7 a.m. the artillery, which included German 21 cm. howitzers, Austrian 15-cm. howitzers, Austrian mountain batteries and field artillery, commenced its work of destruction. By 10 a.m. it seemed that everyone within that area must have perished, and the *tire de barrage* commenced. A few regiments of Bavarian infantry opened the attack, but were received by a most murderous Russian machine-gun and rifle fire. It is a proof of incomparable nerve and endurance on the part of the Russians that after three hours of such an inferno they could still offer effective

resistance. The first attack of the Bavarians broke down and their first lines perished, having achieved little more than to break at a few points a way through the wire entanglements. Only by costly, slow and cautious work were their successors able to approach the Russian positions. At one point a small ridge protrudes from the slope above the Senkova-Malastow road, offering a certain amount of dead ground; it is grown all over with shrubs, which form fairly good cover. Across that ridge the Bavarians managed to reach the bat-



FIELD-MARSHAL
ARZ VON STRAUSENBERG.

tered Russian trenches, which had been cut off from their supports by a screen of the enemy's artillery fire. Having conquered at a considerable cost the first heights, the Bavarian infantry reformed close to the forest which the artillery fire had rendered untenable. The Austrian 15 cm. howitzers and their mountain batteries at once moved on to their support. The Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff, General Conrad von Hötzendorf, had for a long time taken a great interest in increasing the mobility of the heavy artillery. A few years before the outbreak of the war the



A SCENE OF SEVERE FIGHTING.

On the battlefield in Galicia.

Austrian 15-cm. and even the 24-cm. howitzers had been adapted to motor transport ; may be that also General Conrad "built better than he knew."

Whilst the Bavarians were advancing in the northern part of the sector, our Allies were counter-attacking from the south and disputing hard to the enemy every foot-breadth of ground. Only the combined attack of the Bavarians and of Austrian troops, which were fighting farther south in the Mencina district, finally dislodged the Russians from the positions round the "gamekeeper's lodge"; this group of buildings lies at the foot of Hill 469, on its eastern side, between it and Heights 461, 501 and 598. From the "gamekeeper's lodge" access can be comparatively easily gained to these neighbouring hills. One by one the heights of the Zameczysko group were now falling. At last, towards nightfall, the fire of the heavy Austrian batteries was directed against the Zameczysko height itself; it was finally abandoned by our Allies about 8 p.m., and the Bavarians now held this entire sector extending to the east beyond Height 649. They were now only a short distance outside the village of Bednarka.

To the south of the Zameczysko group the 10th Austrian Army Corps (of Przemyśl and Jaroslav, under the command of FML. von Martiny) had conquered the Magora of Malastow and most of the Ostra Gora group.

The net result of the operations of May 2 round Gorlice was the breaking in of the Russian defences on a front of about ten miles and to an average depth of over two miles. The depth attained was, however, by no means even approximately uniform. It was worst in the centre round Gorlice and Senkova rather less marked on the flanks.

"The Germans had shot their first bolt," wrote the special correspondent of *The Times*, Mr. Stanley Washburn, "a bolt forged from every resource in men and munitions that they could muster for months of preparation." The Russian Army "was outclassed in everything except bravery, and neither the Germans nor any other army can claim superiority in that respect." In the case of many an army a disaster such as that which overcame the Russian lines round Gorlice on May 2 might have changed into a catastrophe for the entire force. The Eighth Russian Army, no doubt, suffered severely. "With the centre literally cut away, the keystone of the Russian line had been pulled out, and nothing remained but to retire." Yet the spirit even of that Eighth Army, which had suffered worst, was in no way broken. Many of its units, though decimated, established on their retreat a record of which a victorious army could be proud.

The conquest of the triangle between the rivers and the Zakliczyn-Gromnik road, in other words, the taking of Heights 402, 419 and

269, was the first problem which confronted, in the region south of Tarnow, the Fourth Austro-Hungarian Army under Archduke Joseph-Ferdinand. Until that was done no direct advance against Tarnow could be undertaken. During the months of February and March the Austrian troops had delivered most desperate attacks against the positions of our Allies on those hills; all of them failed. They returned to the work on May 2, supported by a concentration of artillery similar to that employed in the district of Gorlice.

On the morning of May 2, at 6 a.m., the Austrian artillery opened fire from the Mount Val and from the western bank of the Dunajec against Hill 419. The bombardment was continued for more than three hours. Meantime a few regiments of the Tyrolese "Kaiserjäger" (Imperial Fusiliers), belonging to the 14th Austrian Army Corps crossed the forests which cover the northern slopes of the Mount Val, and the valley intervening between it and Hill 419, and took up positions in the forest at the southern foot of the latter, ready to attack the moment when the artillery fire



A YOUNG RUSSIAN VOLUNTEER.

He was aged 14, and was with his regiment at the front.

should stop. About 400 yards of an open, steep slope intervened between the positions now occupied by the Austrian Fusiliers and the Russian trenches. But a few hundred yards to the east, in the forest descending from Hill 412, was another Russian position, of which the Austrians seem to have had no knowledge. About 9.30 a.m. the Austrian artillery fire ceased and the Fusiliers proceeded to the attack. They came at once under a fierce rifle and machine-gun fire directed against them from Hill 419, and they had not yet proceeded much farther when they found themselves enfiladed from the right flank. A small cemetery on the slope now marks the spot at which perished the greater part of the 4th Regiment of the Austrian Imperial Fusiliers. The attack failed completely. The survivors escaped back under the shelter of the forest.

On May 3 the Austrian batteries reopened their fire against the Russian positions on Hill 419. Germans and Austrians who have subsequently visited those trenches express their unbounded admiration for the men who were able to endure such a trial without losing their nerve. From the first trench till about 100 steps in the rear, not a foot of ground was left untouched by shells. The whole hill looks now as if covered with volcanic craters, like a




IN A RUSSIAN TRENCH.

Looking through a periscope.

field ploughed by devils; all the woodwork of the trenches has been reduced to matchwood and the gruesome mixture of earth, wood, human limbs, torn clothes and fragments of shells testifies to the ghastliness of modern weapons.

But even after that second bombardment the Austrians did not repeat their attempt of the previous day at a direct attack against Hill 419. They prepared their way by first conquering step by step the Russian trenches on Hill 412. Its fall rendered the isolated positions on Hill 419 untenable. Still the resistance of our Allies was not broken even now. They withdrew on to Height 269, next to the Vojnicz-Tarnow road, and maintained themselves at that point until they had to



THE RUSSIAN RETREAT.

A gun which was rendered useless by the Russians before leaving Galicia.

evacuate it in consonance with the general retirement in other parts of the front. The defence of this district forms one of the most glorious episodes in the Russian retreat in West Galicia.


On the night of May 1-2, which marks the beginning of the Germanic offensive in West Galicia, Austrian troops effected a crossing of the Dunajec near Otfinow. Under cover of the forests which extend along the range of hills west of the river, the Austrians had concentrated considerable forces of men and artillery. On the night of May 1-2 their engineers, protected by powerful artillery fire, succeeded in constructing a pontoon bridge across the river. The small groups of Russians which were holding at a few points the western bank of the Dunajec, fought with extraordinary obstinacy.

Even German sources record different individual acts of bravery achieved by the Russian soldiers. At one spot a Russian soldier who had swam across the river, plunged back into it in order to rescue his officer; he succeeded in doing it, but on reaching the eastern bank of the Dunajec was killed by what the German prefers to describe as a "stray" bullet. At another point the commander of a Russian battery, having fired off his last shell, and seeing that nothing was left to him except surrender, is reported to have committed suicide.

By the evening of May 2 the Austrian troops had established themselves along a fairly wide front on the eastern bank of the Dunajec. The strategic importance of that move consisted in that it carried the Austrian forces on to the Tarnow-Szczucin railway; thus the connexion was broken between the West Galician Army of General Radko Dmitrieff and the neighbouring Russian Army on the Nida—i.e., the left wing of General Alexeieff's group of armies.

Yet the entire advance effected by the army of Archduke Joseph-Ferdinand, both north and south of Tarnow, would have remained without much consequence had it not been for the further developments which ensued along the Gorlice-Jaslo line.

The German scheme was simple, says a semi-official *communiqué* issued at Petrograd on May 13; it was all "based on lightning rapidity of movement." On May 2 the German forces had pierced the first line of Russian defences in the district of Gorlice, the following days were to decide the actual value of that initial success. On the Dunajec, south of Tarnow, the Russians were holding their own, and even the loss of Hills 402 and 419 on May 3 did not destroy their defence. Once before, in December 1914, after the battle of Limanova, the Austrian armies had broken through the gate of Gorlice and crossed the Western Carpathians from Hungary; they had advanced in the depression, which we call the "Transversal Valley," as far as Sanok. But that success had proved devoid of far-reaching consequences; the Russian armies stood firm round Tarnow and fresh reinforcements brought up from Russian Poland enabled them, in the second half of December, to drive back the Austrians beyond Gorlice and across the Carpathians. Thus experience had taught the Germanic armies to count, in their new offensive in May



" GASED " RUSSIAN TROOPS.

Russian soldiers suffering from the effects of poisonous gas which was used by the Germans, waiting for treatment at a Red Cross station. Inset: A little samaritan brings water to a "gassed" man. This wounded man is holding in his right hand a piece of cotton wool which had been dipped in a soothing chemical. He sniffed at it from time to time.

1915, with the strength of the Russian positions round Tarnow. The enormous concentration of forces in the district of Gorlice allowed them to adopt this time a peculiar plan of advance. Although Mackensen's army had pierced the first Russian lines near Gorlice by a frontal attack from west to east, its main forces did not continue their offensive in the same direction, but advanced to the north-east at an angle of about 45° to the original line. Only the extreme right wing of Mackensen's army continued its advance due east with extraordinary rapidity; its aim was to reach the Dukla Pass before the Russian troops from north-western Hungary could have effected their retreat across the mountains.

The movement, which we might best describe as a "left incline," presented evident advantages to the Germanic armies. It tended to widen the breach which had been effected in the Russian lines round Gorlice; it was bound to result in the abandonment of the Tarnow front by the Russians; and it rendered possible the unimpeded advance of armies which had been standing originally at right angles to one another, along the Dunajec-Biala front and along the southern foot of the Carpathians. Mackensen knew only too well the dangers of an advance through a narrow gap in the enemy's line; he had done it in the battle of

Lodz, and had it not been for the late arrival of two Russian generals, von Rennenkampf and von Scheidemann, he might by now have been a prisoner of war, together with about two or three entire corps of the Prussian Army. The advance of the left wing and centre of Mackensen's army from the Gromnik-Gorlice front in a north-easterly direction automatically carried them into the rear and on to the lines of communication of the Russian forces round Tarnow; at the same time it relieved the pressure which the Russians were bringing to bear on the Fourth Austrian Army. The army of Archduke Joseph-Ferdinand, though inferior in numbers to the Eleventh German Army under Mackensen, was holding a front of about thirty miles, whilst that of the latter did not exceed twenty. Moreover, for reasons given above, the Russian reinforcements could quickest reach Dembica; had not Mackensen moved his army from the Gromnik-Gorlice front against Dembica and Rzeszow, our Allies might have successfully checked his advance by a counter-offensive from the neighbouring sector extending between the Vistula and Tarnow. The swerving towards the north-east implied a redistribution of forces and a devolution of the extraordinary concentration of forces round Gorlice.

As we have previously stated, the extreme



NEAR PETRIKAU.

This is the place where the Germans met the Caucasian army.



RUINED POLISH VILLAGE.


A street scene in a town in Poland, showing the effect of a bombardment.

right wing of Mackensen's army continued a rapid advance due east, towards the Dukla. With that exception the triangle between Gorlice, the Uzsok and Radymno (half-way between Przemyśl and Jaroslav), which was left free by the north-easterly swerve of Mackensen's army, was filled by the Third Austro-Hungarian army under General Borojevic von Bojna, and the Second Austro-Hungarian army under General von Boehm-Ermolli. Only a most magnificent army organization and a most careful preparation, extending to detail, could execute a plan of such magnitude at the speed at which it was done by the Austrian and German armies during the month of May 1915.

On May 2 our Allies had been dislodged from their first lines of defence on the Cieszkowice-Luzna-Gorlice-Malastow front. The attack against Hill 419, to the south-west of Tarnow, had failed. Even after the loss of that position, on May 3, the Tarnow-Tuchow front stood firm. The main thrust had been delivered in the direction of Gorlice and Biecz; soon, however, the entire line had to give way; it was not feasible much longer to pivot on Tuchow. The River Visloka, between Dembica, Pilzno, Brzostek, Jaslo and Zmigrod, offers positions parallel to the original Dunajec-Biala-Ropa front. The Visloka was the third Russian line of defence, and hopes were entertained that our Allies might be able to stop on it the Austro-German advance. It is difficult to give a precise description of the second Russian line. It did not follow any river, but extended across the hills which intervene between the

Biala in the west and the Visloka in the east. In fact, three lines could be traced in that district, but as the retreat did not proceed systematically from the one to the other, it is not necessary for our purpose to enter into the detail of these positions. Different groupings were possible, and the front was changing from hour to hour in accordance with the advance of the Austro-German offensive or of the Russian counter-attacks. Between Tuchow and Olpiny, the Mountain Dobrotyn formed, after the breakdown of the first Russian line, one of the chief Russian defensive positions. It is about 1,800 feet high, and is, like most mountains in that district, covered with thick woods. To the south of the Dobrotyn the Mountain Lipie (about 1,400 feet high) formed an important *point d'appui*. The Mountain Wilczak (1,225 feet), south-west of Biecz and close to the road and railway line which connect that town with Gorlice, forms the key to the valley of the lower Ropa. Between Biecz and Bednarka, the second Russian line followed the heights of the Kobylanka, Tatarowka, Lysa Gora and of the Rekaw; east of it, as the last defence of the Jaslo-Zmigrod road, extended the entrenched positions on the Ostra Gora. To the south of the Gorlice-Zmigrod line the mountain group of the Valkova (almost 2,800 feet high) constituted the last defence of the line of retreat of the Russian forces from Zboro.

During the two days of May 3 and 4 a desperate battle developed for the possession of the wooded hills between the Biala and the Visloka. On May 3 the Prussian Guard advanced to the foot of the Hill Lipie and late in the evening captured the hill itself. On the next



TO ASSIST THE AUSTRIANS.
One of the German Army Corps marching into Galicia to relieve the Austrians.

day it captured, after fierce hand-to-hand fighting in which the Germans vastly outnumbered the Russian forces, Olpiny, Szczeryny and the hills which surround these townships from the east. Farther south, the 39th Hungarian division (Corps Arz) attacked on May 3 the Russian positions on the Mountain Wilczak, near Zagorzany, close to the junction of the Grybow-Biecz railway line with the branch line from Gorlice. Although effectively supported by a tremendous concentration of artillery, the Hungarians seemed at first incapable of making any impression on the Russian positions. It was only after having delivered six unsuccessful attacks that they were able to dislodge by a seventh attack our Allies from their trenches on the Wilczak. The taking of that mountain settled the fate of Biecz and practically opened to the Austrians the road along the lower Ropa towards Jaslo. That town can be considered the key to the Visloka line, just as the district of Gorlice was for that of the Biala and Upper Ropa. It is the most important railway junction in the district between Tarnow and Przemyśl, and lies at the head of the main high roads entering Hungary, between Bartfeld and the Lupkow. Jaslo had been for the last four months the headquarters of General Radko Dmitrieff, the commander-in-chief of the Eighth Russian Army. By the night of May 4 it was evident that the fall of Jaslo itself had become unavoidable. South of it the Bavarians, under General von Emmich, and the 10th Austro-Hungarian Army Corps, under General Martiny, were hacking through their way, by weight of shells and numbers of men, along the Bednarka-Zmigrod road and the secondary road leading from Malastow, past the Valkova Mountain to Krempna. By the night of May 4 they had approached Zmigrod and Krempna; the last direct line of retreat of the Russian troops which had advanced into the region round Zboro was threatened. The evacuation of that district had begun on the same day. On May 4 opened also a more vigorous Austrian offensive round Tuchow, and the fate of Tarnow was by then practically decided, though our Allies still held the town with great skill and stubbornness.

The retreat had spread by the end of May 4 to the entire West Galician front and compelled the Russians to evacuate Northern Hungary west of the Lupkow; even in the Lupkow itself the retreat became more and more a mere question of time. Now that the Austro-

German armies were approaching rapidly the Visloka, and that even Jaslo had become practically untenable, no hope was left of any effective resistance being offered to the German concentration of artillery and men before the San and the Dniester were reached. The history of the next three weeks is mainly marked by rearguard actions, interpolated only here and there by bigger battles, which were fought in defence of specially important junctions of roads or railways or in order to gain the necessary respite for the evacuation of some big military centre.

A sudden retreat of a big army cannot possibly be effected without serious losses in prisoners being suffered. Wounded have frequently to be left behind; stragglers, or even whole detached bodies, cannot rejoin the main forces. Finally, now that even rearguard actions are fought in trenches, their occupants, who cannot hope for any fresh supplies or reinforcements, naturally have to surrender as soon as their ammunition is exhausted or when the enemy reaches their positions with vastly superior forces. The German *communiqués* put the approximate figure of Russian prisoners taken during the three days of May 2-4 at about 30,000. The figure does not seem unlikely, especially as it is certain to include the majority of the Russian wounded. Further, we must remember that as the defeat was caused mainly by lack of guns and ammunition, the Russians were bound to harbour whatever artillery they possessed. When an army retires which is well equipped with artillery and ammunition, its guns cover the retreat; they hold the enemy at bay to the last and are sacrificed for the sake of the men. The Russians during their retreat from West Galicia were compelled many a time to sacrifice men in order to save their artillery and in order to preserve it for a coming greater battle at some more important strategic point.

The losses suffered by the Austro-German armies during their attack against the Dunajec-Biala-Ropa line have never been published; their casualty lists appear only some considerable time after the events, and it is difficult to form on that basis any, even approximate, idea about the losses suffered by them in particular battles. On the other hand, a retreating army enjoys even less than the usual facilities for forming an opinion about the casualties of the enemy. Still, it can be seen from the casualty lists of Austro-Hungarian officers that the losses which they suffered in


the first three days of the West Galician offensive must have been enormous. Occasionally the date of death is put in the Austrian lists after the name of a killed officer. As late as August the days May 2-4 continue to occur in them; and it ought to be remembered that during those early days the share which the Austro-Hungarian forces had in the fighting was smaller, in comparison with that of the Germans, than towards the middle of May, when the Carpathian armies, consisting mainly of Austro-Hungarian troops, were brought into the main battle line.

Hardly any fighting took place on the day of May 2 in the Carpathian Mountains, west of the Lupkow. During the preceding week the Russians seem to have withdrawn from that part some troops for the support of the western line, which was known to be threatened. All further offensive in the Western Carpathians had thus come to an end. The Austrians naturally abstained from a counter-offensive. Their forces were not sufficiently big for that purpose on the Hungarian front, and it paid them better to leave the Russians in their advanced southern positions; Mackensen's offensive from the west, if successful, by cutting their lines of retreat, was bound to create a position of extreme difficulty for the

Russian troops round Zboro and to the south of the Dukla.

Only in the extreme east, where our Allies were facing the mixed Austro-German Army of General von Linsingen, do we hear of some serious fighting taking place in the first days of May. On May 2, says the Russian official *communiqué* published at Petrograd on the following day, "in the direction of Stryj and south-east of Holoviecko, we captured Mount Makovka and took 300 prisoners, including ten officers." On the following night the Austrians recaptured part of these positions, but were again dislodged by the Russians on the morning of May 3. On that day the captures rose to 1,200 prisoners, 30 officers, and three mitrailleuses. Some further fighting is reported on the same day in the region round the village of Osmoloda, near the sources of the Swica and on the Upper Lomnica.

In the region east of Verchovina and Bystra the 79th Austrian Regiment belonging to the 7th Division surrendered voluntarily on grounds of bad food and bad treatment. We are told that "Austrian prisoners complain of their cruel treatment by German officers, who for the slightest misdemeanour, especially on the part of the Rumanians, inflict on them corporal punishment."



EVENING.

CHAPTER LXXXV.

THE RECONQUEST OF PRZEMYSL AND LEMBERG.

THE MAIN OUTLINES OF THE AUSTRO-GERMAN ADVANCE THROUGH CENTRAL GALICIA—THE EVACUATION OF TARNOW—THE RUSSIAN RETREAT FROM HUNGARY—THE EVACUATION OF CENTRAL GALICIA BY THE RUSSIANS—THE RETREAT FROM THE NIDA—THE BATTLE OF OPATOW—THE RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE IN EAST GALICIA AND IN THE BUKOVINA—THE RUSSIAN RETREAT FROM THE EASTERN CARPATHIANS—THE BATTLE FOR PRZEMYSL—THE RUSSIAN COUNTER-OFFENSIVE—THE FALL OF PRZEMYSL—THE AUSTRO-GERMAN ADVANCE AGAINST LWOW—THEIR ATTEMPTS TO CROSS THE DNIESTER—THE NEW CONCENTRATION ON THE SAN—THE FALL OF LWOW.

THE conquest of Central Galicia forms the first section of the history of the great Austro-German offensive which opened on the Eastern front in May, 1915. The drive began with the battle of Gorlice, on May 2. Its first stage closed about May 14; on that day the attacking forces reached the San, the frontier of East Galicia, and the natural southern extension of the strategical line of the middle Vistula.

On May 1 the Russian front in Western Galicia and Northern Hungary extended from the confluence of the Dunajec and the Vistula to Zboro; along the rivers Dunajec, Biala and Ropa, past the towns of Tarnow, Cieszkowice and Gorlice; from Zboro it ran on Hungarian soil, in the main in an easterly direction, past Sztropko, Krasnibrod, Virava, Nagy Polena to the Uzsok Pass. The length of that segment of the Eastern front, between the Upper Vistula and the Uzsok, amounted to about 120 miles. Along that line on May 1 at least 19 Austro-German corps, supported by an enormous concentration of heavy artillery, were facing some eight Russian army corps, poorly provided with guns and ammunition. The district between Gromnik and Malastow was occupied by what came to be known afterwards as the "phalanx." No less than six army corps (the

11th German Army under Mackensen, including the 6th Austro-Hungarian Corps under Arz von Straussenberg, and the 10th Austro-Hungarian Army Corps, belonging to the adjoining army of Borojevic) were here concentrated on a front of about 20 miles. On May 2 Mackensen's "battering-ram" broke the Russian line in front of Gorlice. By the night of May 4 the Austro-German troops reached a line extending from the Mountain Dobrotyn (south-east of Tuchow) across the heights on the eastern bank of the Visloka in front of Jaslo, to Zmigrod on the Jaslo-Zboro road. The right wing of the "phalanx" was advancing quickest; its aim was to cut off the Russian forces which had penetrated into Hungary across the Carpathian Mountains to the west of the Lupkow. On May 5 the Austro-German forces, which were standing south of the Carpathians between Bartfeld and the Uzsok, began to exert pressure against the Russian line in Northern Hungary. On the left of Mackensen's army the Austrian troops under Archduke Joseph-Ferdinand had by the night of May 4 occupied on the front between Tarnow and Tuchow most of the ground between the Dunajec and the Biala, and had established themselves on the right bank of the Dunajec, to the north of Tarnow, thus cutting the connexion between



THE TSARITZA DISTRIBUTING CIGARETTES TO HER TROOPS.

Convalescent members of the 15th Regiment of Dragoons about to return to the front.

the Third Russian Army and the Russian forces on the Nida.

We do not intend for the present to enter into the detail of the fighting which developed during the following days, but shall try to give merely the main strategic outlines of the Austro-German advance through Mid-Galicia. As was pointed out in the last chapter, Mackensen broke the Russian front round Gorlice by a frontal attack from west to east, but the further advance of his main forces did not continue in the same direction. They executed between the Biala and Visloka what we have previously described as a "left incline"; they were now facing north-east and were advancing by echelons, which were, however, kept in close touch with each other. The swerve of Mackensen's army to the north-east threatened to outflank from the south the Russian forces which were offering in front of Tarnow stubborn resistance to the advance of the Fourth Austro-Hungarian Army under Archduke Joseph-Ferdinand. At the same time it made room for the Third and the

Second Austro-Hungarian Armies from across the Carpathians. We can best visualize their advance in the following way: the right end of the line—*i.e.*, the extreme right wing of Boehm-Ermolli's army—remained fixed to the west of the Uzsok, in the district of Volosate; the left end of the line—*i.e.*, the extreme left wing of the army of General Borojevic (the 10th Austro-Hungarian army-corps under General Martiny)—advanced in close touch with the Bavarians under General von Emmich, who formed the right wing of Mackensen's army. In fact, that Austro-Hungarian corps must be included in his first "phalanx," as we have indicated above. Mackensen's advance to the north-east was gradually drawing the two Austro-Hungarian armies across the Carpathians.

Mackensen's "phalanx" has been occasionally talked of as if it had been a fixed formation. It was nothing of that kind. It was a concentration of troops along the lines on which the main resistance was expected or

along which the quickest advance was intended. But there was no one special group of forces earmarked for that purpose. It was the most admirable part of the entire Austro-German plan of advance that there seems to have been very little horizontal shifting or regrouping within the line. The advance was laid out in such a way that the concentrations occurred, as it were, automatically at the points at which they were most needed.

There are four centres of pre-eminent strategic importance in Central Galicia. All the main roads and railways of the country between the Dunajec-Biala-Ropa line in the west, and the San in the east, focus in the districts of Jaslo, Dembica, Rzeszow and Sanok. The occupation of these four centres marks the conquest of Mid-Galicia. The Austro-German forces conquered the district of Jaslo by the *élan* of the first advance after the breakdown of the Gorlice front. The outflanking movement from the south compelled our Allies to evacuate the district of Tarnow and thus to relinquish the main defences in front of Dembica. The rapid advance of the Austro-German armies in the south and the fall of Jaslo rendered impossible any attempt to stop their

drive on the Visloka, *i.e.*, on a line parallel to the original West Galician front. The southwestern angle had been knocked in by the first onslaught round Gorlice, and the following days marked a continuous advance in the process of the straightening out of the line between the Vistula and the Uzsok Pass. When on May 8 the Russian forces rallied for a renewed resistance, coupled with attempts at a counter-offensive, the two groups of armies most immediately concerned in the battle for Mid-Galicia were facing one another along a practically straight line, extending from the Vistula near Szczucin to the mountain group west of the Uzsok Pass.

In the corner between the Nida and the Vistula, and in the Uzsok Pass, the Russians were still holding on May 8 approximately the same positions which had been held by them for a period extending over four to six months ; but the intervening front, which on May 1 was about 160 miles long, measured now only about 120 miles. That shortening of the line was entirely accounted for by the change which had occurred on the front between the Vistula and the Sanok-Homonna railway. On May 1 the Austro-German forces had stood in that



AUSTRIAN TROOPS CLEARING AWAY WIRE ENTANGLEMENTS
ERECTED BY THE RUSSIANS.



A FIGHT ON A—

Germans cut off and annihilated after crossing the water on a temporary bridge which was des-
bayoneted, or drowned

sector along a line forming a concave curve, with its centre round the Magora of Malastow, and its arms extending to the north and east for about 60 miles each. By May 8 the centre of the Austro-German front had advanced to Frysztak on the Vislok,* north-east of Jaslo. Thence it extended for 40 miles to the north-west, to the Vistula, along an almost straight line, running south-west of Dembica and Radomysl, to Szczucin. To the south-east of Frysztak the front followed the extension of the former line through Krosno to Besko; from Besko it curved round the Bukovica mountain to Komancza; the Frysztak-Komancza line measured another 60 miles. Between the

* The *Vislok* ought not to be confounded with the *Visloka*. The names of the *Vislok*, *Visloka*, of the *Vistula*, and also the old name of the *Nida*, which was *Vislica*, are all of the same derivation. We have drawn attention in a former chapter to the frequent occurrence of the river-names of *Bystra* and *Bystryca* in East Galicia, *bystry* meaning "quick, rapid." The name *Visla* (the Polish for *Vistula*) is a transformation of *Bystra*. The *t* has dropped out in these names of the Western Polish rivers, being preserved only in the French and English name for the "*Visla*"; the transition of *b* into *v* is most common in European languages, similarly that of *r* into *l*.

Lupkow and the Uzsok the battle-line had receded during the first week of May, but it had not changed either in length or direction.

The line along which our Allies were trying to stop the Austro-German advance between May 8-10 was neither strong by nature nor had its positions been carefully prepared beforehand. In fact, it was a line which no one could have foreseen, and which no strategist would have chosen of his own free will for a line of defence. It extended diagonally across Central Galicia, cutting its main rivers. Across the railway lines and in front of the three main centres our Allies were holding short river-fronts: west of Dembica they were standing on the *Visloka*; near Stryzow, south-west of Rzeszow, on the *Brzezanka-Stobnica* line; and to the west of Sanok, on the upper *Vislok*. There existed, however, no proper connexion between these main positions, and thus the front of May 8, taken as a whole, could not possibly have been changed into a fixed defensive line of the kind which had previously existed on the *Dunajec* and the *Biala*. Each separate position could be, and in fact was, threatened



—BARREL BRIDGE.

troysed by the Russians, and the men of three German companies, thus cut off, were either shot, in attempting to retire.


from its southern flank. To an army equalling in strength that of the attacking side, the line of May 8 might have served as a basis for a counter-offensive which would have had the reconquest of the line of the Visloka for its first aim. Once before, in December 1914, the Austrians had advanced through the "Transversal Valley" * to Sanok without being able to make headway in the north, and were then driven back to the west beyond Gorlice by fresh Russian forces brought up from Poland. An army inferior in numbers to that of the attacking side could use the positions which our Allies held on May 8 merely to retard the advance of the enemy and to gain time for the organization of its retreat.

By May 10 our Allies had withdrawn from the Szczucin - Dembica - Strzyzow - Sanok line. Mid-Galicia was lost, and the San now offered

the next possible line of resistance. The Russian retreat from Central Galicia, by uncovering the flanks of the adjoining forces, rendered necessary a withdrawal of the Russian front also from the Nida in the north, and from the Carpathian passes in the east. It seemed, however, at that time as if our Allies were going to stop the Austro-German drive on the line of the San and Dniester, on which they had once before, in October 1914, arrested the advance of the enemy.

On reaching the northern edge of the Mid-Galician hills on the Dembica-Rzeszow line, the Austro-German forces executed an enormous "right-wheel," which brought their armies against the San, facing east. This wheel was connected with a new concentration of forces. Again the left wing of the Austro-German battle-line assumed, on the whole, the part of a containing force. Its front was now even longer than it had been in the beginning of May, when its task included an offensive against Tarnow. The five army-corps of the Fourth Austro-Hungarian Army were now deployed on a front of about 50 miles, extending from

* We must remind our readers that what we call "Transversal Valley" is not the valley of one river, but consists of the upper valleys of a number of confluents of the Vistula. They form together an almost continuous depression on the northern side of the Carpathians. Through that depression runs the so-called "Transversal Railway."



AN INCIDENT IN THE BRILLIANT RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE ON THE BESKO-JACMIERZ FRONT.




AUSTRIANS REPAIRING A DAMAGED BRIDGE ACROSS THE VISLOKA.

Tarnobrzeg on the Vistula to the confluence of the Vislok and the San, north of Sieniawa. Towards the end of May we find near Piskorowice, on the San, the same Transylvanian regiments, belonging to the 9th Austro-Hungarian Army Corps, which in the first days of May had stood on the Biala, on the extreme right wing of the army of Archduke Joseph-Ferdinand. The fact that comparatively small forces were deemed and proved sufficient for the defence of the left flank of the main Austro-German armies proves that, at that time, our Allies could have had but very small reserves to spare from the battle-line in Russian Poland, and that this was known to the enemy; it ought to be remembered that not far from the confluence of the Vistula and the San, at Rozwadow, the new Russian railway line from Lublin joins the Galician railway system, and therefore, had any reserves been available from Russian Poland, they could easily have been concentrated in the corner between the Vistula and the San against the left flank of the Galician armies of the enemy.

The district between Sieniawa and Sambor became about May 14 the region of the greatest concentration of forces. The three armies which, in the beginning of May, had held the entire front from Gromnik to the Uzsok occupied about May 14 only the district between Sieniawa and Sambor. The Eleventh German Army under Mackensen held a front of approximately the same length as it had occupied on May 1. Its left wing and centre,

consisting mainly of Prussian troops, had moved by Strzyzow, Rzeszow, Lancut and Przeworsk, against Sieniawa and Jaroslau. The 6th Austro-Hungarian Corps had advanced from Luzna by Biecz, Szebnie, Luteza and Dynow against Radymno. The Bavarians under General von Emmich, having first advanced due east, from the Senkova valley by Zmigrod, Dukla and Rymanow against Besko, swerved from there to the north-east and were approaching the northern sector of the ring of forts which surrounds Przemyśl. The 10th Austro-Hungarian Army Corps, whose home is Przemyśl, kept during the entire drive through Central Galicia on the right of the Bavarians, and reached about May 14 the western front of the fortress. The 7th Austro-Hungarian Army Corps under Archduke Joseph advanced from Mezo-Laborca by Sanok and Bircza; the rest of the army of General Borojevic von Bojna, including the German Corps of the "Beskids" under General von der Marwitz, enclosed the district of Przemyśl from the south-east. It was joined on the Novemiasto-Dobromil line by the Second Austro-Hungarian Army under General von Boehm-Ermolli; the positions of the latter extended to the east beyond Sambor. Thus the 13 army corps which on May 1 had held a front of about 130 miles were now gathered within about 55 miles. The degree of concentration was thus approximately the same as that of Mackensen's first "phalanx" round Gorlice. And indeed the task with which



IN THE RUSSIAN TRENCHES.

On the right is a Russian officer scanning the enemy's position through binoculars; while the men, with fixed bayonets, are waiting the word to charge. Inset: On the look-out.

they were faced was of a similar nature. They had again to tear out the keystone of the Russian front. To the Dunajec-Biala front of May 1 corresponded a fortnight later the line of the San; to the positions on the Carpathian flank those of the Russian armies retiring towards the Dniester; and the keystone of these new positions was the famous fortress of Przemyśl.

Let us now consider in short the main incidents of the Austro-German advance through Central Galicia beginning with May 5.

By the night of May 4 our Allies were still holding the entire right bank of the Dunajec and Biala between Otfino and Tuchow, although the advance of the enemy across the Mountain Dobrotyn was rendering more and more precarious the position of the Russian troops round Tarnow, whilst the crossing of the Dunajec near Otfino by the Austrians on the night of May 1-2 had cut the connexion between the Russian forces on the Dunajec and those on the Nida.

On the night of May 4-5 two Transylvanian regiments belonging to the 9th Austro-Hungarian Army Corps (Army of the Archduke Joseph-



Ferdinand) crossed the Biala near Tuchow; they were the 62nd infantry regiment from Marosvasarhely and the 82nd, consisting mainly of Szeklers, a Magyar tribe which lives in the centre of the Roumanian district of Transylvania. These two regiments formed the vanguard of the 10th Austro-Hungarian Division under General von Mecenseffy. Their first objective was the road from Ryglitz to Zalasova. A group of hills rising to a level of about 1,500 feet extends north of the Mountain Dobrotyn, between the river Biala, the Tarnow-Pilzno road and the river Visloka. A deep valley intervenes between the Dobrotyn and these hills; in that valley lies the town of Ryglitz and through it runs the Tuchow-Brzesko road, the most important road connecting the valleys of the Biala and the Visloka

between the Tarnow and the Gorlice lines. To the north of Ryglie, on a hill about 1,150 ft. high, lies the village of Zalasova; from that hill flows to the north a stream called Szymvald towards a village bearing the same name; towards Ryglie, to the south, flows another stream called Zalasova. A road, connecting that from Tuchow to Brzostek with a secondary road leading from Tarnow to Pilzno, follows the course of these two streams. The occupation of that road by the enemy threatened Tarnow as well as Pilzno. Still the hills along the Ryglie-Szymvald line could not be held long after the enemy had captured the positions on the Dobrotyn; in fact, these hills are the northern continuation of the Dobrotyn-Valkova front which the Austro-Germans had conquered on May 3-4. The ground between the Biala and the Visloka was held by the Russian rearguards for two days after the abandonment of the Dobrotyn, thus giving the main forces round Tarnow sufficient time to fall back beyond the Visloka. Only the position on the hills west of Pilzno was kept by our Allies for one more day. Pilzno is the junction of four first-class high roads and four secondary roads, and had to be held till the evacuation of the entire district was complete. The positions on

the Hill Zdol (about 1,000 ft. high) which dominates the town and district of Pilzno were not abandoned by the Russians until on May 7.

By the morning of May 6 the Russian troops had withdrawn in perfect order from Tarnow, having first removed the great military stores which had been accumulated in the town; Tarnow had been the base of the Russian troops operating on the Dunajec. Only a small detachment of cavalry was left behind, but even of this rearguard a considerable part succeeded in hacking its way through the lines of the enemy and in rejoining the main forces. At 10 a.m. the Austrians entered the town which their heaviest artillery had been ravaging for the last few months. The bombardment of the railway station, and possibly also that of the park of Prince Sanguszko, served a definite military purpose; it is, however, difficult to see what excuse can be given for the partial destruction of the old town-hall and of the fine cathedral, which contains the marble-graves of the families of the Counts Tarnowski and the Princes Ostrogski. It rather seems to suggest the idea that the Austrians did not expect ever to re-enter the town. Tarnow was the first important centre in Galicia which the Germanic armies reconquered after it had remained



AUSTRIANS ENTERING A TRENCH VACATED BY THE RUSSIANS.



THE GERMANS PRESSING INTO POLAND.
Troops of the Death's Head Hussars resting after a march.

for a considerable time in the hands of our Allies. They set out at once to punish everyone who could be accused of having in any way rendered services to the Russians. A short time after Tarnow had been occupied by the Austro-German armies seven of its inhabitants were condemned to death for "high treason." Even from the semi-official account of their trial it can be seen that at least some of these accusations and convictions rested on an exceedingly slender basis and on very doubtful evidence.

On the night of May 6-7 the two Transylvanian regiments, Nos. 62 and 82, crossed the river Visloka both north and south of the town of Brzostek. Artillery posted on a hill near Przeczyca was supporting and covering the operations in that region; that hill, on the left bank of the river, facing directly the low-lying right bank on which stands the town of Brzostek, rises about 400 feet above the level of the river and dominates the entire district. On the morning of May 7 Hungarian troops occupied Height 384 (*i.e.*, 1,260 feet high), north of Brzostek and the hills above Kamienica Dolna. Meantime their engineers constructed a bridge across the Visloka. The town of Brzostek itself was defended by the Russian rearguards with extreme tenacity. Bayonet fighting developed in its streets and was continued with the greatest violence on the cemetery hill. Our Allies did not evacuate the town until they were threatened by an outflanking movement from the south. They were greatly outnumbered by the Hungarian troops, which were now pouring in masses across the Visloka. Having withdrawn from Brzostek, the Russians took up fresh positions along the western and southern fringe of the forests which stretch between Height 320 and Januszkowice. During the night of May 7-8 our Allies continued their retreat to the strong positions in the Chelm Mountains (about 1,750 feet high), between Brzeziny and Frysztak.

Let us now turn to the south, where on the night of May 4 the troops of Mackensen were approaching the Visloka in the district of Jaslo. The main forces were advancing through the valley of the Ropa, along the high-road which leads from Biecz to Jaslo. On the left bank of the Visloka stretches a range of heights; the Ropa, near its junction with the Visloka, breaks its way through a narrow gorge between these hills. East of that gate the Ropa enters a wide valley, turns to the north and joins the

Visloka, to the west of Jaslo. The road continues in its easterly direction, and crosses the rivers before their junction. On these hills, west of the Visloka, the Russian rearguards took up fortified positions and maintained them during the day of May 5. They retired at night on to the hills above Szebnie and round Tarnowiec.

Jaslo is the junction of the Transversal Railway and of a side line from Rzeszow, which connects it with the northern Cracow-Lwow line. Between Jaslo and Szebnie the two railways follow the valley of the river Jasliska, running on its opposite banks. The Russian positions near Szebnie dominated that important strategic district; it was as



GERMAN SOLDIER FIXING UP WIRE-ENTANGLEMENTS.

important from the point of view of the attacking side that they should be taken, as it was difficult to effect their capture. Mackensen entrusted with that arduous task the Hungarian troops of the 39th Honvéd Division (Corps Arz); it is interesting to mark how he left the hardest work to Austro-Hungarian or Bavarian troops, but with what loving care he spared his Prussians, especially the Guards. Attack after attack broke down in the fire from the Russian positions above Szebnie; had it not been for their heavy artillery, the Hungarians would probably never have succeeded in dislodging our Allies from their trenches. But the howitzers did their work, and by the night of May 6 the Russians had to withdraw to positions east of the Vislok. They were followed by the Austro-Hungarian corps of Mackensen's army, whilst the Guards advanced against Frysztak. From here onwards the Prussians kept to the valley of the Vislok and its road and railway-line, leaving to their Austro-Hungarian and



COSSACKS PICKING UP AND

An episode of the retirement of the rear-guard

Bavarian comrades the much less comfortable path across the hills. By the night of May 7 Mackensen's troops had crossed the Frysztak-Krosno line and were hammering against the Russian positions east of the Vislok; especially near Odrzykon and Korczyn a desperate fighting is reported to have taken place.

On the extreme right wing of Mackensen's army the Bavarians and the adjoining corps of the Third Austro-Hungarian Army, after having broken through the Russian positions in the mountains of the Zameczysko and the Magora of Malastow, had advanced to the east at top speed. They reached the Zmigrod-Krempna road on May 4, late at night on May 5 entered the towns of Dukla and Tylava, and reached Rymanow on May 6. The news of the defeat on the Dunajec on May 2 was so sudden and surprising that it sounded almost incredible. The commanders of the 12th Russian Army Corps, which stood south of the main Carpathian range in Northern Hungary, on the extreme right wing of the Third Russian Army, do not seem to have grasped in time the whole gravity of the situation. Whilst they were preparing to withdraw, the Austro-German forces on the northern side of the mountains were closing one

after the other the exits from the passes. When at last they realized the entire extent of the disaster, for some of them at least the roads were closed.

Some brigades, especially those farther east, were still able to cross the Dukla before the coming of the enemy. Others were left with the choice of surrendering or of hacking their way through the Austro-German lines which were barring their road to the north, whilst other enemy troops from the army of General von Borojevic were pursuing them from the south. The Second Austro-Hungarian Army, with the exception of the 10th Army Corps, had taken no part in the battle of May 2; it was against their interest to hurry up the retreat of the Russian troops from Hungary. By May 4 they were however, pressing forward with full strength along the entire line, so as to prevent the Russians from the Ondava valley from effecting a junction to the east with the troops of the Eighth Russian Army in the valley of the Laboreza. On May 7 the 48th Russian Division, under General Korniloff, found itself surrounded in the Dukla Pass by vastly superior enemy forces. Its commander did not, however, give up the game for lost, and succeeded with remarkable skill in breaking through the Austro-German ring and in rejoining the main



CARRYING THEIR WOUNDED COMRADES.
columns of the Russian army in Poland.

Russian forces which were falling back through the "Transversal Valley" towards the Brzozow-Besko-Ordzechova line. But not all the troops retreating across the Carpathians west of the Lupkow were equally enterprising and equally successful.

By May 6 the Russian troops in the entire district of the Lupkow were involved in the retreat. On May 7 our Allies had to evacuate the Virava-Telepovce-Zuella-Nagy Polena line which they had conquered in April as the prize of many hard-fought battles. Their retirement was covered mainly by the 49th Division, which was holding the main positions until the entire force had crossed the mountain-range, and then withdrew, after having first blown up the Lupkow tunnel. West of the Lupkow the 7th Austro-Hungarian Army Corps under Archduke Joseph and the Germans under General von der Marwitz were delivering desperate attacks against the retreating forces of our Allies. Severe fighting took place on the Varentyzow Mountain, but the Russians were practically taking their own time. The retreat of General Brussiloff's Army was a true military achievement and contributed much towards enabling the heroic, but badly mauled troops of the Third Russian Army to extricate themselves from Central Galicia. On May 8 the forces of

these two Armies were joining hand in the region of Sanok. East of the Uzsok Pass no marked changes had as yet occurred.

We have indicated the main outlines of the battle-front of May 8 in our strategic survey of the Austro-German advance through Mid-Galicia. We have also drawn attention to the most serious strategic weakness of the Russian positions, which was that the most important sectors, the Mielec-Dembica line, the Strzyzow-Lutza front and even the Brzozow-Besko-Bukovisho position could be outflanked from the south. Another serious obstacle to effective defence seems to have been the uneven distribution of the Russian troops. The German drive had been planned for weeks ahead, and even comparative details of the direction of advance and the concentrations of troops must have been settled beforehand. The absence of properly prepared lines of defence behind the original positions in the west proves that the collapse of the Dunajec-Biala front and the subsequent retreat to the San must have come as a surprise to the Russian army-command. Under these circumstances the Russian retreat was no smaller feat of military skill than was the Austro-German advance. Our Allies never and nowhere were really routed, and their troops did not dissolve in a panic. The mere

fact that the average advance of the enemy did not exceed six miles a day bears witness to the orderly character of the Russian retreat. Yet a proper distribution of forces, making the most of them, and securing the different points of the line with due regard to their importance can hardly be expected where the plans have not been laid down beforehand. The continuous shortening of the line, which led to a concentration of the forces of the enemy, was liable to cause a conglomeration, rather than concentration of the retreating army.

On the extreme right wing, on the lower Visloka, the Russian troops had given least ground to the enemy and were as yet most effectively resisting his advance. South of Strzyzow, the positions of our Allies followed on May 8-9 in the main the course of the stream Brzezanka till Lutcza, and then that of the Stobnica almost till Brzozow. The hills stretching along these valleys rise about 300 feet above their level and are covered with thick woods. They offer fairly favourable positions for defence. Unfortunately insufficient numbers of Russian troops seem to have been directed towards this line. The main forces retreated along the safest and most direct road—i.e., through the "Transversal Valley" towards Sanok. In front of that important town, which had for many months served our Allies as a base for their operations in the Carpathians, strong defensive positions had been constructed. They extended approximately along a semi-circle. From Brzozow they ran for about five miles to the south, passing west of the village of Jacmierz; that village lies where the hills descend to the broad, completely flat valley of the Vislok. Three miles south-west of Jacmierz, at the other fringe of the valley, where the high-road from Rymanow to Sanok crosses the River Vislok, lies the village of Besko, an important strategic point on the line which our Allies defended between May 8-10. For more than five miles to the south-east of Besko stretches a mountain-group, called Homondova Gora; it rises about 650 feet above the valley of the Vislok and is covered with big, dense forests. On its southern slope lies the village of Odrzechova, and to the west of the Homondova Gora the village of Novotaniec. Through these two villages and across the Bukovica towards the Sanok-Homonna railway-line extended on May 8 the main Russian positions south-west of Sanok. In this region our Allies had gathered consider-

able forces and not merely offered a decided resistance to the enemy, but even attempted from here a counter-offensive to the west.

Between May 8-10 raged along the entire line from Szczucin to the Uzsok what we may describe as the battle of Mid-Galicia. Having occupied Pilzno on May 7, the Austrian troops on the following day broke the Russian front near Dembica, and our Allies had to retire on to the Ropeczyce-Vielopole line. The junction of the Lublin-Rozvadow-Mielec line with the railway from Rzeszow was lost, and the Szczucin-Mielec line and even that of the lower Visloka became untenable. Meantime the main German offensive was developing in the central sector south-east of Strzyzow, in which the Russian forces were comparatively weakest and which reinforcements could not reach in time to stop the German advance. "In the evening of the 9th," says the Russian official *communiqué* of May 11, "a situation unfavourable to us was created in the principal sector of the fighting—namely, in the region of Strzyzow." The situation was saved for the time being by a brilliant Russian counter-offensive from the Besko-Jacmierz front, and time was gained for an orderly retreat of the main forces. There was, however, no hope of arresting the Austro-German advance for any longer period of time until the San-Dniester line was reached. On May 10 the Russian defence in the valley of the Vislok broke down and the German centre was quickly approaching the Dembica-Rzeszow-Jaroslaw railway-line. The troops concentrated in Sanok were themselves hard pressed from all sides. The district of Rymanow had been reached by the Bavarians on May 6; during the following two days they had brought up heavy artillery, including some 21-cm. howitzers, with which they were bombarding the Russian positions west of Sanok. From the south-west the 10th Austro-Hungarian Army Corps was pressing against the Russian positions in front of Odrzechova, the 7th Austro-Hungarian Army Corps and the Germans under von der Marwitz were advancing from the south. East of the Sanok-Homonna railway-line the entire Second Austro-Hungarian Army, under General von Boehm-Ermolli, was hammering against the Baligrod-Lutoviska front; they reached on May 9 the same line along which they had stood two months earlier, when trying desperately to break through to the relief of Przemyśl.

By the night of May 10 the battle of Central



GERMAN UHLANS CAUGHT IN A RUSSIAN BARBED WIRE ENTANGLEMENT.

Galicia was practically over. Across all the roads Austro-German troops were advancing like a gigantic flood against the line of the San; the Russians were falling back on Przemyśl. On May 11 the enemy occupied the districts of Sendziszow, Rzeszow, Dynow, Sanok and Lisko, on May 12 those of Lancut and Dubiecko. On May 13 our Allies evacuated Przeworsk; among the last to leave was Captain Ratlow with the 7th Russian railway-battalion; it had been their task, beginning with Rzeszow,

to destroy the railway-bridges, stations, plant, etc. During the following few days the outer ring of the fortress of Przemyśl was reached by the enemy from the west. Then a lull set in in the fighting, in so far as the sector west of Przemyśl was concerned. On their retreat the Russians had carefully destroyed all bridges, culverts, and tunnels, and torn up as much as they could of the roads and railways. Time was required for bringing the lines of communication into such a condition as would admit the trans-

port of the heaviest siege artillery; without at least 30·5 cm. howitzers an attack against Przemyśl was unthinkable. Although the Austro-German engineers were working day and night, they were unable to reconstruct more than about four miles of railway a day, and as late as May 25 the trains from the west could not proceed beyond Lancut on the northern line, and not farther than half-way between Krosno and Sanok on the Transversal Railway. Moreover, fresh forces had to be brought up to fill the gaps which had been torn in the Austro-German lines in the many battles fought between May 2-12; the wounded, on the other hand, had to be sent back to the base hospitals. What exactly was the price in blood with which the Austro-German armies paid for their victory is not known, but the calculation which puts them at well over 120,000 certainly does not seem likely to prove an exaggeration. During the same period (May 2-12) the three armies of the Archduke Joseph-Ferdinand, Mackensen, and Borojevic claim to have captured 103,500 men, 69 guns, and 255 machine-guns. These figures do not seem unlikely. The toll in prisoners which has to be paid by a retreating army is always heavy; it must further be remembered that the retreat of our Allies had led them through hilly or even mountainous country, where it is impossible for a retiring army to keep close together, and where detached bodies are in great danger of being captured by the enemy. Moreover, the figure of prisoners is certain to include many wounded, and that not only of battles fought during the advance itself; Sanok and its surroundings, especially the watering-places of Rymanow and Ivoniecz, contained some of the most important Russian base-hospitals. They were considered there as safe as a German hospital would have been at Brussels or Liège. It is certain that their complete evacuation was not possible in the short time at the disposal of the Russian authorities.

The number of guns captured by the Austro-German armies, even if exactly stated, is remarkably small. Four guns to a thousand men was the normal ratio laid down by Napoleon I., and it has certainly not been lowered since his days. Of the guns captured by the enemy a considerable proportion is known to have been taken from the Russian troops which had been cut off on their retreat from Northern Hungary. Otherwise the Russian commanders were specially careful to save their guns, and

hardly ever abandoned any, unless they were absolutely unfit for further use; it was, after all, the weakness of their artillery and the lack of ammunition which had been the main cause of the defeat, and whatever artillery there was had to be preserved for the defence of the San line.

The breakdown of the front near Dembica was followed by a withdrawal of the Russian troops from the lower Visloka. On May 11 the Austrians crossed the river near Mielec, on May 12 they reached Kolbuszowa. During the next few days our Allies continued their retreat to the north, towards the confluence of the Vistula and the San; they retired, fighting continuous rearguard actions, on to the Tarnobrzeg-Rozwadow line, thus maintaining their hold on the two important bridge heads of Sandomierz and Rozwadow.

The Russian retreat from the Szczucin-Dembica line necessitated a rearrangement of positions in the adjoining sector on the left bank of the Vistula. The strongly fortified positions on the Nida, which our Allies had occupied since December, 1914, had to be abandoned, and the entire line south of the Pilica had to be withdrawn in conformity with the retreat in Galicia. The retreat pivoted on Inowlodz, the Bzura-Rawka-Inowlodz line in front of Warsaw remaining firm. The positions on the Nida were evacuated during the night of May 10-11, our Allies retiring slowly towards their new positions behind the Kamienna river. Mr. Stanley Washburn, the special correspondent of *The Times*, who inspected these positions, described them as even stronger than the Blonie line before Warsaw. On May 12 German troops of the Army Woyrsch occupied Kielce.

But it was not without striking a heavy blow at the pursuing forces of the enemy that the undefeated Russian Army withdrew on to the new lines, south of Ilza and Radom. "Regarding the movement as a whole," writes Mr. Washburn, "suffice it to say that in the two weeks following the change of line this one army inflicted upon the enemy a loss of nearly 30,000 in killed, wounded, and prisoners. The Russian losses were comparatively trifling." The Austro-German forces were following up leisurely the retreating Russian corps, not expecting any serious fighting to occur until the line behind the Kamienna were reached. Instead of that, on May 15 the Russian com-

mander halted the main body of his troops in front of his fortified positions on a line extending from Brody by Opatow towards Klimontow. Between May 15-17 a battle developed on this front, which is the more interesting as it is one of the few in this war fought in the open without trenches. "In any other war," says Mr. Washburn, "it would have been called a good-sized action, as from first to last . . . more than 100,000 men and perhaps 350 to 400 guns were engaged." The enemy came on in four groups. The 3rd German Landwehr was moving from the south-west by Wierzbniak against Ilza, slightly to the north of Lubienia. Next to it, coming from the direction of Kielce, was the German Division of General Bredow, supported by the 84th Austrian Regiment. This body was advancing against Ostrovec, the terminus of a railway which runs from the district of Lodz to the south-east by Tomaszow and Opoczno, and crosses the Iwangorod-Olkusz line half-way between Kielce and Radom. Farther to the

south three Austro-Hungarian Divisions were advancing—namely, the 25th Austrian Division against Lagow, and the 4th Austrian Landwehr Division, supported by the 41st Honvéd Division, against Ivaniska; they moved along roads converging on Opatow. The 25th Austrian Division, commanded by Archduke Peter Ferdinand, was composed of crack regiments, the 4th Hoch- and Deutschmeisters of Vienna, and the 25th, 17th and 10th Jäger Battalions.

"It is probable," says Mr. Washburn, "that the enemy outnumbered the Russians by at least 40 per cent. Certainly they never expected that any battle would be given by the supposedly demoralized Russians short of their fortified line, to which they were thought to be retiring in hot haste. General ——— selected the Austrians for his first surprise, but began by making a feint against the German corps, driving in their advanced guards by vigorous attacks and causing the whole force to halt and begin deployment for an engagement. This took place on May 15. On the same day,



A RUSSIAN WOMAN DOCTOR,
Attached to the Siberian Regiment.



GENERAL VON EMMICH (X) AND HIS STAFF STUDYING PLANS.

with all his available strength, he swung furiously with Opatow as an axis, from both north and south, catching the 25th Division on the road between Lagow and Opatow with a bayonet charge delivered from the mountain over and around which his troops had been marching all night. Simultaneously another portion of his command swept up on the 4th Division coming from Ivaniska to Opatow. In the meantime a strong force of Cossacks had ridden round the Austrians and actually hit their line of communications at the exact time that the infantry fell on the main column with a bayonet charge, delivered with an impetuosity and fury that simply crumpled up the entire Austrian formation. The 4th Division was meeting a similar fate farther south, and the two were thrown together in a helpless mass, losing between 3,000 and 4,000 in casualties and nearly 3,000 in prisoners, besides a large number of machine-guns and the bulk of their baggage. The remainder, supported by the 41st Honvéd Division, which had been hurried up, managed to squeeze themselves out of their predicament by falling back on Wszachow, and the whole retired to Lagow, beyond which the Russians were not permitted to pursue them, lest they should break the symmetry of their own line,"

The Austrians themselves admit that they suffered serious losses in that battle. Thus we derive from an Austrian source the information that on May 16 not a single officer and only twenty-six men were left of the entire 4th company, 1st battalion of the 10th Austrian Infantry Brigade. By May 17 the Austrians had withdrawn more than twelve miles to the south-west and south of Opatow.

A spur of the Lysa Gora, the highest mountain-group of Russian Poland, separates the Lagow-Opatow road, along which the 25th Austrian Division had been moving, from the line of advance of Bredow's troops. During the night following on the defeat of the Austrians the victorious Russians crossed the mountains by a forced march, and fell on the right flank of the German formation, whilst other troops opened a general frontal attack against it. General Bredow was forced to fall back in haste in the direction of Bodzentyn and to summon to his support the adjoining 4th German Landwehr Division. Its sudden withdrawal to the south weakened, however, considerably the German line south-west of Radom, near the crossing of the Radom-Kielce and

the Konsk-Ostroviec railways. The Russians did not fail to profit from the thinning of the German line in that sector. "Near Gielniow, Ruski Brod and Suchedniow," says the Russian official *communiqué* of May 17, "our sudden counter-attacks inflicted severe losses on the enemy's advance guards."


Having thus checked the German advance the Russians stopped, awaiting the further development of the situation on the San.

"On the left bank of the upper Vistula, in the Opatow region," says the Petrograd *communiqué* of May 15, "fighting continues, the enemy here having apparently received a certain number of reinforcements. His attempts to take the offensive were repulsed with success by our counter-attacks, in the course of which the enemy suffered heavy losses."

In East Galicia and in the Bukovina, between the Carpathians and the Dniester, the Russian and the Austro-Hungarian armies were still facing each other on May 1 along approximately the same lines on which they had stopped about the middle of March. From the Szlis Mountain and the valley of the upper Lomnica the battle front extended to the north of Nadvorna and Kolomea, by Ottynia towards Niczviska on the Dniester; east of Niczviska it followed approximately the course of the river down to the Bessarabian frontier.

The floods, which during spring had prevented military operations in the wide, flat valleys of the Bystrzycas, had receded by the beginning of May, and fighting was resumed. The Russians were certain to attempt the reconquest of the Pruth valley; for the Austrians, especially in view of the successful advance through Central Galicia, it was a matter of supreme importance to gain a foothold on the northern bank of the Dniester. The district south of Stanislau was in itself a strategic backwater and would have been of no value to our Allies, had it not been for the Odessa-Stanislau railway line, which runs through the valley of the river Pruth, past Czernowitz and Kolomea.* About 60 miles of that line, between Bojan and Ottynia, were on May 1 in the hands of the Austrians, whilst the Russian troops were standing at a distance on the average of only about 20 miles to the north of the railway. Could they have carried it by a quick advance they would have gained an

* For a map of that district refer to p. 435, Chapter LXXVI.



important line for the transport of reinforcements and supplies from Southern Russia to the threatened Mid-Galician front. It must be remembered that Kiev and Sebastopol are military centres equal in importance to Brest-Litovski, Vilna or Petrograd. It is only by the occupation of the Czernowitz-Kolomea railway line that a Russian counter-offensive in East Galicia could have affected the course of the main operations in Mid-Galicia and on the San. Otherwise, however successful, it could not have exerted any immediate influence on its development. The eastern flank of the Austro-German armies was safe. The mountain range of the Transylvanian Carpathians, with its peaks approaching a level of 7,000 feet and its passes more than 3,000 feet high, formed an insuperable obstacle to rapid operations, and not even the conquest by the Russians of the entire region between the Dniester and the Carpathians would have stopped the Austro-German advance on Lwow.

For the enemy the breaking through of the Dniester line was of supreme strategic importance; could his armies have crossed the "dead belt" of the Dniester on the Bukovinian frontier, and firmly established themselves on its left bank, the retreat of at least large portions of the Ninth Russian Army might have been cut, and even the other armies of General Ivanoff's group, which about the middle of May were holding the line of the San and of the marshes on the upper Dniester, might have been involved in the disaster. They would have lost the support which they were deriving during the following two months from the river cover on their southern flank, and which alone enabled them to carry out their retreat through East Galicia without ever suffering a crushing defeat.

As a movement forestalling the offensive of the enemy in that region, the Russian advance undertaken about the middle of May against the valley of the Pruth proved a complete success; it was a success also as a military operation. Our Allies did not, however, succeed in capturing in time Kolomea, which was indispensable for the use of the southern railway line; after the second fall of Przemyśl the chief strategic aim of the advance was lost, and conforming to the retreating movement of the other armies, toward the middle of June, the two corps of cavalry, which formed the main body of the Russian Army in the valley of the Pruth, fell back beyond the Dniester.

The fighting on the Dniester front began on May 6. On May 8 the Russians attacked Ottynia, and on the same day the Austrians succeeded in capturing by a surprise attack the important bridge-head of Zaleszczyki. On the following day they were again driven out of Zaleszczyki by our Allies, losing 500 men in prisoners, three heavy guns, one field gun, and several machine guns. On May 10 the Russians opened their offensive along the entire Dniester line from west of Niezviska to Uscie Biskupie, on a front of about 40 miles; they crossed at the same time the Bukovinian frontier from Novosielica on the Pruth and advanced to Mahala,* a village about five miles to the east of Czernowitz.

South-west of Uscie Biskupie a small stream called Onut joins the Dniester from the right bank, near a village bearing the same name. It is practically the only confluent which the Dniester receives from the Bukovina. Near its mouth the cañon of the Dniester widens out into a broad, flat valley, and the river itself is shallow; a hill rising near the village of Onut bears the significant name "Kolo Bolota," which means in Ruthenian "next to the mud." This small valley was on May 10 the scene of a remarkable and almost unique feat in military history. The Don Cossacks, having cut a passage in the wire entanglements in front of the fortified positions held by the enemy's infantry, drove the Austrians in a hand-to-hand fight from three rows of trenches. Through the opening thus formed the Russian horse poured into the valley of the Onut and dashed into the enemy's rear. The Austrians were compelled to evacuate the entire district on the Onut. Charging into the masses of the retreating enemy the Cossacks sabred many and captured several thousand prisoners, a battery of machine guns, and several searchlights and caissons.

By the night of May 10 the Russians held the entire right bank of the Dniester. On May 11 the Austrians attempted counter-attacks, which, however, broke down completely. "In this operation," says the Russian official *communiqué* of May 13, "the Austrian units which led the offensive were repulsed near Chocimierz with heavy losses. Our artillery annihilated two entire battalions and a third surrendered. Near Horodenka the enemy gave way about

* The name of Mahala is an interesting reminiscence of Turkish rule over the Bukovina. "Mahala" means in Turkish simply "a place, a township."



AN AMBUSCADE IN POLAND.

A Party of Cossacks surprise German Cavalry.

7 o'clock in the evening of the same day and began a disorderly retreat. We again captured several thousand prisoners, guns, and some 50 ammunition caissons." Horodenka is the junction of six first-class high roads and a station on the Zaleszczyki-Kolomea railway; it is, in fact, the most important strategic point between the Dniester and the Kolomea-Czernowitz front. On the same night the Austrians evacuated their entire line of positions from the river Bystrzyca to the Rumanian frontier, of a length of 88 miles, and on the following day retired south of the Pruth. On May 13 the

Cossacks under General Mishtchenko entered the town of Sniatyn on the Pruth, about half-way between Kolomea and Czernowitz, and occupied Gwozdziec, a place eight miles north-east of Kolomea. Farther west they captured, on May 14, after severe fighting, the town and district of Nadvorna and part of the railway line from Delatyn to Kolomea, cutting thereby the connexion between the group of corps under the command of General von Pflanzer-Baltin and the German Army "of the South" under General von Linsingen.

Meantime the Russians were also from the



RUSSIAN DUG-OUTS OCCUPIED BY THE AUSTRIANS.

north closing in on Kolomea. On May 13 a Russian reserve regiment under Colonel Asowsky carried the strongly fortified Austrian positions near the villages of Zukow and Jakobowka, about eight miles north of Kolomea. Only in front of the town the Austrians were able to maintain their positions with the assistance of reinforcements brought up by train and by bringing into action their last reserves, composed of sappers, and even of detachments still in course of formation. In the six days between May 9 and May 14 our Allies pressed back the enemy on a front of more than 60 miles for a distance amounting on the average to more than 20 miles, capturing about 20,000 prisoners and a rich booty in guns, machine guns and ammunition.

After May 15 a lull set in in the fighting on the Pruth. Only round Kolomea and Czernowitz violent artillery duels were continued. The decision had to fall in the west, and for that struggle all available forces were required. Events were moving at such a rate that even the acquisition of the entire Odessa-Stanislau-Lwow railway could not have any more seriously affected their development. In the first days of June, after the fall of the town of Stryj, our Allies had to abandon their advanced positions on the Pruth. On June 6 Pflanzer-Baltin re-established his connexion with Linsingen. On the next day our Allies evacuated

Kalusz and Nadvorna, and on June 9 they withdrew from Obertyn, Horodenka, Sniatyn and Kocman.

The retreat now extended also to the north-eastern corner of the Bukovina, between Zaleszczyki, Onut and Czernowitz. The Austrians were here moving in three groups, along the Dniester in the north, along the Pruth in the south, and across the hills in the middle against the village of Szubraniec. Near this village the Russian artillery inflicted very severe losses on the enemy, but finding themselves in danger of being outflanked by the 42nd Croatian infantry division, which was advancing through the forests on the Dniester, our Allies withdrew on June 12 from the Bukovina on to Russian territory.

Between the Uzsok and the upper Lomnica, in the district where the group of F.M.L. von Szurmay and the army of General von Linsingen were facing parts of the Ninth Russian Army, the first fortnight of May was comparatively uneventful. The main movements in that region were merely complementary to the changes of front which were developing to the west and east of it.

On May 12 the group of Szurmay opened its advance to the north of the Uzsok Pass; the fall of Sanok had compelled our Allies to evacuate their positions in the pass, as the

Austrian advance on Sambor was threatening to cut off their line of retreat. On May 16 the troops of General von Szurmay crossed the upper Stryj near Turka, and leaving the high road and railway which lead towards Sambor, advanced over secondary roads against the famous oil district of Schodnica, Boryslaw and Drohobycz. They occupied its most important centres on May 17-18.

The main forces of the army of General von Linsingen started their advance on the same day as those of General von Szurmay. The Russian troops which had during the last four months repelled round Koziowa the most violent attacks of German crack regiments, had to retire in order to keep in touch with the entire line; just as the Austrian advance on Sambor had necessitated the evacuation of the Uzsok, the advance on Drohobycz rendered inevitable the retreat of our Allies from the passes of the Vereczke and the Beskid. Fighting stubborn rearguard actions, the Russian forces, which included in that district some of the best Finnish regiments, withdrew in the direction of the town of Stryj and of Bolechow. The German advance proceeded quickest along the main road and railway. On May 18 their vanguards reached the outskirts of the wide valley

in the centre of which lies the town of Stryj. Here they were stopped on a line of strongly fortified Russian positions, stretching in a concave semicircle from Uliczna and Holobutow in the west to the hills in front of Bolechow in the east. The position of the army corps of Count Bothmer, which was standing south of Stryj in the valley of the River Stryj, was thus by no means an easy one. On May 18 it was holding in the centre a salient about six miles long and only about three miles wide. On its right the army corps of General Hoffman was advancing slowly against the Bolechow-Dolina line; in the narrow valleys and on the spurs of the mountain group of the Bukovinec it suffered more than one serious reverse or even defeat at the hands of the retreating Russians.

Meantime on the extreme right of General von Linsingen's army the brigade of General von Bluhm and other adjoining German troops were trying in vain to relieve, by means of an advance through the valleys of the Swica and Lomnica, the pressure which our Allies were exerting on the group of army corps under General von Pflanzer-Baltin. It was not until the beginning of June that the army of General von Linsingen succeeded in crossing the "Transversal Valley"



RUSSIAN REINFORCEMENTS LEAVING FOR THE FRONT.



F.M.L. VON SZURMAY
Being decorated with an Iron Cross by
General von Linsingen.

and thus in entering into close, direct touch and cooperation with the adjoining armies in the north-west and south-east.

The battle for Mid-Galicia closed on May 14 with the reaching of the line of the San by the Austro-German armies. The fighting of the next three weeks (May 14-June 3) can be described as the battle for Przemyśl. The direct attack against its forts had to be postponed until the arrival of the heavy Austrian siege train, and the intervening time was taken up by an enveloping movement against the fortress on the part of the Austro-German armies.

On May 14 German troops of Mackensen's army occupied Jaroslav, an important strategic point on the left bank of the San, about 16 miles north of Przemyśl. On the same day the Fourth Austro-Hungarian Army reached the western side of the river on a broad front between Rudnik and Lezajsk. By the night of May 16 the Austro-German forces occupied practically the entire left bank of the San from Rudnik to Jaroslav for about 40 miles. "Near

Jaroslav," says the Russian official *communiqué* for May 17, "the Germans, heedless of the countless losses inflicted on them by our very severe artillery fire, are endeavouring to establish themselves on the right bank of the San." They succeeded on the same day in effecting a crossing at several points. On May 18 they enlarged their hold on the right bank of the river between Jaroslav and Lezajsk (at the junction of the San and the Vislok). A German Division, consisting of Oldenburg and Hanoverian troops, reached Radava on the Lubaczowka; farther north the enemy captured Sieniawa. "South of Jaroslav," says the Petrograd *communiqué* for that day, "we maintain ourselves on both sides of the river." Mackensen was planning an advance in force from the Sieniawa-Jaroslav front to the south-east, against the Przemyśl-Lwow railway line; its sector between Mosciska and Sadowa Wisznia was the most vulnerable point of the Russian line of retreat from Przemyśl; it was most easily accessible from the north. Between May 20-24 the Austro-German engineers constructed 15 bridges across the San between Jaroslav and Sieniawa, thus preparing the way for a new "phalanx" and "battering ram" against the Russian lines.

To the south of Przemyśl the weakest sector of the Russian line extended between Nizankovice and the big marshes of the Strwiaz and the Dniester, north-east of Sambor. "South of Przemyśl," says the Russian *communiqué* dealing with the fighting of May 14-15, "the enemy has only established contact with our cavalry by mounted patrols." The next few days mark the beginning of one of the most desperate battles of the war. About four Austro-Hungarian and one German army corps were massed between Dobromil and Sambor. On May 15 the enemy occupied the Height of the Magiera (about 1,050 feet high) and entered the town of Sambor. During the next few days the Austro-German troops attempted to hack their way from the Novemiasto-Sambor front against Hussakow and Krukienice. Their aim was to reach from the south the sector of the Przemyśl-Lwow railway line against which Mackensen was pressing from the north. "Between Przemyśl and the great marshes of the Dniester," says the Petrograd *communiqué* of May 18, "the masses of the enemy which attacked us reached in many places the wire entanglements of our defence, but were scattered by our fire. Nevertheless, at the cost

of enormous sacrifices, the enemy succeeded in capturing the trenches of our two battalions." These trenches near Hussakow were recaptured by the Russians on the following day (May 17). The offensive was, however, resumed by the Austrians on the following day, and by May 19 they had crossed the line Lutkow-Jacwiengi-River Strwiaz and got within six miles of Mosciska. By May 21 the Austrian troops had conquered the main Russian defences in that region, and the Russian forces in Przemyśl were seriously threatened with having their line of retreat to Grodek cut off by the concentric advance of the enemy against Mosciska from north and south.

A Russian counter-offensive along the entire line opened on May 21. Its aim was not to save Przemyśl, but to render possible the evacuation of the place. Przemyśl could not be held; most of its forts had been destroyed by the Austrians before their surrender of May 21. Those which had survived were too well known to the enemy to be of much value to the defending force. The new works constructed by the Russians could not be compared in strength with those on which the Austrians had worked for many years. The most favourable line for the defence of Przemyśl against the Austro-German advance would have been the outer ring, along part of which the original Russian siege army had met and withstood the Austrian attempts at relieving the fortress. That ring was not, however, sufficiently complete, and, moreover, the forces of our Allies seem to have been insufficient for holding that far-flung line.

Whatever there was of the fortress of Przemyśl was bound to fall before the heavy Austro-German artillery. Its defence was merely meant to retard the advance of the enemy, but it would not have paid had that had to be done at the price of losing its garrison. It was not meant to shut itself up in the doomed fortress, and its line of retreat had to be preserved intact.

The Russian counter-offensive of May 21-25 was planned as an enveloping movement against the envelopers of Przemyśl. They tried from the north and the north-east to sweep down on the lines of communication of the Austro-German forces which had crossed the San between the rivers Tanew and Szkło. In the extreme north, in the corner between the Vistula and the San, our Allies advanced from the Tarnobrzeg-Grebow-Rozvadów line in a southerly direction and captured the towns of Nisko and Ulanów and the villages of Krawce, Przyszów and Nowosielce. They advanced simultaneously from the east against the San between Rudnik and Sieniawa, and got within a mile of Radawa. On almost the entire line of the San, to the north of its junction with the Lubraczówka, our Allies compelled the Austro-German forces to fall back on to the left bank of the river and captured many guns and prisoners. The culminating point of that advance was reached on May 27, when the 3rd Caucasian Corps, under General Irmanoff, captured Sieniawa, taking about 7,000 prisoners, 6 heavy guns and 6 field guns; that corps belonged to the Third Russian Army of General Radko Dmitrieff, had gone



A REST FROM THE TRENCHES.

Men of the Siberian Regiment marching from the trenches after several days' duty.


through the whole retreat from the Dunajec, and on several occasions previous to May 27 had been reported partly annihilated in German *communiqués*. Yet in face of the superior artillery of the enemy our Allies were unable to cross the San, and the advance of the enemy north of Przemyśl was not delayed for long. On May 24 Mackensen resumed the offensive. Containing the Russians between Rudnik and Sieniawa along the San and using the Lubaczowka as cover for his left flank, he opened a vigorous advance due east of Jaroslav. On the same day his troops captured Drohojow, Ostrow, Wysocko, Vietlin, Makovisko, and approached from the north-west the railway station of Bobrowka. The Austro-Hungarians under General Arz von Straussenberg occupied the town of Radymno and compelled the Russians to fall back beyond the San; the Austro-German encircling movement against Przemyśl was thus pressed even south of the Szkło. On May 25 the Austro-Hungarian troops crossed the San opposite Radymno and captured the bridge-head of Zagrody on its right bank; on the following day they conquered the village of Nienowice, about four miles further east, and the Height of Horodysko, which rises between the valleys of the Wisznia and the Szkło, halfway between Radymno and Krakowiec; meantime, north of them Mackensen's troops reached between the Lubaczowka and the Szkło the line Zapalow-Korzenica-Laszki-Lazy, about 10 miles east of Jaroslav, and captured Height 241, the most important strategic point in that low-lying marshy plain. During the next few days stubborn fighting continued with varying results on the Tuchla-Kalnikow-Naklo-Barycz line. The village of Naklo lies between the San and the Wisznia, only about five miles to the north of Medyka, a station on the main railway line, halfway between Przemyśl and Mosciska. South of Naklo rises a hill about 650 feet high. Against this height the enemy was now directing his attacks. Its capture would have exposed to the fire of his artillery the only Russian line of retreat from Przemyśl.

South of Przemyśl the Russian counter-offensive attempted to outflank the Austrian troops which, near Hussakow, had drawn close to the fortress and to the Przemyśl-Grodek-Lwow railway line. The arrival of considerable reinforcements enabled the Russians to check the Austrian advance almost in this whole region, except in the direct neighbourhood

of Hussakow. "The offensive which we opened on the 22nd," says the Petrograd *communiqué* of May 24, "is being pursued along the left bank of the Dniester, and was developed yesterday with great success, notwithstanding the enemy's counter-attacks. We captured, after a fight, the new and old villages of Burczyce, as well as the villages of Iszechnikow and Holobova, and part of the village of Ostrow." In the course of the day our Allies took, moreover, 2,200 prisoners, several machine guns and a considerable amount of ammunition. During the following day slight progress was made from the direction of Burczyce; by May 24 the advance of our Allies came to a stop. On the line Krukienice-Mosciska our Allies were offering effective resistance to the advance of the enemy on the heights on the little river Blozewka, but the Austrian attacks against the Russian positions round Hussakow were daily increasing in violence. The village of Hussakow lies in the valley of the small river Buchta, only about three to four miles east of the Fort Siedliska, which guards from the south the Przemyśl-Mosciska-Lwow railway line. That fort forms part of the outer ring of Przemyśl. The evacuation of Przemyśl could not be delayed much longer, especially as also the direct attacks against its forts were opened from the west in the last days of May by the heaviest types of Austrian and German howitzers.

The successful Russian offensive against the San, north of the Lubaczowka, and along the left bank of the Dniester had exercised no direct effect on the position round Przemyśl itself. By the end of May only a zone about 10 miles wide, running eastward from Przemyśl past Mosciska towards Grodek, separated the 6th Austro-Hungarian Army Corps and the Prussian Guard which were standing between the San and the Wisznia from the troops of General von der Marwitz and the Third Austro-Hungarian Army round Hussakow. Except for that opening to the east, the fortress was surrounded on all sides by the enemy, and on May 30 even the railway line Przemyśl-Grodek came, near Medyka, under the fire of the heavy Austrian batteries.

As early as May 17 Przemyśl had been invested from three sides. The Bavarians, under General Kneussl, who occupied the northern front, had managed to bring with them some of their 21 cm. Krupp howitzers, and were bombarding the Russian positions round Mackovice and Kozienice, and were



A FRONTIER SKIRMISH.

Russian Troops repulsing an advance guard of the enemy.

working their way towards the forts of Dunkoviczki that commands the road and railway from Przemyśl to Radymno. The 10th Austro-Hungarian Army Corps which had approached Przemyśl from Krasieczyn tried at first a *coup de main* against its outer works, but, repulsed with heavy losses, settled down in front of the forts and works of Pralkovice, Lipnik, Helicha and Grochovce and those situated round the Mountain Tatarowka; its line joined to the north-east of Przemyśl, near the blown-up fort of Lentovnia, the positions of the Bavarians. The Russian commander of Przemyśl, General

Artamanoff, had reconstructed some of the old Austrian forts and equipped them with Russian 12 cm. howitzers; besides that, new works had been erected. The Austrians had brought with them only their 15 cm. howitzers, and had to wait for their 30.5 cm. batteries before they could open their attack against Przemyśl, though it was now only a shadow of what it had been before the capture by our Allies on March 22, 1915.

The 30.5 cm. howitzers arrived about May 25, and the attack against Przemyśl began on May 30; in many places the enemy was making



GERMAN TRANSPORT AND CAVALRY
On the way to Dakla Pass.

use of the earthworks which our Allies had constructed when they had been the besiegers, and which they had had no time to destroy on their retreat into the fortress. On May 30 the Bavarians captured the Russian positions near Orzechowce, which cover the northern sector of the outer ring of forts round Przemysl. On the same day a violent bombardment was opened and infantry attacks were delivered against the entire northern and north-western front of the fortress, which extends from the river San (above, i.e. west of Przemysl) to the Przemysl-Radymno road, that is from Lentownia to Dunkowiczki; or to put it in more technical language, the attacks of May 30 were directed mainly against the front defined by the line of forts from No. 7 to No. 11. Fort No. 7 lies within the big loop which the San forms to the east of Przemysl. South of it, on the bank of the river, lies the village of Ostrow, to the east extends the ridge of Height 241, closing off the neck of the river loop. Fort No. 7 forms in the outer ring of forts the key to the sector of the San valley occupied by Przemysl. Against this fort an attempt was made by Austrian troops, which seem to have got across the San from the west or south-west, having first concentrated behind the dense forests which cover that region. "During the night of May 30-31," says the Russian official *communiqué* of June 1, "the enemy succeeded in approaching within 200 paces, and at some points even in gaining a footing in the precincts

of Fort No. 7, around which raged an obstinate battle that lasted until two in the afternoon of the 31st, when he was repulsed after suffering enormous losses. The remnants of the enemy who had entered Fort No. 7, numbering 23 officers and 600 men, were taken prisoners."

On May 31 the Bavarians concentrated again the fire of their heaviest batteries against the forts round Dunkowiczki (Nos. 10a, 11a and 11). The bombardment was continued till 4 p.m., when the fire stopped, and the enemy's infantry, consisting of one Prussian, one Austrian and several Bavarian regiments, proceeded to storm the forts, which by that time had been changed into mere wreckage. Their garrison, decimated by the bombardment, could not resist much longer, and withdrew beyond the road which runs behind the outer ring of forts round Przemysl. On the same day the 10th Austro-Hungarian Army Corps opened its attack against the south-western forts of Pralkowice and Lipnik. On June 1 the German troops of Mackensen captured two trenches east of Fort No. 11; they had to pay a heavy price in blood for every yard of their advance. Meantime the heavy batteries directed their fire against Forts Nos. 10 and 12. The breach in the outer ring of forts had to be enlarged, and these two forts were chosen for the attacks of the following day.

At noon of June 2 the 22nd Bavarian infantry regiment captured Fort No. 10, and towards night the Prussian Grenadier Guards occupied

Fort No. 12. During the night of June 2-3 the enemy entered the village of Zuravica, which lies within the outer ring of forts. Meantime the Austrian troops had broken through from the south-west, and in the afternoon of June 2 occupied the Zasanie (literally "the part beyond the San"), on the left bank of the river.

For the last few days the Russians had been evacuating the fortress, and the only part of the fortress which they held with considerable forces was that which covered directly their line of retreat towards Grodek and Lwow. During the night of June 2-3 the last Russian forces were withdrawn to the east, and early in the morning of June 3 the Bavarians and Austrians entered the town of Przemyśl. The semi-official account, sent out by the Wolff Bureau, emphasises the fact that the first to enter the town was a battalion of the 3rd Regiment of the Foot Guards, and that the Austro-Hungarian troops *followed* the Germans. It is not altogether clear why a small body of the Prussian Guard was detailed to assist the very much larger bodies of Austrians, Hungarians and Bavarians in the storming of Przemyśl; the description of the entry into the conquered fortress seems to suggest the underlying motive.

The fall of Przemyśl had been unavoidable from the very moment when the immense superiority

of the Austro-German artillery and the enormous concentration of their troops had broken the Russian defences on the Dunajec-Biala line. But in the fall of Przemyśl were involved those not only of Lwow, but even of Warsaw and Ivan-gorod. A sweep through East Galicia to the line of the San had been in recent years as much part of the Russian strategic plan for the case of a war against the Central Powers, as was the abandonment of Western Poland. The Vistula-San-Dniester line from Thorn in the north to Chocim in the south-east is the one strong, continuous line stretching across the Polish and Galician plains, between the line of the Oder and the Carpathians to the west and south, and the line of the Niemen and Bug to the north-east of it. No stable balance can be attained with one side holding the line of the middle Vistula round Warsaw and the other commanding its natural southern extension, the San line round Przemyśl.

The outbreak of the Austro-Italian war on May 23, was followed by a regrouping of the Austro-Hungarian armies in Galicia and by certain changes in the army commands. Generals Dankl and Borojevic von Bojna were transferred to the Italian frontier. General Dankl had been in any case in command of an army of only about half the normal size; his troops were united with the German army of



AUSTRIANS FIRING FROM THEIR TRENCHES.

General Woyrsch, in conjunction with which they had been fighting for the last half year; it will be remembered that in May also that army was considerably under strength. General Kövess von Kövesshasa, who before the war had commanded the 12th Austro-Hungarian Army Corps, and had stood during May at the head of certain Hungarian regiments included in General Woyrsch's army, seems to have been now put in command of all the Austro-Hungarian forces included in that army. General Borojevic von Bojna was transferred to the Italian front probably owing to the vast experience of mountain warfare which he had acquired during the half-year of fighting in the Carpathians. It is impossible to say as yet how much of his army he took with him to the south. One thing is fairly certain: that no extensive regrouping of forces was undertaken until after the fall of Przemyśl. The Austro-Hungarian official report of May 25 speaks of an "Army Puhallo"; it is evident from its position that this was the army of General Borojevic under a new commander. After the fall of Przemyśl that army seems, however, to have undergone far-reaching changes. Part of it was probably transferred to the Italian front; other parts were distributed among the other Austro-Hungarian and German armies, to replace regiments withdrawn to the southern front or to make up for the heavy losses suffered during the Galician campaign. Thus, *e.g.*, we find that the 10th Austro-Hungarian Army Corps, which from Gorlice till Przemyśl had always moved on the left wing of the Third Austro-Hungarian Army under Borojevic, next to the right wing of the Eleventh German Army of Mackensen, appears in the beginning of July near Krasnik, *i.e.*, in conjunction with the Fourth Austro-Hungarian Army under Archduke Joseph-Ferdinand. Some other parts of the Third Army seem to have been included in those of Mackensen and of Boehm-Ermolli, which from now onwards became direct neighbours; thus, *e.g.*, the German Corps under General von der Marwitz forms during the battle of Lwow part of the Second Austro-Hungarian Army. The status and composition of the surviving "Army Puhallo" is not clear.

About the same time, whilst in the north the reconstructed forts of Przemyśl were being demolished by the heavy howitzers of the enemy, another important position, farther south, was crumbling down under their fire.

Since May 18 the German troops had been busy enlarging their narrow salient in the Stryj valley against Uliczno in the west and Bolechow in the east. At the same time they were getting their heavy mortars and howitzers into position in front of the Russian trenches between Holobutow and Stryj. On the morning of May 31 fire was opened against them, and after a few hours of bombardment little was left of the defences before which thousands of Austrians and Germans had died in vain in attempts to carry them by assault. The final conquest of the Russian positions near Holobutow was effected by the 38th Hungarian Honvéd Division under F.M.L. Bartheldy, to which the German corps-commander, Count Bothmer, left the most difficult part of the work. They were *followed* by the Germans, thus inverting the arrangement which had been adopted for the triumphal entry into Przemyśl; but this time the order of procedure did not appear in the report of the Wolff Bureau.

The fall of Stryj rendered inevitable the withdrawal of the entire Russian line towards the Dniester. Step by step our Allies retired to the north; their retreat will remain memorable in military history, for, whilst falling back, they were capturing thousands of the "pursuing" enemy. They retired behind the Dniester, but preserved their hold on the main bridge-heads and on whatever important strategic points could be kept to the south of the river, without disturbing excessively the symmetry of the line.

With the fall of Przemyśl and Stryj closed the second stage of the Austro-German offensive. The third we may call the battle for Lwow, and date it as extending from June 3 till June 22, the day of the recapture of the Galician capital by the Austrians.

The strategic plan underlying this third chapter of the Austro-German offensive can be explained in very few sentences. The most effective way of crushing the retreating Russian armies would have been a flank attack from the south. A successful crossing of the Dniester by the enemy would have had disastrous consequences for our Allies. Their armies would have been outflanked, some of their lines of retreat would have been cut, and a dissolution of a large portion of the retiring forces could hardly have been avoided. All the Austro-German attempts at breaking through the Russian armies holding the line of the



A RUSSIAN SUDDEN COUNTER-ATTACK.

Dniester ended, however, in failure. Our Allies gradually rolled up their line on the Dniester from west to east, keeping step with the retreat of the armies which were facing west. But nowhere did the enemy succeed in breaking effectively through the defences of their southern flank.

To the west of Lwow stretches a line which might almost be compared in strength with that of the Dniester. It is the line of the lakes and marshes which extend along the small river Vereszyca; those positions are best known as the Grodek line, by the name of the town guarding the most important passage across it.

The chief weakness of that line is that it reaches for only a very short distance to the north. In the north-west of Lwow, between the towns of Vereszyca and Rava Ruska opens a gap in its western defences. That gap lies east-north-east from Jaroslav. Against it was advancing the army of General von Mackensen.

After the fall of Przemyśl the Fourth Austro-Hungarian Army attempted to effect a "left wheel" from the line of the San. Pivoting on its extreme left wing, it was trying to wheel its centre and right wing so as to get to face due north, and thus to cover the left flank of the forces which were advancing on Lwow.

It was supported by at least one army corps (the 10th Austro-Hungarian) from the late army of Borojevic. That corps moved from Przemyśl due north against the line of the river Tanew, as an immediate cover for Mackensen, who was advancing from Jaroslav and Radymno against Rava Ruska and Zolkiew, and was thus turning from the north the defences of Lwow. The Second Austro-Hungarian Army under General von Boehm-Ermolli was moving on both sides of the Przemyśl-Lwow railway line under a slight angle to the north-east. The armies of General von Linsingen and General von Pflanzer-Baltin were standing south of the Dniester; the advance of the Second Army was gradually drawing them to the north across the river, just as Mackensen's advance from Gorlice towards Rzeszow had drawn the armies of Borojevic and Boehm-Ermolli across the Carpathians.

During the 10 days which followed on the fall of Przemyśl little progress was made in the centre, in front of the Jaroslav-Sambor line, by the armies of Mackensen and Boehm-Ermolli. Part of the time was probably required for the regrouping of the forces and for the concentration of fresh material with which to re-open the campaign. Moreover, the operations on the wings, *i.e.*, on the Lower San and on the Dniester, seem to have tied down for the time being a certain amount of reserves, and the result of those operations had to be awaited before any new move was undertaken from the centre.


In the north, between Krawce, Rozvadow and Rudnik, our Allies were vigorously pursuing their counter-offensive. On June 2 they pierced the enemy's lines and captured an important fortified position in the region of

Rudnik, taking about 4,000 prisoners and many guns and machine-guns. "West of Rudnik," says the Russian *communiqué* of June 3, "we almost completely annihilated the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Tyrolese regiments." The success thus gained was followed up on the following day in the direction of the village of Novosielec, and the enemy was driven back in disorderly retreat. The 14th Austro-Hungarian army-corps fell back on fortified positions extending from Stany on the River Leng (a small tributary of the Vistula which joins it east of Sandomierz) by Jata to Lentovina, a station on the Rozvadow-Przevorsk railway line; from here his lines extended by Sarzyna towards the San. About 1,000 prisoners were taken in that region on June 4. The Russians had by now got over about one-third of the distance from Rozvadow to the Tarnow-Jaroslav railway, the most important line of communication of Mackensen's Army. In view of this advance of our Allies, German reinforcements were sent to the support of the retreating Austrians. On the night of June 3-4 they delivered from the left bank of the Leng three furious attacks against the Russian flank between Krawce and Burdzyn, but were repulsed with heavy losses. The advance of our Allies to the south was, however, arrested.

No important movements took place on the San between Lezajsk and the Lubaczowka during the week following on the fall of Przemyśl. Between the Lubaczowka and the Szkło some fighting is reported to have occurred on the Zapalow-Korzenica line. Between the San and the Vyszina in the direct neighbourhood of Przemyśl the German troops were advancing from the Pozdziacz-Medyka towards the Starzawa-Czerniawa line. South of the Przemyśl-



RUSSIAN TROOPS HAULING A HEAVY GUN
On to a Platform of a specially constructed line.



GENERAL ARTAMONOFF,

The Russian Governor of Przemyśl, in his quarters during the Russian occupation.

Lwow railway the German troops under General von der Marwitz were approaching Mosciska from the south-west. How slow the movements were in that region and how obstinate was the resistance offered by our Allies can be recognized from the fact that the town of Mosciska, only about 11 miles east of Przemyśl, was not reached by the Germans until May 14.

The main fighting during those days centred round the bridge-heads on the Dniester. On a front of about 20 miles, between the Sambor-Rudki railway and the Litynia-Kolodrubys road, the marshes of the Upper Dniester form an absolutely impassable barrier to military operations. They are on the average about 8-10 miles wide, and not a single road or railway leads across them. Between Kolodrubys and

Zuravno, on a front of about 30 miles long, the marshes still cover a certain amount of ground on both sides of the river, which attains in that sector a width of about 100-150 feet and a depth of about 3-4 feet. At Mikolajow and Zydaczow* important roads and railways cross the river. Mikolajow, on the northern bank of the Dniester, due south of Lwow (about 20 miles), was strongly fortified; the district is by nature very well fitted for

* Zydaczow (pronounce Jidatchoff) had been in the Middle Ages a Roumanian settlement. Its name had been "Judatchu"; it was derived from the word "judex" (judge). Zyd (pronounce jid) means in Slav languages "a Jew"; by a process of assimilation, the foreign name, of which the meaning was obscure to the local population, was changed into one which they were able to understand.



ARRIVAL OF KING LUDWIG OF BAVARIA IN LEMBERG.

purposes of defence. Hills covered with dense woods rise between Mikolajow and the river to a height of about 1,250 feet; they dominate the valley of the Dniester and form a most formidable defensive position. Nor does the bridge-head of Zydaczow offer much better chances for an attack from the south. The Russian positions in that region lay in the midst of a maze of rivers and ponds. Covered from the south by the Lower Stryj, the Dniester and the marshes, which are especially broad in this district, the Russian positions on the hills north-east of Zydaczow, between the Dniester and the lakes of Chodorow, were equal in strength to any defences on the Dniester. Ten miles south-east of Zydaczow lies Zuravno; between Zuravno and Nizniow, on a front of over 40 miles, the Dniester presents the comparatively least serious natural obstacles to an army trying to force its line. Hardly any marshes encompass the river, though its banks are low; it is only east of Nizniow that begins the district of the deep cañons, of which a detailed account was given in Chapter LXXVI. Half-way between Zuravno and Nizniow lies Halicz,* one of the most important strategic centres of Galicia and the most important passage across the Dniester. The railway bridge, which the Austrians had blown up before their retreat in September 1914, had been reconstructed by the Russians, who in addition had built five wooden bridges across

the river. Halicz itself had been originally fortified by the Austrians; our Allies had added three new lines to its defences. They stretched in a semicircle round it, at a radius of more than five miles.

Zuravno offered to the Germans comparatively the best chances of breaking through the Russian defences on the Dniester, and against it they directed their main forces. On May 31, after the fall of Stryj, the Germans pushed forward vigorously in the direction of Mikolajow and Zydaczow; their main aim probably was to establish themselves safely on the left bank of the Dniester between Kolodruby and Zydaczow, and thus to secure the left flank of the troops which were to attack Zuravno against the possibility of an attack from that direction. It seems less likely that they hoped to capture either of these bridge-heads. "Between the Tysmienica and the Stryj," says the Russian *communiqué* of June 2, "the enemy, who had concentrated there a considerable amount of heavy artillery and had brought up reinforcements, by stubborn attacks made with large forces, achieved some successes in the course of the night" (May 31-June 1). In the course of the following two days the Russians fell back on to the Dniester bridge-heads. The German attacks made against them on the night of June 2-3 were repulsed with very heavy losses and were followed by successful Russian counter-attacks.

"On June 3," says the Russian official *communiqué* of June 5, "the enemy continued

* Halicz was once one of the chief capitals of Eastern Europe. The name Galicia is derived from it.

his attacks against our bridge-heads over the Dniester between Tysmienica and the Stryj-Mikolajow railway. During the day we repulsed four desperate assaults on our positions near Ugartsberg (two miles south of the Dniester), using our bayonets and hand grenades. About midday, on the following day, on the whole of the above-mentioned front, the enemy was repulsed, and began to take up a position along a new front out of gun range. Our troops, assuming the offensive in their turn, attacked the enemy near Krynica (five miles south of the Dniester)." During the following three days no further attacks were undertaken by the enemy against the Dniester between the mouth of the Tysmienica and that of the Stryj; only Russian counter-attacks continued from the direction of Litynia. The Germans resumed their operations round Mikolajow and Zydaczow about June 7, but henceforth this sector is of only secondary importance.

On June 5 began the German attacks against the bridge-head of Zuravno; on that day the enemy occupied the town on the right bank of the river, and to the south of it the important Height 247, which dominates the valley. On the 6th Austro-German troops succeeded in forcing the passage of the river, and on the 7th they enlarged considerably their positions on the northern bank by capturing the hills near Novoszyn and by reaching the important

strategic point of Bukaczowce. "On the left of the Dniester, near Zuravno," says the Russian report, "the enemy's forces have been increased, invading the forest as far as the railway." It was evidently their intention to turn from the north the defences of the Martynow-Siwka bridge, on the high-road from Rohatyn to Kalusz. Had they succeeded, they might have firmly established themselves on the flank and in the immediate neighbourhood of Halicz. On June 6 the troops operating on their right wing had joined hands with those of Pflanzers-Baltin and occupied Kalusz. Paying an awful price in dead and wounded, they reached on June 7 south of Siwka the Myslow-Wojnilow-Kolodziejow line. Near Siwka alone about 2,000 of the enemy perished in an ambush; they were first mown down by machine-guns and then the survivors were finished off in a bayonet attack. It was the aim of the Austro-German commanders to reach from the east Halicz and Stanislaw, whilst the forces which had crossed the Dniester at Zuravno were to turn the Russian positions along the river.

June 8 marks a turning-point in the battle. On the following day the German advance to the north of the Dniester was brought to a stop. After a fierce fight the enemy was driven back behind the Chodorow-Bukaczowce railway line, several villages, including Raczewko, were reconquered by the Russians and about 800



THE AUSTRO-GERMAN TROOPS ENTERING PRZEMYSL.

prisoners were taken. On June 10 the battle attained its climax. The Austro-German forces were driven back across the Dniester. On that day the Russian captures amounted to 17 guns, 49 machine-guns, 188 officers and about 6,500 men. Among the prisoners was an entire company of the Guard regiment of the Prussian Fusiliers; the entire captures of the three days June 8-10 were 17 guns, 78 machine-guns, 348 officers and 15,431 men.

On June 11 the Germans renewed their attack on Zuravno, recaptured the town and on the following day advanced for a distance of about five miles to the north of it. On June 13 they reached Roguzna, a village about ten miles north of Zuravno. During the next few days, however, our Allies drove them again back towards the Dniester.

Meantime, farther east, the Austro-German armies had reached the river almost along the entire line between Jezupol and Zaleszczyki, forcing several passages across it below Nizniow. But these successes proved of no avail. As we have previously stated, below Nizniow it is not the river itself that matters, but its "dead belt," the belt of river-loops, cañons and forests. After having crossed the river itself, the enemy nowhere succeeded in emerging from that zone.

By June 16 it was fairly clear that the line of the Dniester could be nowhere forced to any considerable depth and on a front sufficient to


enable bigger bodies of troops to open an attack against the Russian flank; hence the attack against Lwow, if it was to be taken, had to proceed from the west.

During the lull in the fighting on the Middle San Mackensen effected round Jaroslav a new concentration of artillery similar to that which had won the day round Gorlice. He seems also to have received fresh reinforcements in men. A new "phalanx" was gathered west of the San, mainly in the district between Piskorovice and Radymno.

On June 12 a violent bombardment was opened against the Russian positions. On the same day Austro-Hungarian troops crossed the San and occupied Piskorovice and Sieniawa. On the 13th the advance extended to the entire line, from the River Zlota down to the Radymno-Javorow road; it was continued on the 14th. The heavy Austrian batteries adapted to motor-transport were accompanying the advancing troops and breaking down the resistance of the Russian troops. By the night of June 14 the Ninth Austro-Hungarian Army Corps (Fourth Austro-Hungarian Army) stood before Cieplice, and the entire army of Archduke Joseph-Ferdinand was slowly wheeling from the San towards the River Tanew. On the same night Mackensen's troops reached a line extending from Oleszyce by Nova



INTERIOR OF THE FORTRESS OF PRZEMYSL.
After the German Occupation.



FORTS NUMBER 10 AND 11, PRZEMYSL,
After the Bombardment by the Austrian
Heavy Artillery.

Grobla and Wielkie Oczy* to Krakowiec. Meantime General von der Marwitz reached Mosciska. On June 15 Cieplice and Dachnow were taken and the enemy's forces approached Lubaczow, Niemirow, Javorow, and Sadova Visznia. The report sent out by the Wolff Bureau on June 16 says: "The Army of Colonel-General von Mackensen has captured since June 12 more than 40,000 men and 69 machine-guns." It is evident that this sentence applies to the entire group of armies operating in Galicia, not merely to the Eleventh German Army. Thus by June 12, in the German official and semi-official language, Mackensen had replaced as commander of the Galician armies the Austro-Hungarian Generalissimo, Archduke Frederick.

On June 16 the Austrian troops of the Fourth Army, continuing their "left-wheel," advanced through Maydan and Cewkow and crossed the Russian frontier, facing due north. Meantime Mackensen's Army, advancing with its characteristic impetuosity, had passed Lubaczow, Niemirow and Javorow, and was pressing forward across the hills against the line of



Rava Ruska, Magierow and Janow. The Army of General von Boehm-Ermolli was moving along the high road towards Grodek. Late in the afternoon of June 16 it came into contact with the Russian rearguards near Wolczuchy, about three miles west of Grodek, by the night it reached the River Vereszyca and occupied its western bank. About midnight it captured by assault the western part of the town of Grodek.

On June 17 the advance of the Fourth Austro-Hungarian Army to the north continued between the Vistula to the Jaroslav-Oleszyce-Belzec road. In the corner above the junction of the Vistula and the San our Allies, conforming

* These names give an idea of the character of the country. "Nova Grobla" means "The New Dam," "Wielkie Oczy" "The Big Eyes"; ponds and small lakes are frequently called "eyes" in Slav countries.

to the retreat on the right bank of the San, fell back on to their old positions between Tarnobrzeg and Nisko. West of the San the Austrians occupied on that day Krzeszow, Tarnograd, and Narol, thus establishing themselves on the entire line, along the Tanew front. During the fighting of the following week the valley of the Tanew served as an effective cover for the northern flank of the Austro-German Armies which were advancing against Lwow. The valley of the lower and middle Tanew is one huge marsh for about 35 miles to the east of its junction with the San; that marsh is about 10 miles wide and covered with forests. Only very few roads lead through that region. Whoever would dare to leave the beaten track is lost; he would perish in the bog. Even where the marsh ceases, the ground is still unfavourable to military operations; it is soft sand in which men and horses sink deep and across which heavy transport is impracticable. Having reached that region, the Austrian troops could securely hold it with small forces.

From the junction of the San and the Tanew till Narol, for a distance of 45 miles, the Austro-German forces were facing due north; between Narol, Rava Ruska and Magierow, on a line of about 15 miles, the front was turning toward the north-east; south of Magierow "the other armies of General von Mackensen" * were holding the line of the Vereszyca down to its junction with the Dniester. The distance from Magierow to Lelechow on the Upper Vereszyca amounts to 10 miles, the line of the Vereszyca down to Kolodrubry on the Dniester to 30 miles. The new line offered our Allies fairly good defensive positions. Several ranges of hills, rising to an average height of 1,200 ft., extend between Narol and Magierow. Similarly the line of the Vereszyca, which is covered against the west by the river, and by ponds and marshes, is reinforced by a chain of wooded hills which exceed in height by several hundred feet the level of those extending to the west of the line.

* Quoting that passage from the German official communiqué the Viennese *Neue Freie Presse* adds in brackets the following remark: "It is not known whether Mackensen commands several armies, or which armies are under his command." Thus notwithstanding its exceedingly, one might say excessively, close connexion with Berlin, the *Neue Freie Presse* seems to have had no "official knowledge" about the "supersession" of Archduke Frederick by Mackensen.

From Rava Ruska to Komarno, on a front of over 40 miles, a furious battle raged during June 18 and 19 and throughout the intervening night. The Austrians succeeded in capturing a few positions of our Allies in front of Grodek and Komarno, yet it was not on the Vereszyca that the decision was to fall. With the help of their heavy artillery the Germans had borne down the resistance of our Allies in the north, and on June 20 Mackensen's Army occupied the towns of Rava Ruska and Zolkiev. The line of the Vereszyca was turned and our Allies had to fall back on their lines in front of Lwow.

On June 21 our Allies rallied to resist the advance of the enemy in front of Lwow, the capital of Galicia, which had been in their possession ever since September 3, 1914. Eight miles to the north of the town they held against the troops of Mackensen a line extending from Zoltance past Kulikow towards the hills north of Brzuchovice. West and south-west of Lwow they were defending the line of the River Szczerec, against the army of Boehm-Ermolli; its high eastern banks and its chalk-rocks were offering good positions for defence. The battle round Kulikow and on the Szczerec was fought on June 21. During the following night the Russians fell back on to their last positions round Lwow, the evacuation of which had by then been completed.

The fiercest fighting took place along the Janow-Lwow road. Here, on a narrow front between the village of Rzesna and Hill 320, across the high road, our Allies were offering a last resistance to the advance of the Austrians. Their flanks were covered by marshy streams, the positions themselves had been carefully built and fortified. Premature attacks delivered by the enemy ended in disaster for the attacking columns. Then followed the usual bombardment by the batteries of heavy howitzers. The Russian defences were smashed and across their wreckage the Austrian infantry was storming to the east, towards Lwow. About the same time the enemy was crossing from the north the hills on the Mlynowka and carrying the last Russian trenches on the Lysa Gora.

Lwow was entered by the enemy on Tuesday, June 22, at 4 p.m., after having remained for 293 days in the possession of our Allies.

CHAPTER LXXXVI.

GERMANY AT WAR.

GERMAN OPINION AT THE OUTBREAK OF WAR—THE "WRONG" DONE TO BELGIUM—BUILDING UP OF GERMAN LEGENDS—POLITICAL UNITY ASSURED—GERMANY UNDER MARTIAL LAW—PATIENT ACCEPTANCE OF THE MILITARY REGIME—DISAPPEARANCE OF THE PERSONAL FACTOR—POSITION OF THE KAISER—THE PUBLIC PROPAGANDA AND WAR LITERATURE—PRESS ORGANIZATION—HATRED OF ENGLAND—THE FOOD PROBLEM AND ITS SOLUTION—INDUSTRY AND TRADE—THE CONTROL OF LABOUR—FINANCE—THE WAR LOANS—GERMANISM RUNS RIOT—INTERNAL POLITICS—ATTITUDE OF SOCIALISTS—GERMAN AIMS AND AMBITIONS REVEALED—THE DEMAND FOR ANNEXATIONS—THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR'S CHALLENGE TO EUROPE.

WHEN the tension of the brief diplomatic crisis that followed the presentation of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia was relieved by the declarations of war on Russia and on France, by the invasion of Belgium, and by the consequent intervention of Great Britain, the anxiety of the German people gave place to an outburst of jubilant patriotism and warlike enthusiasm. The first outburst of joy did not last long. The crowds in Berlin and other capitals might cheer, and the politicians and newspapers might rejoice, but the country as a whole was pretty well aware that the coming struggle was such as the world had never seen, and that Germany had assumed a task with which Bismarck's three wars provided no comparison.

Nevertheless, the common belief was that the war would be short. There was great anxiety about the possibly disastrous blows that might be expected from the British Navy, and the people vented all its wrath and sarcasm upon the failure of German diplomacy to divide Germany's enemies and to prevent the coincidence of naval war with the great trial of strength on land. But, apart from that peril, it was hoped that a smashing blow would be given to France in a very brief space of time, and that Germany could then feel secure

against invasion and continue offensive operations in the light of events and at greater leisure. The country rapidly settled down to the business of economic preparation for such emergencies as could then be foreseen, and if the wonderful resistance of Belgium was a bitter disappointment and sadly disturbed the dream of the early fall of Paris, Germans generally found relief in a passionate explosion of feeling against England. Meanwhile, the still, small voice of conscience, protesting against the wrong done to Belgium, was drowned by a hoarse chorus of calumny and vituperation. It took some months for the German Government to build up the lying tale—chiefly by absurd manipulation of such documents as were ultimately found discarded or forgotten in the Foreign Office at Brussels—that Belgium had long before the war abandoned her neutrality and thrown in her lot with France and England. The German public was fooled by coarser methods. While the German army tore its way, murdering and pillaging, through the little State whose neutrality Germany had guaranteed, the German public was fed on stories of Belgian cruelty and treachery and taught that the Belgians earned their fate by "pouring oil on German soldiers" or gouging out German eyes. They soon forgot the fatal words, which echoed and re-echoed through the whole



MAKING OUT CASUALTY LISTS IN BERLIN.

civilized world, of the Imperial Chancellor, in his speech in the Reichstag on August 4 :

The wrong—I speak openly—that we are committing we will endeavour to make good as soon as our military goal has been reached. Anybody who is threatened as we are threatened, and is fighting for his highest possessions, can have only one thought—how is he to hack his way through.

The Chancellor tried subsequently, especially in another speech in the Reichstag (December 2, 1914) to explain his words away. All the intellectuals of Germany toiled at the same task, like murderers striving to wash bloodstains from their garments. After a year of such efforts Professor Schoenborn, of Heidelberg, summed up the results in the following delightful formula :

These sentences can, of course, be rightly understood and appreciated only if regard is had to the whole situation in which they were spoken. They were uttered at an hour of fate of the German Empire, to a political gathering, and as part of a Government declaration of high policy. They were not intended, therefore, to constitute, and could not constitute, an impartial and considered theoretical judgment, from a legal standpoint, upon the merits of this German procedure. On the contrary, they are one section of a political action.*

If that was good enough for the professors, it is not surprising that for the public Belgian neutrality soon became "the English swindle."

* From a large volume of German apologetics, called "Deutschland und der grosse Krieg" (page 566), published in July 1915.

Meanwhile the nation answered as one man to the call of the Emperor and the Government, and the whole country was inspired by the spirit of unity and determination. As every competent judge of German conditions had predicted, the great Socialist party, although it embraced one-third of the whole people—and probably at least one-half of the men who first took the field—offered no serious opposition whatever. After brief deliberation and an unimportant difference of opinion behind the scenes, the Socialists voted for the war credits that were immediately demanded by the Government. As the war progressed their attitude showed certain fluctuations, but it was never such as to give the Government the slightest anxiety. They were quite content, it seemed, with an empty phrase, such as that in which the Kaiser after his speech from the Throne on August 4 exclaimed : "I no longer recognize parties. I know only Germans." It is true that when the Kaiser followed up this demonstration by proposing to shake hands with the party leaders, the Socialist leaders did not accept the invitation, but they soon bowed to public opinion and did nothing to mar the increase of admiring loyalty which, as we shall see, the Emperor most adroitly used.

The more preposterous the abuse of all

Germany's enemies, but especially England, the more confident became the belief in Germany's "cause." Was she not fighting a "defensive war for her existence" against "a world of enemies"? Had not perfidious England, after years of jealous efforts to "hem Germany in," fallen upon her in her hour of need? Were not Germany's enemies striving to overrun her territories and destroy her industry and trade because they could not face the competition in the world's markets of her intelligent and industrious people? It was a fit soil for national heroes and the creation of legends. Perhaps it is not inappropriate that the first hero the German nation took to its heart was not a man but a gun—the famous 17 in. howitzer which Krupps had built in secret and which battered down the forts at Liège. But then in rapid succession came others—"father Hindenburg," the "saviour of East Prussia from Cossack hordes," Captain von Müller of the Emden, which for so long raided commerce and defied British sea power, and Weddigen, the pioneer in the submarine war.

Before, however, we deal with the machinery and methods by which opinion was guided and controlled and the great German war legends were built up, let us briefly consider the internal position. Again and again in the years before the war German statesmen protested before God and man that the best proof of their good

intentions was that they had kept the peace for 40 years. In public and in private the Kaiser loved to claim this as his own personal achievement, and there were many who believed that his highest ambition was to go down in history as the *Friedenskaiser*, the great ruler who had controlled vast armies but never used them, who had increased the power and prestige of Germany without ever striking a blow. What this strange and unfamiliar theory of the virtue of keeping quiet really meant was that Germany regarded war as something normal and in the nature of things. Peace was rather the excessively virtuous interruption of war than war the rude interruption of peace. When at last the Great War came, it was hailed with something like relief. Prussia-Germany had been delivered from the perils of pacifism and internationalism, and was once more about to convince Europe that might is right. After a year of war the Imperial Chancellor, suspect of feebleness and international prejudices, could rally all German opinion with the cry, "We have got over our sentimentality (*Wir haben unsere Sentimentalität verlernt*)."
After all, the State was founded upon force, and force should prevail.

It is difficult to describe in terms easily intelligible to an English reader the facility with which Germany threw off her whole civilian trappings and reverted to the pure type



IN THE STATE APARTMENTS OF THE KING OF BAVARIA'S PALACE, MUNICH.
Bavarian Court Ladies.



THE KAISER IN THE EASTERN THEATRE OF WAR.

of the military State. Within a few hours of the issue of the mobilization order the whole country was under military control. Government Departments, provincial administrations, municipal administrations, all lost the very show of independence, and became handmaids of the military rulers of the country. In Berlin, for instance, all power passed at once into the hands of the Military Governor. Throughout the Empire the real control of administration was vested in the generals in command of army-corps districts—that is to say, the generals left behind as deputies for the generals who took the field. It was they who guided and coaxed and threatened the public by constant proclamations. It was they and their subordinates who really managed everything, and saw to it that in every sphere the needs of the army and the prosecution of the war were held superior to any other consideration whatever. It was the military authorities who suppressed newspapers, exercised the censorship upon news and upon private communications, prevented the holding of public meetings which did not suit their view of the country's interests, and generally directed the whole course of civil life. They had ample powers to commandeer supplies and, as we shall see later, to control labour. The whole machinery of the State was at their disposal and subject to their will and pleasure.

It must not be supposed that this military régime was felt to be irksome or was accepted with reluctance. It was, rather, regarded as perfectly natural. Germany at war had no thought or care for anything but the successful prosecution of the war, and the people generally had no more eager desire than to play their part as willing members of the great machine. The more perfect the organization for war proved to be, the more enthusiastic did the country become. The people were willing to make any sacrifices, because they felt themselves to be integral parts of the whole complex scheme which contained the whole forces and resources of the Empire. Immediately war broke out, the country was given a great object-lesson in the perfect precision of the mobilization. The State railway system, which was at once taken over by the military authorities, moved the vast armies without any confusion or delay. The fighting forces were called out in accordance with arrangements of which every detail was fixed in advance. Knowing almost exactly what part every man would have to play as the war progressed and as reinforcements were needed, the public, inspired and encouraged by the feeling of a real equality in sacrifice, could adapt and readjust its whole life to meet the strain. There were no idle hands and shirkers were, necessarily, rare. Men who were left at their industrial or

commercial work knew that they were left because, after consideration of each individual case, their work was considered to be necessary. And they also knew that they might at any time be called to the colours.


In contemplating the spirit of Germany, one must not forget the force of tradition. It was only 50 years before the war that the German Empire had been united by the sword. Very many of the most prominent men in Germany had themselves taken part in the war against France. Every family had its personal ties with the great time of Bismarck. Above all, the whole country knew how the German victories then had brought unimagined wealth and prosperity and prestige. It was easy to persuade such a people that it was fighting to hold and defend what its fathers had won, and to complete their work, and that defeat would mean relapse to the old conditions and the breaking up of the Empire into a number of small and impotent States. Moreover, the people upon which such arguments were employed was essentially bellicose, and in its heart welcomed a policy of aggression and of conquest by the sword.

The most remarkable immediate effect of the swallowing up of Germany in the military machine was the apparent disappearance of the personal element both in government and administration. Not only were the minor



CAPT. VON MÜLLER,
Of the "Emden."

[Swaine.]



CAPT. WEDDIGEN.


statesmen, from Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, the Imperial Chancellor, downwards, whom a strange fate had placed in command at such a time, easily pushed into the background. No great soldier appeared to take their place. The Chief of the Great General Staff soon proved to be a Moltke only in name, and he was actually superseded after a few months of war. The whole machine, as it were, ran itself. There were very few ministerial or administrative changes. There was soon a new Imperial Finance Minister. Otherwise the men who were found in office remained in office. Delbrück, as Imperial Minister of the Interior, was responsible for control of food supply and industrial reorganization generally, Havenstein continued to perform his important functions as head of the Imperial Bank—and so on. From time to time questions of high policy involved personal conflict—especially, as the result of the dispute with the United States about submarine "piracy," the revival of the old feud between Grand Admiral von Tirpitz, Secretary of State for the Imperial Navy, and the Imperial Chancellor. But upon the whole there was less friction than in times of peace, and among the mediocre administrators there was seldom any marked assertion of personal ambition or of claims to predominance.

The most striking and important illustration of this state of things was the change in the position of the Emperor. The whole truth about

his personal and direct responsibility for precipitating the war is still unknown, but it is beyond dispute that he directed the course of German action in the last days of crisis. When war had broken out he played his part with great caution and skill. On August 17 he left Berlin for the Western Front, and established himself at Luxemburg, where he was accompanied by most of the Ministers and an enormous retinue. From time to time he addressed some message to the troops or to the people at home, but such utterances were like reticence in him. He watched the most acute phase of the First Battle of Ypres in October, and made other spectacular appearances in the field, but the more marked became the failure to reach Paris (or even Warsaw), the more modest

secret of his grey hairs and diminished vivacity of bearing.

Apart from everything else, and from the undoubted fact that in his new guise the Emperor rapidly gained in the affections of his people, account had to be taken of the obvious failure of the Royal Family to win distinction in war. It was only for a short time that the German newspapers were instructed to insist upon the presence of all the Emperor's sons in the field. The name of the Emperor's brother, Grand Admiral Prince Henry of Prussia, soon disappeared altogether. Above all, the German Crown Prince not only failed notoriously as a commander, but by his personal habits acquired a reputation hardly more savoury than, say, that of the Turkish commander in Syria. He shocked even the German Army and the German people. Of all the German princes the only one who gained solid prestige in the first year of war was the Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, who had the popular task of opposing the hated British in the West.



DOCTOR DELBRÜCK,
Imperial Minister of the Interior.


became the Emperor's bearing towards his people. In December, 1914, he even returned to Berlin in the dead of night, in order to avoid all public demonstration. As the war progressed, the Emperor succeeded in forming something like a new Kaiser legend. He was more and more careful to avoid all appearance of interfering either in strategy or in policy, and he gradually became a sort of venerable father of his people, sharing their sacrifices and mourning their losses rather than calling upon them to do his Imperial will. The impression of venerability, which became so strong as to constitute almost an infringement of the monopoly so long enjoyed throughout Europe by the Emperor Francis Joseph, was strengthened by changes in the Kaiser's personal appearance. He aged visibly, and the Court photographers made no

In no previous war had there been anything to compare with the prodigious propaganda that began all over the world with the very beginning of hostilities. In no country was the campaign conducted so deliberately—and unscrupulously—as in Germany. It soon appeared that there was no service too mean and no intellectual prostitution too base for patriotic German pens. In the German view it was the duty and privilege of every citizen to promote the German cause in time of war by any method that seemed to offer itself. For the civil population no less than for the armed forces—to quote the Imperial Chancellor's phrase—"necessity knew no law." The whole intellectual forces of the nation and the whole spoon-fed Press were mobilized immediately, and the world was invited to watch the strangest war of words in history. The leading ideas were much the same as those of the generals. There must be great rapidity and no squeamishness. There must be plenty of heavy artillery. The main enemy must be attacked with peculiar violence. There must be no dissipation of forces. We have said that Germany expected a short war. The literary campaign was planned accordingly. It is inconceivable that, if they had had any conception of the probable duration of the war, the Germans would have conducted their propaganda on the same lines. They seem to have

believed that they could drown the truth in a hurricane of high explosives, and so deafen the whole world with their shrieks and protestations that it would not recover consciousness and the power of criticism until the war was over. At the same time there was evidently more anxiety about opinion in Germany itself than the event justified. As a matter of fact, German opinion proved to be entirely docile and perfectly willing to be misled. It fed greedily upon the official version of the causes of the war, and responded instantly to every call.

There is no occasion to discuss here the

ethical basis of this sort of patriotism or to examine closely the reasons which caused Germans generally to adopt a very bad case with very great unanimity. But there is no doubt that the rapid growth of material prosperity had for years before the war been undermining intellectual honesty and preparing the "learned classes" to play the part they did. The fact was evident, if only from the condition of the Press, which had grown steadily in influence and prosperity, especially in the last 10 years, without acquiring any shreds of decency or raising at all the low standards and evil repute of German journalism. Neverthe-



A CORNER OF KRUPP'S WORKS
Showing the Sheffield-made Machinery.

less, the results were astonishing even to those who were well acquainted with Germany, and they will stand to the credit of German civilization for all time.

There is no better illustration of the general character of the German propaganda than a manifesto which in October, 1915, when the German crimes in Belgium had moved universal horror, was published broadcast over the names of almost every German well known for scientific or artistic achievement. We will quote it in full:

We, as representatives of German Science and Art, raise before the whole civilized world our protest against



THE KAISER AND MARSHAL VON HINDENBURG.

Photographed by the German Emperor. The proceeds from the sale of this picture were handed over to the German Red Cross Fund.

the lies and calumnies with which our enemies try to besmirch Germany's pure cause in the struggle for existence that has been forced upon her. The iron mouth of events has disposed of the carefully propagated fictions about German defeats. All the more urgent now is the effort to pervert facts, and to sow suspicion. Against these efforts we raise our voice. This voice shall proclaim the truth.

It is not true that Germany was guilty of this war. Neither the people nor the Government nor the Kaiser wanted it. The utmost efforts were made on the German side to avert it. The documentary proofs are open to the world. Often enough did William II, in the twenty-six years of his reign prove himself the protector of the world's peace; often enough have even our enemies recognised this fact. Yes, this very Kaiser whom they

now dare to call Austria has for a decade past been ridiculed by them for his unshakable love of peace. It was only when superior forces which had long been lying in wait on our frontiers fell upon our people from those sides that the people rose like our sons.

It is not true that we criminally violated the neutrality of Belgium. It has been proved that France and England were determined to violate Belgium's neutrality. It has been proved that Belgium consented. It would have been suicide not to anticipate them.

It is not true that the life or property of a single Belgian citizen has been assailed by our soldiers without the compulsion of most bitter necessity. Again and again, in spite of all warnings, the population shut at our soldiers from ambulances, and scattered wounded and mortally injured doctors engaged in their humanitarian work. More contemptible forgery is inconceivable than the keeping of silence about the crimes of these murderers in order to make the just punishment which they suffered into a crime on the part of the Germans.

It is not true that our troops raged brutally against Louvain. With heavy hearts they were compelled to practice reprisals—by bombarding parts of the city—on the mad population, which treacherously fell upon them in their bedrooms. The greater part of Louvain has been preserved; the famous Rathaus remains entirely intact, and our soldiers marched themselves in procession to the flames. If works of art have been or shall be destroyed in this terrible war, every German would lament the fact. But just as we yield to nobody in the love of art, we decidedly refuse to pay by a German debt for the maintenance of any work of art.

It is not true that our leaders have disregarded the provisions of international law. Unbridled brutality is unknown to them. But in the East the earth is drenched with the blood of women and children who have been butchered by the Russian hordes, while in the West deep-deep bullets have torn the breasts of our warriors. The right to go on the defence of civilisation belongs first of all to those who have allied themselves with the Russians and Serbs, and provided the world with the horrible spectacle of Manafelise and Siggers being spared against the white race.

It is not true that the struggle against our so-called militarism is not a struggle against our Kultur, as it hypocritically asserted by our enemies. Without German militarism German Kultur would long ago have been swept off the face of the earth. It is for the protection of Kultur, and not of Kultur, that militarism has arisen in a country which for centuries has been surrounded like no other country by Kultur raids. The German Army and the German people are one. The consciousness of this fact to-day makes millions of seventy millions of Germans, without distinction of education, class, or party.

We cannot deprive our enemies of the poisoned weapons of lies. We can only cry out to all the quiet that the witness they bear against us is false. To you who know us, and who, together with us, have gained the highest promises of humanity, we cry aloud—believe us! Believe that we shall fight this fight to the end as a Kultur people, for which the heritage of a Goethe, a Beethoven, and a Kant is as sacred as hearth and home. For this we pledge you our names and our honour.

The 93 signatories of this precious document included such historians, philosophers and political economists as Brentano, Brandl, Eucken, Häckel, Harnack, Laband, Lamprecht, Lens, Schmoller, Wismowitz and Wundt, writers like Hauptmann and Scher- mann, men of science like Ebelich and Wassermann, and representatives of all the arts.

Here, indeed, was the whole German legend—



THE WAR-WORN KAISER.



THE KAISER'S YOUNGEST SON.
Prince Joachim wearing his Iron Cross.

the undesired and uninvited "struggle for existence," the unprovoked assault by a coalition of treacherous neighbours, the evil intentions of France and England against Belgium which had to be "anticipated," the gentleness of the German soldiery, the need for reprisals, the treason committed by Germany's enemies against the white race, the defence of *Kultur*, and the sacredness of the struggle inspired by the purest German traditions. For all this these distinguished Germans "pledged their names and their honour."

The professors went on as they had begun. The student of the German history of this time will always find in their utterances and actions in the first three or four months of the war the most damning proof of Germany's ambitions and Germany's guilt. Their excesses did their country a good deal of harm, and before the end of 1914 the Government began to put a check upon them and recommended more cautious and considered behaviour. "The German intellectuals," said the *Berliner Tageblatt* in December, "have a preference for

kicking neutrals in the stomach, and it is evident that this practice does not lessen the enormous difficulties which Germany has at present to overcome. Anybody who knows something of contemporary history will refrain from singing the praises of the diplomatists. But the so-called intellectual leaders sometimes have less political insight than the youngest attaché."

The manifesto that we have quoted introduced the world at large to a little-known conception—German *Kultur*. Henceforward *Kultur* played a more prominent part in the war than any other word in the German vocabulary. The Germans distinguished between *Kultur* and civilization, but by the former they meant little else than civilization of the peculiarly German type. Its significance and meaning for other peoples they put in a popular couplet:

"Denn es muss am deutschen Wesen
Einmal noch die Welt genesen."

(For the world must one day find
Its healing in the German mind.)

The Germans, in fact, were the chosen people. The idea ran through the whole German war literature. It was Professor Adolf Lasson, of Berlin University, who expressed it most plainly. His utterances did more than anything else to bury the extreme propagandists in ridicule and to provoke the mingled amusement and resentment of the whole world at German pretensions. Professor Wilhelm Ostwald had already said: "Germany has reached a higher stage of civilization than the other peoples, and the result of the war will be the organization of Europe under German leadership." Professor Haeckel had demanded the conquest of London, the division of Belgium between Germany and Holland, and the annexation of the Congo State, a great part of the British colonies, the North-East of France, Poland, and the Russian Baltic provinces. Professor Lasson went further. "We are," he wrote, "morally and intellectually superior to all men. We are peerless. So, too, are our organizations and our institutions." Germany was "the most perfect political creation known to history," the Kaiser was "*deliciæ humani generis*," and the Imperial Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, was "the most eminent of living men." The language was crude and ridiculous, but it was an expression of the ruling German idea—that the ties of common humanity had been destroyed, and that Germany now stood not merely alone but "peerless."

Germany set about the mobilization and manipulation of opinion with extraordinary zeal and energy. There was, as we have seen, rigid military control of the Press, which prevented all criticism of an undesired kind, while the newspapers were compelled to publish what the authorities wished to be published. The whole machinery of control of the Press, which was considerable in peace time, was reorganized and "speeded up." The Press Bureau of the Foreign Office, which was a survival from Bismarck's time and usually worked in the dark, was put upon a new basis, and became a full-fledged "department" of the Foreign Office, thus giving almost perfect independence to its notorious chief, Dr. Hammann. The military authorities organized intelligence bureaux, and editors and leader-writers were kept in the straight path by daily

"Press conferences" under the auspices of the Great General Staff. A number of trustworthy writers were directly employed by Government departments to prepare articles and descriptive reports. There was even a distinct "corruption bureau." The greatest attention was paid to the Press of all neutral countries. Wherever possible, the German Government bought outright or subsidized "neutral" newspapers, and it went to infinite pains to get the assistance, as correspondents in Germany or as organizers of "neutral news agencies," of pro-German writers whose names were well known abroad. The Swedish explorer, Sven Hedin, was a more than welcome guest, who described with much skill and infinite obsequiousness German life in the field and the virtues and heroism of the German Army. There was a host of satellites from other neutral countries,



THE GERMAN CROWN PRINCE AND HIS STAFF.
At his headquarters in the North of France.

and the Government was even able to secure the services of a few needy British renegades. One of the most scurrilous organs of the German Government was created out of a Berlin news sheet, published in English and called the *Continental Times*, which before the war had lived a precarious existence for the benefit of American and British tourists.

Immediately after the outbreak of war subsidized agencies were established—the most notorious was controlled by the Centre Party Deputy in the Reichstag, Herr Erzberger—to flood neutral newspapers with German news. Regardless of the cost, these agencies would telegraph many thousands of words a day to every important neutral newspaper, and be content if a few hundred words got into print. It must not be supposed that the German news was mainly false news. On the contrary, the German authorities were alive to the importance of establishing some reputation for veracity. They were utterly unscrupulous in case of need, but, as a rule, the German reports were not remarkably inaccurate. The successes of German arms were, indeed, sufficient to justify, at most times, the luxury of truthfulness. The German Navy was less fortunate, and the Naval Press Bureau almost invariably published false accounts of events at sea. Confidence was not increased abroad by boasted devotion to "truth." As early as September, 1914, an appeal for an intense "truth" campaign, promoted apparently by Herr Ballin and the

publicity department of the Hamburg-Amerika Line, had laid it down that the world must be taught unceasingly "that Germany was shamefully fallen upon, that the German cause is just, that Germany is united for victory or death, and that Germany's enemies are conducting the war with a shamelessness that cries to Heaven."

One curious method of the propaganda was the circulation on a vast scale of "private letters" addressed not only to neutral but even to belligerent countries. An office was established in Berlin at which suitable compositions were dictated and copied, and unsuspecting British families would suddenly receive an elaborate statement of "the German case" in the form of a letter from some long-forgotten German travelling acquaintance or old servant. They suddenly developed eloquence like the following:

We fight for the existence of our country, which our enemies have long been trying to crush, for Western civilization, and for humanity, against the barbarism of the East and the sway of the knout.

Meanwhile German opinion was skilfully and successfully guided into what seemed to be the most profitable channels. A particular line of argument was maintained as long as its popularity lasted, and then there was an immediate diversion. At first there was a torrent of abuse of the "treacherous, worthless and murderous Belgians," who had "richly earned their fate." Then came a passionate



MEN OF A BAVARIAN REGIMENT
Parading before King Ludwig at Munich.



DR. HELFFERICH,
Secretary of State for the Imperial Treasury.

crusade against England. Partly because of the failure to carry through the original plan of campaign and reach Paris, partly because of the stubborn hope that France would weaken in her resolution and consent to make a separate peace, it soon became the fashion in Germany to regard France with an assumed pity and magnanimous toleration. There was a good deal of curious discussion as to whether Russia or England was the "chief enemy," and Russia's claims to the position remained fairly strong during the invasion of East Prussia and the menace to Posen and Silesia. But public opinion was too strong, and throughout the first year of war nine-tenths of the German effort was directed against the British Empire. In October the Munich illustrated paper *Jugend* published the following poem by a certain Herr Ernst Lissauer:*

French and Russian they matter not,
A blow for a blow and a shot for a shot:
We love them not, we hate them not,
We hold the Weichsel and Vosges-gate,
We have but one and only hate,
We love as one, we hate as one,
We have one foe and one alone.

He is known to you all, he is known to you all
He crouches behind the dark grey flood,
Full of envy, of rage, of craft, of gall.
Cut off by waves that are thicker than blood.
Come let us stand at the Judgment place,
An oath to swear to, face to face,
An oath of bronze no wind can shake,
An oath for our sons and their sons to take.
Come, hear the word, repeat the word,
Throughout the Fatherland make it heard.
We will never forgo our hate,
We have all but a single hate,

* This brilliant translation, by Barbara Henderson, first appeared in the *New York Times*.


We love as one, we hate as one,
We have one foe, and one alone—
ENGLAND!

In the Captain's Mess, in the banquet-hall,
Sat feasting the officers, one and all
Like a sabre-blow, like the swing of a sail,
One seized his glass held high to hail;
Sharp-snapped like the stroke of a rudder's play
Spoke three words only: "To the Day!"


Whose glass this fate?
They had all but a single hate.
Who was thus known?
They had one foe, and one alone—
ENGLAND!

Take you the folk of the Earth in pay,
With bars of gold your ramparts lay,
Bedeck the ocean with bow on bow,
Ye reckon well, but not well enough now.
French and Russian they matter not,
A blow for a blow, a shot for a shot,
We fight the battle with bronze and steel,
And the time that is coming Peace will seal.
You will we hate with a lasting hate,
We will never forgo our hate,
Hate by water and hate by land,
Hate of the head and hate of the hand,
Hate of the hammer and hate of the crown,
Hate of seventy millions, choking down.
We love as one, we hate as one,
We have one foe, and one alone—
ENGLAND!

These verses won immediate fame, and there is no doubt that they accurately represented German feeling. It was idle for the *Frankfurter Zeitung* to say: "The greatest mistake we could make would be to reply in kind to the impotent hatred which spits at us everywhere." Not until a year later was it recognized that there might be some truth in this view, and Herr Lissauer was induced to explain that his poem was an outburst of momentary passion and not intended to be "political." Hatred became intensely popular, and professors and journalists raised the new doctrine of "the right of hate" to the same level among Germany's national possessions as "the will to conquer." Somebody coined the expression "*Gott strafe*



PROF. LASSON,
Doctor of Philosophy
at Berlin University.



DR. KARL PETERS,
The German
Explorer.




England!” as a form of greeting for German patriots, and it was freely used as an inscription on notepaper and stamped on letters and parcels for foreign countries. An extraordinary feature of the campaign was the peculiar “hatred” of Sir Edward Grey. The British Foreign Minister was given a position all to himself as a callous, cruel and crafty schemer, the chief author of the war, and, indeed, the worst man living. This view was quite deliberately propagated by the German Foreign Office, and any sign of decreased passion was promptly remedied by a flaming attack in the *Cologne Gazette* or some other mouthpiece of the Government.

There was hardly any subject in connexion with the war which the Germans did not regard mainly in relation to England. They were well provided with a series of exciting topics. The appearance of the British Expeditionary Force in the field was the signal for

RETURNING TO THE FRONT. German troops who recovered from their wounds. Inset: A Berlin Idyll.

a torrent of abuse of the “mercenaries” who were supposed to be recruited in the slums of England while all well-to-do people stayed at home. Before the war was six weeks old the *Hamburger Nachrichten* wrote:

The sons of German mothers are fashioned in the image of God, who brought a sword into the world. But the sons of French, English, Russian, and Belgian mothers have shown themselves to be as beasts which shoot with horribly tearing bullets at German warriors, mutilate German wounded, and commit murder.




HERR BALLIN,
Of the Hamburg-Amerika Line.

Stories about the use of dum-dum bullets and about horrible mutilation of German wounded were for a long time deliberately encouraged by the military authorities, and were immensely popular. When, in the course of the autumn of 1914, it became necessary to deal seriously and systematically with the problem of food supplies, the Government described the British blockade as the British *Aushungerungsplan*, or scheme to starve Germany out. The phrase was almost as useful as what was called *Einkreisungspolitik*, or the British policy of trying "to hem Germany in." It was of no avail to quote German precedents or the utterances of German statesmen. The blockade was to be regarded as "war upon women and children." In March, 1915, after the slander had done its duty, the Socialist *Vorwärts* summoned up enough courage to say, "The truth is that starving out is the oldest method of war, and a method privileged by international law to the present day. Of course the object is not really that human beings should die of hunger. The purpose is only, by pressure upon the stomach, to compel people to make peace." The furious campaign against the sale of munitions of war by the United States to the Allies was conducted with equal indifference to German precedents and to the obvious facts of the case. Another extremely



PROF. OSTWALD.



PROF. ERNST HAECKEL.

popular subject was "reprisals." They were demanded against all and sundry, and the newspapers were perpetually discovering wrongs or indignities done to Germans which called aloud for vengeance. It was in this way that the Germans made themselves responsible for the general internment in the chief belligerent countries of "alien enemies." Two or three months after the outbreak of war, Dr. Karl Peters, the African explorer, who had for many years enjoyed British hospitality after disgracing himself by ill-treatment of African natives, published violent articles, declaring that "the best lot that befalls Germans in England is to rot like dogs." This was followed by numerous lying "interviews" with Germans who had been released from such internment camps as then existed in England and allowed to return home. The German Government was induced to demand the release of all German subjects, and, having failed to obtain this preposterous demand, proceeded to intern all male British subjects in Germany without distinction. With great difficulty arrangements were afterwards made for the exchange of certain classes of civilians.

The general temper of the country swayed, naturally, with the course of military events. But it found constant solace during the first

year of war in the achievements of the German submarines and the raids of Zeppelin airships on England. It was quite seriously believed that, when the "submarine blockade" began on February 18, 1915, England would be completely cut off. And little doubt was felt that the Zeppelins would rapidly produce panic and probably at the least reduce London to ashes.

Let us turn now to the economic situation, and deal first with the question of the food supply. In Germany, more than in any other of the belligerent countries, it dominated politics, and, partly of necessity, partly by choice, Germany pushed it into the forefront of international controversy and made it the basis of her most frantic appeals to neutral opinion, and also of her most violent accusations against Great Britain.

At the beginning of the war ridiculous stories were spread all over the world about the imminence of German starvation. Later on, when Germany, as we shall see, had solved her main problems, it became the fashion to say that the whole discussion of scarcity had been "bluff." The talk of "bluff" was nearly as ridiculous as the talk of "famine." The truth was that as soon as the British Navy

cut her off from the world's seas Germany was faced with the difficult and delicate problem of readjusting her system in such a way as to make good a diminution of her ordinary food supply which, as regarded bread stuffs at any rate, could be estimated at from 15 to 20 per cent. of her total consumption. The problem could be solved upon certain conditions, the chief of which were continued protection of German corn lands from invasion, administrative efficiency, and a general willingness among the people to practise economy and to bear any reasonable sacrifices. There can be no doubt that Germany had made less direct preparation in this than in any other sphere. The main reason was that the all-powerful Prussian agrarians would brook no interference. Eighteen months before the war the Kaiser, in one of his rash and ill-considered speeches, had said: "There is no longer any doubt that Germany not only can now supply, but also will be able for the future to supply, bread and meat for all her people." Although this Imperial utterance was hotly disputed, assumption of its truth was the only basis of calculation, and even after the war broke out very little was done until prices soared up and discontent became general. It was not until nearly six months after the outbreak of war



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STUDY OF A PRUSSIAN HOUSEHOLD HAVING ITS MORNING HATE.



[Barnett.]

SIR EDWARD GREY,

British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

that the Government put into force a really comprehensive system of control.

The first action of the Government was to take a census of the actual supplies in the country. The results were not published, but in the month of November, when the scheme of *maximum* prices was introduced, an official statement said:


We have bread and corn enough to feed the Army and the people until the next harvest. We must be sparing with our supplies in order to start the next harvest year with the necessary reserves. We desire to be able to see the war through under all circumstances until we have won the certainty of a permanent peace. The Government knows that in this desire it is at one with the whole population, and it is convinced that the population will be ready to understand and to promote all measures which this aim requires.

At the same time the Government indicated that there was enough rye for all requirements up to the beginning of September, 1915, and enough meat for all requirements up to the beginning of August, 1915. These calculations took into account the serious damage done to the harvest in East Prussia by the Russians, and in Alsace-Lorraine by the French. They also took into account the very serious fact that the German farmers had wasted large quantities of corn as fodder, when the importation of fodder barley from Russia ceased. The total corn deficit as compared with normal years was probably about 16 per cent. The German harvest of 1914 had been, in spite of all official statements to the contrary, below the average. When, at the end of the year, the German Government desired for obvious reasons to give the other side of the picture, it published the following comparative statis-

tics (in tons) of the harvests of 1914 and 1913:

		1914	1913
Wheat	...	3,971,995	4,655,956
Rye	...	10,426,718	12,222,394
Barley	...	3,137,983	3,673,254
Oats	...	9,038,185	9,713,965
Potatoes	...	45,569,559	54,121,146

Before the autumn of 1914 was far advanced the situation, as might have been expected, became intolerable. The farmers pursued a purely selfish policy, insisting upon maintaining their stocks of cattle at the expense of the bread supply, and encouraging the rise in price of bread corn. Prices not only rose, but varied enormously in different parts of the country. When the Government at last, and rather timidly, intervened, they had to deal with a situation infinitely worse than at the outbreak of war. What they did was to establish *maximum* prices in the markets, and to establish bakery regulations. This was the origin of the famous "war bread," which played almost as important a part in German propaganda abroad as in the sustenance of the German people at home. The basis of the scheme was a *maximum* price of £11 per ton of rye in Berlin. The prices then varied geographically, being lowest in the east, and highest in the west and south—that is, at the points most distant from the main sources of supply. For example, the *maximum* price of rye (which cost £11 in Berlin) was £10 9s. at Königsberg, and £11 17s. at Munich and Aix-la-Chapelle respectively. The *maximum* price of wheat



SIR EDWARD GREY

As he appeared in German War Cartoons.



"THE YEAR OF VICTORY."

German soldier passing the Pillar of Victory in Berlin and saying he must march further before receiving his wreath (*Lustige Blätter*, August, 1915).

was fixed uniformly at £2 more than the local *maximum* price for rye. The price of flour was not fixed, and the Government did not deal at all with the vital problem of potatoes. With certain exceptions, however, the use of rye and wheat as fodder was forbidden, and millers



Victoria!!

THE KAISER EN ROUTE FOR PARIS.
(From *Lustige Blätter*, Jan. 27, 1915.)

were compelled to produce *minimum* percentages of flour from the grain.

The institution of "war bread" consisted in compulsion upon bakers to "mix" their bread. They were required to put at least 10 per cent. of rye into wheat bread, and at least 5 per cent. of potato into rye bread. They were allowed to put 20 per cent. or even more, of potato into their compositions without depriving them of the title of "bread." The next step was to popularize these new kinds of food. As in everything else, the Prussian Royal family was expected to lead the way,



"GOD PUNISHED ENGLAND."

(*Lustige Blätter* Cartoon after bombardment of Yarmouth.)

and the newspapers were soon full of descriptions of the consumption of "war bread" in the Palace at Potsdam, and by the Emperor and Crown Prince in the field. The "sacrifice" entailed does not seem to have been very great. Some towns distinguished themselves by the extreme nastiness of their "war bread," but travellers who tested it in various places came to the conclusion that its bitterness was in no proportion to the sweetness of the feeling that the British attempt "to starve Germany out" had been doomed to failure.

The new scheme came into force on November 4, 1914. It was all very well but for the fact that there was no compulsion on the



"THE SPLENDID ISOLATION."

(*Simplicissimus* Cartoon in March 1915.)

farmers to keep the markets supplied. The scarcity of corn became more acute than ever, and the dealers promptly made use of the differentiation in prices in different parts of the country, which bore no true relation to the cost of transport, in order to sell in the dearest rather than in the nearest market. The Government was profuse in its appeals to the public to practise economy, but before the end of the year it was compelled to revise the whole system. It was announced that new measures

were required in order to insure Germany's ability to survive a "critical" period, which would begin about the middle of May, and end only with the gathering in of the harvest of 1915. As neither the Ministry of the Interior nor any other department was capable of assuming control of the whole matter, it was decided to form a limited liability company, with powers of expropriation, and with the duty of acquiring, conserving, and ultimately distributing, corn supplies. The company,

which was given the name of War Corn Company (*Kriegsgetreidegesellschaft*), was composed of large industrialists, and of towns with a population of more than 100,000. The directors were representatives of the State and industrial magnates. The profits were limited to 5 per cent. of the capital. At the same time the bakery regulations were stiffened, and the proportion of potato to be mixed with rye was increased.

All this was preliminary to the final plunge. Towards the end of January it was announced that the Government had decided to seize all supplies of corn as a monopoly of the Empire, and to establish a new system of distribution and restriction of consumption. Holders of stocks of corn were required to declare them by a fixed date, and the stocks passed into the possession either of the War Corn Company or of local municipal organizations. These bodies dealt with the supply of corn to the mills, and an Imperial administration was set up to deal with the distribution of supplies to the local authorities, which in turn had to regulate the distribution to the public. The essence of the scheme was the establishment of an uniform bread ration. It was originally intended to leave the local authorities free to deal with the distribution of the *quantum* of bread and flour allotted to them, but after a period of uncertainty a system of "bread tickets" was adopted all over the country. The basis of the system was a ration of slightly more than 7 ounces of flour per head per day. The ration was subsequently increased, and exceptions were made for classes of persons engaged in heavy manual work.

When the "bread tickets" were introduced, the Prussian Government issued an explanatory statement, which included the following:

There can be no doubt that this measure goes far deeper into the economic life of our people than all other measures taken during the war. It is, however, necessary, in order to assure a sufficient and regular supply of our people with bread until the next harvest, and it is therefore a vital necessity for the State and for the nation. The measures taken hitherto have not proved sufficient to guarantee an economic use of our supplies of corn, which are indeed in themselves thoroughly sufficient, but are nevertheless limited. In particular, the previous measures did not effectively prevent the use of corn as fodder. There are only two ways open for the attainment of our purpose. Either there must be a quite extraordinary rise in corn prices, which would limit consumption and make the use of corn as fodder impossible, or all corn supplies must be confiscated and distributed to local authorities in proportion to the number of people to be fed. The Federal Governments have decided upon the second

course, in order to spare the German people during the period of war a great increase in the price of bread.


The measure that has been taken gives us the certainty that the scheme of our enemies to starve Germany out has been brought to nothing. It assures us a sufficient supply of bread until the next harvest. It makes our country, in this economic war also, invincible. We are confident that the authorities in all branches and every single official, even though they are not officially bound to co-operate, will work with all their strength for the carrying out of this great task, and will assist the population by their advice and by their actions. We are sure of the willing cooperation of all circles of our people and its economic organizations. Every individual will remember that conscientious obedience to the regulations is a grave and sacred duty to the Fatherland.

The patriotic spirit and the firm will for victory, which in this great time manifest themselves so splendidly in our people, give us the certainty that every man and every woman will do their duty gladly and with joy in making sacrifices. As our heroic troops out there on the ramparts, so we, who stay at home, will and shall for our part hold out victoriously in the great battle for the existence and the honour of the Empire.

The initiation of this scheme necessarily caused a good deal of anxiety, and a certain amount of local disturbance, but as soon as the public discovered that these extraordinary measures did not conceal any real peril of "starvation," they rapidly adapted themselves to circumstances, and the "bread ticket" became as natural a feature of daily life as the "insurance card" and other similar German institutions.

The war pressed heavily upon the German people as a whole, and the longer it continued the more serious became the increase in prices—especially of meat—while the British blockade involved the complete disappearance of many ordinary articles of food. The situation was made good by extraordinary and very well organized economy, and by a general willingness, at any rate among the poorer classes, to make sacrifices "for the Fatherland." All over the country there was systematic instruction in the art of war cookery, and the public took readily to the most extraordinary food substitutes—for example, substitutes for coffee, eggs, butter, and oil. Every inconvenience and hardship was accepted almost as evidence of Germany's "power to hold out." Germany, indeed, earned the compliment paid by Mr. Lloyd George in his tribute to the "potato bread spirit."

As the first year of war drew to a close, the Government was able to announce that there was a surplus in hand of 70,000 tons of wheat and rye remaining from the 1914 harvest, and that the outlook for the coming year was satisfactory. Enormous efforts had been made to increase the crop area, and care had been taken that there should be no repetition of the



MARSHAL VON HINDENBURG.

"May the Spirit of 1914-15 remain with us—Von Hindenburg," is the translation of the autograph inscription above.

scarcity of potatoes. Corn was grown wherever corn could be grown, and imagination was stimulated by the putting under cultivation of open spaces in and about large cities. Towards the end of July, 1915, details were published of a revised scheme of organization. The main features of the scheme which we have described remained unchanged, and as regards prices the basis was as before, £11 per ton of

rye in Berlin; but the organization was simplified and brought more effectively under Government control.

It must not be forgotten that the most important condition of success was the security of German territory against invasion. At the end of the first year of war the German Armies, both east and west, were occupying large areas of enemy territory, and, so far from being



SEEKING NEWS OF THE MISSING

Relatives of Germans in the field at the Casualty Information Bureau, Leipzig.

exposed to the menace of invasion, Prussia was steadily engaged in the "restoration" of her eastern Provinces.

If Germany had made little preparation before the war for the solution of the food supply problem, she had also made comparatively little special preparation for the adaptation of her industry and trade to war conditions. As regards industry, however, her system of organization for the capture of the world's markets had been such that it was comparatively easy for her to concentrate her whole effort upon the purposes of war. The intervention of Great Britain made it obvious that she would sooner or later be cut off from the seas, and lose, at any rate temporarily, the bulk of her foreign trade, which in the year before the war had, according to German statistics, amounted to considerably more than £1,000,000,000. Germany was importing every year raw materials to the value of about £250,000,000, and foodstuffs to the value of about £150,000,000, and she was exporting manufactures worth some £375,000,000. While her oversea trade was in great part doomed to destruction, she could go on trading with the small neutral States that were her neighbours—but even this only so long as these neutrals could resist British and other belligerent

pressure, to which they were naturally subject in view of the necessity for them to maintain their own foreign trade. As we have seen, one of the main objects of German propaganda in neutral countries was to stir up hostility to all British measures which affected neutral trading.

It is not surprising that this state of affairs pressed with special severity upon Hamburg and Bremen, and that these cities developed a quite peculiarly venomous hatred of England. Lübeck, which was open to the Baltic, enjoyed an artificial revival, but Hamburg became almost as dead as Bruges. Herr Ballin, the head of the great Hamburg-Amerika Line, was put out of work, and had to devote himself to new duties of organization in Germany. He and other shipping magnates endeavoured for a time to pretend that nothing was wrong, and two months after the outbreak of war the Director-General of the North German Lloyd, Herr Heineken, was blandly asserting that German shipping had nothing to fear except "a temporary reduction of dividends." But such pretences were soon abandoned. It was much the same with the export trade. At the end of August, 1914, it was triumphantly calculated that during that month the falling off in German exports had been only 44·8 per cent., as compared with the falling off in British exports of 45·1 per cent. It was, how-


ever, very soon decided to publish no export or trade figures at all, and at the end of the year Chambers of Commerce and similar institutions were positively forbidden to issue reports.

Meanwhile Germany set about the task of revising her whole industrial and commercial system, in order to make the most of the home market, and to meet every requirement of war. The history of the first year of war in Germany is the history of an intense and concentrated effort directed solely to the purposes of war, and regarding such possibilities of foreign trade as remained as secondary windfalls. Customs duties on imports were, of course, abandoned, and a veto was put upon the export of everything which Germany required. The first and most important matter to take in hand was the problem of raw materials. It was treated, like everything else, from the point of view that the needs of the military forces must be superior to every other consideration. The Prussian Ministry of War opened a Raw Materials Department under the direction of Herr Walter Rathenau, of the *Allgemeine*



DISTRIBUTING CLOTHING
to the East Prussian refugees in Berlin.

Elektrizitäts-Gesellschaft. This Department obtained a census of all important materials in the country, and kept a tight hand upon them. Care was taken that only what the forces did not need could be used in ordinary trade, and by its hold upon the various industrial organizations the Department stimulated all efforts to use up old material and to provide substitutes.

25 Gramm 1. Woche	25 Gramm 1. Woche	250 Gramm 1. Woche	250 Gramm 1. Woche	50 Gramm 1. Woche	50 Gramm 1. Woche
25 Gramm 1. Woche	25 Gramm 1. Woche	Nicht übertragbar  Nicht übertragbar Berlin und Nachbarorte.		50 Gramm 1. Woche	50 Gramm 1. Woche
25 Gramm 1. Woche	25 Gramm 1. Woche	Ausweis für die Entnahme von Brot und Getreidemehl.		50 Gramm 1. Woche	50 Gramm 1. Woche
25 Gramm 1. Woche	25 Gramm 1. Woche	Gilt nur für die 1. Woche vom 22. bis 28. Februar 1915. Rückseite beachten! I 000000		50 Gramm 1. Woche	50 Gramm 1. Woche
100 Gramm 1. Woche	100 Gramm 1. Woche	250 Gramm 1. Woche	250 Gramm 1. Woche	100 Gramm 1. Woche	100 Gramm 1. Woche

THE GERMAN BREAD TICKET.
As issued to the people of Berlin in February, 1915.



BRITISH PRISONERS IN GERMANY.
Serving out War Bread.

At the same time, by the cooperation of the rival industrial associations, a joint industrial committee was formed for the whole Empire. Under its auspices special committees were constituted for the special industries. These schemes did not work without considerable friction and difficulty, but their main purpose was successfully achieved. Scarcity did not, of course, show itself in all directions at the same time. At one moment the main difficulty was rubber, at another moment it was petrol, at another moment copper. Cotton was the last problem of all, and the Germans succeeded in hiding this great difficulty until almost the end of the first year of war. It was not until abundant evidence showed the seriousness of the cotton situation that the British Government was induced to change its policy, and to declare cotton absolute contraband of war. By that time the Germans had reorganized their cotton trade, and stopped the manufacture for civilian use of all cotton goods that were not absolutely necessary.

The point upon which the Germans insisted with the greatest pride was the rapid and skilful adaptation of their factories and workshops to new purposes. Great electrical works

were soon turned into munition factories; firms which made machinery before the war made shells instead; boiler makers produced field kitchens; umbrella manufacturers produced waterproof clothing, and so on.

This process of adaptation stimulated the imagination of the country, and the newspapers were never tired of explaining that it was a most wonderful exhibition of German genius. This feeling was so strong that people hardly stopped to inquire why the German Navy fulfilled none of the functions—especially the protection of trade—for which it was supposed to have been built. Isolation became a virtue, and a whole literature sprang up, reviving the doctrines of Fichte, and glorifying the “self-contained commercial State” as an ideal. Public interest was also encouraged by appeals for the systematic collection of all unused materials which might help to make good the deficiency in imports. Thus there was an Imperial metal week, and an Imperial wool week, during which German patriots brought the contents of their cupboards and lumber rooms to collecting centres, and offered them up on the altar of German sacrifice. A copper collecting scheme achieved

special popularity, and the women and children produced a wonderful assortment of pots and pans to be made into ammunition for the destruction of Germany's enemies.

For the reasons already explained, it is impossible to gauge the real extent to which industry and trade were maintained. German writers confined their attention almost entirely to the iron and coal industries. There is no reason to doubt the assertion that in the course of 1915 the production of coal was brought up to about 70 per cent., and the production of iron and steel up to about 60 per cent. of the peace figures. Germany took away, of course, all the raw materials that could be found in France and Belgium, and seized large quantities of machinery.

The most serious question of all was perhaps the supply of labour. As to this, the main point to observe is that Germany was enabled to economise and to use to the last ounce all the labour that was available. Side by side with the control of industry and the adaptation which we have described went a highly developed system of control and distribution of

labour. Of course the distribution could not be quite uniform, and the trades which could not adapt themselves to war purposes had to suffer immediately, in addition to all their other troubles, by the withdrawal of men. As in England, great changes were effected in regard to women's work, and there was so much of it in the market that unemployment among women continued to be serious. A neutral correspondent of *The Times*, describing the situation in June, 1915, said that 40 per cent. of the workers engaged in the manufacture of high explosives and shells and in the packing of cartridges were women. They formed 15 per cent. of the "hands" occupied in the making of harness, saddles, bridles, and other leather goods used for military purposes; 50 per cent. of the makers of tents, shelters, haversacks, and other equipment; 33 per cent. of the workers in pharmaceutical industries; 15 per cent. of the surgical instrument makers; and 20 per cent. of the field-glass producers; 75 per cent. of all the employees in the tinned meat and conserve factories working exclusively on Army contracts were women; a



BRITISH PRISONERS IN GERMANY.

Dinner time.



A GERMAN FIRST-AID AND "REFRESHMENT" STATION IN EAST PRUSSIA.

similar number were engaged in textile mills providing the clothing for the soldiers; and 70 per cent. of the tobacco workers were women. But it does not seem that the most important industries were ever in serious danger. This was due in part to the efficient working of the Labour Exchanges, but above all to the character of the German military system. Every German of military age was a potential soldier, liable at any time to be called to the colours. Moreover, the country was and remained under martial law, and the local military authorities kept just as sharp an eye to problems of industry and labour as to their purely military business. Strikes were impossible. "Pilfering" of labour was impossible. Whenever difficulties of any sort seemed likely to arise, military intervention was certain. Another

called to the colours, and the proportion of unemployment at different periods:

Date.	Member-ship.	On Active Service.	Unem-ployed.
August 1, 1914 ...	533,814	Nil.	13,132
August 29, 1914 ...	377,756	143,343	73,895
October 31, 1914 ...	348,271	172,202	27,727
January 30, 1915 ...	316,822	199,760	8,318
May 1, 1915 ...	291,526	228,594	4,593
July 31, 1915 ...	264,677	259,529	3,414

Regarding the industrial and commercial situation as a whole, it must be said that the upheaval caused by the war was less intolerable than might have been expected. So-called "luxury" industries, which could command a supply neither of raw materials nor of labour, and could not be converted into "war" industries, were squeezed out of existence. There was great suffering in the distributing trades, although the vast proportion of the



TRANSPORTING GERMAN HIGH-EXPLOSIVE SHELLS IN WICKER BASKETS.

and not unimportant factor was the systematic use that the Germans made of the labour of prisoners of war. It was especially valuable to the farmers, but large numbers of prisoners were also employed in the mines, and in various forms of skilled work.

The immediate consequence of the outbreak of war was a considerable increase in unemployment. Before the end of August, 1914, unemployment in skilled trades was more than 22 per cent. But the figures fell very rapidly, and in the spring of 1915 they were at or below the ordinary peace level. The whole movement of the labour market is well shown by the following returns published at the end of a year of war by the largest labour organization in Germany—the Metal Workers' Union. It illustrates the fluctuations in trade union membership, the rate at which men were

men normally employed in them were in the field. On the other hand all the "war" industries were not only very busy but immensely prosperous. The great syndicates and combines reaped a large harvest, and the war profits soon became a public scandal, so that the Government was compelled to promise a scheme of special taxation—after the war. Almost the most serious anxiety was the question whether the industries and trades that had so successfully been turned to the purposes of war could with equal facility be turned back again to the purposes of peace. What, in particular, was the prospect of the recovery of foreign markets by a people whose methods of warfare had not only horrified the whole world, but warned every nation of the consequences which followed close upon the heels of "peaceful penetration" by Germans?

We have already described (Vol. I., pp. 196 *et seq.*) the main features of the financial situation in Germany at the outbreak of war and the special machinery which was then set up. On August 4, 1914, the Reichstag had voted war credits to the amount of £250,000,000. One year later the total amount of war credits voted was brought up to £1,500,000,000. In December there was a vote of £250,000,000; in March 1915 came the third vote of £500,000,000; and in August 1915 came the fourth vote, also of £500,000,000.

One of the special measures taken at the outbreak of war was to authorize the Empire to discount three-month Imperial Bills instead of Treasury Bills. The result was that the stock of Bills in the Imperial Bank, which a week before the war was only £37,500,000, increased by the end of August to £237,500,000. At the end of March 1915 the amount of Bills was not less than £343,000,000. Similarly, the amount of notes in circulation rose from about £95,000,000 at the end of July 1914 to nearly £212,000,000 at the end of August, to more than £280,000,000 at the end of March, and to more than £290,000,000 at the end of June 1915. In other words, the mobilization of the German armies was financed by the creation of paper, and the pressure on the

Imperial Bank, which throughout was very heavy, became most severe immediately before the issue of War Loans.

Early in September the Government made the first War Loan issue. It took the form of £50,000,000 of 5 per cent. Treasury Bonds with a five years' currency, and a 5 per cent. Loan of undefined amount, irredeemable until 1924. The price of both the Treasury Bills and the Loan was 97½. During the ten days in which the lists remained open, a tremendous propaganda was carried on in the Press. Savings Banks were mobilized and every sort of appeal was made to the public. The following quotation from an official newspaper article is typical:

The victories which our glorious Army has already won in the west and east justify the hope that now, as in 1870, the expenses and burdens of the war will fall ultimately upon those who have disturbed the peace of the German Empire. But first we must help ourselves. Great interests are at stake. The enemy still expects salvation from our supposed financial weakness. The success of the Loan must baffle this hope.

German capitalists, show that you are inspired by the same spirit as our heroes, who shed their hearts' blood in the fight. Germans who have saved money, show that you have saved, not only for yourselves, but also for the Fatherland. German corporations, companies, savings banks, and all institutions which have blossomed and grown up under the powerful protection of the Empire, repay the Empire with your gratitude in this hour of fate. German banks and bankers, show what your brilliant organization and your influence on your customers are able to produce.




BISMARCK'S BIRTHDAY: CELEBRATIONS IN BERLIN, APRIL 1, 1915.
A group of distinguished personages led by Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, the German Chancellor, Bismarck's grandson, and Herr Kämpf, President of the Reichstag, proceeding to the memorial service.

The results were satisfactory. The total amount of subscriptions was £223,000,000, and a remarkable feature was the large number of small subscriptions. There were, for example, 231,000 subscriptions of from £5 to £10, 241,000 subscriptions of from £15 to £25, 453,000 subscriptions of from £30 to £100, and 157,000 subscriptions between £100 and £250. Probably about £40,000,000 came from the Savings Banks. A considerable sum came from the pledging of securities with the special War Banks, which were set up for this very purpose, but it must be admitted that the use made of these institutions was not so great as had been expected. The war lending institutions, established in connexion with the Imperial Bank, were authorized to issue their special paper up to a total amount of £150,000,000, but according to the published statistics the amount of paper actually issued never exceeded £79,000,000. This total was reached in April 1915 in connexion with subscriptions to the second War Loan.

It was soon recognized that the control of the Treasury in war time was too much for the commonplace official Herr Kühn, who had been in office since the beginning of 1912. Herr Kühn succumbed to his chronic gout, and a young and able director of the Deutsche Bank, Dr. Helfferich, was appointed to succeed him. He was a man of large ideas, who regarded the affairs of State from a purely businesslike point of view. He was by no means above methods of advertisement, and after the success of the first War Loan he had produced a bombastic pamphlet for neutral countries, in which he said that the German Loan "overshadowed in importance the largest financial operations yet known in history," and that Germany had performed "a feat unique in the history of finance." He had also qualified for Ministerial office by the publication of an extremely misleading analysis of the causes of the war.

In March 1915 the second War Loan issue was made—this time an unlimited amount both of Treasury Bonds and Imperial Loan, with interest as before at 5 per cent., but with the price raised from 97½ to 98½. The second loan, like the first, was irredeemable until 1924. The issue was hailed as a great success, and produced no less than £450,000,000, the number of subscriptions being officially stated to be nearly 1,700,000. No accurate information was forthcoming regarding the various sources of these subscriptions, and an official announce-



BISMARCK CELEBRATION IN BERLIN.
A parade of students in front of the Bismarck statue on April 1, 1915.

ment that the Savings Banks provided only about £98,000,000 was soon proved to be far below the mark. The result was a triumph of organization and of public propaganda, and the Government no doubt succeeded in raking in a great part of the "war savings" which had been made by the profitable business of supplying the forces, and in the country districts by the high prices obtained for the harvest. At the time of the second War Loan issue Dr. Helfferich made his first appearance in the Reichstag and loudly proclaimed the doctrine that Germany had only to "carry on" to victory, and then recoup herself at the enemy's expense. He said:

The future development of the Imperial Debt depends upon the result of the war. We shall not be able to refrain, and we do not think of refraining, from making our enemies pay for the material loss which falls upon us on account of the war begun by them.

He described the British method of increasing taxation in war time as "useless adhesion to tradition." He estimated the total cost of the war to all the belligerents to be at that time £75,000,000 a week.

The success of the second War Loan was regarded as an immense victory. In a message



THE KAISER AND HIS ADVISERS,

1st (back) Row: Von Mackensen, Von Moltke, Crown Prince, Von Francois, Von Ludendorff, Von Falkenhayn, Von Einem, Von Beseler, Von Bethmann-Hollweg, Von Heeringen.
 2nd Row: Von Bülow, Crown Prince of Bavaria, Duke of Wurtemberg, Von Kluck, Von Emmich, Von Haeseler, Von Hindenburg, Von Tirpitz.
 Kaiser.

of congratulation the Kaiser declared that it was "a manifestation of the will to conquer and of the confidence in victory of the German people, relying in God."

Although the proceeds of the second War Loan were exhausted, and the Government was again financing the war by Treasury Bills, the third War Loan was not issued until September 1915. It was again a 5 per cent. issue, but included this time no Treasury Bonds. The price of issue was raised to 99—chiefly for purposes of demonstration. It was admitted that war loan enthusiasm had diminished, but success was confidently awaited, especially on the ground that the position of the banks was again strong, and that the Savings Banks deposit now amounted to more than £1,000,000,000. Dr. Helfferich now estimated Germany's war expenditure at about £100,000,000 a month. He again sought to inspire confidence by insisting on the prospect of a large war indemnity, saying:

If we desire the possibility of shaping a peace in accordance with our needs and our vital requirements, we must not forget the question of cost. We must see to it that the whole future livelihood of our people shall, so far as is in any way possible, be relieved of the burden. The leaden weight of thousands of millions is due to the people who got up this war. They, not we, shall drag it along with them. Of course, we know that this is a matter of peculiar difficulty, but everything that can be done in this direction shall be done.

In addition to the increased insistence on indemnity prospects, the Germans at this time were becoming more and more enamoured of the doctrine that they were "self-contained and self-supporting," carrying on the war by exploitation of their own internal resources while other peoples piled up debt, and making "finance" consist in payments from one pocket to the other. It was almost seriously maintained that this process could be continued indefinitely. This comfortable doctrine was also used to allay anxiety at the fact that foreign exchanges remained entirely unsatisfactory, the value of the mark falling 12, 14, or even 16 per cent. in every neutral country, from Sweden to Brazil. The German public was urgently implored to sell foreign, and especially American, securities in order to invest the proceeds in the German War Loan, thereby "taking advantage" of the "temporary" depreciation in German currency.

Meanwhile the Germans kept a discreet veil over the affairs of their Allies. In Austria-Hungary there was no attempt to publish a Bank Return or to give any other clue to the

deplorable state of finance and trade. Turkey was soon living on paper money with no better backing than imaginary hoards of gold "for Turkish account" in Berlin banks. Even in Germany the situation was carefully concealed by a permanent veto upon publication of stock exchange prices. There was a good deal of speculation in the shares of industrial concerns which profited, or were likely to profit, by the war, but the transactions were secret, and great pressure was employed by the Government to check speculation which was supposed to endanger the prospects of the War Loans.

After the first few months of the war the German States—and the municipalities—sup-



GERMANY'S SHORTAGE OF COPPER.

Owing to the shortage of copper, teachers were instructed to request their scholars to collect and bring copper articles to school.

pressed all information about their finances, and it was merely announced that they were in entire agreement with the Imperial Government. The *Frankfurter Zeitung* admitted in February 1915 that all the State budgets had been thrown into confusion. They seem, indeed, to have contented themselves with periodical issues of Treasury Bills as and when need arose.

During the first year of war the pride and joy of the Imperial Bank and of the whole people consisted in the accumulation of gold. Before and on the eve of war Germany had obtained all the imports of gold that were possible, and much annoyance was caused by



"POUR LE MÉRITE."

The Archduke Frederic of Austria obtains the Order from the Kaiser.

the increase of the Bank Rate in London, four days before the war, to 10 per cent. The stock of gold in the Imperial Bank on July 30, 1914, was returned at something over £62,000,000. Little by little and by intense effort, it was increased to £120,000,000, and the amount was only slightly below that figure at the end of the first year of war. The total was increased by December 1914 to £100,000,000, chiefly by the total suspension of specie payments, and there was then an immense campaign of collection. The public were told that it was an imperative duty to let "patriotism become the key to the most carefully guarded money chest." An "Imperial gold week" was organized, and school children were rewarded if they brought gold coins to school to be exchanged for paper. Women were urged, and to a considerable extent induced, to offer up rings and ornaments "for the Fatherland." The sum obtained was large, but it was not nearly so large as had been expected.

In one way and another, then, Germany succeeded in creating and maintaining a tolerable financial situation. Above all, and thanks to successes in the field, the public was satisfied.

There was no apparent disposition to enquire too closely into the real situation, and the steady flow of money into the Savings Banks was a fair proof of the general sense of confidence and security.

We have said that the first outburst of jubilation about the war did not last long, and it will appear obvious that the economic conditions which we have just described were not calculated to promote enthusiasm, especially when it was proved again and again that the Allies could not be separated by diplomatic intrigues, and when it was seen that German successes did not frighten Italy, Germany's own ally, nor produce among neutral states generally the effects which according to all German theory ought to have been produced. As the struggle progressed there was increasing gloom among the people at home. This was proved by the calm with which news even of the greatest victories in the East was received, and by the constant complaints about difficulties and privations. Letters from home that were found on German prisoners amply illustrated the last point, and it was found necessary to publish repeated appeals to German women not to distress the men at the front by gloomy descriptions, but to write cheerfully and bear privations patiently. Both public speeches and newspaper articles during the greater part of the first year of war insisted less upon the prospects of positive victory than upon Germany's "ability to hold out." *Wir werden durchhalten* was the constant refrain, and it was usually added, "We shall win because we have got to win."

The enormous casualties of the German armies had a very depressing effect from an early stage of the war, and it was found desirable to start a movement against the wearing of mourning in public. After the appearance of the first few casualty lists the newspapers were forbidden to publish any but local casualties, together with the names of officers killed, and the public had either to purchase the lists as issued by the military authorities or to visit the military buildings or municipal offices where they were displayed.

The whole matter of "celebration" of victories was, like everything else, organized by the Government. When it was decided that a celebration was desirable, orders were given that the bells should be rung, and flags were hoisted on public buildings as a signal

to the people to display flags on all the houses. At the same time the schools were closed for a day, after the teachers had delivered appropriate patriotic addresses. The best organization sometimes breaks down, and there was a ridiculous exposure of the defects of the system at the time of the great Austro-German drive in Galicia at the beginning of May, 1915. This was the most critical stage of the negotiations with Italy, and in his haste to create the desired impression the Kaiser sent orders to Berlin for celebration of a triumph, unfortunately without supplying any information about what had happened. Some people said that "the great battle in the North Sea" had at last taken place, others that "20,000 French had been taken prisoners," others that the Russians had lost 180,000 men. In Munich crowds filled the streets all day, quarrelling as to whether the victory had been won by Hindenburg or by an Austrian. The *Tägliche Rundschau* boldly complained of the failure of the authorities "to spare the nerves of the people," and said:

Were we in any way impatient? There was not a trace of the public hysteria which prevails in France. We lived in the calmest confidence, and Herr Hindenburg had unlimited credit upon which he could have fed for weeks and months. And now this obscure sensation is

officially thrown to the public. When the flags have been flying for half a day on every official building we should like to know why and for what reason. Has anybody considered what foreign countries will say when they are told that the whole capital of the German Empire is floating in flags without any human being having half an idea of the reason?

The effect of the official blunder was all the more bitter because there had after all been a real and important victory, and public confidence in the authorities had received a quite unnecessary shock. Even the German public was capable of understanding that German strategy was not infallible. They had been promised in vain during the first months of the war, first Paris, then Warsaw, and then again Dunkirk and Calais.

Another unfortunate mistake on the part of the authorities was the too liberal distribution of military awards. From the very beginning there was a wholesale distribution of Iron Crosses. Before the war the possession of an Iron Cross was a rare distinction and a cherished memory of the war of 1870. Iron Crosses soon became as plentiful as blackberries. According to official statistics there had up to the end of March, 1915, been distributed five Grand Crosses, 6,488 Iron Crosses of the First Class, and 338,261 Iron Crosses of the Second Class.



TO HONOUR THE IRON CROSS.
A parade of German troops.



IN A GERMAN HOSPITAL AT BERLIN.
Princess August Wilhelm visits the wounded soldiers.

During the whole of the war of 1870 only 1,304 Iron Crosses of the First Class and 45,791 Iron Crosses of the Second Class had been distributed. At the end of the first year the Kaiser began profuse distribution even of the famous Prussian Order *Pour le Mérite*. It was conferred upon all the commanders in the East, and even upon the German Crown Prince and the other commanders in the West. At the same time the Iron Cross, with a white instead of a black ribbon, was conferred upon all sorts of civilians for their services in administration and organization. Matters were made worse by favouritism. When it became almost a disgrace for officers not to wear the Iron Cross it will be understood that the claims of the private soldier were apt to be neglected.

A Germany thrown upon her own internal resources and shut in, and at the same time taught to believe that Zeppelins and big guns were the unparalleled expressions of German genius and that submarines were really almost a German monopoly, not unnaturally gave way to strange excesses of "national" sentiment. Pan-Germanism took new shapes and directions. Great efforts were made to rid the German vocabulary of all foreign words. The police conducted systematic raids upon signs and advertisements containing foreign expressions of any sort. German women were even required to make the patriotic sacrifice of

submission to German fashions, and eager societies were formed for the promotion of Germanism in hats. It was also seriously maintained that the German Universities—not content with the abandonment by German Professors of their foreign degrees and academic distinctions—should close their doors entirely both to foreign students and foreign influences. The main argument was that German science was so infinitely superior that its fruits must be retained for German use and for the domination of the world. In a word, Germanism ran riot through all classes of society.

The circumstances in which Germany had provoked the war, and the very nature of the war and of her internal problems, made it necessary for the German leaders to concentrate their attention on the maintenance of domestic unity and on the preservation for as long a time as possible of the fiction that Germany had been "fallen upon" and had to defend her existence. Hence, while the sessions of the Reichstag and of the various State Diets were restricted as much as possible, and public meetings were rare, all official utterances in the greater part of the first year of war which were not concerned with technical details or economic problems returned invariably to the German doctrine of the origins of the war and attempted to confirm its defensive character. It is,

indeed, hardly worth while to waste more words on such gatherings as those of the Reichstag in December 1914 and January 1915. As regards political unity, it has already been said that the Socialists gave no trouble. From time to time they discussed in secret their favourite academic question—whether they ought to vote supplies in a non-Socialist State. They decided the question three times in the affirmative sense, although there was a fairly large minority. Their Press in great part remained sober and moderate in its language, although some of the provincial Socialist organs, especially at Hamburg and in parts of Saxony, became violently chauvinist and peculiarly Anglophobe, and attacked the attitude of the official Socialist organ, *Vorwärts*. In June 1915 the Socialist party summoned up its courage to produce a manifesto containing the following passage :

We utter afresh the sharpest protest against all efforts and proclamations in favour of annexing foreign territory and of doing violence to the territory of others, such as have been made public by the demands of great economic associations and the speeches of leading non-Socialist politicians. The mere fact that such efforts are made postpones yet further the peace for which the whole people so ardently yearns. The people desire no annexations. The people desire peace.

If the war, which daily demands fresh sacrifices, is not to be indefinitely prolonged and to last until all nations are utterly exhausted, one of the belligerent Powers must extend the hand of peace. Germany, who, attacked by greatly superior forces, has hitherto victoriously kept her enemies at bay, brought to naught the scheme of starvation, and proved herself invincible, ought to take the first step towards the attainment of peace.




PROF. ISRAEL, THE FAMOUS BERLIN SURGEON.

In the Empress's Hospital train.


In the name of humanity and *Kultur*, and strengthened by the favourable military situation created by the valour of our comrades in arms, we call upon the Government to declare itself ready to enter into peace negotiations, in order to bring the bloody struggle to an end.

This manifesto was a mere flash in the pan, and had no other result than the very temporary suspension of the newspapers which published it. It was really only part of a controversy about the right to discuss Germany's aggressive intentions at all, and when, as we shall see, after the successes against Russia in May, June, July and August, the Government thought fit to lift a little of the veil, the Socialists made not the slightest effort to stem the tide.



GERMAN WOUNDED IN A CONVALESCENT HOME.

Passing away the time making paper chess-boards.



MODEL TRENCHES IN BERLIN.

To view these trenches visitors paid entrance fees, which were given to Red Cross Societies.

Apart from the Socialists, there was no material whatever which could have made an Opposition. We need not consider the tendencies of the various parties, little divergent as they were. The only point that needs to be observed is that the war had put an end for the time to the old antagonism between economic interests—between the agrarians and the industrialists. When Germany was thrown on her own resources they entered into a natural alliance. The agrarians in particular could claim that they had not only maintained the strength of the military forces, but that every German owed to them his daily bread. As for the Roman Catholic Centre Party—really the strongest effective force of all—it need only be said that after the intervention of Italy it conceived that it had a double stake set upon the success of the Central Powers.*

In putting, as it did at a very early stage, an absolute veto upon the discussion of German aims (*Kriegsziele*), the Government may have

* The strength of the principal parties in the Reichstag was on Nov. 1, 1914, Socialists, 110; Centre Party, 91; Conservatives, 53; Radicals, 45; and National Liberals, 44.

considered the inadvisability of raising hopes which might be too rudely disturbed by military failure. But the main consideration was the need to maintain the pretence that Germany had no "aims." During the month of February the Imperial Chancellor went so far as to rebuke in his official organ, the *North German Gazette*, those who wanted to discuss "romantic schemes of conquest." The veto upon discussion was described as the "well-weighed decision of the political and military leaders." There was no "desire to exclude the cooperation of the German people," and "when the time came" the Government would be "grateful for the support of a strong public will." As a matter of fact, the rule against discussion had on several occasions been broken—notably in a demand for the annexation of Belgium which was contained in a speech by the National Liberal Leader, Herr Bassermann, and in a "New Year message" in which Herr Ballin had said:

The mischievous interference which is bringing our oversea trade almost to a standstill is possible for the English Navy only because the North Sea area proved liable to easy blockade. . . . We must out and away beyond the North Sea area, and seek a naval base which in future, at any rate in this part of the world, will

assure to us the same possibilities that England enjoys and ruthlessly exploits.


There was not really any doubt about German appetites. In March a joint petition in favour of free discussion was addressed to the Imperial Chancellor by all the important industrial and agricultural organizations of the Empire. It declared that the whole German people was inspired by a single powerful will—that Germany should emerge from the war “greater and stronger, with secured frontiers in west and east, and with the European and Colonial extensions of territory which are necessary for the security of Germany’s sea power, as well as for military and economic reasons.” The Imperial Chancellor replied with fresh admonitions, saying that these “polemics against a decision of the highest military and civil authorities” were untimely, and “would not accelerate victory in the field.” In June—this was the occasion of the Socialist manifesto to which we have referred—the King of Bavaria blurted out the admission that he had rejoiced at the intervention of Great Britain in the war, because he saw the hope of an extension of German frontiers in south and west, and the fulfilment of his

dreams of better connexion of South Germany with the sea.

So matters went on through the summer. The attitude of the Imperial Chancellor exposed him to attack, and there was a more or less determined attempt to get rid of him when the conflict with the United States arose out of the sinking of the *Lusitania*, and Grand Admiral von Tirpitz, who had staked his reputation on the success of the “submarine blockade” of Great Britain, resisted all idea of concessions to American demands. In August, before the meeting of the Reichstag, the National Liberals, after their leader, Herr Bassermann, had had a personal dispute with the Imperial Chancellor, adopted, and published, a resolution demanding outright “extension of the German frontiers in east and west and over seas.”

By this time, however, little attempt was still made to conceal at any rate the general character of Germany’s ambitions. Upon the anniversary of the outbreak of war the Kaiser issued a long and jubilant manifesto, with the following very significant conclusion :

In heroic action we suffer and work without wavering until peace comes, a peace which offers us the necessary military, political, and economic guarantees (*Sicherheiten*)



GETTING FIT TO RETURN TO THE TRENCHES.

German wounded undergoing scientific treatment in a Berlin hospital.

for the future, and which fulfils the conditions necessary for the unhindered development of our producing energy at home and on the free seas.

In the political slang of the time the expressions "the necessary military, political and economic guarantees" and "the free seas" meant everything that the "annexationists" could ask. They were well satisfied.

Soon afterwards the *Paris Temps* was able to publish the text of a second petition which had been submitted to the Government in May by the representative industrial and economic organizations—the Agrarian League, the two Peasants' Leagues, the Central Union of German Industrialists, the League of Industrialists, and the Union of the Middle Classes. This very important document removed a great deal of what *The Times* called "the drapery with which Germany has sought to hide from innocent neutrals the true scope of her ambitions." We will give the main passages in full.

After asserting that the war must produce "an extension of German power," the signatories said :

Together with a colonial Empire which will fully satisfy the numerous economic interests of Germany, together with guarantees for the future of our trade and our fiscal system, and together with an indemnity both sufficient and of an appropriate kind, we regard the principal aim of the struggle which has been put upon us as consisting in a guarantee and an improvement of the European basis of the German Empire.

The chief direct claims against the British Empire were contained in this comprehensive formula. About the Continent of Europe the


petition was more precise. It dealt first with Belgium :

Because it is necessary to assure our credit at sea and our military and economic situation for the future *vis-à-vis* England, and because the territory of Belgium, which is of such great economic importance, is closely linked with our principal industrial territory, Belgium must be placed under the legislation of the German Empire as regards monetary, financial, and postal questions. The Belgian railways and waterways must be closely linked up with our communications. By constituting a Walloon area and a preponderant Flemish area, and by placing in German hands the economic enterprises and properties so important for the domination of the country, we shall organize government and administration in such a way that the inhabitants will not be able to acquire any influence upon the political destinies of the German Empire.

The writers then turned to France :

As regards France, and always bearing in mind our situation *vis-à-vis* the English, it is a vital interest for us, with a view to our future at sea, that we should hold the coastal region bordering on Belgium up to about the Somme. This will give us an outlet on the Atlantic Ocean. The hinterland which must be acquired at the same time must be of such extent that, both economically and strategically, the ports at which the canals terminate can assume their full importance. It is necessary to annex the mine basins of Briey, but no further territorial conquests ought to be made in France except in consequence of considerations of military strategy. As regards this matter, it is very natural, after the experiences of this war, that we should not expose our frontiers to fresh invasions by leaving to our enemy the fortresses which threaten us, especially Verdun and Belfort, and the western spurs of the Vosges situated between these two fortresses.

By the conquest of the line of the Meuse and of the French coast, with the outlets of the canals, we should acquire, in addition to the iron districts of Briey already indicated, the coal areas in the Departments of the Nord and the Pas-de-Calais. These territorial increases—as is a matter of course after our experiences in Alsace-Lorraine—assume that the population of the annexed territories will not be able to obtain a political influence upon the destinies of the German Empire, and that all



WOMEN TRAM CONDUCTORS IN BERLIN.
Taking lessons in the mechanism of electric trams.

the sources of economic power in these territories, including properties large and small, will pass into German hands. France will indemnify the proprietors and absorb them.

Having thus disposed of the west, the petitioners explained that the industrial gains there must be balanced by an increase of agricultural territory at the expense of Russia. They said:

It is necessary to strengthen the agrarian foundation of our economic system. We must make possible a German agrarian colonization on a large scale, and the repatriation upon German territory of German peasants living abroad, and especially in Russia. We must also largely augment the number of our nationals capable of bearing arms. All this demands a considerable extension of the Eastern frontiers of our Empire and of Prussia by the annexation at least of certain parts of the Baltic Provinces and of the territories to the south of them, without losing sight of the necessity for making possible the military defence of the Eastern frontier.

In order to reconstitute Eastern Prussia, it is absolutely necessary to protect the frontiers by including certain strips of territory. East Prussia, Posen, and Silesia must no longer remain our outer marches, exposed as they are at present.

The memorandum said that what had been stated about the population of the areas annexed in the west held good in the east also, and remarked that the war indemnity to be demanded of Russia should consist in great part of cessions of territory.

Finally there was an elaborate explanation of the economic reasons for seizure of the French coal districts by Germany. It was argued, in particular, that if Germany's enemies were to hold the chief of the world's sources of mineral oil, Germany must secure all her requirements of gas coal and soft coal.

The evidence was already overwhelming, but the last touch was added on August 19, 1915, when the Imperial Chancellor delivered a speech in the Reichstag which confessed Germany's ambitions before all the world. Once more, but with unwonted violence of language and with much deliberate perversion of the truth, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg protested Germany's innocence and love of peace, proclaimed the "blood-guilt" of her enemies, and charged England in particular with the responsibility for the failure of diplomatic efforts to procure an arrangement between England and Germany in the years before the war, and to avert war when the great crisis came. But the real significance of the speech, which was hailed with enormous satisfaction throughout the Empire and brought the Imperial Chancellor public orations and an unexpected popularity, was that it marked the abandonment of the fiction of "Germany's defensive war." The



A HUGE WOODEN STATUE OF FIELD-MARSHAL VON HINDENBURG,

Which was erected in the Siegesallee in Berlin. The public hammered nails into the statue on payment of a certain sum to war charities.

fall of Warsaw, Ivangorod and Kovno and the conquest of Galicia and Poland were the signal for German diplomacy also to take the offensive. The vital passages of the speech ran as follows:

The world which arises out of this war shall and will not wear the aspect of which our enemies dream. They strive for the restoration of the old Europe, with a powerless Germany in the midst of it as the playground for foreign intrigues and covetousness and if possible as the battlefield of Europe—a Germany in which impotent little States shall be at foreign beck and call, a Germany with her industries shattered and carrying on only petty trading in her home markets, without a navy, a Germany the vassal of the gigantic Russian Empire.

No, this tremendous world-war will not restore the old conditions. A new system will arise. If Europe ever comes to peace, it can be only by the establishment of an inviolable and strong Germany. The English policy of the balance of power must disappear. . . .

Germany must so build up, fortify and strengthen her position that the other Powers shall never again think of a policy of hemming Germany in. For the protection and welfare of ourselves and of all peoples, we must win the liberation of the world seas—not as England desires to do, in order to rule them alone, but in order that they may be at the service of all peoples in equal degree. . . .

This war has shown of what greatness we are capable, when we rely on our own moral strength. We do not hate the peoples that have been driven into war against us by their Governments. But we have got over our sentimentality. We shall see the fight through, until those peoples demand peace from the really guilty, until the road becomes free for a new Europe, liberated from French intrigues, Muscovite passion of conquest, and English guardianship.

To this insolent challenge to Europe Sir Edward Grey promptly published a scathing reply. What was the German programme? Germany to control the destiny of all other nations—Germany to be supreme and alone to be free—"free to break international treaties; free to crush when it pleased her; free to refuse all mediation; free to go to war when it suited her; free, when she did go to war, to break again all rules of civilization and humanity on land and at sea; and, while she may act thus, all her commerce at sea is to remain as free in time of war as all commerce is in time of peace. . . . Not on such terms can peace be concluded or the life of other nations than Germany be free or even tolerable."

At the same time Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg's speech led to overwhelming disclosures concerning the efforts of Germany to assure herself of the neutrality of Great Britain before she proceeded to attack Russia and France. In view of grossly misleading statements by the German Chancellor, directed to show that England had prevented the peaceful settlement of differences with Germany and had refused benevolent offers made in the interests of peace, the British Government was forced to publish a full account of the unfortunate negotiations which Lord Haldane, then a member of the Government, had been permitted to conduct in Berlin in 1912. Germany had, under the cloak of willingness to abandon some part of a

measure then being prepared for the increase of the German navy, demanded a neutrality treaty which would have prevented Great Britain from giving assistance in war to Russia or France, while Germany remained free to participate in a war against those Powers in fulfilment of the terms of the Triple Alliance. This disclosure confirmed the opinion which had become general in England regarding the dangerous influence exerted by Lord Haldane in the years before the war. What was more important, it disposed for ever of the excuses and prevarications of Germany, and stripped bare her persistent and determined scheme for the domination of Europe.

In a year of war Germany had given a remarkable demonstration of her military power, of the patriotism of her people, of the great strength and resources of the country, and of her unsurpassed efficiency in organization and administration. She had shown little sign either of war weariness or of political, moral or economic exhaustion. But she stood alone. She held the reins at Vienna and Budapest, and her puppets governed Turkey. Her strength and her violence had made a certain impression. But, just as she had been abandoned, in spite of all material temptations, by her ally Italy, she had won neither friends nor sympathy nor approval. She had only hardened with all her blows the courage and resolution of all the nations whom she had driven to war, and wherever in all the wide world men believed in human ideals and cherished national independence and liberty, it was realized that no peace could be tolerable but a peace that put an end to Germany's arrogant ambitions and lust of conquest.



CHAPTER LXXXVII.

THE WORK OF THE CANADIAN CONTINGENT.

CANADA AND THE SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES—STRENGTHENING THE IMPERIAL TIE—THE MEMORIAL SERVICE AT ST. PAUL'S CATHEDRAL—THE FULL COST OF WAR—ANGER OVER THE USE OF POISONOUS GAS—ARMY OF 150,000 MEN PLANNED—THE PRINCESS PATRICIA'S REGIMENT—FIRST DAYS IN FRANCE—WINTER LIFE IN THE TRENCHES—FIGHTING AT ST. ELOI—OFFICERS KILLED—THE GREAT FIGHT OF MAY 8—THE FIRST CONTINGENT LEAVES FOR FRANCE—FIGHTING QUALITIES OF THE CANADIANS—THE ROSS RIFLE—SOME MISCONCEPTIONS IN FRANCE—M. MAURICE BARRES ON THE CANADIANS—MORAL AND PHYSIQUE OF THE MEN—CANADIANS AND THE BRITISH SOLDIER—SIR JOHN FRENCH'S OPINION—RELATIONS BETWEEN OFFICERS AND MEN—DISCIPLINE—RESOURCE—BACKWOOD WILE—GENERAL ALDERSON—TAKING OVER TRENCHES—THE CONTINGENT IN ACTION—THE FOUR CHIEF FIGHTS—THE CANADIAN CAVALRY—SECOND CONTINGENT ARRIVES—SIR ROBERT BORDEN VISITS ENGLAND—THE SPIRIT OF CANADA.

THE story of the great fight of the Canadian Division at St. Julien sent a thrill of pride through the Empire. The Canadian people themselves would be the first to disclaim and to protest against any attempt to picture the gallantry, the dash, and the stubborn valour of their men as something overshadowing that of other British troops. "We will be proud," wrote one young Canadian corporal, "if we may prove ourselves worthy to stand side by side with the Regular Army of England." But men realized that in the final and most severe test Canada had proved herself a nation. It was felt, and with reason, that things could never be the same again between England and Canada. The tie between them, strong before, had been deepened and strengthened by the ultimate sacrifice offered by the Dominion. "It is the supreme consecration of Canada to the Empire," wrote Lord Rosebery. A memorial service to the Canadian fallen was held in St. Paul's Cathedral, and hours before the service commenced not only were the great aisles of the cathedral itself thronged, but thousands waited outside, anxious to show by their presence their sympathy and admiration.

In Canada the long casualty lists that quickly arrived brought grief, but no repining. In cities like Toronto and Montreal, Winnipeg and

Vancouver, there was scarce a family of note but had its honoured dead. In Toronto, for example, regiments such as the 48th Highlanders and the Queen's Own Rifles had been recruited in the years of peace from the great financial, professional and commercial families of the city. The University, the clubs, the exchanges and the banks were all strongly represented in the lists. When the regiments first set out for the Front it was difficult for the cheering crowds watching them to realize the gravity of their mission. Now, however, Canada learned to the full what the war meant and what it must cost.

There was passionate pride from one end of the Dominion to the other. East and West, the French of Quebec, the Scottish of Nova Scotia, the English of Toronto, and the Americans of Southern Alberta were united in common grief and common glory. The universal emotion found its expression not alone in glowing speeches in Parliament and in impassioned editorials in the great Canadian newspapers, but also in the quick response of the nation. If there was pride there was also anger, anger at what the Canadian people felt to be the illegitimate methods of war the enemy employed. The story of the use of poisonous gas by the Germans deepened the resentment. Canada felt that there could only



FIELD-MARSHAL H.R.H. THE DUKE OF CONNAUGHT

With officers of the Royal Canadian Horse Artillery at Montreal. On the left of His Royal Highness is Major Eaton, in command of the B Battery; on the right is Colonel Panet, commander of the Regiment.

be one response to warfare such as this. The Minister of Militia, General (afterwards Sir) Sam Hughes, led the movement for a great increase in the forces. Canada had started at the beginning of the war to raise 30,000 men; now she placed the figure at 150,000, with as many more afterwards as might be necessary. There had been 6,000 Canadian casualties in the fighting. For every Canadian who had fallen ten came forward. From all parts of the Dominion recruiting officers reported that they were overwhelmed with offers of service. The question before the Dominion Government was not how many men it could raise, but how many it could equip, drill, and maintain of the men who offered themselves.

The story of what Canada did in the first days of the war is told in an earlier chapter.* In the autumn of 1914 the first Canadian contingent arrived at Salisbury Plain accompanied by the Princess Patricia's Light Infantry—a special corps raised at the cost of Mr. Hamilton Gault, a wealthy Montreal citizen, and named after the daughter of the Duke of Connaught,

* Vol. II., page 237, *et seq.*

the Governor-General. The contingent, placed under the command of Lieutenant-General E. A. H. Alderson, spent an exceedingly trying winter on the Wiltshire downs. The season was one of the wettest on record. The men were for most of the time under canvas. The roads around the camp sites, ill-fitted for heavy traffic, became mere quagmires. The troops were many miles from a town, and considerable distances even from small Wiltshire villages.

The Princess Patricia's, largely composed of old soldiers who had seen service in war, were the first to go to the Front. They arrived in France in December, and were at once hurried north and given a heavy spell of trench digging in the rear lines. From there, early in the New Year, they were moved into the fighting trenches.

Two days of heavy marching, sixteen miles each day, brought them close to the front firing lines. After a brief pause at a ruined village, they moved quietly along sheltered roadways into the communicating trenches, and then to the front, where they relieved French troops.



LIEUT.-GENERAL EDWIN HERVEY ALDERSON, C.B.,
Commander of the Canadian Division of the British Expeditionary Force.

The night was pitch dark; it was raining heavily, and everywhere the countryside was deep in mud. No light could be struck, and commands had to be whispered along the ranks. The slightest sign of life brought an instant bullet from a German sniper. Star shells fired from the German lines at frequent intervals sent a sudden hard blue light on the muddy fields, the broken wire entanglements, and the barely visible earthworks. The men could hear the Germans opposite to them, scarce a stone's throw away, baling the water out of their trenches. The Patricia's settled down at once, with the remainder of the allied forces, to the

the subject of a great deal of adulation, through no desire of its own. Its nickname—"Pat's Pets"—was the subject of much good-humoured banter. The men protested vigorously. They begged their admirers in Canada to stop talking about them. "Do us the credit of believing that we are neither boasters nor idiots," said one of them at the time, "but just soldiers who are trying to do our soldier's work at the Front as every other regiment in the British Army is. We know that our experience is trivial compared with other regiments, but we try to do as well as we can, like everybody else."



CANADIAN TROOPS READY TO LEAVE CANADA FOR ENGLAND.

Sir R. L. Borden, Premier; Hon. G. E. Foster, Minister of Commerce; Hon. Robert Rogers, Minister of Public Works; and Major-General Sir Sam Hughes bidding good-bye to the officers of the Canadian Expeditionary Force.

dull and exacting winter routine work. Bitter cold, constant rain, and omnipresent mud were their chief trials. They soon learned that for the moment at least there was nothing to do but to wait, to watch, and to guard themselves from the German fire, keeping under cover. Scouts and sharpshooters were present on either side. It was scarce possible for a man to raise his hand above the trenches without drawing a quick bullet. It seemed as though the Germans knew the position of every dugout in the Princess Patricia lines. They had rifles so fixed as to cover them exactly, enabling the trigger to be pulled without the necessity of aiming.

Princess Patricia's Regiment had been made

Within a month of its arrival at the Front the Princess Patricia's Light Infantry had won the good-will and admiration of every regiment which saw its men and knew its record.

One of the first actions by which the Patricia's drew special attention to themselves was around St. Eloi, where they were holding a line of trenches. Some Germans completed a sap from which they were able to cause the British at this point much trouble. The Patricia's were ordered to sweep them back. Two officers, Lieutenant Crabbe and Lieut. Colquhoun, went to have a look over the ground at midnight, and never returned. The advance was covered by a party of snipers, and they were followed by a group of bomb throwers commanded by Lieut. Papineau. They crept up to



THE NURSING STAFF OF THE MCGILL HOSPITAL.

Waiting inspection of H.R.H. the Duchess of Connaught, April 22, 1915. The McGill Hospital Corps was organized by Dr. (Colonel) Birkett, Dean of Faculty of Medicine at McGill University, and was recruited among the Faculty, Graduates, and Undergraduates, with staff of nurses from two leading hospitals at Montreal.

within twenty yards of the enemy's trenches, and then leapt right into the German lines. Lieut. Papineau behaved in a way that won him special distinction. To every Canadian there seemed something strangely dramatic in the fact that a Papineau, a lineal descendant of a great rebel of 1837, should thus in one of the earliest engagements of Canadians in France

stand out as a hero among heroes in the defence of the Empire.

The work of the Princess Patricia's during the next few weeks was prosaic, monotonous, and costly. Several officers were disabled, picked off by snipers, wounded by hand grenades or shot in attacks on the trenches opposite. Captain Newton, who had come



H.R.H. THE DUCHESS OF CONNAUGHT INSPECTS THE MCGILL HOSPITAL CORPS.



THE SECOND CANADIAN CONTINGENT IN TRAINING AT TORONTO.

Men of the 4th Battery bringing a gun into position.

from the Duke of Connaught's personal staff, was one of the first to be killed. He was followed by Captain Fitzgerald, an officer who had won in a few weeks the enthusiastic love and admiration of his men. Fitzgerald gave his life in attempting to bring back from the open the body of one of his own soldiers lying in front of our trenches, although he knew that the venture would mean almost certain death. "He was a hero, and he met a hero's end," his soldiers declared. Colonel Farquhar, the commander of the regiment, was killed by a stray bullet. Major Hamilton Gault, the founder of the Patricia's, was wounded, had to return to England, recovered, and went to the Front again, only once more to be severely hurt, all within a very few weeks. In this time of constant trench fighting the strength of the regiment, which probably with the fresh drafts sent out, had totalled 1,500, was reduced to less than one half.

On April 18 the Patricia's were in barracks in Ypres when the Germans began reshelling the town with very heavy guns. The men had quickly to clear out of their barracks into the fields. The bombardment continued day by day, but did not reach its full strength until the 22nd, when the town was largely destroyed by shell fire. The regiment moved to a wood

some distance south and west of the trenches then occupied by the Canadian Division. The Germans endeavoured at this point to cut them off from the Canadian front. The commander who had succeeded Colonel Farquhar, Lieut.-Colonel Buller, was wounded on May 5, and Major Gault, who arrived that day, having just recovered from a former wound, took command. On May 6 and 7 the German bombardment of the lines became much more intense. On the night of May 7 the roll-call showed that the strength of the regiment was then 635 men. At half-past four on the following morning the Germans fired some ranging shells into the lines, and not long afterwards an almost overwhelming bombardment began. Between seventy and eighty heavy German guns concentrated a heavy fire of high-explosive shells and gas shells upon the section held by this regiment. By six in the morning every telephone wire to the brigade headquarters and to the trenches had been cut, and heavy bodies of German troops could be seen pausing, waiting for their opportunity to rush on our front. An advance at this point would have enabled the Germans to execute a forward movement, dangerous to the line the British held.

The German artillery fired upon the regiment

from three different sides. Trenches were useless as protection. The British artillery was inadequate to reply to such a tornado. There was nothing for the Patricia's to do but to lie low in their lines, to wait, and to endure. All available men, orderlies and scullions, scouts and signallers, were called into the trenches. The Germans, thinking that their bombardment had surely effected its purpose, came on at the double. Those of the Canadians who were left stood up to them and drove them back. The Germans, however, succeeded in getting some machine guns into position.

An orderly was sent back to the Brigade headquarters telling of the desperate position. Major Gault, while encouraging his men and sustaining them by his courage and coolness, was struck by a shell and severely wounded in the left arm and thigh. He had many companions lying wounded or dying in the trenches by now. The command was taken over by Lieut. Niven. The German fire grew even more intense than before. Heavy howitzers supported the field guns. It seemed as though the whole line must be wiped out. At nine o'clock the German shelling decreased, and the German infantry again attempted to storm the position. The remnants of the Patricia's met them once more with such a fierce fire from rifles and machine guns that the attack utterly failed. Thereupon the bombardment was renewed;




KEY MAP OF THE BRITISH POSITION.

soon every British machine gun was buried by heavy shell fire. In two instances the unwounded men dug the guns out again and mounted them afresh. The official description of the battle told that one gun was actually disinterred three times and kept in action, until a shell annihilated the whole section.



MAJOR-GENERAL SIR SAM HUGHES AND HIS SON, MAJOR GARNET HUGHES, OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, AT A REVIEW.



PRINCESS PATRICIA'S LIGHT INFANTRY BEATING OFF A GERMAN ATTACK, MAY 8, 1915.

The fight continued hour after hour from dawn until noon and then until late in the day. Soon only four officers were left—all of them lieutenants. By noon the supply of small arms ammunition was running low. By half-past one, when the men were still holding on desperately a detachment of the Rifle Brigade reached them as reinforcements. They brought a machine-gun section with them, and the two regiments joined forces on the one front. Later in the afternoon a detachment of the King's Shropshire Light Infantry arrived and brought them twenty boxes of small-arms ammunition. The Patricia's had already used up nearly all of their own cartridges and the cartridges of those who had fallen. The fresh supply was quickly handed round.

Barely had the scattered lines again got in place before the Germans launched their third attack. This was the most desperate of all. Some of the Germans actually got into the far trenches at the right at a point where every one of the Princess Patricia's had been killed. They were few in numbers, and were hunted out. The great body of the Germans were driven back by the steady fire from the British troops.

At ten o'clock that night the two officers who were left, Lieut. Niven and Lieut. Papineau, took the roll-call. Only one hundred and fifty fighting men and a few stretcher-bearers were left to answer. Late that night the battalion was relieved by the King's Royal Rifles. Before retiring the Patricia's, helped by the others, gathered together, as far as they could, the bodies of their dead. "Behind the damaged trenches," wrote the Canadian Eye-Witness, Sir Max Aitken, in a moving and eloquent dispatch, "by the light of the German flares and amid the unceasing rattle of musketry, relievers and relieved combined in the last service which one soldier can render another.

"Beside the open graves, with heads uncovered, all that was left of the regiment stood while Lieut. Niven, holding the colours of the Princess Patricia's, battered, bloody, but still intact, tightly in his hand, recalled all that he could remember of the Church of England service for the dead.

"Long after the service was over the remnant of the battalion stood in solemn reverie, unable, it seemed, to leave their comrades, until the colonel of the 3rd King's Royal Rifle Corps gave them positive orders to retire. Then, led by Lieut. Papineau, they marched back 150 strong to reserve trenches."



[Lafayette

LIEUT.-COLONEL H. C. BULLER,
Of the London Rifle Brigade, who succeeded
Colonel Farquhar, Commander of Princess
Patricia's Light Infantry, killed in action at
Neuve Chapelle.

The first Canadian Contingent remained in England until February, 1915. Elaborate precautions were taken to ensure the safety of its voyage to France.

The Germans were known to be preparing special efforts to torpedo the transports. The Canadian rank and file anticipated that they would first be sent to the big military camp outside Rouen, and after a further spell of training would be moved to the front.

The regiments marched out from Salisbury Plain one night as though on a route march. But in place of returning they were taken straight to a port on the west coast. The transports made an immense detour, and while



NEWFOUNDLANDERS FOR THE FRONT
On parade, and troops wearing sun-helmets leaving Britain's oldest colony.

German submarines, waiting stealthily around Havre, were watching for their prey, the ships containing the troops, now well out into the Atlantic, turned and made for port on the coast of the Bay of Biscay. Many of the transports for safety sake took four or five days for a crossing that could have been made by a direct route in as many hours. The entire Contingent arrived in safety.

Landed in France, the Canadians were agreeably surprised. There was to be no waiting in base camps. Enormous piles of trench clothing had been accumulated in sheds near the quays. As each company stepped ashore its men were served out with wolfskin coats, mittens and trench socks. They were then led straight to trains drawn up in the siding and taken across France to Flanders.

In England there had been much speculation about the fighting qualities of the Canadians. There had been many complaints concerning

their alleged lack of discipline. It was common knowledge that a small proportion of them had by no means appreciated the loneliness, the mud, and the harsh conditions of life on Salisbury Plain. How would they take to the still harder life at the Front? Military experts, those familiar with fighting armies, never had a doubt what the answer would be, and their confidence was immediately justified. The physique, equipment, bearing and discipline of the Canadians as they reached the British lines in Flanders aroused general admiration. Their fine motor transport services, the perfection of the minute details of their outfit, their horses and their medical and commissariat arrangements were all in keeping. The one part of their equipment about which there was some criticism was the rifle. They were armed with the Ross rifle, a weapon made in Canada. There had been considerable controversy concerning the Ross rifle in former years between the British and Canadian authorities, and there was a feeling in Canada that England had attempted to discriminate against this weapon because it was manufactured outside the United Kingdom. Old soldiers who examined the Canadians expressed their fears that the Ross rifle, while possibly one of the best for competition firing in peace times, was too fine an instrument for the rough-and-tumble work of the fighting field. It was soon to be given a very exacting test, and the British authorities eventually re-armed the Canadians with the regulation British Army rifle.

Many people in France expected the Canadian




FIRST CANADIAN ACTIVE SERVICE CONTINGENT.
Colonel V. A. S. Williams inspecting the rifle ranges at Valcartier.



CANADIAN MEDICAL STAFF IN FRANCE.

Front row—left to right: Capt. Bentley, Major Elliott, Lieut.-Col. Shillington, Major Bell, Capt. Walker. Second row: Capt. Penticost, Capt. Fisher, Capt. Doe. Back row: Capt. C. A. Walker, Capt. Wood, Capt. Jowen, Capt. Young, Capt. Moffat.



CANADIANS' NIGHT ATTACK AT YPRES: RETAKING OF THE GUNS


The fight in the wood: Canadian Scottish and the 10th Battalion Canadian Infantry recapture their 47's at the point of the bayonet.

Contingent to be largely composed of Red Indians, trappers and cowboys. This was amusingly illustrated by some of the articles by famous French writers after visits to the Canadian lines. M. Maurice Barrès, for example, wrote a charming description of them that was largely taken up with accounts of a Red Indian soldier who had just died, like the last of the Mohicans, for the honour of his people, with the ingenious devices, the tricks and the wiles of the trappers and hunters; and with the Canadian-built huts in Flanders, which brought to his mind the huts of villages of the American Indians of olden days. Actually the larger proportion of the members of the first Canadian Contingent were English-born young men who had lived for some time in Canada; there were only a very few of American-Indian descent, and these were men who had been brought up under European conditions. Most of the soldiers were drawn from the cities: bank clerks, railway men, estate agents, business leaders and the like. Nearly all the officers had been active immediately before the war broke out in commerce, in finance, or in the learned professions. The old Militia force had proved merely a skeleton, an invaluable skeleton, which had been clothed with flesh and blood, drawn from all ranks of the Canadian people.

There were a certain proportion of trappers, hunters and mining men in the ranks. Their knowledge proved invaluable, and the trappers were quick to use the same guile that they had employed in catching the fur-bearing animals of the north in now deceiving the Germans. It was soon found that the average young man from Canada, British-born or Canadian-born, of French descent from Quebec, or prairie farmer of the Mid-West, had a vigour and an abundance of resource all his own. The people of Canada live an open-air life. In most places there is hunting of some kind within reach of even the young man of very modest means. The forests of Eastern Canada and of the Rockies give one and all opportunities of hardy outdoor life impossible to most men in Europe. The stimulating air of the northern lands makes for real vitality. The Canadians are a well-fed and a sober race; they drink less alcohol than any other division of the British people, with the possible exception of the New Zealanders; poverty as known in the slums of Europe is very rare, and the children of the labourer have an abundance of wholesome food. The life of

the people is singularly sound. In the great cities, notably in Toronto, there is a high standard of personal conduct which enlists a powerful current of public sentiment against the low, the base and the unworthy.

When the Canadian Contingent reached the British lines it was found that these factors told. The physique of the men was a topic of general comment. Equally remarkable was their resourcefulness. The Canadians were given a time for preparation, being sent to the trenches with British companies to learn the



(Elliott & Fry.)

LIEUT.-COL. F. D. FARQUHAR, D.S.O.,
Princess Patricia's Light Infantry (killed).

ways of trench war. A real comradeship was quickly formed between them and the English regiments, a comradeship which endured. The English Regular soldier had heard with some suspicion of the privates in the ranks from the Dominion who were paid nearly five shillings a day, as against his one and twopence. The Canadians had expected to find the average British soldier something of an automaton. They discovered one another as they really were. "I think a hundred times more of the British Tommy than I ever did before," wrote one Canadian. "These few days in the



CANADIANS IN TRAINING AT CANTERBURY.

Riding practice at the Cavalry Dépôt.

trenches with a British regiment have been a revelation to me," another young fellow wrote to his parents in Toronto. "The British Tommy is splendid. He is alive to his fingertips. He is full of devices to deceive the enemy; he knows all kinds of tricks; he hasn't a mean

streak in him, and he's a first-class fighting man. He uses his brains. It has been a revelation to me to find him as he really is." From this it may be fairly deduced that if the British troops had been inclined to regard the Canadian as somewhat untrained, the latter had been inclined to consider the former as wooden in their methods. Closer contact enabled both to found saner judgments.

"The Canadian troops having arrived at the Front," Sir John French wrote to the Duke of Connaught on March 3, "I am anxious to tell your Royal Highness that they have made the highest impression on us all. I made a careful inspection a week after they came to the country, and was very much struck by the excellent physique which was apparent throughout the ranks. The soldierly bearing and steadiness with which the men stop in the ranks on a bleak, cold and snowy day are most remarkable. After two or three weeks' preliminary education in the trenches, they have now taken over their own line, and I have the utmost confidence in their capability to do valuable and efficient service." This favourable impression of the men was echoed by all military observers. The Canadian soldiers were marked from the beginning for their high spirits, their enthusiastic energy, and their determination. They were full of jokes, even when fighting was hottest. "Say, boys," one Canadian remarked to his comrades during the heavy fighting at St. Julien, when a particularly heavy blast of fire struck them, "say, there seems to be some kind of a war on here!" The relations between the Canadian officers




SIR ROBERT BORDEN.

The Canadian Premier meets in London Lieut. Horsey of the 48th Canadian Highlanders who was twice wounded. On Sir Robert's left is Mr. R. D. Bennet, M.P. for Calgary, Canada.

and the men doubtless seemed surprisingly free and easy to those accustomed to the stricter outward forms of the European armies. Officers and men in the ranks often enough shared in social intercourse and mixed freely outside the hours of duty. The private in the regiment is often of as good position in civil life as his captain. Those who noted the Canadians carefully, however, observed that, if there was free intercourse when off duty, there was ready obedience and willing discipline. One point of difference sometimes arose between the officers and the men on the field of battle—a difference that would be impossible in Continental armies—emulation as to which should take the more dangerous part. “Our officers always lead the way,” the Canadian soldiers said. They would relate how one colonel advanced in front of his men armed only with a cane in one of the most desperate charges of the war; how another paused for a second when it seemed as though the fire of the enemy must annihilate them all to light a cigarette and to exchange a jest with a soldier near him; and many more tales of the same kind. At Festubert a captain was leading his men in a desperate venture where they all had to go single file.

As they neared the most perilous point the non-commissioned officer in charge of the bomb-throwers stepped up hastily. “I beg your pardon, sir,” he said gruffly, “but bomb-throwers always go first.” And before the officer could have ordered him back, he had run ahead. That was typical of the Canadian spirit. When the Canadians found a chance to charge the enemy they went ahead uttering all manner of cries, unless the order was given for silence. “As we charged up the hill on to the wood held by the Germans outside St. Julien,” one man related, “some yelled, some shouted, and we made a row that you could have heard half a dozen miles off. It seemed to drown for a moment even the roar of the guns.”

Another quality of the Canadians which attracted much attention was their resource. Many of the men had experienced spells of rough work in mining camps or on pioneer work in the West. Some were familiar with every trick of the woodman. They were fertile in disguises, keen to develop fresh enterprises, and eager to trick the enemy in front of them. The Canadian bomb-throwers and snipers soon developed a reputation of their own among the Allied forces.



OFF TO THE FRONT.

H.R.H. The Duke of Connaught bids good-bye to the officers of the 42nd battalion Canadian Expeditionary Force, after the inspection, May, 1915.



THE KING INSPECTS THE CANADIAN

March past of the 7th



LORD KITCHENER (on right).

Before the First Contingent left England fears were expressed in some quarters lest it should be split up among different British Divisions and so lose its distinctive characteristics. Happily the British military authorities did not attempt this. The Division remained united, and General Alderson continued in command in Flanders as on Salisbury Plain. The aim of the Canadian Government was to have at the earliest possible

moment a Canadian Army Corps at the Front with adequate reserves in England. General Alderson succeeded almost on the first day of his arrival at Salisbury Plain in winning the confidence and respect of the Canadians. He more than retained it in Flanders. "Alderson is a human being, not a military ramrod," wrote one young Canadian observer to his friends at home. General Alderson did not attempt to eliminate the somewhat free-and-easy style of the Canadian rank and file. He saw that, utilised properly, it could be made into a source of fighting strength. He talked to the soldiers under him as man to man. Before they went for the first time into the trenches, he told them how his old regiment—the Royal West Kent, which had been in France since the beginning of the war—had never yet lost a trench. "The Army says, 'The West Kents have never budged.' I am proud of the great record of my old regiment. And I think it is a good omen. I now belong to you and you belong to me, and before long the Army will say, 'The Canadians never budged.' Lads, it can be left there, and there I leave it. The Germans will never turn you out." A General who could strike this note in addressing the men of the West was sure of their enthusiastic support.

General Alderson's advice to the troops under



TROOPS ON SALISBURY PLAIN, 1915.

Battalion British Columbia Infantry.

him before they entered the trenches was full of practical wisdom.

We are about to occupy and maintain a line of trenches. I have some things to say to you at this moment which it is well that you should consider. You are taking over good and, on the whole, dry trenches. I have visited some myself. They are intact, and the parapets are good. Let me warn you first that we have already had several casualties while you have been attached to other divisions. Some of these casualties were unavoidable,

and that is war. But I suspect that some—at least a few—could have been avoided. I have heard of cases in which men have exposed themselves with no military object, and perhaps only to gratify curiosity. We cannot lose good men like this. We shall want them all if we advance, and we shall want them all if the Germans advance.

Do not expose your heads, and do not look round corners, unless for a purpose which is necessary at the moment you do it. It will not often be necessary. You are provided with means of observing the enemy without



THE KING INSPECTS THE CANADIANS AT SALISBURY PLAIN,
Previous to their departure for the Front. His Majesty, Lord Kitchener (on left), and Commanding
Officers leaving the parade ground after the inspection.



THE CANADIANS AT YPRES.

An exchange of patriotic enthusiasm as British reinforcements advanced through the Canadian lines. The Dominion troops answering the cheers of their commander's (General Alderson) old regiment, the West Kents, who are shown in the background of the picture.

exposing your heads. To lose your life without military necessity is to deprive the State of good soldiers. Young and brave men enjoy taking risks. But a soldier who takes unnecessary risks through levity is not playing the game, and the man who does so is stupid, for whatever be the average practice of the German army, the individual shots whom they employ as snipers shoot straight, and, screened from observation behind the lines, they are always watching. If you put your head over the parapet without orders they will hit that head. There is another thing. Troops new to the trenches always shoot at nothing the first night. You will not do it. It wastes ammunition, and it hurts no one. And the enemy says, "These are new and nervous troops." No German is going to say that of the Canadian troops.

You will be shelled in the trenches. When you are shelled, sit low and sit tight. This is easy advice, for there is nothing else to do. If you get out you will only get it worse. And if you go out the Germans will go in. And if the Germans go in we shall counter-attack and put them out; and that will cost us hundreds of men instead of the few whom shells may injure. The Germans do not like the bayonet, nor do they support bayonet attacks. If they get up to you, or if you get up to them, go right in with the bayonet. You have the physique to drive it home. That you will do it I am sure, and I do not envy the Germans if you get among them with the bayonet.

On March 1 the Canadian Division took over some 6,500 to 7,000 yards of trenches. The work of the Division during the next few weeks was one mainly of endurance. The Germans did not attack, but continued sniping, and shell-fire was kept up between the two sides.

The First Canadian Division was engaged in four principal fights during the spring and summer of 1915. The first of these was the advance on Neuve Chapelle. Following this came the second battle of Ypres, when the Division saved the line on the retirement of the Algerians and Turcos after being gassed, and resisted the desperate and almost continuous attacks of the German troops for almost three weeks. The Canadians took a prominent part in the fighting at Festubert in May, making a brilliant advance on May 20-21, and seizing several of the enemy's trenches. They also took a large part in the action of June 15 at Givenchy. All of these actions are fully described in the sections dealing with the general campaigns in Flanders. After mid-June the Canadians were mainly engaged until the autumn in holding a section of the trenches.

It might well seem invidious to pick out any for special mention among troops all of whom did so well. The 8th Battalion the Winnipeg Rifles won special distinction at the second battle of Ypres for being the one regiment able to hold its trenches firmly although heavily gassed. Our troops at that time had no respirators or anti-gas helmets. With quick ingenuity the Winnipeg troops transformed their handkerchiefs into respirators and stood their


ground. The 2nd Infantry Brigade, the Western Canadians, under Brigadier-General Currie, did magnificently at Ypres. It was placed in a desperately dangerous salient. It held its ground until the trenches were wiped out by German gun fire, and then its remnants retired in good order. The Highland regiments more than maintained the ancient Scottish reputation. Among the many great deeds of the Highlanders one must be mentioned—the charge of the Canadian Scottish under Lieut.-Colonel Leckie and the 10th Battalion under Lieut.-Colonel Boyle at Ypres, when they went




[Elliott & Fry.]

LIEUT.-COL. H. C. BECHER,
1st Battalion West Ontario Regiment (killed).

through the German lines, recovered the big guns that had been lost, and held them long enough to remove their breech blocks and render them useless. The character of the fighting in which the Canadians were engaged can best be judged by the casualties. One typical case can be named, the British Columbia Regiment. Every officer in this regiment who came out with the first troops from Canada was killed or wounded before the autumn of 1915, and only two of the wounded were able by that time to return to their regiment.



THE BATTLES



The Canadian Cavalry (the Royal Canadian Dragoons, Lord Strathcona's Horse, and the 2nd King Edward's Horse) were made into a Cavalry Brigade before the First Division left England and were placed under the command of General Seely, formerly British Secretary of State for War. The scope for cavalry in the first year of the war was necessarily limited. The best tribute to this Brigade was paid by Sir John French, in an address to the troops :

I am very glad to have this opportunity of coming here to tell you how very highly I appreciate all the services you have rendered. The eagerness with which you came forward to place your services at the disposal of the Empire, and the great part you are playing in this war, have served to strengthen the bonds that bind our great Empire together—bonds that will never now be severed. I wish to express my appreciation to you for the splendid manner in which early in the year, when the Canadian Infantry Division had suffered great losses, you volunteered to leave your horses and to come out here. At the commencement you took a very prominent part in the battle of Festubert, where we not only gained a considerable amount of ground, but inflicted great losses on the enemy, and captured a large quantity of material. Then afterwards at Givenchy you kept up the same fighting record, and since that up till a few days ago you have been doing very hard work in other trenches.

I am quite confident that whatever you are called upon to do in the future will be nobly carried out. Your record will go down to history as one of the most splendid in British history.

Almost immediately after the first Canadian contingent left Salisbury Plain for the Front the second Canadian contingent began to arrive. The command of this division while it remained in England was given to a distinguished Canadian soldier—General Sam Steele—a soldier whose active military record went back to the days of the Red River Expedition, and who had long been a familiar figure in Canadian life. There had been more time to organize this contingent, and it was in some ways even more distinctly Canadian than its predecessor. The great Canadian Universities were notably represented, in some

instances by separate units. The Eaton Machine Gun Brigade, named after Sir John Eaton, of Toronto, who contributed 100,000 dollars towards its organization and equipment, was efficient and valuable. There had been splendid competition, not only among the different Provinces but among the great cities, to see which should be best represented, and the result was one worthy of Canada.

In the latter part of the summer of 1915 Sir Robert Borden, the Canadian Premier, and General Hughes, the Minister of Militia and Head of the War Department, visited Europe. They were given a splendid reception. Sir Robert Borden was presented with the Freedom of the City of London, the highest civic honour England can bestow, and General Hughes was knighted before his departure home. The visit of these two Canadian leaders was almost wholly concerned with detail questions of administration, and in discovering how Canada could co-operate most effectively in the war.

The spirit of Canada at the end of the first year was the same as it had been at the beginning. Partisan quarrels had been largely wiped out. The leader of Liberalism, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, worked in accord with his old political opponent the Premier for the common end. From Halifax to Prince Rupert the Canadian people knew only one thing, and that was that this was their fight, and that they would see it through, if needs be, to the last man and to the last dollar. Politicians recognized that the war must necessarily be followed by a great development in Imperial relations, particularly by a unity of Empire forces for purposes of defence: but they were prepared to leave the discussion of such developments until afterwards. For the moment their single purpose was to aid in bringing the war to a successful conclusion.



CHAPTER LXXXVIII.

THE BATTLES OF AUBERS AND FESTUBERT.

IMPORTANCE OF THE BATTLE OF AUBERS—"THE TIMES" CORRESPONDENT'S TELEGRAM—NECESSITY FOR INCREASED SUPPLIES OF HIGH EXPLOSIVE SHELLS—DESCRIPTION OF THE BATTLE—NEW PLAN OF SIR DOUGLAS HAIG—BATTLE OF FESTUBERT—VICTORY OF THE BRITISH.

ON the early morning of Sunday, May 9, the British troops defending Ypres from the onslaughts of the Germans, were aroused by the sound of a terrific cannonade south of the Lys. This marked the opening of the fight for the Aubers ridge, part of a great Franco-British offensive extending from the south of Armentières to the north of Arras. On May 14 appeared the report of the Military Correspondent of *The Times*, who had been staying at British Headquarters, that the want of an unlimited supply of high-explosive shells had been a fatal bar to the success of the British attempt to storm the heights commanding Lille, which, if taken by the Allies, would render the German salient at La Bassée untenable. Five days later Mr. Asquith announced the coming formation of the Coalition Ministry, and on May 25 the list of the members of the new Cabinet was published. On June 16 Mr. Lloyd George became Minister of Munitions.

The Battle of Aubers, therefore, marks an important point in the history of the war, and deserves for this reason, as well as on its own merits, treatment in considerable detail. Although complete success did not crown the efforts of our troops, yet the losses incurred on the Aubers ridge were by no means wasted. The assaults directed by Sir Douglas Haig forced

the Crown Prince of Bavaria to concentrate a large portion of his available troops and artillery to the north of the La Bassée salient, and the consequence was that the Germans were not in sufficient strength to resist Joffre's thrust from the Arras region towards Lens.

La Bassée, the point of the salient, was surrounded by a network of brickfields, mine works and other enclosures skilfully fortified by the Germans. A direct attack on it could not be entertained for one moment by commanders who did not regard their infantry as mere food for cannon. But an advance from the Lys to the ridge which, starting near Fort Englos, four miles or so west of Lille, runs in a south-westerly direction to Aubers, two miles east of Neuve Chapelle, and terminates abruptly on the hill called Haut Pommereau, an advance across this ridge and then over a narrow strip of low-lying land to the second ridge which follows the road from Lille through Fournes to La Bassée would, if successful, turn the position of the Germans and oblige them to evacuate La Bassée and its environs.

Such an advance had been almost successfully made by the British in the first three weeks of October 1914. They had carried Neuve Chapelle, crossed the first ridge and the low ground and occupied Le Pilly, a mile

from Fournes, at the edge of the second ridge. But the German counter-attack, backed by enormous numbers and a gigantic artillery, had driven them from Le Pilly, dislodged them from the Aubers-Fromelles-Radinghem ridge, and flung them out of Neuve Chapelle. The Battle of Neuve Chapelle in March 1915 had, however, enabled Sir John French to start his second offensive to secure the ridges.

Since October the Germans had been entrenching their lines from Lille to La Bassée. They were now rabbit-warrens bristling with machine-guns and protected by barbed wire, some of extra stoutness, which could not be cut by ordinary clippers or broken by shrapnel. The lessons learnt from the bombardment to which the enemy had been subjected at the Battle of Neuve Chapelle had been turned by him to good account. Deep trenches, reinforced with concrete, and underground galleries had been constructed to shelter the garrisons defending them. Heavy guns posted on the hills south-east, near Pont-à-Vendin, could deluge with shell the British if they stormed the heights.

Ypres was protected by the Second Army, under Sir Herbert Plumer, the III. Corps holding Armentières. It was the task of Sir Douglas Haig with the First Army to carry the entrenchments and redoubts on the right wing of the Crown Prince Rupprecht's Army. The IV. Corps, according to Sir John French's plan, was to attack the German trenches and redoubts in the neighbourhood of Rouges-Bancs, north-west of Fromelles, the Indian Corps and the I. Corps were to carry those in the plain at the foot of the Aubers ridge between Neuve Chapelle and Givenchy and afterwards to storm the heights.

At midnight on May 8-9 the streets of Béthune, behind the extreme right of the First Army, were crowded with reserve troops. From Béthune round to Armentières the roads and lanes leading to the British trenches were filled with marching men and the material of war. The soldiers knew that they were about to engage in one of those encounters which in Napoleonic times would have been reckoned a pitched battle, but in 1915 were held to be mere incidents. It was understood that, as at Neuve Chapelle, the action would be opened by a bombardment of the hostile lines.

At 2.30 a.m. there was sufficient light for the gunners to find their targets. Sighting shots were fired by the field guns and howitzers.

The artillerymen were feeling for the parapets of the German trenches. About 4.30 the firing died away. Save for the humming, throbbing aeroplanes overhead or the passage of a motor ambulance, there was nothing to rouse the attention of the waiting soldiers. The aeroplanes were engaged in giving information to the gunners and, as at the battle of Neuve Chapelle, in bombing, during the day, stations and bridges (for example, the canal bridge near Don) through or over which the German reinforcements were moving or likely to be moved.

The morning was bright and clear. To the right were Cuinchy, with its brickfields, and the ruins of what had once been Givenchy. Trees and hedgerows obscured the view of the trenches on the low ground, but against the sky rose the Aubers ridge and the silhouettes of the villages crowning it. The firing round Ypres had temporarily subsided. Here and there an officer took out his watch and looked at it impatiently. Suddenly at 5 a.m. the guns spoke out, at first singly, but shortly the individual reports developed into one long roar. The air quivered as the huge shells swished through it, the earth shook as they struck their targets. On the horizon a cloud of smoke and dust speedily formed. It was as if one long street of houses in the distance had been bombarded and set on fire.

Shortly before six o'clock the order was given to the British troops to advance. North of Fromelles battalions of the IV. Corps dashed for the German advanced trenches. Firing their rifles, they approached the first line, then flinging their hand grenades they poured into the enemy's position, thrusting back the defenders with the bayonet, and carrying everything before them.

At 6.17, from the south, beyond the ridges, a thunderous sound told that the French had also begun their advance from the south of La Bassée.

Elated by their success, the men of the IV. Corps pressed on. They saw Lille before them. The prize missed at Neuve Chapelle seemed within their grasp. They were close to Haubourdin, a suburb of the city. But at this moment masses of Germans débouched from Lille and counter-attacked, and, as the German centre was still practically intact, the order was given to retire. Sullenly the troops withdrew, turning from time to time to fire or charging to stop the pursuing foe.



THE CANADIANS ON THE WEST FRONT.

Private Smith carrying bombs to his comrades in the trenches.

Meanwhile the Indians and I. Corps, moving forward from the line Neuve Chapelle-Festubert had at the outset been successful. The Pathans and Gurkhas had occupied the wood in front of Fromelles; the villages of Fromelles and Aubers and the first-line German trenches on the Aubers ridge, which had been pounded to a shapeless mass, had been seized. But the second-line trenches had not received sufficient treatment from the artillery, and, when the victorious troops moved on against them, the Germans issued from their hiding

places, and with rifles and batteries of machine guns mowed down the attacking forces. The machine-guns were, as usual, the most formidable obstacle in the British path. The fire from these skimmed the ground, inflicting wounds on the lower parts of the body. Yet, still undaunted, both the Indians and British endeavoured again and again to close with the enemy.

If individual courage and initiative could have gained the day, Lille would that evening have been cleared of the enemy. At both ends

of the battlefield British soldiers were winning names for themselves in history. Near Rouges Bancs Lieut. O. K. Parker, of the 2nd Battalion Northampton Regiment, who during the fighting exhibited extraordinary courage and resolution, before the attack was delivered made a daring reconnaissance along the German front. Under a terrific fire Second-Lieutenant H. M. Stanford, Royal Field Artillery, imperturbably mended telephone wires. Acting-Sergeant F. W. Shepherd, of the 1/13th (Kensington) London Regiment (T.F.), advanced 400 yards from the firing line to the enemy's breastwork with a telephone line. It was cut, and he started laying a second. Subsequently he carried two wounded men out of the line of fire. From an isolated tree close behind the trenches, Major J. R. Colville, of the 55th battery of the Royal Field Artillery, amidst bursting shells, observed the havoc wrought by the battery which he was directing.

In the foreground of the fight Acting-Corporal Charles Sharpe headed a bombing party and cleared 50 yards of trench. His companions were killed or wounded, but with four other men he attacked and captured a further trench,



LIEUT.-COL. C. B. LECKIE,
Commander of the Canadian Scottish.

250 yards long. He had secured the V.C. So had Corporal James Upton, of the 1st Battalion Sherwood Foresters, who displayed amazing courage when rescuing the wounded.

At one point the line ceased to advance. Second-Lieutenant Nevile West, of the 2/ Royal Berks Regiment—the sole surviving officer—placed himself at its head and the attack was resumed. West was shot and fell to the ground. Pulling himself together, he got up and ran forward, only to be wounded a second time.

South of Neuve Chapelle similar heroic actions had been or were being performed. On the night of the 8th, in the Rue du Bois region, Second-Lieutenant John Millar, of the 1/ Black Watch, had reconnoitred a German trench, and loosened or cut the wire in front of it. The next day, under intense fire, he established flag communication with our signallers who had reached the German parapet. A non-commissioned officer of the same battalion, Corporal John Ripley, who subsequently received the V.C., was the first to ascend the enemy's parapet. Standing on it, he directed those following him to the gaps in the German wire entanglements. Then, leading his section to the second-line trench of the enemy, with seven or eight men he blocked both flanks and arranged a fire position, defending it until he was badly wounded in the head and all his comrades had fallen. Lance-Corporal David Finlay, of the 1/ Black Watch, led a bombing party of twelve. Ten of them fell. Finlay ordered the two survivors to return, but himself, regardless of his own



MAJOR G. W. BENNETT,
2nd Batt. (killed).

[Elliott & Fry]



[Elliott & Fry.]
CAPTAIN G. J. L. SMITH,
1st Batt. West Ontario Regiment (killed).

personal safety, went to the assistance of a wounded man and carried him over a distance of a hundred yards of fire-swept ground. He, like Ripley, was awarded the V.C.

Near Richebourg Lance-Corporal W. Stuart, of the 1/ Royal Highlanders, started playing the pipes as he left the trench, and, though grievously injured, never ceased playing them until the German line was reached. Private G. Anderson, also of the 1st Battalion Royal Highlanders, in broad daylight went out and warned several wounded men lying in front of the trench that a bombardment was about to commence. He then crawled back in full view of the enemy, dragging with him an officer badly wounded. Before sunset he saved three more severely wounded men, and during the night brought in eight more. These exploits were performed under heavy rifle, machine gun and shell fire.

Two more of the innumerable heroic episodes on that day may be recorded. Near Fromelles a British soldier found himself the sole survivor of the party with which he had advanced. He was surrounded, but managed to crawl into a deep shell crater. The Germans knew where he was, and with their usual chivalry wished to kill him. Unable to hit him with their rifles, unwilling to risk being shot by the British in the background if they went for him with the bayonet, they contented themselves with lobbing hand-grenades into the hole. By some miracle the British soldier escaped, and, all day long, lay there flinging back such of the grenades as did not explode. At night he crawled back in safety to his comrades.

The second incident was of a more tragic nature. Hard by, the men of a machine-gun detachment took two German machine-guns and turned them against the enemy. For some time they continued alone in a trench fighting the captured guns to the last. They were overpowered by numbers and killed.

We have seen what one or a few individuals did, let us observe the movements of the 5/ (Cinque Ports) Territorial Battalion of the Royal Sussex Regiment as they are recorded by Lieut.-Colonel F. G. Langham, who commanded the battalion and was himself wounded:

We had to attack. The assaulting line—2/ Sussex on the left, and the 2/ Northamptons on the right—both over establishment. Second line—ourselves on the left, and the 2/ King's Royal Rifles on the right. Third line—1/ Loyal North Lancashires on the left, and the 9/ King's Liverpools (T.F.) on the right. Our job was to "mop up" the trenches after the assaulting line had taken them and support our 2nd Battalion and the Northants. The 60th had to go on behind the latter and work along the right to a point forming a sort of bastion in the German second line, and if they got there to go further on to a point still further to the right. We had, therefore, to "mop up" on the front of the two assaulting battalions, and it meant sending up a third company to follow the King's Royal Rifles to "mop up" behind the Northants.



[Elliott & Fry.]
LIEUT.-COL. HART McHARG.
7th Vancouver Batt. (killed).

After a bombardment of forty minutes the advance began. Three companies of the 2/ Sussex and the Northants went out over our parapets and got to from forty to eighty yards from the German lines. From us "C" Company, less one platoon, "A" Company, less one platoon, and the whole of "B" Company went out in the second line, with two companies of the King's Royal Rifles. Then the most murderous rifle and machine gun and shrapnel fire opened, and no one could get on or get back. People say the fire at Mons and Ypres was nothing to it. No end of brave things were done, and our men were splendid but helpless. After some considerable time we got orders to retire, but this was easier said than done. Some men were 300 yards out from our parapet, many dead, and some even on fire. Every now and again you would see the men roll over on the ground. The men began to crawl in, most of them wounded.

After getting in all we could, we were ordered to go back to a supporting trench. We were then told we should assault again at 12.30, it being then about 9.30 a.m. These orders were varied from time to time, and at last we moved up to another trench, and were told to act if necessary in support of troops who would assault at 4.45. All the time a tremendous artillery fire was on, and we were being shelled by howitzers. The Black Watch and 1/ Cameronians then assaulted, and got it just as badly as we did; a few got in only to be bayoneted. Several of our men, still alive, got up and joined them in their charge, after lying out there twelve hours. Unfortunately I cannot find out that any of these brave fellows got back safely, though there may be some among the wounded. If I can trace any as having survived I shall certainly recommend them for some reward. It was getting cold when, about 6 p.m., we received orders to retire to billets.

Besides the regiments mentioned in the above letter, the Munster Fusiliers distinguished themselves by their desperate efforts to break into the enemy's trenches. The nature of the obstacles in the way of the Munsters and other battalions of the I. Corps will be seen when we describe the Battle of Festubert. The ordeal which they and other regiments underwent may be surmised from an extract from the letter of an officer who took part in the battle:

The orders said that the guns would bombard the trenches for ten minutes, the entanglements for ten minutes, and then the trenches again for ten minutes. During the shelling of the last ten minutes, and under its cover, we were to advance to within fifty yards or so of the German trenches, and the instant it ceased to rush them and proceed on to the reserves. Well, almost as soon as our shelling proper started at five o'clock, the enemy replied, and with some effect, too, a big lyddite landing in the traverses on either side of the one I was in—in one case killing four and wounding three. All this time there was no sign that the hostile trenches were even manned, except for one poor fellow that got blown up some dozen feet by one of our high-explosive shells.

I suppose we all looked pretty awe-inspiring, as we all had on muslin masks dipped in hypo as a counter-actant for asphyxiating gases. Ten minutes or so after the commencement of the bombardment we were all down at the bottom of the trench, for the enemy's shells were bursting in front, behind, and in our lines. By this time you can imagine we were fairly excited, but we still believed that we would do our job

without much opposition from the Germans, who were mostly dead—perhaps! Of course, in the row it was impossible to hear orders shouted from traverse to traverse, so one of our men dashed round. A lyddite shell choked the air with yellow fumes just by: that was the end of him. Another went round: "C Company advance: pass it on!" he yelled. "C" got up, scrambled—with the aid of many hands—from the trenches, and flung themselves over the parapet. Immediately an absolute hail of bullets met them even before they were through our own entanglements, and the hostile shelling was terrific.

After a short interval—"G to advance!" comes the shout. Up we get: machine-guns sweep the parapet up and down, backwards and forwards, and many fall back into the trench dead or mortally wounded. Once on the level again down we go flat. The number of dead and wounded lying about is awful—and the shells!

Inch by inch, foot by foot, yard by yard we work ourselves forward, through the grass, in many places even then soaking with blood.

Our artillery has slackened fire, almost stopped, in fact—thinks we are almost at the enemy. The place is an inferno—a red hell, and oh! those frightful lyddites: blow the place to bits, and rip, and slash, and tear to pieces those puny things lying in the grass—so still.*

Any real progress was impossible.

Behind the British lines were massed the reserves waiting eagerly to join in the fight. But Sir Douglas Haig, informed of the strength of the German second line, decided to break off the combat.

The news of the French victory at Carençy, where, with an expenditure of 276 rounds per gun, the German defences had been demolished and their positions taken, had reached him. By obliging the enemy to keep such large bodies on the north of the La Bassée salient he had materially contributed to the French success, and, with the Second Battle of Ypres still undecided, it would have been foolhardy to take unnecessary risks. Orders were, therefore, given to the troops to cease their advance. All night wounded men were limping or being carried back from the Aubers ridge. The unburied dead lay on it in thousands.

The moral of the day's fighting was drawn by the Military Correspondent of *The Times* in these words: "If," he wrote, "we can break through the hard outer crust of the German defences, we believe that we can scatter the German armies, whose offensive causes us no concern at all. But to break this hard crust we need more high explosive, more heavy howitzers, and more men. This special form of warfare has no precedent in history. It is certain that we can smash the German crust if we have the means. So the means we must have, and as quickly as possible."

By the morning of May 10 the IV. and I. Corps and the Indian Corps were back in their

* From a letter published by the *Morning Post*.



THE CANADIANS IN A HOT CORNER.

Lieutenant F. W. Campbell and a handful of men with a machine gun gained the enemy's front trench, and advanced along it under heavy fire until a barricade stopped them. When the little band was reduced to two—Lieutenant Campbell and Private Vincent—and in default of a tripod, the lieutenant set up the machine gun on Vincent's back and fired continuously. Afterwards the German bombers entered the trench and Lieutenant Campbell fell wounded. Eventually he crawled away in a dying condition, while Vincent succeeded in dragging the gun to safety.

old positions and Sir Douglas Haig had decided that the better course would be to approach the Aubers ridge from the Neuve Chapelle-Givenchy front alone. Sir John French sanc-

tioned this proposal, directing that the fresh assault, however, should not be made without a powerful and deliberate artillery preparation. The 7th Division, part of the IV. Corps, was to

be moved round to support the offensive, which was to begin on the night of May 12. The very dull and misty weather, however, so interfered with the observation of the gunners that the advance was postponed till the 15th. During the interval the artillery on both sides played on each other's trenches. To ensure Sir Douglas Haig's success, on the day chosen for the assault Sir John French placed the Canadian Division under his orders. The Canadians had recovered from the effects of the German asphyxiating gas and from their exertions at the Second Battle of Ypres which was just finishing. They were inflamed with righteous fury against their dastardly opponents, and were anxious to mete out further punishment to them. They did not accompany the first advance; but they were destined to render later most valuable assistance to their British comrades.

Saturday, May 15, dawned, and all were in a state of expectancy, because it was known that a further attack was to take place after sunset. The Military Correspondent of *The Times* has left us his impressions on that day:

On Saturday morning I visited the Ypres district, and found that all was reasonably quiet after the furious bombardments of the previous days. Our troops there had suffered much from their inability to silence the German guns, of every calibre up to 12 in. But our

troops were still in good heart; the German infantry would not stand up to them, and, in spite of our losses there seemed to be no immediately serious danger on this side.

A look along the rest of the line down to the region of Laventie gave an impression that no hostile action was impending, and I passed on—fairly confident that we should not be disturbed that night by a German offensive—down to the village of La Couture, whence a good view was to be gained of the bombardment against that part of the German front selected for the night attack.

This village had suffered much. Most of the inhabitants, except a most gallant *curé*, had fled. The church and churchyard, as well as the village, showed signs of devastation. But the havoc wrought by our own shells on the German lines was greater still. From our guns and howitzers a well-aimed, deliberate, and fairly heavy fire was in progress all the afternoon and well into the night. This fire struck the German trenches and fortified posts. It wrecked the barbed wire in parts, and every now and then a heavy explosion, or the outbreak of a fire, showed where our shells had told.

I noticed that the heavy battery, which was to the right rear of my observation post, was firing with great precision, and, in general, the effect of the fire appeared to be good, although it could not be described as overwhelming, or as likely to drive good troops out of their works.

In the late afternoon Sir John French rode out amongst the troops and was received with enthusiastic acclamation. He wished them good luck, and addressed to all a few warm and inspiring words. No one knows better than he how to strike the right note in an appeal to soldiers, and he had the pleasure of observing how keen the men were for a dash at the enemy, how confident they were in his leadership, and how delighted they were that the hour had come at last for the attack.

The Staff arrangements for the attack were well done. All column roads were marked by signboards, and every attention paid to the perfect ordering of the troops. Every movement took place after dusk, and it was in complete silence that the various units drew out of their billets and bivouacs, and gradually took their place at the appointed spots.

The night was dark, but not very dark, though there was no moon. The wind was scarcely perceptible, and the weather was warm.

All was ready. The Royal Engineers at great risk had been cutting the barbed wire in front of our own trenches, and bridging two ditches which would have to be crossed. They had made scaling ladders for the men, and, in a dozen other ways, sought to render easier the very difficult task in front of their comrades. Officers had maps revised from the photographs taken by aeroplanes. The negatives, procured under such hazardous circumstances by the aerial operators, revealed to the military cartographers the German position as seen from above. These photographs somewhat resembled those taken through telescopes of the surface of the moon. Features which escaped the eyes of officers stationed on the ground were indeed revealed, but the heights of obstacles, the depths of trenches and ditches could only be guessed. The men were cleaning their rifles and sharpening their bayonets.



INDIAN TROOPS ERECTING TELEGRAPH WIRES.

"Behind the lines," writes an eye-witness, "I saw a chaplain prepare his fighting men for the great assault." It was in an orchard carpeted with blossoms shaken off by the concussion of the guns. "He stood at a small table," continues the narrator, "with the pure white linen and glistening silver. Kneeling on the grass was one of the best-known fighting battalions in the British Army, and I saw officers and men step out and kneel before the Holy Table with hands stretched out to receive the Blessed Emblems of the Body Broken and the Blood Shed."

The trenches were filling up. The Indians were on the left, the 2nd Division of the I. Corps in the centre, and, on the right, the 7th Division of the IV. Corps. The attack was to be delivered from that section of our front which from Richebourg St. Vaast followed the road known as the Rue du Bois and then ran south of the road until it reached the turning to the hamlet of La Quinque Rue. Thence the line proceeded southward, passing in front of the ruins of Festubert, which has given its name to the battle.

The Indians and the 2nd Division were to assault the German trenches under cover of the night: the 7th Division was to advance at dawn.

On the extreme right, south of the hill, crowned by the battered church and houses of La Bassée, stretched a plain, the monotony of which was broken by the factory chimneys and spoil heaps of a mining district. The trenches, connecting the French army which had won Carency with the British First Army, could be discerned in the distance. To the left of La Bassée a little knoll and a pile of crushed masonry indicated Festubert. Thence to Neuve Chapelle was a fenny country, intersected by broad ditches filled with mud and slimy water and hidden by tall, coarse grass. At least two of these had to be crossed by the British.

Some clumps of poplars and willows afforded a little natural cover to the enemy. Among them and in groups of cottages, in farms, and isolated houses were hidden many of their deadly machine-guns. The main strength of the defence, however, lay in three lines of trenches drawn by the Germans across the fields and meadows which, in places, were water-logged and thus added to the difficulties of the assaulting troops. Low redoubts and breastworks running from the front to rear, divided the



INDIAN TROOPS IN THE TRENCHES.

German lines into sectors each capable of independent defence, and no pains had been spared to make their works an impregnable barrier. Formidable, indeed, was the long serpentine obstacle which lay between the British and their objective, the Aubers ridge.

The sun had sunk to rest and the men waited calmly for the signal. Neither moon nor stars lit up the sky. Facing the British and Indians was the 7th Prussian Corps, recruited from the industrial and mining districts of Westphalia. The 57th, 56th, and 54th Infantry Regiments and the 24th Pioneers were in the trenches. Of these the 57th Regiment alone was destined to lose in two days 2,400 out of 3,000 men.

The Germans were on the alert. Shouts of "Come on, we are ready," had been heard during the afternoon.

At 11.30 p.m. the order to assault was given. As our men left the trenches, the sky was illuminated with flares shedding downwards a bright white glare. German searchlights swung round to meet the advancing tide of British Imperial troops. The rattle of the rifle and the rat-tat-tat of the machine-guns were both heard in their highest intensity. Men fell as they clambered over the parapets, fell in increasing numbers as they pushed gallantly forward. The Indians making for Richebourg l'Avoué were held up.

South of the Indians advanced the 2nd Division. Its left captured the first line

of trenches, but halted in order to keep touch with the Indians. The centre and right broke into the German second line of trenches, gaining 800 yards in frontage and about 600 yards in depth at the furthest part. An officer who was present in this sector of the battlefield relates some incidents of the fighting:

In our immediate vicinity the attack was to take place on a front of about half a mile, while away to right and left other divisions were attacking. Here the regiments attacking were the Worcesters, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, 60th King's Royal Rifles, and the King's Liverpool Regiment. Soon after ten o'clock along this front there were four lines of men lying in the open in front of the breastwork, with more behind waiting to support. At 11.30, in pitch darkness, they rose with one accord to the attack. In perfect quietness they went forward at a walk. They had hardly started when a flare rose from the German trenches; on they went, still walking. The flare had apparently discovered them, for other flares went up; then a hail of lead was poured into the advancing troops, who then started to charge. The sharp bark of the machine guns and the crackling of "rapid fire" of the rifles, was deafening.

For some reason most opposition was met on the left of our line by the Worcesters and Inniskillings. The King's Royal Rifles and the King's on the right soon obtained their trench and went on to their second. On the left, nothing daunted by the sheet of lead that they had to penetrate, the Worcesters and Inniskillings went on bravely. Numbers fell, and the Worcesters found their task impossible; but the Irishmen, pushed on, line after line, and after terrible losses in officers and men obtained their section of trench and immediately made for the second line. A rush through another hail of lead, and the second line fell to them. At dawn the successful regiments joined up, and five or six hundred yards of the first two lines of German trenches were held by our brave men. Many heroes from our front trenches during the day shouldering bandoliers of ammunition—or carrying boxes of bombs—attempted the 300 yards dash across the open to the captured German trenches. Some got across, but many fell. There is no recognition for these—they were brave men doing their duty. They knew the risk and took it gladly, willing to do their share for the honour of their country and regiment. During the day our trenches, supporting trenches and communication trenches were subjected to a terrific bombardment. The wounded suffered most by this, for although the stretcher-bearers took all risk, it was quite impossible to remove many of them. It was not until dark that any real attempt to clear off the wounded, who had been lying in the trenches all day, could be made. On Monday the Oxford and Bucks and the Highland Light Infantry pushed on from the captured trenches and won more ground.*

Captain C. L. Armitage, of the 6th Battalion of the Worcestershire Regiment, had been among the leaders in this attack. After his men had failed to gain their objective, he skilfully withdrew and reorganized them behind our breastwork. After sunset he rescued many wounded men.

The King's Liverpool Regiment referred to above attacked two farms. A company reached the outbuildings of one of these, but eventually had to withdraw. Lance-Corporal Tombs of

this regiment crawled on his knees no less than five times to bring in wounded. Lieutenants Hutchinson and Fulton, with a bombing party, advanced down a trench, captured many Germans and put to flight others, who were promptly fired upon by their own men. In response to calls for ammunition, Hutchinson the next day led up a party through machine gun fire, the last part of the journey being performed on hands and knees. Later, on May 18, this officer conducted some bombers who forced 200 Germans to surrender and as many to retreat.

The Inniskillings advanced up both sides of a road called "the cinder track." Their left, owing to the delay in bringing up a supporting regiment, was exposed to the concentrated fire of machine guns and had to halt. The two companies on the right, however, reached the enemy's trenches. Second-Lieutenant J. L. Morgan, who had repeatedly returned to hurry up reinforcements, was mortally wounded.

It was now that a surprise was sprung on the enemy, who may not have suspected the presence of the 7th Division round Festubert. At 3 a.m. on Sunday, the 16th, the Division was launched at the very intricate entrenchments in that quarter. We will follow the progress of some of the regiments engaged in the attack.

The Welsh Fusiliers had arrived on the evening of the 15th. During the small hours of the night Royal Engineers had been out in front cutting passages through our own wire entanglements and bridging a wide ditch which separated our lines from the enemy's. In the dull light preceding the dawn, our artillery at 3 a.m. began to hurl shells at the parapets of the German entrenchments. Suddenly the curtain of shell fire receded east of the enemy's line. The moment had come for the assault. Up the ladders provided to scale our own parapets the men clambered; they dropped down on the further side, and under a terrific fire streamed off to the openings in the wire entanglements. Lieutenant-Colonel Gabbet, their commander, fell riddled with bullets. Major Dixon, shot through the legs, lay at the edge of our own trench. Passing beyond and thinning visibly, the Fusiliers sprinted for the bridges over the ditch a hundred yards away. The cheery shouts of the Celts mingled with the hoarse, guttural cries of the Westphalians. Had the artillery breached the German parapets? A wild yell of joy

* This narrative was published in *The Daily Chronicle*.



HIGHLAND PIPERS PLAYING THE CANADIAN SCOTTISH INTO YPRES.

Canadians honoured by their British comrades on their return from the battle at Langemarck.

told the Warwicks in reserve that the gunners had done their work. Into two smoke-obscured trenches the wave of excited Welshmen poured. There was a short, hand-to-hand encounter. Then the Teutons fled down a long communication trench leading to an orchard. Careless whether they hit their own men or not, the German gunners opened on what a minute before had been the Westphalian trench. While Sergeant Butler, badly

wounded, was firing the only machine gun which had not been knocked out, Captain Stockwell led his men up the communication trench. He had been joined by thirty-five men of the Scots Guards, which regiment was abreast of the Welshmen. A hundred yards on they met a barrage of British shells. Our gunners had expected the Westphalians to put up a better fight.

The news that the Welsh Fusiliers had reached this point, was conveyed to our artillery

which then turned its attention to the trenches and redoubts beyond.

The shelling ceased, and Captain Stockwell was about to lead his men to the orchard when a German officer and two men appeared in the communication trench with a machine gun. The Fusiliers and Scots Guardsmen fired a volley and, over the corpses of the three Germans, they rushed to the orchard. There—1,200 yards from the British lines—they were brought to a standstill by machine gun fire from six ruined cottages. The four bomb-throwers with the party made an entrance into the first cottage, and throughout Sunday Captain Stockwell and his little band maintained themselves in it. Only one of seven orderlies sent for reinforcements got back. At night he received orders to retire to the second line of German trenches, which had been meanwhile occupied by us and put in a state of defence.

The clearance of these trenches had been chiefly due to the bombers, each of which carried half a dozen grenades. Among them Company-Sergeant-Major Barter with seven men had bombed 500 yards of trench, cut the wires of eleven mines, and captured three officers and 102 prisoners. He was awarded the V.C.: "I had only just arrived at the front," a German officer, who belonged to the 57th Regiment, afterwards explained, "I was in Lille for three days, and was then sent to the trenches. The first day I was shelled; the next day a British soldier threw a bomb at me. I thought I had had enough, so I surrendered." Some of the prisoners were Polish miners, who were rejoiced to escape from German tyranny.

Similar scenes had occurred in the neighbouring area attacked by the Scots Guards and Scottish Borderers. The Borderers met with a mishap. Colonel Wood was wounded and fell into a stream and would have been drowned but for Sergeant Burman and Corporal Coleman, who jumped in and pulled him out. Caught by a torrent of machine gun fire, the Borderers came to a halt.

The Scots Guards, headed by Sir Frederick Fitzwygram, went on alone. Sergeant Heyes joined a bombing party of the Borderers and, when the officers were killed, with typical British initiative he took command. He succeeded in capturing some 250 yards of German trenches.

Sir Frederick Fitzwygram and a company, borne away by their eagerness, outdistanced

the rest of the regiment. Near the Rue du Bois they were surrounded and killed. A few days later their bodies were found in the midst of a circle of German dead, empty cartridge cases, twisted bayonets and broken rifles.

On the other flank of the Welsh Fusiliers the West Surreys (the Queen's), a regiment largely composed of Londoners, were fully equal to their great reputation. The two leading companies had been almost wiped out in the first few minutes of the charge; Major Bottomley was mortally wounded. The other companies, however, stormed the first-line trenches of the enemy and stuck to them all Sunday. For tactical reasons they were then withdrawn. One of their number, Private Hardy, had joined Sergeant-Major Barter's bombing party, whose exploits have been already described. Wounded in the right arm, Hardy fell fainting to the ground. The wound was dressed and he recovered. No sooner was he on his legs than he cried, "Luckily I'm left-handed," and ran off to rejoin Barter. With his uninjured hand he flung grenades until a shot laid him low.

Hardy's heroic death was the culmination of one of the most curious incidents in the war. Some time after the outbreak of hostilities a certain Captain Smart, of the 53rd Sikhs, who had been in England on furlough, absented himself without leave and joined the Expeditionary Force as a private. The "Hardy" whose dauntless action we have described was Captain Smart! He had told Barter what he had done, explaining that he had deserted in order to get into action as soon as possible. "Luckily I'm left-handed," is a phrase that should live from its association with this gallant officer, who, after his death, was reinstated in his former rank.

The answer of another man of the Queen's, Private Williamson, deserves to be recorded. He had been bringing in wounded men through storms of bullets. The Adjutant of the South Staffords, seeing that he was exhausted, told him to take cover; "No, sir," he said, "my place is in the firing line with my regiment, and I must go back to it."

No less meritorious was the conduct of the South Staffordshires. The men from Walsall and Wolverhampton had been taunted by the Germans the night before. But the enemy proved more valiant with their mouths than with their hands. Charged by the South Staffords, they bolted down the communication trench, and several hundred yards of the

German line were won. Second-Lieutenant Hassall, a reserve officer, when bombing, exhibited personal courage of no ordinary kind. Under heavy fire he also returned to fetch grenades. Captain Singleton Bonner also distinguished himself, and Captain A. B. Beauman handled his company with great skill and, after reaching the line allotted to the battalion, entrenched himself and during that and the next two days held on under heavy artillery fire.

As the battle proceeded, fresh troops were thrown in to increase the momentum of the British attack. Late on Sunday evening the Grenadier Guards advanced, and joined in hunting the Germans from their lairs. One Grenadier was seen methodically bombing a large body of Germans huddled together in a trench. A machine gun was brought up and laid through a hole in the parapet. As the Germans scuttled away from the exploding grenades, they were torn down by its fire.

The Gordons, too, did yeoman's service. Lieut.-Col. A. Gordon, shot through the knee, refused to be taken to a dressing station, and remained until the parapet of the captured trench had been reversed, and faced the enemy.

The Warwicks, behind the Welsh Fusiliers, who had been the recipients of special attention

from the German artillery, went forward and explained to the Germans with their bayonets that Birmingham exports men as well as arms and ammunition. Second-Lieutenant Chavasse, bearing a name well-known in Birmingham, and a nephew of the Bishop of Liverpool, led the leading company in the attack. The young officers in this battalion showed great courage and skill.

Turning from the deeds of individual regiments, officers and men, let us consider the results of the fighting on May 15 and 16 from a wider standpoint. By 7 a.m. on May 16 the 7th Division had entrenched itself on a line running nearly north and south, half-way between their original trenches and La Quinque Rue. Dividing it from the 2nd Division were, however, two breastwork entrenchments running back from the front of the enemy's first-line trenches, and so constructed as to give fire laterally in both directions; also a series of redoubts. The entrenchments were armed with machine guns behind steel shields, and high explosive shells were required to render them untenable. At 10.30 a.m. of the same day an attempt had been made from La Quinque Rue against the communications of the enemy, but it ended in failure. On the extreme left the attack of the Indians had been



INDIAN TROOPS IN NORTHERN FRANCE.



"SHABASH! KUCH DAR NAHIN HAI!"—"BRAVO! THERE IS NO FEAR!"
The Charge of the 40th Pathans near Ypres.

suspended, and the rest of the day had been spent in endeavouring to unite the inner flanks of the 2nd and 7th Divisions. At nightfall the Germans had counter-attacked, and the furthest point occupied by the 7th Division—the cottage taken by Captain Stockwell of the Welsh Fusiliers—had had to be abandoned.

By the morning of Monday, May 17, the British had driven two salients into the German lines—one north of Festubert, the other south of it. At about 9.30 a.m. the operation of connecting the salients recommenced. Rain was falling.

Pressed from three sides, subjected to a cross fire from several directions and to continuous bombing and shelling, the resistance of the enemy gradually weakened, and many prisoners were captured. In front of the farm Cour de l'Avoué, between La Quinque Rue and Richebourg l'Avoué, a horrible scene, already referred to at page 80, was witnessed. The remains of a battalion of Saxons hastily brought up to reinforce the Westphalians had proposed to surrender. They advanced towards our line and were at first greeted by a hail of bullets. Immediately they threw down their rifles, and one of them waved a white flag tied to a stick. At that moment the Westphalians north of them poured volley after volley into their Saxon comrades, while the German artillery behind opened on them. In a few seconds all that was left of the band were a few wounded men writhing on the ground.

Meanwhile the 7th Division in front of Festubert pressed southwards along the German trenches, bombing and bayoneting everyone in their path. Their task was to push on in the direction of Rue d'Ouvert, Chapelle St. Roch and Canteleux, while the 2nd Division on their left was directed on Rue du Marais and Violaines. The Indian Corps was ordered to keep in touch with the 2nd Division and the 51st (Highland) Division was directed to Estaires to support the First Army. By nightfall the whole of the German first-line trenches from the south of Festubert to Richebourg l'Avoué were in our possession. In places the second and third lines had been captured, and beyond them many important tactical points were also held. The men, some of them wet through and covered from head to foot with mud, were eager to continue the fight. The news of the gassing at Ypres and of the torpedoing of the *Lusitania* had infuriated them, and their

tempers had not been softened by such incidents as that about to be recounted.

A party of sixty Germans, dressed in khaki, advanced towards a British trench. One of the treacherous scoundrels called out in excellent English: "Don't shoot, we are the Grenadier Guards." A British officer climbed out and walked forward. Immediately he was fired upon, though not hit. His men, full of a righteous indignation, rushed from their trench and slew them to a man.

That night a Territorial Battalion, the 4th Cameron Highlanders—men from Skye and the Outer Islands and Inverness-shire, many of them gillies or gamekeepers, had an experience which the survivors will not soon forget. At 7.30 p.m. they received orders to attack some cottages. In the dark they stumbled on a deep and wide ditch. Some swam it; others found planks left by the Germans and so crossed over. All the while they were being shelled and also fired at from some houses on their left. One company completely missed its way; another was virtually wiped out. A third company reached the back end of a German communication trench. By 9 p.m. this company was in desperate straits. No bombs and few cartridges were left. About midnight two platoons managed to reach it, but they had no machine guns with them. It would have been folly to remain any longer in such an exposed position. The survivors made their way back as best they could. Their commander, Lieut.-Col. Fraser, and twelve other officers were killed, and half the battalion killed, wounded or missing. In this retirement Sergeant-Major Ross, a veteran, was noticed as behaving with remarkable coolness and courage.

Tuesday, May 18, was the birthday of Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, the author of the order not to take prisoners. In *The Lille War News*—a paper published for the consumption of the credulous German soldiers—there appeared this crazy exhortation:

Comrades, if the enemy were to invade our land, do you think he would leave one stone upon another of our fathers' houses, our churches, and all the works of a thousand years of love and toil? . . . and if your strong arms did not hold back the English (God damn them!) and the French (God annihilate them!), do you think they would spare your homes and your loved ones? What would these pirates from the Isles do to you if they were to set foot on German soil?

In spite of this frenzied appeal the "strong arms" of the Germans were unable to prevent the British making further progress, although

the weather was cold and rainy, which interfered with artillery preparation. Our troops advanced from the Festubert-La Quinque Rue road to a point about 1,200 yards north of it, and they seized a post 300 yards south-east of the hamlet. The enemy, however, still retained two large farms south of Richebourg l'Avoué and west of the Festubert-La Quinque Rue road—viz., the farm of the Cour de l'Avoué, before which the unfortunate Saxons had been butchered, and the farm du Bois. These farms were very strongly defended: they bristled with machine guns. But still our men would not be denied, and by Tuesday night success crowned their efforts, the total number of prisoners taken had reached 608, and several machine guns had been captured.

That day Lieutenant J. G. Smyth, of the 15th Ludhiana Sikhs, near Richebourg l'Avoué—after two attempts had failed—with a party of ten men conveyed 96 bombs to a point within a few yards of the enemy. To do this he had to swim a stream, and all the time he was under the fire of howitzers, machine guns and rifles. The V.C. was his reward.

Lieutenant A. V. L. Corry, of the 2/ Grenadier Guards, had also distinguished himself. At Rue du Bois, when his commander was killed and all the other officers wounded, he had reorganized the company and handled it with great coolness.

The next day Sir Douglas Haig withdrew the 7th and 2nd Divisions. The former was relieved by the Canadians, the latter by the 51st (Highland) Division. Both divisions were, with the artillery of the 2nd and 7th Divisions, placed under the command of Lieut.-General Alderson. The 7th Division remained in Army Reserve. The weather continued wet and cold. There was little to be recorded, though during the night of the 19th–20th a small post in front of La Quinque Rue was captured, and Corporal T. G. Earl, of the 2/ Welsh Fusiliers, distinguished himself at Richebourg l'Avoué by bringing in wounded men on five separate occasions, eventually being himself struck down.

On Thursday, May 20, the rain ceased, but the day was dull and cloudy. Between 7 and 8 p.m. the Canadians brilliantly seized certain points to the north-east of the Festubert-La Quinque road, including an orchard. Some prisoners and machine guns were captured. The 21st, apart from an artillery duel, was uneventful, though some slight progress was made

near Festubert. The next day the 51st (Highland) Division was attached to the Indian Corps, and the Canadians repulsed three very severe hostile counter-attacks from the direction of Chapelle St. Roch, the enemy suffering heavy loss.

But the Germans were still capable of further effort. The 7th Prussian Army Corps, now strongly reinforced, made on Sunday, May 23, another effort to break through the Canadian line near Festubert. They advanced in masses, and, as usual, were mowed down by shrapnel, machine-gun and rifle fire. Many of their batteries had been silenced during the day. On the 24th and 25th the 47th Division (2nd London Territorials) carried some of the enemy's trenches, and in the centre on the 24th near Bois Grenier, between Armentières and Neuve Chapelle, a slight success was gained. During the night several attacks made by the Germans near Festubert were repulsed.

"I had now reasons to consider," says Sir John French, "that the battle which was commenced by the 1st Army on May 9 and renewed on the 16th, having attained for the moment the immediate object I had in view, should not be further actively proceeded with. . . . In the battle of Festubert the enemy was driven from a position which was strongly entrenched and fortified, and ground was won on a front of four miles to an average depth of 600 yards."

The advantage gained was, in space, perhaps small, but measured by moral standards great. Immediately after the failure of the Germans to gas and blast their way through to Ypres, British troops, fighting as ever with clean hands and without the assistance of an overwhelming artillery, had broken through an elaborately fortified German position. In bayoneting, bombing, and whatever requires personal courage in the individual, they had again displayed a marked superiority over those opposed to them.

We have already given some examples of the daring and noble courage exhibited by certain regiments, officers and men during the desperate fighting from Saturday, May 15, to Tuesday, May 18. Those examples were not exceptional. A few more instances of British heroism may fittingly conclude this chapter.

Private J. Jones, of the Scots Fusiliers, repeatedly carried messages over dangerous ground. He was mortally wounded on the last of his important errands. Summoning up his



READY TO START FOR THE TRENCHES.

An evening scene near the battle-line. British troops about to start for the trenches carrying sacks of coke, planks of wood and broken up packing cases for making fires, and, in addition to full pack and rifle, the men carry parcels of food.

last strength he waved the paper he was carrying to attract the notice of his comrades. The message was taken by one of them from his dead body. Lieut. A. T. Quinlan, R.A.M.C., attached to the same regiment, was dangerously wounded while tending a wounded man in the open. Shells were bursting around him. He forbade two stretcher-bearers in a neighbouring trench to come to his assistance.

Lieutenant Graham, of the Essex Regiment, who accompanied the Fusiliers, was a man of exceptional height, and therefore an easy mark for the enemy. The Colonel of the Fusiliers advised him to keep at the rear of the attacking party. When the charge began, he rushed ahead and was almost immediately shot down. Lance-Corporal J. Lonigan, of the 60th Rifles, a stretcher-bearer, was buried by the explosion

of a shell. No sooner was he dug out than he resumed his duties as if nothing out of the way had happened to him. Second-Lieutenant Lloyd Jones, of the Yorkshires, was bombing a trench. A German sniper from behind a hedge killed a non-commissioned officer by his side. The Lieutenant, creeping forward, flung his grenade with such excellent aim that two German soldiers were blown up and the sniper's hand was smashed to pieces. The 8th Royal Scots, a Territorial Battalion brought into the front line, remained through the thickest of the fighting and proved itself worthy of those it joined. Its gallant commander, Lieut.-Colonel Brook, was killed by a shell on the third day.

Of the work of the Royal Engineers and the Royal Army Medical Corps it is superfluous to speak. One section of the Engineers from late in the afternoon of Sunday to 3 a.m. on Monday under constant shell and rifle fire constructed two trenches, one nearly two hundred yards long and six feet deep. The stretcher-bearers and orderlies of the R.A.M.C. moved in the deadliest areas as unconcerned as if they were in a hospital ward. Both the artillery observers and the signallers who were responsible for the telephone communication between the fighting line and the batteries and headquarters also displayed the utmost gallantry.

Modern war is shorn of much if not all its ancient pageantry, but for practical fighting

our men still possess the heroic qualities of the race.

The Canadians rendered invaluable assistance in the last phase of the battle of Festubert, as they had previously done in the fighting round Ypres when the Germans first opened their gas retorts. Collectively they lived or died up to the reputation which they had gained in the St. Julien trenches. Of the acts of gallantry performed by individuals the following may be mentioned:

Private H. T. Cameron, attached to the Field Ambulance of the 1st Canadian Division, volunteered on the night of May 20-1 to assist in collecting the wounded in an orchard captured from the enemy. Of the seven men who accompanied him four fell. He was awarded the Medal for Distinguished Conduct. On May 23 Colour-Sergeant J. Hay, of the 8th Canadian Infantry Battalion, after all the officers had been killed or wounded, took command of his company, and by his coolness and gallantry rallied them and kept them steady throughout the day. Private E. H. Hester, of the 5th Canadian Infantry Battalion, who had already distinguished himself on the 20th, 21st and 22nd, on the 24th led an attacking party, and with it entered a bomb-proof shelter, cutting the wires of a number of mines, and thus saving the lives of many of his comrades.



BRITISH ARTILLERY GOING INTO ACTION.

CHAPTER LXXXIX.

AMERICAN OPINION AND THE FIRST YEAR OF WAR.

GERMAN POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES—OPINION IN AMERICA—RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR—GERMAN PROPAGANDA—EDUCATIONAL CAMPAIGN—COUNT BERNSTORFF—HERR DERNBURG DISMISSED—*The New York World's* EXPOSURES—THE FATHERLAND—AMERICAN NEUTRALITY—EXPORT OF MUNITIONS—THE ARCHIBALD EXPOSURES—DR. DUMBA RECALLED—MR. ROOSEVELT, COLONEL WATTERSON, AND OTHER PRO-ALLIES' OPINION—GERMAN SUBMARINE "BLOCKADE"—AMERICAN SHIPS SUNK—THE LUSITANIA—UNITED STATES NOTES TO GERMANY—RESIGNATION OF MR. BRYAN—SINKING OF THE ARABIC.


NOTWITHSTANDING the large proportion of people of German birth in America, the cause for which the Allies were fighting was sure from the first of a large measure of American sympathy. The United States Government, of course, at once proclaimed an official neutrality. Indeed it was the only first-class Power of the Western world that could maintain an attitude of even comparative detachment towards the combatants. During the first year of the war this attitude was maintained in spite of the utterly lawless and abominably inhuman acts perpetrated by the German Government against innocent American citizens: acts which severely tried the President's patience. But the formal attitude of the Government is one thing: that of the American masses another.

The relative importance of the German population is usually greatly exaggerated in discussing the activities of the German-Americans. It is true that of the total foreign-born population 25 per cent. were of German birth, but on the other hand 24 per cent. were born in the British Empire. To carry the comparison a point further, it will be found that whilst Germany and her Allies represent

33 per cent. of the total foreign-born population, as reported by the last United States Census (1910), Great Britain and her Allies represent 54 per cent. It is evident that the German-Americans in the United States from the outbreak of the war created a noise out of proportion to their numerical importance. Had the British Canadian, Italian, Russian, and other nationalities identified with the Allies conducted themselves in a similar manner, an intolerable condition of affairs would have resulted, which might have ended in civil riots. Happily this was not the case. Whilst Germans and Austro-Hungarians, backed by their Embassies, used the neutral territory of the United States to disseminate the most shameless propaganda and encourage deeds of violence, representatives of the Allied nations retained a dignified and law-abiding attitude towards the Republic that had offered them hospitality and broader opportunities. For these and other reasons the sentiments of the American people were overwhelmingly on our side. They were not slow to see, in spite of German propaganda to the contrary, that this was a war fastened upon Europe by the arrogant ambition of one Power, that Great Britain

went to the uttermost lengths of persuasion in order to avert it, and that in entering upon it she acted under compulsion of irresistible obligations of honour and duty as well as of self-interest.

The relations of the United States with Germany, it should be borne in mind, were, and had been for a generation or more, of a close and cordial character. It is true that of late years German emigration had declined, but this was, in part at least, made up by the increase of travel and commerce, and by the extension of financial connexions between the



DR. WALTER H. PAGE,
American Ambassador in London.

two countries. It was further helped by the establishment of splendidly equipped German steamship lines plying between New York and Hamburg and Bremen; by the interchange of American University professors with those from German Universities; and by the broadened relations resulting from common studies in science, literature and music. In all these departments of knowledge Germany exercised a distinct influence on the people of the United States. Throughout the United States there existed a deep feeling of friendship for the German people, and an equal admiration for what were supposed to be their ideals and matchless progress. Many Germans fought on the side of the North in the Civil War. Next to the British, German emigration to the United States had always been the most satisfactory in every respect. The Germans were law-abiding, industrious, thrifty, and, until the war brought about the awakening,

were regarded as sound and loyal citizens of the country of their adoption. Certainly no prejudice existed in any quarter against Germans, therefore to their own acts alone must be attributed the stupendous change of sentiment which took place during the first year of the war. The wanton and barbarous destruction of Belgium, the murder of innocent non-combatants and women and children on the high seas and in undefended towns and watering places, caused a powerful revulsion of sentiment against the Germans. The friends of Germany, both in the Universities, where exchanges of professorships had introduced new and intimate ties between the Republic and the Empire, and in the scientific institutions, as well as those engaged in trade, commerce and finance, were amazed to find men they had hitherto regarded as civilized advocating and defending the most barbarous acts of war. It took some time for men who had enjoyed intimate relations with Germany and the Germans to identify their late friends and colleagues after they had thrown aside their masks. The amiable, engaging Dr. Jekylls became distorted into bloodthirsty Mr. Hydes, and it was not surprising that their American friends failed to recognize them.

One of the earliest and most striking illustrations of this awakening occurred before the destruction of the *Lusitania* sent a wave of unspeakable horror throughout the length and breadth of the United States. In October, 1914, a manifesto, signed by 93 of the most prominent men of Germany, distinguished in various branches of science, art, education and literature, was circulated broadcast throughout America. It was entitled "An Appeal to the Civilized World" * and in it an attempt was made to change public opinion in the United States on the subject of the war. Judged by the weight and importance of the names attached to it, this document should have served the purpose intended, but unhappily for the enemy the American public were not to be influenced by mere assertions, even when promulgated by men of great distinction. That public decided to go deeper than the surface in its search for truth. The most comprehensive reply to the manifesto of the German professors was that made by Samuel Harden Church, President Carnegie Institute, Pittsburg.† After assuring the pro-

* This document is printed in full in Vol. V., page 168.

† Published in full by *The Times* in pamphlet form.



DR. WOODROW WILSON,
President of the United States of America.

(From a portrait painted specially for "The Times History of the War.")



PROFESSOR SAMUEL HARDEN CHURCH,
Of the Carnegie Institute, Pittsburg.

fessors of the esteem in which many of them were held in America, of the appreciation of their eminent services to humanity, and reminding them that their names were as well known in America as in Germany, Mr. Church proceeded to say that it would be impossible for America to take sides against Germany unjustly or from prejudice. Whilst earnestly striving to maintain an impartial neutrality, Americans would at the same time earnestly strive to find the right and condemn the wrong, because neutrality can never mean indifference. In short, the American people, having divested themselves of prejudice, proceeded to study the evidence in order that public opinion might conform to the facts. After remarking that it was pathetic to note the importunity with which the people of Germany were seeking the good opinion of America in this strife, Mr. Church said :

Your letter speaks of Germany as being in a struggle "which has been forced upon her." That is the whole question ; all others are subsidiary. If this struggle was forced upon Germany, then indeed she stands in a position of mighty dignity and honour, and the whole world should acclaim her and succour her, to the utter confusion and punishment of the foes who have attacked her. But if this outrageous war was not forced upon her, would it not follow in the course of reason that her position is without dignity and honour, and that it is her foes who should be acclaimed and supported to the extreme limit of human sympathy ?

I believe that the judgment on this paramount question has been formed. That judgment is not based upon the lies and calumnies of the enemies of Germany, nor upon the careless publications contained in the newspapers, but upon a profound study of the official correspondence in the case. This correspondence has been published and disseminated by the respective

Governments concerned in the war ; it has been reprinted in full in our leading newspapers, and with substantial fullness in our magazines, and has been republished in a complete pamphlet form in one huge edition after another by the *New York Times*, and again by the American Association for International Conciliation ; and the public demand for this indisputable evidence has not yet been satisfied, although many millions of our people have read it. These documents are known officially as (1) The Austro-Hungarian Note to Serbia, (2) The Serbian Reply, (3) The British White Paper, (4) The German White Book, (5) The Russian Yellow Book, (6) The Belgian Grey Book. They contain all the letters and dispatches which each government desired to publish to the world as its own justification for being at war. And, by the way, every man who studies these papers will regret two things : first, that Germany has not dared to publish her correspondence with Austria, and, second, that Austria has not dared to publish her correspondence with Germany. If the world were in possession of this suppressed evidence, its judgment on the question of guilt would doubtless be greatly facilitated. But, in so far as they have been printed, all of these documents are before me as I write this letter ; I cannot help wondering whether they have been circulated in Germany ; I cannot help wishing that the German people might have the opportunity which my countrymen have had of reading these State papers in their fullness.

In concluding his spirited indictment of German methods and of the German professors, Mr. Church said :

And so, at last, we find ourselves shocked, ashamed and outraged that a Christian nation should be guilty of this criminal war. There was no justification for it. Armed and defended as you were, the whole world could never have broken into your borders. And while German culture still has something to gain from her neighbours, yet the intellectual progress which Germany was making seemed to be lifting up her own people to better things for themselves and to an altruistic service to mankind. Your great nation floated its ships in every ocean, sold its wares in the uttermost parts of the earth, and enjoyed the good favour of humanity, because it was trusted as a humane State. But now all this achievement has



DR. CHARLES W. ELIOT,
President Emeritus of Harvard.



WATCHING THE WAR BULLETINS IN NEW YORK.

Crowds coming out of the down-town offices in the evening watching the war bulletins outside the "World," "Sun" and "Tribune" offices. The skyscraper on the right is the Woolworth building.

vanished, all this good opinion has been destroyed. You cannot in half a century regain the spiritual and material benefits which you have lost. Oh, that we might have again a Germany that we could respect, a Germany of true peace, of true progress, of true culture, modest and not boastful, for ever rid of her war lords and her armed hosts, and turning once more to the uplifting influence of such leaders as Luther, Goethe, Beethoven, and Kant ! But Germany, whether you win or lose in this war, has fallen, and the once glorious nation must continue to pursue its course in darkness and murder until conscience at last bids it withdraw its armies back to its own

boundaries, there to hope for the world's pardon upon this inexpressible damnation.

Mr. Oswald Garrison Villard,* writing some months after Mr. Church, apparently came to precisely the same conclusions. Mr. Villard said :

So far as has been ascertained, no German publication of the complete English and French documents has been

* *Germany Embattled, an American Interpretation.*
By Oswald Garrison Villard.

attempted; the public has learned of them almost wholly through partisan comments by their own editors. Thus the writer has been unable to discover in the German papers to which he has had access any fair discussion or publication of Belgium's official statement of her side of the case, and the documents bearing thereon. Of all the literature of the war, nothing is more impressive and convincing than this. But the *New Yorker Staats-Zeitung*, for one, made haste to abridge and bury it in an inconspicuous place.

Dr. Charles W. Eliot, President Emeritus of Harvard, in a letter to the *New York Times** touched on the same point in these words:

The pamphlets by German publicists and men of letters which are now coming to this country, and the various similar publications written here, seem to indicate that the German public is still kept by its Government in ignorance about the real antecedents of the war, and about many incidents and aspects of the portentous combat. These documents seem to Americans to contain a large amount of misinformation about the attack of Austria-Hungary on Serbia, the diplomatic negotiations and the correspondence between sovereigns which immediately preceded the war, and the state of mind of the Belgian and English peoples.

Space must be found for one other opinion on the responsibility for the war, because the basis of all the German propaganda in America was that the war had been forced upon Germany. In October, 1914, the *New York Times* submitted the White, Orange, and Grey Books of Great Britain, Germany, Russia and Belgium to Mr. James M. Beck, formerly Assistant Attorney-General of the United States, and one of the leaders of the New York Bar, and asked him to consider the evidence submitted to determine the legal responsibility for the war. Mr. Beck's brief occupied two pages in the *New York Times*, and is a close analysis of the testimony presented. His full arguments will be found in the pages of a pamphlet printed by *The Times*, from which is reproduced here only the "judgment," which in Mr. Beck's opinion "an impartial court would not hesitate to pass":

1. That Germany and Austria in a time of profound peace secretly concerted together to impose their will upon Europe and upon Serbia in a manner affecting the balance of power in Europe. Whether in so doing they intended to precipitate a European war to determine the mastery of Europe is not satisfactorily established, although their whole course of conduct suggests this as a possibility. They made war almost inevitable by (a) issuing an ultimatum that was grossly unreasonable and disproportionate to any grievance that Austria had, and (b) in giving to Serbia, and Europe, insufficient time to consider the rights and obligations of all interested nations.

2. That Germany had at all times the power to compel Austria to preserve a reasonable and conciliatory course, but at no time effectively exerted that influence. On the contrary, she certainly abetted and possibly instigated, Austria in its unreasonable course.

3. That England, France, Italy, and Russia at all times sincerely worked for peace, and for this purpose

not only overlooked the original misconduct of Austria but made every reasonable concession in the hope of preserving peace.

4. That Austria having mobilized its army, Russia was reasonably justified in mobilizing its forces. Such act of mobilization was the right of any sovereign State, and as long as the Russian armies did not cross the border or take any aggressive action no other nation had any just right to complain, each having the same right to make similar preparations.


5. That Germany, in abruptly declaring war against Russia for failure to demobilize when the other Powers had offered to make any reasonable concession and peace parleys were still in progress, precipitated the war.

This impartial and neutral American jurist declared that in his judgment Germany and Austria were responsible for the war; that Germany had it in her power to compel Austria to preserve a reasonable course, but did not exert that influence; that England, France, Italy and Russia sincerely worked for peace, and that Germany in abruptly declaring war against Russia precipitated the war. Mr. Beck adds that he reached these conclusions with reluctance, as he had a feeling of deep affection and admiration for the German people. But "the German nation has been plunged into this abyss by scheming statesmen and its self-centred and highly neurotic Kaiser, who in the twentieth century sincerely believes he is the proxy of Almighty God on earth, and therefore infallible."

It will be seen that the very foundation of the German propaganda in America had been undermined. After failure in the endeavour to convince America that the Allies were the aggressors, there remained only the more difficult task of trying to demonstrate that it is right for a great nation to trample under foot another people because in her judgment her welfare demands that the weaker shall pay the price, to hide, distort, and travesty the facts, and to carry out an organized campaign against the truth. Great Britain, Russia, France and Italy did not find it necessary to initiate a propaganda abroad on behalf of their soldiers, their motives, or their policies. The Allies bore themselves with rare dignity and restraint, and their qualities of self-control contrasted favourably with the German propagandists, who sought to conquer hostile American opinion by the lowest and most disreputable methods.

The attitude of Great Britain in all this sordid business was simply one of anxiety, just anxiety, to have the moral support of the American people in this war for liberty and right. But we knew that it was behind

* Published October 2, 1914.



Left : At home in New Jersey.
Right : With his Secretary.



At a Naval Review.

A DAY WITH DR. WOODROW WILSON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

us, and it was hardly becoming in us, while it might be disagreeable to the American Government, that we should openly solicit the good opinion that was already given us so freely. We were conscious of our own good right. The facts were before America as they were before the rest of the world. We were content that she should form her own judgment upon them.

The "German educational campaign" in the United States was undertaken by Herr Dernburg, who arrived in America on August 25, 1914, accompanying the German Ambassador, Count Bernstorff, who, at the outbreak of war, was at home on leave of absence. He euphemistically described his mission as "the enlisting of American support for the German Red Cross." The real purpose of this German emissary, however, was not long in developing, and under the direction of Count Bernstorff, the German Ambassador, a gigantic campaign was organized to feed the American public with German news and views, and to deflect their sympathies, if possible, from Great Britain to the side of Germany. The choice of Dernburg was characteristic of German methods. Twenty-five years before the war this son of a Berlin Jewish journalist had been a

volunteer bank clerk in Wall Street, and his methods were always regarded in Germany as "American." After a fairly successful business career he was "invented" by Prince Bülow at the end of 1906 to become Colonial Secretary, and to run the "national" elections to the Reichstag on a colonial issue which Bülow had forced for his own ends. The election campaign, which was managed on lines new in Germany, was successful, and Dernburg increased his reputation. It was, however, quickly discovered that a Jewish Minister was impossible in Prussia as soon as he had ceased to be actually necessary to his masters, and during a political crisis in 1910 Dernburg, anticipating his certain fate, took refuge in resignation. In the years before the war he had lost all influence in Germany, and to those who knew his situation it seemed something like an insult to the United States that he should suddenly be brought out of his retirement "to bamboozle the Americans." Dernburg had no lack of assistants. The American Embassy alone provided him with people like the naval attaché, Captain Boy-Ed, better known for his work in the Tirpitz press bureau than for his knowledge of the sea.

There were other lesser lights, and strong banking and other friends in America who volunteered to help in moulding public opinion. The Kaiser apparently felt sure of the support of the German-American population, but it was noted soon after the destruction of Belgium that the Kaiser's popularity with at least four-fifths of the American people was decidedly on the wane. The principal newspaper organs of these worthies were Mr. Herman Ridder's *New Yorker Staats-Zeitung*, once, but no longer, a paper of considerable influence, and Mr. Hearst's *New Yorker Morgen Journal*. There were many less important journals printed in German and perhaps others in English that were brought into line. New German organs were founded for the special purposes of German war propaganda. Most notorious among these latter journals was the *Fatherland*, edited by Herr Viereck, who claimed that he was "America's foremost living poet." From the headquarters in New York emanated a continuous stream of "statements" by the Ambassador, "letters to the public" from Dr. Dernburg, "addresses" and magazine articles by Dr. Hugo Muensterberg, who occupied the Chair of Psychology at Harvard. In short, the "news syndicate"



MR. HERMAN RIDDER,
Editor of the *New Yorker Staats-Zeitung*



(From the "New York Tribune.")

DR. DERNBURG.

Will he take his dog with him?

methods so well known in America were worked for "all they were worth," and the "big drum" was beaten so loudly from Maine to California that at first it seemed likely that the purpose in view would at least partially be accomplished.

Such, then, were the *personnel* and their methods widely developed by the German Government for the purpose of working up public sentiment in the United States. An American correspondent in *The Times*, in commenting on the campaign said:

The general assault on American public opinion began with the moment of Count Bernstorff's arrival. He ceased to be an Ambassador and became a Press Agent Extraordinary and Publicity Promoter Plenipotentiary. The German Embassy in Washington put up its shutters as a diplomatic establishment and was converted into a news agency. The American newspapers were drenched with Ambassadorial communicativeness. The New York journals which had reporters to whom Count Bernstorff could pour out his heart got interviews measurable only in columns. To the great Press outside New York Count Bernstorff spoke through the medium of "statements" to the New York offices of the two leading American news agencies. For a week or ten days not a morning or evening journal of consequence in the United States went to press without some fresh effusion from Bernstorff. Now it was an "official denial" of the latest act of German brutality. Then there would be some new braggart prognostication of Germany's "absolute invincibility." To vary the monotony of Bernstorff's *pronunciamentos*, Captain Boy-Ed was now impressed into service, and he began feeding the Press with "interviews" and "statements." Then Dr. Dernburg was "put on the job." His *début* consisted of a long, carefully-prepared brief arguing the German case with the finesse of a shrewd counsel for the defence, for the Kaiser's cause in America was now at a point where it urgently required rehabilitation. By "news syndicate" methods widely developed in the United States, Dr. Dernburg's

statements received publicity in the leading journals of the country, reaching all the way from New York to the Golden Gate.

The movement was conducted with characteristic thoroughness and characteristic want of scruple. The Consular Service was mobilized, the German societies, which seek to preserve a separate German *Stimmung* amongst the German citizens of the United States, were marshalled and set to work; even German firms were employed to bring pressure on the American Press by furtive menaces of withdrawing support unless news and comments on the war were manipulated in German interests. Newspapers, as we have said, were purchased, and German newspapers published



DR. DERNBURG

Of the German Press Bureau in America.



COUNT VON BERNSTORFF.

German Ambassador at Washington, with his American wife and daughter.

in the United States subsidized. Publicity agencies of all kinds were employed for the dissemination of news and articles favourable to Germany, and correspondents in the pay of the German Government were sent abroad for the purpose of extolling German methods and German arms, describing German "victories," and "interviewing" the military and political leaders.* There never had been such a saturnalia of falsehood, calumny, and clumsy fictions as this revelry of corruption, inaugurated and carried out in the United States by Count Bernstorff and his satellites. The sum of money expended must have been enormous,

* See, for instance, the White Paper *re* Mr. James F. J. Archibald referred to below. Thus Count Bernstorff writes to Mr. Archibald:—"I have heard with pleasure that you wish once more to return to Germany and Austria, after having promoted our interests out here in such a zealous and successful manner," while he notifies the German Frontier Customs Authorities that Mr. Archibald "is proceeding to Germany with photographic apparatus, etc., in order there to collect material for lectures in the United States of America in the interests of the German cause."

some estimates giving the amount at £400,000 per week. But, as we shall presently see, when the sinking of the *Lusitania* caused the exit of Herr Dernburg, a series of damaging exposures, and the publication referred to below of Austrian and German papers found in possession of Mr. James F. J. Archibald, shed new light on these pitiful conspiracies to delude the American public, and it was found that these dishonest wares were not suited for the American market.

In spite of some vicissitudes and several exposures as to methods employed, Herr Dernburg's work continued until in May, 1915, he began a campaign the purpose of which was to justify the crime of the sinking of the *Lusitania* and the murder by Germans of innocent women and children. His defence of this was so callous and brutal that it sent a thrill of disgust throughout the country, and American newspapers began an agitation for his expulsion. As a first step to that end it was reported that the American Government had asked Count Bernstorff to explain the precise nature of Herr Dernburg's mission, and at the same time had suggested that Count Bernstorff's legitimate duties would be facilitated by Dernburg's elimination. Realizing

that his usefulness was at an end, the German Government granted the informal request, and Dernburg having obtained through the American Government a safe conduct from the British Government, left for Germany June 13, 1915, on board a Norwegian ship. It was generally conceded by the American Press that any Englishman who had taken the liberties Dernburg had taken with American hospitality would have been ejected much sooner. Thus the principal advocate of German barbarity and the nominal head of the missionary work ignominiously disappeared.

However much the loss of Herr Dernburg may have affected the character of the work done by the German Embassy Press Bureau, it did not curtail in any way its activities. From influencing the public Press and individuals it spent money lavishly in the promotion of strikes and the employment of spies, and engaged in every sort of intrigue to poison public opinion and cripple the legitimate industries of the United States. In August, 1915, a crushing exposure of these German plots was published in the *New York World*, and German treachery in America was brought to light. The exposure began by the publication of a series of secret Government docu-



COMMANDERS OF GERMAN WAR VESSELS.

Captain Thiedfelder of the "*Kronprinz Wilhelm*" on left, and Captain Thierichens of "*Prinz Eitel Friedrich*" on right. Both these vessels were interned in America in April, 1915.



(From the "Cape Times.")

LEAVING THE DOOR OPEN.

Hans—"Call off that dog: my Franz wants a drink."

Jonathan—"Taint my dog. The water's fer all of 'em (AS CAN GET IT)."

ments which were lost by, or according to the German version, stolen from Privy Councillor Dr. Albert in the Elevated Railway, New York. This exposure, in the words of that journal, "raises for the first time the curtain that has hitherto concealed the activities and purposes of the official German propaganda in the United States." The documents suggested that Count Bernstorff had at his command a revenue of about £400,000 weekly. This money was used not only for the suborning of American public opinion, but for the purposes of promoting strikes in munition factories, for agitation against, and for an embargo on the exportation of munitions. Perhaps the most damning document from the *World's* portfolio of secret German papers was a report made to the German Chancellor by one Waetzoldt, who signed himself "Commercial Expert," and wrote on the Consul General's notepaper, suggesting the best means to foment American trade irritation against Great Britain. After expressing hopes that the cotton question would soon become acute, the Chancellor's Consular Agent observed:

From the German standpoint, pressure on the American Government can be strengthened by the interruption of deliveries from Germany, even if the British Government should permit exceptions. Those shipments especially should be interrupted which American industries so badly require, especially chemical and dye stuffs, as also goods which are used in the realm of fine arts. Withholding of goods is the surest means of

occasioning the representation to the Administration in Washington of American interests. Those protests have most weight which come from American industries which employ many workers. The complaint of one of the great American dye factories, which declared that the continued withholding of dye stuffs would make necessary the dismissal of 4,000 workmen, has done more than the protest of importers. A copy of this report is being forwarded to the Imperial German Embassy.

The document was signed "Waetzoldt, Trade Expert to his Excellency the Imperial Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg," and was headed: "Regarding protests of American importers of German and Austrian goods against the British Order in Council." Money, it was shown by these letters, had been freely expended for the purpose of fomenting strikes, with the connivance of disloyal trade union leaders. An official in the office of the Military Attaché of the German Embassy in Washington was shown to have been in communication with certain labour leaders for the purpose of bringing about strikes in ammunition and motor-car factories. Conferences were actually held, it appears, between agents of the German Government and these labour leaders just before the strikes at the Remington and other works.

An important feature of the campaign was an elaborate scheme to control the Press of the United States—mainly through the American Press Association—to establish newspapers



(From "Collier's Weekly.")

ANOTHER VICTORY.

And another Iron Cross for von Tirpitz.




THE DICTATOR.

From a German Cartoon.

and news services, finance lecturers and film exhibitions, and publish pamphlets and books—all for the purpose of dividing the American people to the advantage of the German Empire. In furtherance of this aim the German Government was clearly shown to be a financial backer of the *Fatherland* and similar pro-German apologists. The correspondence as published consisted mainly of facsimile letters from Herr von Stumm, the head of the Political Department of the German Foreign Office,

from Count Bernstorff, and from Dr. Heinrich Albert, chief financial agent of the German Government. George Sylvester Viereck, editor of the *Fatherland*, appeared in the correspondence as an applicant for £300 sterling a month. He acknowledged the receipt of £50, and announced that he would send to the secretary to obtain the rest. In reply Dr. Albert promised payment, but demanded the control of the *Fatherland* counting house and an agreement regarding the policy to be pursued



MR. ROBERT LANSING,
American Secretary of State.

by that journal.* Herr von Stumm wrote on behalf of Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg to Count Bernstorff, recommending that the expenses of the second visit to Germany of Mr. Edward Lyell Fox, an American journalist "who on the occasion of his last visit was most useful to us by reason of his good reports," be paid out of the funds of a German information service. Count Bernstorff approved the recommendation of the Chancellor, and wrote to Captain von Papen, the Military Attaché, instructing him to get in touch with Mr. Fox. The most interesting feature of the *World's* disclosures, however, was the reproduction of an ambitious scheme forwarded to the German Foreign Office for the inauguration of a news agency to supply American newspapers with German "information." The author of this scheme said :

In order to carry through our aim it is necessary to begin to carry through a Press agitation which is adapted

* Count Bernstorff's story is that Mr. Viereck refused to carry out the necessary conditions :—"Mr. Albert made it clear to him [Viereck] that we are not in agreement with his attacks on the Administration, and especially on the President, and that we could not give him any extensive support, however justifiable his claims might be in view of his friendly attitude towards Germany, unless he would grant us a sufficient control of the editing of the paper to enable us to prevent such attacks."

to the character, wishes, and way of thinking of the American public. Everything must be communicated to them in the form of news, as they have been accustomed to this, and only understand this kind of propaganda. For the distribution of news we have in view it will be absolutely necessary to found a new American news syndicate with German money. This has been accomplished by the United States Corporation, without them letting it become known that German money is behind it.

An elaborate scheme for the establishment of this bogus news association was worked out, the aim being to give American newspapers and magazines news and pictures. These articles were to be so subtly manipulated that the fact of their being pro-German was to be disguised from the guileless American editor, who was to be "spoon-fed" daily with this valuable "news" to the extent of from 3,000 to 4,000 words by wireless. This was to be sent with suitable pictures from Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and the Balkan States. On the eastern and western fronts "well-known popular American correspondents" were to be stationed, "who shall have access to all the material they absolutely require." A special Chinese service was even planned to counter-weigh "against the Japanese propaganda." A list of topics not to be dealt with by this precious news association was supplied as a guidance for German official propagandists. The list included :

1. The Belgian neutrality question as well as the question of Belgian atrocities should not be mentioned any more.

2. It should not be tried any more to put the blame for the world war and its consequences on England alone, as a considerable English element exists in America and the American people hold to the view that all parties are partly guilty for the war.

3. The pride and imagination of Americans and the regard for their culture should not be continually offended by the assertion that German culture is the only real culture and surpasses everything else.


In this way, and by methods that came close to being criminal, was the American public to be gulled. The exposures of the *World* connected not only the German Embassy in America and its principal officials, but the Foreign Office in Berlin itself with these scurvy tricks to mould public opinion, and if possible embroil the American Government with that of Great Britain. The *World's* exposure of the plot was opportune, and had the effect of curbing the activities of the German Government in the more hazardous enterprises. In short, the first year of this so-called campaign for moral support in America was a failure. The Germans had utterly failed to understand the American temperament. Bad as their case was they

actually made it worse by their clumsy methods, which included, as we have seen, plots to destroy life and property, the forging of passports, the making of false affidavits, and the promotion of strikes. Though the Germans might pride themselves on their scientific method of getting to the root of a subject, with all their knowledge of America and Americans, they never got to the root of the American mind. The attempts during the first year of the war, both individually and collectively, to mould the public opinion of the United States were alike dismal failures. The American mind, perhaps more given to generalizing than to analysing, was at first slow to see what this "propaganda" work really was, but in the end it appeared that they saw both the men and the deeds they accomplished in their proper proportions. In all this work the Germans left out of account the fact that Americans, like Englishmen, are accustomed to form their own judgment in politics as in other matters. American opinion not only refused to be deluded by the shallow tricks of the German Embassy and propagandists, but it went straight ahead to the deeper issues of the war. It noted with Dr. Eliot and others that German militarism and all which it implied were the root causes of the conflict. It plainly discerned that "the fingerprint of the militarist" was stamped upon Louvain as it was upon Zabern. It realized that this militarist code was the direct negative of all civilization, all progress, and all morality, as the world had hitherto understood them. Only by their extermination could the ideals and principles which the democracy of the United States, like the democracy of England, loved and revered with their whole strength, be preserved to them and to mankind. The German propaganda did far more to awaken the American people to that truth, and to their own immense moral interests in the results of the war.

It is not possible in the space allotted to discuss the question of American neutrality in all its varied phases. As we have seen, the Government at the outbreak of the war declared itself absolutely neutral—as one eminent writer expressed it, "neutral in letter and in spirit." This was the Government attitude, and President Wilson's most inveterate enemy would hardly accuse him of not having lived up to his declaration. It has been said that the best proof of impartiality is that both

sides are dissatisfied, and to a certain extent this may be said to be true. The "fierce neutrality" of ex-President Roosevelt would have favoured a declaration of war upon Germany; whilst the friends of Germany would have liked the United States Government to have stopped the exports of munitions of war, and to have bought up the many interned German vessels, in order that the proceeds of the sale might have gone to Germany. The German-Americans, ignoring the fact that the German Government had always maintained and, wherever possible, exercised the right to sell munitions of war to belligerents, incessantly clamoured for the prohibition of the sale of munitions of war to England and France. When Mr. Bryan, American Secretary of State, in his letter to Senator Stone,* in a remarkably clear and cogent statement ruled in favour of the Allies, the pro-German press loudly complained of it as far too friendly to Great Britain. With characteristic mendacity the subsidized German Press of America, and the Governmentally controlled Press organs of Germany,

* Letter from the Secretary of State, Mr. Bryan, to Mr. Stone, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, defending the neutrality of the United States in the European War, January 24, 1915.




MR. JAMES WATSON GERARD,
United States Ambassador at Berlin.

proceeded to accuse Mr. Bryan of "flunkeyism towards England," and President Wilson of allowing England to dictate his Notes (see the cartoon taken from a German paper, printed on p. 253). The *Cologne Gazette* of February 8, 1915, concluded three columns of abusive criticism with the following outburst:

It is the brutal British standard of might which finds expression in this American utterance. England is supreme at sea, therefore neither right nor reason, neither international agreements nor any other principles of universal law, can have sway. This is the language of the same man, Mr. Bryan, who formerly and with such self-complacence played the part of an apostle of universal peace. We are certain that the German-Americans and those who think with them will not fail to give his epistle the answer it deserves.

A few months later, as we shall see, when Mr. Bryan resigned office because he did not

Stone, the Senator from Missouri, where the German-Americans were strong, for information with which he might answer the complaints of his constituents. This it did so comprehensively, categorically, and authoritatively—the President is said to have taken a hand in its preparation—as to elicit the praise, irrespective of party, of nearly all the responsible newspapers of the country. We cannot follow Mr. Bryan through all the twenty specific points with which he dealt in this document. It is enough to say that he showed that the action of the Washington Government was based upon legal principle, and proved that in no instance had that Government exhibited the slightest bias in favour of either party. He swept away, once for all, a whole mass of



MR. WILLIAM J. BRYAN.
Ex-American Secretary of State.



MR. THEODORE ROOSEVELT.
Ex-President of the United States.

agree with President Wilson's attitude in relation to the sinking of the *Lusitania*, these same organs of the German Government, both at home and in America, were as freely beslaving Mr. Bryan with their nauseous flattery as they were in February bespattering him with their malignant abuse. In his letter to Mr. Stone, the Secretary of State, Mr. Bryan, refuted at length the charges persistently made by the pro-Germans that the United States Government had "shown partiality" to the Allies at the expense of Germany and Austria-Hungary. The letter, which at the time of its publication was regarded as the most remarkable document which the war had produced in America, was written in response to a request by Mr.

German and pro-German fictions, and placed the American people in the position in which Great Britain had particularly wished them to be—the position to know and to judge the facts for themselves. There are, we need hardly remark, certain points in international law as it affects neutral rights, and in the application of that law to particular circumstances, on which the English and the American view differed. But, subject to this reserve, it may be said, broadly speaking, that the doctrine laid down by Mr. Bryan was the doctrine of our own Courts. Perhaps the most important of Mr. Bryan's replies to the broader of the pro-German arguments was that in which he refuted the charge of general unfriendliness

towards Germany and her ally. He pointed out with unanswerable truth that any suspicion on this head which the friends of Germany and Austria might have felt arose from the undeniable fact that "on the high seas German and Austro-Hungarian naval power is, thus far, inferior to the British." It followed, he showed them, that Great Britain could prevent contraband from reaching Germany and Austria, but that Germany and Austria could not prevent contraband from reaching us. It was not the duty of the United States or of other neutrals to do for them what they were powerless to do for themselves. The friends of Germany had assumed that it was America's business to prevent all trade in contraband and "thus to equalize the difference due to the relative naval strength of the belligerents. No such obligation," Mr. Bryan instructed them, "existed." The fact that Germany and Austria-Hungary could not draw upon the American markets in the face of our naval superiority did not make it the duty of America to close her markets to us. They were open upon equal terms to everybody who was strong enough at sea to get access to them. As Uncle Sam remarks in a cartoon on page 252, "Taint my dog. The water's fer all of 'em (as can get it)." In commenting on the letter, *The Times* of January 26, 1915, said:

Mr. Bryan's defence of American neutrality, taken as a whole, can be unpalatable only to those who wish to see that neutrality surreptitiously infringed. There are, as we have said, points on which we do not see eye to eye with him. But as we and our Allies share the desire of the American people that their neutrality should be real and not a sham, and as we recognize and follow the general doctrines upon which it is founded, Mr. Bryan's letter commends itself to us as an admirable exposition of the policy which becomes the greatest of neutral peoples.

It must not for a moment be supposed that this trenchant declaration, showing that the sale of ammunition by the United States to the Allies was a well-established usage of nations and that Germany herself had furnished enormous quantities of arms and ammunition to belligerents in the Russo-Japanese War and in the Balkan Wars, satisfied the German-Americans. Failing to gain their point by fair means, the Kaiser's spies and agents in the United States tried foul methods, and began a campaign of intimidation and, on a small scale, one of "frightfulness." Allies' war material was burnt, and mysterious fires broke out in various parts of the United States, generally in factories manufacturing

war material. One large establishment engaged on munitions of war was burnt down. German agents crossed the frontier to Canada perpetrating dynamite outrages, and breaches of neutrality were committed in the most reckless manner. Appeals, signed by hundreds of the publishers and editors of the subsidized foreign press in America, were sent to factories where foreign-born citizens were engaged in making munitions, calling upon them to desist from the work. When this failed, more drastic methods were attempted. Strikes were organized and engineered by the use of German money and the employment of German agents, and foreign-born workmen were denounced as traitors to their countries, and threatened by the German and Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors with severe punishment if they continued to labour in what President Wilson had called the "legitimate industries of the country"—the manufacture of munitions of war. While engaged in this propaganda and intimidation Count Bernstorff, three months after (April, 1915) Mr. Bryan had so fully disposed of the question of the trade in arms, had the impertinence to address another Note, in which he formally charged the United States with departing from her neutrality in favour of Great Britain. To this, however, he received from Mr. Bryan the following courteous but sharp rebuke:

I note with sincere regret that, in discussing the sale and exportation of arms to the enemies of Germany, your Excellency seems under the impression that it was within the choice of the Government of the United States to inhibit this trade, and that its failure manifested an unfair attitude towards Germany. This Government holds that any changes in its own laws of neutrality during the progress of the war which would affect unequally the relations of the United States with the nations at war would be an unjustifiable departure from the principle of strict neutrality by which it has consistently sought to direct its actions. I respectfully submit that none of the circumstances urged alters the principle involved. The placing of an embargo on the trade in arms at the present time would constitute such a change and would be a direct violation of the neutrality of the United States. It will be clear that, holding this view, and considering itself in honour bound thereby, it is out of the question for this Government to consider such a course.

The question of justifying exports of munitions was also brought up by the Austro-Hungarian Government in a protest addressed to the American Ambassador in Vienna, on June 29, to the effect that a neutral Government could not be allowed to trade in contraband unhindered if the trade took the form and dimensions whereby the neutrality of the country would be endangered. This peril the



THE SINKING OF THE LUSITANIA.

The Liner after being torpedoed by a German Submarine, May 7, 1915.

United States incurred, Austria-Hungary contended, by exporting war material for the use of the Allies. In one of the most pointed documents yet written Austria-Hungary was informed, in the words of Secretary Lansing's Note, that :

Manifestly the idea of strict neutrality now advanced by the Imperial and Royal Government would involve a neutral nation in a mass of perplexities which would obscure the whole field of international obligation, produce economic confusion, and deprive all commerce and industry of legitimate fields of enterprise, already heavily burdened by the unavoidable restrictions of war.

In this connexion it is pertinent to direct the attention of the Imperial and Royal Government to the fact that Austria-Hungary and Germany, particularly the latter, have during the years preceding the present European War produced a great surplus of arms and ammunition, which they sold throughout the world, and especially to belligerents. Never during that period did either of them suggest or apply the principle now advocated by the Imperial and Royal Government.

During the Boer War between Great Britain and the South African Republics the patrol of the coast of neighbouring neutral colonies by British naval vessels prevented arms and ammunition reaching the Transvaal or the Orange Free State. The allied Republics were in a situation almost identical in that respect with that in which Austria-Hungary and Germany find themselves at the present time. Yet in spite of the commercial isolation of one belligerent, Germany sold to Great Britain and the other belligerent hundreds of thousands of kilos of explosives, gunpowder, cartridges, shot, and weapons; and it is known that Austria-Hungary also sold similar munitions to the same purchaser, though in small quantities.

As usual, the opinion of the pro-German editors was that the Note would prove a great satisfaction to Great Britain. To impartial observers, however, the position taken by

Secretary Lansing was unassailable. If Austria-Hungary and her present Ally had acted otherwise in these circumstances, the Imperial and Royal Government might with greater consistency and greater force have urged its contention. In giving the practical reason why America had advocated and practised trade in munitions of war, the Note wished it to be distinctly understood as speaking with no thought of expressing or implying any judgment with regard to the circumstances of the war, but as merely putting very frankly the argument which was conclusive in determining the policy of the United States. In conclusion Mr. Lansing said :

The principles of international law, the practice of nations, the national safety of the United States and other nations without great military and naval establishments, the prevention of increased armies and navies, the adoption of peaceful methods for the adjustment of international differences, and finally, neutrality itself, are opposed to the prohibition by a neutral nation of the exportation of arms, ammunition, or other munitions of war to belligerent Powers during the progress of the war.

Thus the American Government for a third time announced its determination not to yield to German agitation for stopping the export of munitions of war. This very able Note left no single loophole for further legitimate agitation for an embargo on munitions of war. It should have put an end to the insincere propaganda on this subject both in Austria and in America, which, however, had in reality

been inspired from Berlin. It did not, however; because the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, as we shall show later, having been defeated in argument, entered into a conspiracy to accomplish by chicanery and even violence what he had failed to secure by proper diplomatic methods. The double-faced treachery of the crusade engineered by German agents (hiding behind American dupes) for the excitement of public opinion, demanded an embargo against Great Britain and France, while Germany herself planned enormous exports of war material through several agencies. Sufficient has been said to demonstrate that President Wilson had shown both patience and tolerance of the Austro-German propaganda as persistently carried on for the first year of the war. It had been of a character that might well have moved a more excitable ruler not merely to anger but to action. When it was deliberately aimed at the segregation of German-Americans from the main body of American citizens, and their enrolment for political purposes in the interests of Germany rather than of the United States, the President adopted an attitude of detachment.

We have shown how he allowed Herr Dernburg all the rope that he could possibly have desired, and how he maintained an attitude of the strictest official unconsciousness in the presence of the variegated campaign of commercial, social, financial, and political terrorism which the Austro-German agents waged. Early in September, 1915, however, a case arose which rightly aroused the President's indignation, and resulted in a request (September 10) for the recall of Dr. Dumba, the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Washington. Dr. Dumba was convicted on evidence which he was unable to deny of conspiring with Captain von Papen, the German Military Attaché, to disorganize American factories engaged in supplying the Allies with munitions. His scheme was to stir up strikes and discontent among the Austro-Hungarian employees in these works, and to bring home to them a sense of their "guilt" and disloyalty in furnishing war material for the enemies of the Dual Monarchy. The appearance of an Ambassador, who had been completely demolished in argument, as a fomentor of strikes in the country to which he is accredited is, to say the least, unusual; but Dr. Dumba found in it nothing but what was perfectly proper. President Wilson, however, took a different view, and the Austrian

Foreign Office was requested to recall Dr. Dumba. The diplomatic career of Dr. Dumba had been somewhat unfortunate. Of Macedonian origin, he acquired his first experience in that tortuous school of diplomacy the Austro-Hungarian Legation at Belgrade. The sort of work that the Ballplatz used to demand of its representatives in the Serbian capital has been made sufficiently known to the world in a series of unsavoury trials and scandals. There was no reason for thinking that Dr. Dumba was anything but an efficient pupil in the arts that earned for Count Forgach a



CAPTAIN TURNER,
Passing through a street in Queenstown after the
"Lusitania" outrage.



AFTER THE SINKING OF THE "LUSITANIA"

"We find that this appalling crime was contrary to international law and the conventions of all civilized nations, and we the crime of wilful and wholesale murder before the tribunal of the civilized world. We desire to express our sincere condolence in this murderous attack on an unarmed liner."—The unanim